Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

by Plato

  e

  337

  How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh; that’s your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

  You are a clever man, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, “for this sort of nonsense will not do for me”—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort: “Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?”—How would you answer him?

  b

  c

  Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

  Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

  I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

  I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

  But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

  d

  Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.

  What, and no payment! A pleasant notion!

  I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

  But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

  Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else.

  e

  Why, my good friend, I said, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

  338

  Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says, Thank you.

  b

  That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

  Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.8 And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won’t.

  c

  Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancra tiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

  That’s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

  d

  Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

  Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ—there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?9

  Yes, I know.

  And the government is the ruling power in each State?

  Certainly.

  And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

  e

  339

  Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word “interest,” which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words “of the stronger” are added.

  A small addition, you must allow, he said.

  b

  Great or small, never mind about that: we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say “of the stronger”; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

  Proceed.

  I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

  I do.

  But are the rulers of States absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

  c

  To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

  Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

  True.

  When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

  Yes.

  And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects—and that is what you call justice?

  Doubtless.

  Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse?

  d

  What is that you are saying? he asked.

  I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

  Yes.

  Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

  e

  Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

  340

  Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

  But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometime command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

  Yes, Polemarchus—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

  Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

  b

  But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thoug
ht to be his interest—this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

  Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

  Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

  c

  Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

  Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible, but might be sometimes mistaken.

  You argue like an informer,n Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

  d

  e

  341

  Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

  Certainly, he replied.

  And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

  Nay, he replied, “suppose” is not the word—I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

  b

  I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

  In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

  And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

  c

  Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, though you proved to be a thing of naught with regard to that, too.

  Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

  A healer of the sick, he replied.

  And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

  A captain of sailors.

  The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

  d

  Very true, he said.

  Now, I said, every art has an interest?10

  Certainly.

  For which the art has to consider and provide?

  Yes, that is the aim of art.

  And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?

  What do you mean?

  e

  I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

  Quite right, he replied.

  But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

  342

  b

  Yes, clearly.

  Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

  C

  True, he said.

  Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

  True, he said.

  But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

  To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

  Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

  d

  He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

  Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?

  Yes.

  And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors, and not a mere sailor?

  That has been admitted.

  e

  And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler’s interest?

  He gave a reluctant “Yes.”

  Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

  When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

  343

  Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?

  Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.

  What makes you say that? I replied.

  Because you fancy that the shepherd or cowherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night.11 Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another’s good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and ser
vant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less.12 Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men,13 and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man’s own profit and interest.