Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty

by Bradley K. Martin

  Q. What do you think of the idea for Radio Free Asia broadcasts in Korean to North Korea?

  A. “You should do Radio Free Asia at the same time. To destroy the Kim Il-sung regime, the radio broadcasts are very important. You have to let North Koreans understand U.S. society and see the decency in the U.S.”

  Q. Are there enough receiver sets in North Korea?

  A. “Of course, ordinary citizens won’t have the equipment, but the people specializing in relations with the U.S. and South Korea are very curious and lack the real information. Satisfying their curiosity will help to spread that influence to others.

  “There are most definitely people inside North Korea who are against the regime. They don’t feel they have any backing. Finding that the U.S. backs them would help. In view of my position if I had been in a Western European country and gotten in contact with the CIA there, for me to have returned to North Korea could have been better for reunification.”

  Q. You mean if you had returned to North Korea as a spy?

  A. “Not exactly as a spy. But I could have acted as a guide for the press coming to North Korea, given them good access, helping to open up North Korea society.”

  Q. Are others trying to do that sort of thing?

  A. “I believe there are quite a few, but it’s hard to distinguish just who.”

  Q. What’s the highest level of people assuming such roles?

  A. “I believe they’re spread around—two or three may even be among those closest to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. But Western forces can’t accomplish internal collapse of the regime because they have no way of contacting those anti-regime people inside. The most important thing is getting in contact with those people.”

  Q. Can you identify those open to such direction?

  A. “Only by common sense.”

  Q. Did you hear complaints?

  A. “A lot. But no one would say socialism is bad. Some would say one-man rule is corrupting society.

  “Among the first generation of the revolutionaries—around the age of Kim Il-sung—no one has any doubts. The second generation is mostly Kim-worshippers, excepting only a few who have had contact with the outside world and are highly educated. I guess I’m between second and third generation. But don’t get me wrong. The third generation could be as fanatical as the first generation if there’s been no outside contact. But in each generation there are some highly educated people who can analyze reality. Those people realize the discrepancies. Those people need some guidelines from foreign nations.”

  Q. Who can provide those guidelines?

  A. “Foreign specialists in North Korea should have the most contact with people coming from North Korea, or go into North Korea and have some influence there.”

  Q. Should the U.S. broadcast, say lessons in how to pull off a coup d’état?

  A. “Do it through unofficial channels. There must be unofficial channels as well—so it’s special contact, personal contact. Even that is going to be very difficult. Take the case of the two North Korean soldiers the South Koreans recently saved at sea. They wanted to go back. That’s how rigid and blockheaded they are. Those two military men were part of the State Security marine division. Before they were sent back to North Korea, I told the KCIA to ask them if Im Eung-seong was still three-star. They said yes, he’s still a hotshot at State Security. We were colleagues for fifteen years. Im is very conservative.”

  Q. I’m still not quite clear on what you think about holding out to the Kims the possibilty of exile in the United States, since you said they wouldn’t actually be interested and “would rather bomb than leave.

  A. “In the current situation of course they’d bomb us first. But after normalization, with diplomatic ties, then when the time came they would consider exile to the United States.”

  Q. Can a policy of guaranteeing North Korea’s external security be combined with starting a radio service that would attack the ideology of its leaders?

  A. “It would be possible only if you put some buffer between the U.S. government and this new station. You should give the feeling the U.S. government does not dominate it. I do like the idea of the U.S. taking a neutral stance, guaranteeing the security of both North and South Korea against attack by the other Korea.”

  Q. What do you think of a policy like this: The United States says, “We’ll guarantee the external security of both Koreas but we don’t agree with the system. We’ll hope for the ultimate collapse and “will propagandize, just as North Korea propagandizes.” Would they buy it?

  A. “They would like that proposal. Ensuring that the U.S. would pose no threat to the regime is very important. They’d like it. But of course, they’d have doubts. They’d go along with it—catch the bait. It would go deeper down their throats. When it got down far enough, they wouldn’t be able to spit it out.”

  Q. Suppose the Americans said, “OK, you say your system is great. We don’t agree, but we’ll give you a chance to prove it. Chop your military spending, as Seoul will, and concentrate on your economy. See what you can achieve under socialism, without the excessive military burden. We know you’ll still proselytize the Southerners. We’ll propagandize in favor of capitalism and democracy. But you’ll have time to see what you can do.”

  A. “They wouldn’t go directly to spending all that military money on the civilian economy. But the U.S. could guide them to shift their spending. If a relationship develops between the U.S. and North Korea, U.S. influence should spread. The economic infrastructure should be influenced by the U.S. economy, so that it couldn’t stand alone. They don’t have much trade with the old East Bloc any more.”

  Q. But how can the United States trust them if they don’t drastically cut military spending at the beginning? History makes Americans doubt them.

  A. “Basically you should not think that way First, normalization of diplomatic ties should come. This shows the United States acknowledges both North Korea and South Korea. If the United States hesitates, another century-will go by. This is the post–Cold War era!”

  Q. So Washington just gives them diplomatic recognition?

  A. “From the North Korean standpoint, this is the way the United States should be in both North Korea and South Korea. The way things are now if it got cold, the U.S. would give the South Koreans clothing and tell the North Koreans to take off their clothes.”

  Q. How can the nuclear weapons issue be resolved? It’s a matter of face for the United States, and it’s a world-wide concern regarding the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty. How do we get past that to diplomatic recognition?

  A. “As far as this nuclear issue is concerned, if the United States insists on saving face it will be impossible to resolve. The only way to resolve it with U.S. face saved is to have a war. No one wants that. The United States should stop now and acknowledge the situation as it is, then afterward move to control the situation.”

  Q. Recognize a fait accompli? But things have gone so far with IAEA demands.

  A. “The North Koreans think the IAEA is not an international organization but a sub-department of the United States. North Koreans—all the people—have been going hungry so they could develop nuclear weapons. All those thirty years of work would go up in smoke if they submitted to the IAEA or followed its principles. To North Korea, just having these weapons in case of a war with South Korea is enough. Of course, Pyongyang knows that if North Korea bombs South Korea the United States is not going to just stand by and let it happen.”

  Q. But how can the United States be neutral if North Korea has the bomb but South Korea does not? Don’t the Americans have to let South Korea build one, or at least continue to be ready to bomb North Korea?

  A. “It’s not important whether nuclear weapons are based in South Korea. They have Team Spirit [joint annual U.S.–South Korean military exercises]. Pyongyang sees that as training for nuclear war against North Korea. In a few hours all the U.S. weapons could be shipped to South Korea and missiles could be shot from t
he U.S. to North Korea. That’s why the United States has to be neutral. If the U.S. shot a missile from Okinawa, how long would it take to get to North Korea? How long from North Korea to South Korea?”

  Q. To recognize a country that has cheated on the NPT and to guarantee its defense would pose a very difficult political problem in U.S. terms.

  A. “Acknowledge all the nuclear weapons already made. Before signing diplomatic relations, go and inspect.”

  Q. So North Korea would give up its nuclear card in the process of getting recognition?

  A. “After diplomatic ties are established, they’ll want to safeguard their credibility, especially if the IAEA comes up with a more internationally equal system. My recommendation of diplomatic ties is not based on the nuclear war issue. Rather, the reason is to increase contact with North Korea, so that foreign culture can infiltrate. People then will eventually figure out what they want, and that will bring about the downfall of the regime. Trying to find out if they made nuclear weapons or not—that’s not the important issue right now. They’ve been made already. Other than that, the only solution is a war. If you keep forcing them into a corner, it’s 90 percent sure there will be a war.”

  Q. Making IAEA more equitable is a contradiction in terms. The organization is inherently inequitable, based on raw power. But what is to replace it?

  A. “What difference does it make? India and Pakistan are already making nuclear weapons regardless of the NPT.”

  Q. They’re not members.

  A. “Still, they’re part of the world.”

  Q. So North Korea withdraws from the NPT; China refuses to approve sanctions; the United States says, “OK, Kim, you win this one. Now let’s talk.” Is that the scenario?

  A. “No. You should not allow North Korea to leave the NPT.”

  Q. How could it be kept in?

  A. “If there’s a third round of U.S.–North Korean talks, maybe the United States should give in on some of North Korea’s demands so North Korea has no choice but to stay in the NPT.”

  Q. Like what demands?

  A. “For example, acknowledging the regime, ending Team Spirit. Now North Korea has proposed a certain number of sites for inspection. The U.S. wants two more included. Maybe you shouldn’t force the issue on those extra sites, but have periodic regular inspections.”

  Q. Americans should just close their eyes and pretend they’re enforcing NPT?

  A. “Yes. The North Koreans have a strong standpoint now. They have weapons to retaliate against attack, and they’re ready to fight.”

  ***

  Q. What economic training did you have for your role as a businessman?

  A. “I graduated from political officers’ school and took engineering. I never had any real economic experience but learned on the job. Most of my subordinates, though, graduated from the People’s College of Economics in the international relations unit, and “were well-trained.”

  Q. I had the impression that the society changed in the 1980s to become more corrupt and cynical.

  A. “On your next trip I can show you women who ask for money. [He laughed.] Even in Pyongyang that kind of girl emerged. With North Korean currency they can’t buy foreign goods. Girls who would do anything for foreign currency emerged, behind officials’ backs, eager to buy clothing and other foreign goods.

  “Before, when people had foreign currency they would ask people going abroad to buy things for them. Kim Jong-il heard of this and allowed people to buy foreign goods inside North Korea. That started around October of 1977, but people were wary at first. They feared it was a trick to get their foreign exchange. It was more effective starting in the 1980s. Starting in the 1980s you could buy food with foreign currency in shops. People had always been able to go to shops, just in Pyongyang, where they could buy food according to the numbers of their family members, but buying with foreign currency started in the ’80s.”

  Q. In your day, how much meat was available to a member of the elite such as you?

  A. “I was satisfied with the amount provided. I don’t have hunger for meat. I can’t be compared to other officials, though. I was dealing in foreign currency, so I could always go and buy meat. I can’t say the other officials were the same as I. But most officials in North Korea are very satisfied with their lives. The basic necessity is just three meals a day. They were guaranteed that. If they just worked hard for the government and stayed in their places, they could be sure of those three meals.

  “As for the quality of housing, South Korean apartments are much larger. But in North Korea the question is how many rooms you have. I had $100,000 to $150,000 worth of furniture in my home. I had command of foreign currency. When I traded with other countries, I got gifts. So I had access to expensive foreign things. The dollar currency is so powerful in North Korea. With $100 you can buy ten of the best-quality suits. The KCIA was very surprised when I defected. I had over $100,000 worth of currency with me when I defected. None of the other defectors had access to the lifestyle I experienced.”

  Q. Why did you defect, really? You had a comfortable life within the system.

  A. “Even though I had a very comfortable life, I felt uncertainty and apprehension. During the Cold War, my cousin came to South Korea. Then, under orders of the South Korean government or the U.S., he returned to North Korea. He was prosecuted and executed. When I was young I didn’t have problems on that account, but it became a problem as I became a prominent member of society. In North Korea circumstances like that are considered very important for the other members of a family. Having a defector or traitor in the family can be a big minus. This is the main reason why I defected to the South. I feared that because of that background if there arose a situation where I could not fulfill one of Kim Jong-il’s orders he might bring it up. I had trouble with Kim Jong-il’s orders. He wanted to do something like the Olympics in North Korea—the World Festival of Youth and Students. The company I was with was supposed to take care of the money problem for the festival. I had to be the money resource. I was president of the company, Daeyang Trading Co. I was supposed to come up with about $10 million—first $ 3 million, then another $ 3 million, and finally $ 4 million. I was going to import cobalt from Africa and re-export it for $15 million. But the buyer insisted on paying after delivery. The problem was that Kim Jong-il wanted the money quickly. A government official called me in Moscow and we had a big argument. There wasn’t time to get the money. That’s when I defected.

  “At first I regretted defecting, very much. Everything was so alien to me. So I considered defecting again to a third country. I’m still here because if I go back to North Korea it will only mean death. Life has gotten better, but still there’s a lot of psychological stress in being a defector. South Koreans say they want reunification but they are distant toward me. I wonder how it would really work out.

  “South Korean officials have hardly made any use of my information. I met U.S. military intelligence people three times, but they just asked general questions. [On the other hand] I was writing a book and I discovered that my typist was taking pages of the manuscript back to the KCIA. I got rid of her and have refused to publish the book. I can’t publish it because some of my high government-official friends might be hurt, people who are outwardly loyal but who have some doubts. Exposing them to reprisal could damage prospects for reunification. Kim Jong-il is very upset. I imagine my family was sent to a harsh place. If Kim Jong-il had cause for even greater anger, I’m afraid he would get to my family in a worse way and even get to me. I thought Bill Clinton could bring reunification, since I believe the U.S. has power to influence the situation. But I have some fear that reunification would allow family members of defectors, and others in North Korea who have suffered on account of defectors, to come and kill the defectors.”

  I met Kim Jong-min several times in informal circumstances. As I got to know him I realized he was truly unhappy with the way his life had turned out. He spoke more than once of how much he missed h
is family. One daughter—like his mother—-was very beautiful; if she came to the South she could enter the pageant and become Miss Korea, he boasted. Once, he failed to show up for a morning appointment with me in a coffee shop. Later he explained that he had stayed up drinking with a friend and slept too late. I learned that he had married in the South, but then had divorced and was left with alimony problems. I worried that he was not making and never would make the adjustment to living in Seoul. And, as he had done, I extrapolated from his situation, worrying how North and South Koreans would fare living together in any eventual reunification.

  In July 2001, Kim left Seoul on a trip to China and promptly disappeared. By that time, it was not uncommon for defectors to travel to the China–North Korea border and mount rescue operations to try to bring out family members. Sometimes they employed Chinese who could travel freely in North Korea, but some of the defectors actually went in themselves— sometimes succeeding, sometimes not. At least one defector who went in himself-was captured and publicly executed. The Seoul newspaper JoongAng Ilbo in reporting Kim Jong-min’s disappearance the following February quoted colleagues as recalling his often expressed wish to bring his daughters to South Korea.1

  TWENTY-SIX

  Yen for the Motherland

  Hong Song-il, also known by his Japanese name, Seichi Tokuyama, might have seemed an anomaly. Forty years old “when I interviewed him,1 the third-generation Korean resident of Japan owned a chain of eight pachinko — Japanese pinball—parlors in and near Tokyo, drove a Mercedes-Benz and was both objectively and in his own mind a rich capitalist. Nevertheless, he contributed substantial funds both directly and indirectly to communist North Korea. In our talk he explained “why he and many other capitalistic Koreans looked north to Pyongyang rather than south to Seoul for their Korean homeland.