The Tattie Lads

by Ian Dear

  This was all very well, but as Martin pointed out to the R-A Falmouth, rescue tugs often had to try to find torpedoed ships beyond the range of the primitive ¼ kW Marconi sets they all carried. It was also not unusual for as many as six tugs to be at sea (it had been decided that, where possible, tugs should work in pairs) and these might not only be out of touch with land but with each other. It was also a common occurrence to search for ships that had already sunk, or had been taken in tow by other ships, so this lack of co-ordination was a huge waste of time and effort – and sometimes lives.

  Martin’s plans and proposals

  To counter this drain on precious resources, Martin submitted that one vessel should be detailed for the following duties: to maintain W/T communication between shore stations and all rescue tugs operating in the area; to relay information to other rescue tugs received from shore or elsewhere; and to ascertain the positions and circumstances of the damaged vessels being sought, together with such instructions as may be issued from the shore. This vessel would transmit the position of each rescue tug to the shore, render additional towing assistance where needed, and carry additional stores such as spare W/T equipment. It would operate from Falmouth or the Scillies, have a ‘rescue tug officer’ in overall command, and a leading telegraphist to cope with the extra W/T load. In fact, once his plans were approved, Martin recruited four additional telegraphists for the W/T sets he had had installed, thus enabling a twenty-four-hour watch to be maintained.

  Martin suggested that the converted trawler Zaree, though not powerful enough to be a good rescue tug, would be ideal for the task. She was an exceptional sea boat, with a large steaming radius, and there was room aboard for a W/T office, ancillary equipment and stores. The more powerful Marconi set with which she was equipped was expected to have a range of between two and three hundred miles.

  The tugs could not spread proper aerials and were always getting out of touch. So the trawler was specially fitted. She had preposterous topmasts – and she felt them too with a beam sea – but her aerial was over 70 feet from the deck, and she was the connecting link between the shore and the ships working with her.42

  Martin proposed ‘that I may be allowed to carry out the duties of Rescue Tug Officer mentioned, observing that I have had opportunity during the last nine months, of going to sea in rescue tugs and that I am well acquainted with the personnel and sea-going abilities of all the tugs, and with the localities in which they operate. I would suggest that these last two points are of great importance when considering the movements of tugs in rough weather.’41

  He also requested that his present appointment be changed from Inspector of Rescue Tugs to ‘a sea-going appointment as Rescue Tug Officer for Devonport Command’, and that he be appointed to command Zaree for control of all rescue work in the area. If he had to be at sea for prolonged periods, he wanted to appoint a junior officer to take over his shore duties.

  Attached to this correspondence was a detailed drawing of the proposed alterations to Zaree to accommodate an enlarged W/T office. Neatly captioned, it was obviously drawn by a skilled draughtsman, since Martin, who was to become a talented water colourist between the wars, was an accomplished artist.

  Martin’s proposals swiftly passed through the chain of command, and on 18 June the Admiralty approved them. Martin then issued details of the future W/T organisation of Rescue Tug Service in the Falmouth area when at sea, and made it clear that while Zaree would always be ready to proceed to sea if any rescue operations were launched, she would not normally be employed on convoy or any routine duties. Then on 27 August he made a further, and very important, proposal:

  I have the honour to submit that: hitherto no attempt to keep vessels afloat while being towed has been made. The reason being, that the Admiralty Salvage organisation does not deal with any vessel until the Rescue Tugs have beached her or brought her into port. Tugs employed in towing can carry neither the extra men, nor the gear required for first aid salvage at sea; and are fully occupied in the work of towing alone.

  I am of the opinion that vessels which have sunk after many hours towing, might in several cases have been saved, had it been possible to put men and gear on board. This is particularly the case when an engine room is being slowly flooded through a leaky bulkhead, so that it has been impossible to keep the engine room clear of water. The same applies to the stokehold.41

  He suggested Zaree should be supplied with an electric pump ‘together with a phase generator, and the necessary piping, switchboard starters and flexible lead; 2 sets of Tangye Tackles [differential pulleys] to lift about one ton; and diving plant’. The generating plant could be fitted to a rescue vessel and the pumps run on board the torpedoed ship through an electric cable slung from a hawser. This had not been done before, but the Admiralty Salvage Adviser with whom Martin had discussed it had thought it perfectly feasible:

  It is submitted that Zaree will, in addition to her W/T duties, be able to give most valuable assistance in this way, and that I shall be able to spare an Executive and an Engineer officer, and a working party for this work, which cannot be done by a Rescue Tug when towing.41

  He wanted the W/T store with which Zaree was to be fitted to be big enough to house a lathe, a drilling machine and a motor for the lathe: ‘If these were installed the efficiency of the ship would be considerably improved. If they are not available from Admiralty Supply, I would supply them myself,’ but would like to know if he would be compensated if these items were lost or damaged. ‘The tools are stored,’ he added, ‘as I took them ashore when leaving my last ship, in which I had rigged an armourer’s workshop.’ There was, it seemed, no end to his talents.

  After the necessary alterations to the Zaree were approved, it took a couple of months for them to be completed, but on 11 October she was reported as having arrived at Brest where Martin, a fluent French speaker, was to discuss with the French authorities the co-operation between the French tugs based there and the British ones based at Falmouth and the Scillies.43

  On 26 October he reported to the R-A Falmouth that the telegraphists were working well and there had been no difficulty in transmitting to land stations. However, communication with the tugs was not as good as expected, though the Stoic class Cynic, now based at the Scillies, had received his signals at a distance of one hundred and twenty miles. He thought this could be improved upon, as the previous month the Zaree had been able to contact the torpedoed Norwegian steamer Thomas Krag being towed by the Cynic some three hundred miles from the Scillies. As a result, the Zaree had been able to assist in towing the damaged steamer to Brest.

  Martin obviously relished his new command. ‘It would be difficult to imagine any work which could be more interesting or exciting,’ he wrote after the war, and went on to explain the intricacies of taking another ship in tow, especially in heavy weather:

  The best plan is to cross the disabled ship’s bow at right angles, or nearly so; and whether she should be approached from the weather or the lee side depends greatly upon the way in which the towing ship handles, the way she cants when going astern, and whether she lies naturally head or stern to the wind when drifting herself. The chances of getting a heavy line across are better when approaching from the windward side, and if the ship will answer her helm readily when going dead slow or with the engines stopped, this is probably the better plan. Taking a vessel in tow in bad weather is a very severe test of seamanship, and the safest method can only be decided upon at the moment, for in no two cases are the conditions really similar.44

  He also had some interesting insights into the handling of an ocean-going tug:

  [Anyone looking at one] might think that she would stand any amount of hard driving, and hard driving was the essence of the job, for no time [should] be lost in reaching the ship in distress. But no greater mistake could be made. A tug is literally built around her towing hook, which, for purposes of handling the vessel, must be practically amidships. As a consequence, boilers, bunkers and a
ll the superstructure must be crowded into the forward half of the ship.44

  A tug would behave well enough when moving at about four knots, but:

  Drive her all out into a head sea and you will see something you will never forget. She takes the first sea all right – the water just rushes through the hawse pipes. Up goes her head, hovers a moment, and then crash she goes into the next, a cataract pours over the fo’c’sle, solid chunks of water dash against the wheelhouse windows and the sea rushes aft knee deep and leaps out over the taffrail.44

  He then explained why life on board during long passages to find a damaged ship was so hard:

  Put it at 360 miles at 6 knots, and this is very good going against a head sea in the Western Ocean in winter – 60 hours – and then perhaps a long and heartbreaking tow afterwards. Thirteen, fifteen, and in one case, from memory, seventeen days out with eleven days’ towing. That ship was brought safe to Queenstown at last in tow of five or six tugs – one end of her was in the air, the other under water; she wouldn’t tow and she wouldn’t steer, but they saved her. It was no wonder that sick returns were heavy and the accidents numerous.44

  Recognition

  On 19 February 1919 the Admiralty issued a notice to the Fleet:

  The Board of Admiralty desire to record their high appreciation of the work performed during the war by the Rescue Tugs, the Foreign and Coastal Towing Tugs, and the Tug Service generally, and to express their thanks to the officers and men who rendered such efficient service in saving life, in salving valuable tonnage, and in many other directions…

  [After describing the work of the Rescue Tug Service, the notice continued:] From the inception of the Rescue Tug Service, in the early part of 1917 up to November 1918, some 140 damaged vessels were safely towed into harbour by these tugs. In addition to these vessels the tugs have also assisted over 500 ships,45 which had become disabled either by enemy action or marine risks…

  Throughout a long period of arduous labour the officers and men of the various tug services have shown promptitude, courage, and resources, and the thanks of the whole nation are due to them for the magnificent work which they had established.46

  On 11 June 1919, The London Gazette announced that Martin had been awarded the OBE (Military) ‘for valuable services as Officer in Charge of Rescue Tugs, Plymouth’, and he was allowed to retain his rank of Lt-Commander RNVR.

  Notes

  1. Conan Doyle A. ‘Danger! Being the Log of Captain John Sirius’, Strand Magazine (July 1914): 1–22.

  2. May ER. The World War and American Isolation, 1914–17. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1959. p.115.

  3. Tug Control: Work of the Tug Distribution Committee, 25 May 1917, in ADM 116/1739.

  4. Report of the Tug Distribution Committee, 15/11/17, in ADM 116/1739.

  5. Indicated horse-power is a reciprocating engine’s theoretical power assuming it to be frictionless. A rough rule to estimate a tug’s pulling power is one ton of ‘pull’ for every 100 ihp, but in the higher horsepower tugs this ‘pull’ is less, e.g. a 4000 hp tug develops a ‘pull’ of about 32 tons. A seven-ton ‘pull’ will tow a ship of 5000 tons displacement about four knots in good weather. See AFO P.600/43 in ADM 1/13096.

  6. Brown B, Hancox D. ‘Tugs and Salvage Craft of the Royal Navy’, part manuscript in the DSRTA archive. Courtesy Buster J Browne.

  7. All First World War rescue tugs are listed in www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyBritishShips-Dittmar5Support.htm

  8. Commander RGH Henderson RN, who organised the successful French coal trade convoys, proved these figures were based on inaccurate statistics.

  9. Grove E, editor. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939–45. London: Navy Records Society; 1997. Chapter 1.

  10. Lloyd George D. War Memoirs. Vol. II. London: Odhams; 1938. pp.681–82.

  11. Hurd A. The Merchant Navy. Vol. III. London: John Murray; 1929. p.371.

  12. Still WN. Jr. Crisis at Sea: The US Navy in European Waters in World War I. Gainesville: University of Florida Press; 2006. p.350.

  13. Halpern PG. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 1995. pp.344–45.

  14. Grove E. The Defeat, op. cit. p.4.

  15. Hurd A. The Merchant Navy, op. cit. p.40.

  16. Halpern PG. A Naval History, op. cit. p.342.

  17. French D. The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–18. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1995. p.70.

  18. Lloyd George D. War Memoirs, op. cit. pp.676–77.

  19. Sims WS. The Victory at Sea. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 1984. pp.9–10.

  20. Still WN. Jr. Crisis at Sea, op. cit. pp.165–66.

  21. Ibid., p.166.

  22. From Appendix II TDC meeting, 15/11/17 in ADM 116/1239.

  23. Fayle C. Official History of the Great War: Seaborne Trade. Vol. III. London: John Murray; 1924. p.465.

  24. Hurd A. The Merchant Navy, op. cit. pp.64–65.

  25. Bull TH, article from unknown journal in DSRTA archive.

  26. Tug Control: Work of the Tug Distribution Committee, 28 May 1917, in ADM 116/1739.

  27. Osborne J. The Scillonian War Diary, 1914–18, Vol. II, Appendix C, unpublished manuscript. Memories of Mrs Katie Thompson. Courtesy Isles of Scilly Museum, St Mary’s.

  28. Osborne J. The Scillonian War Diary, op. cit., Vol. II, Appendix O, pp.xiv–xv.

  29. Ibid., p.xxv.

  30. Court of Enquiry into Condesa’s loss in ADM 137/3287.

  31. Officially known as the Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR). It was formed in 1910 and recruited from fishermen. After the First World War it was absorbed into the RNR.

  32. Hurd A. The Merchant Navy, op. cit. Vol. III. pp.40–41.

  33. Ibid., Vol. II. p.227.

  34. Lane T. The Merchant Seaman’s War. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1990. pp.30–31.

  35. Court of Enquiry in ADM 156/169.

  36. Dear I. The Royal Ocean Racing Club: The First Seventy-Five Years. London: Adlard Coles Nautical; 2000. pp.18–20.

  37. Formed from privately owned small steam and motor yachts whose owners offered their services in an emergency to the Royal Navy. In July 1915 it was amalgamated with what became the Auxiliary Patrol.

  38. Martin EG. ‘Cruising’, Yachting World & Marine Motor Journal (20 November 1926): 1208.

  39. The Scilly base weekly report dated 14 September 1917 in ADM 137/2209.

  40. Martin EG. ‘Cruising’, Yachting World & Marine Motor Journal (20 December 1924): 1141–2.

  41. ADM 131/96.

  42. Martin EG. ‘Cruising’, Yachting World & Marine Motor Journal (20 December 1924): 1142.

  43. Falmouth weekly diary of 14/10/18 in ADM 137/949.

  44. Martin EG, ‘Cruising’, Yachting World & Marine Motor Journal (20 December 1924): 1141.

  45. A more recent source puts the figure at over 800. See Booth T. Admiralty Salvage in Peace and War, 1906–2006. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime; 2007. p.78.

  46. This tribute was published in many British newspapers in February 1919.

  2

  Campbeltown

  The Admiralty’s Rescue Tug Service was just getting into its stride in 1918 when the Armistice brought an end to hostilities. The Service and the TDC were disbanded the following year, and during the 1920s the dire economic situation forced the Admiralty to dispose of the Stoic and Frisky class rescue tugs, one of the Resolve class and twenty-seven of the Saint class, the balance being retained in various capacities.

  Frisky and Saucy were two of the Frisky class sold abroad. In 1930, Frisky was acquired in Hamburg by a Canadian salvage firm, Foundation Maritime Ltd. She was renamed Foundation Franklin and did useful work during the Second World War.1 Saucy was purchased by the Admiralty from the Shanghai Tug & Lighter Company soon after the start of the war. In September 1940, while in the command of Lieutenant A Paton RNR, she towed to safety a Dutch ship that had been set on fire by German aircraft in the Firth of Forth. But she
was then sunk by a German mine with the loss of her entire crew of twenty-eight, eighteen of whom came from the Devon fishing port of Brixham. When the new Assurance class was built (see Chapter 5), two of them were named Frisky and Saucy after their First World War predecessors.

  The loss of St Genny, which foundered off Ushant in January 1930, had shown the Saint class was not really suitable for the open ocean, although that didn’t mean they didn’t go there. But when the war started in September 1939, they were mostly employed in coastal waters, in the Mediterranean or in the more sheltered parts of the North Sea.

  The prompt revival of the Rescue Tug Service and the TDC2 – the latter before war had even been declared – and the appointment of a CCRT, was proof that EG Martin’s ideas, given the serious limitations of the vessels at his disposal, had worked and had not been forgotten. Despite being fifty-nine years old, he was one of the first to be recalled for duty, and on 11 October 1939 he was granted the rank of Lieutenant RNVR and appointed ‘for inspection duties outside Admiralty (Rescue Tug Section)’.3 Later he was appointed Inspector of Tug Equipment, though there is no record of the date. Probably it was on 25 November 1939 when he was promoted to his First World War rank of temporary Lt-Commander, as later correspondence confirmed the appointment required someone of this seniority.

  In October 1940, a base for rescue tugs was opened at Campbeltown, a small Scottish port on the Mull of Kintyre that was close to the Atlantic convoy routes. Martin was put in charge of it as Maintenance Officer Rescue Tugs4 and was under the NOIC, Campbeltown, who commanded HMS Nimrod, the ASDIC [an early form of sonar] and mine detection base at the port.