Black May

by Michael Gannon

  58. Blackett, Studies of War, p. 232. The comparison of escort perimeter to convoy size is further elaborated in NARA, RG 38 Chief of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, Secret Reports of Naval Attachés, 1940–1946, File F-6-e, Stack Area 10W4, Box 252, Folder “Anti-Submarine Operations, Great Britain, Various, 1943–1944, Intelligence Report, Naval Attaché, London, 12 May 1943”: The perimeter of a convoy of 40 ships (4 columns of 10) was 23 miles long when the escort vessels were stationed 4,000–5,000 yards from the outside ships. With 78 ships (6 columns of 13) the perimeter was 27 miles long, which was an increase of only 1/6th. Where the 40-ship convoy required six escort vessels, the 78-ship convoy needed only seven. When the speeds of the two convoys were about the same, the percentage of stragglers from the larger convoys was a little less. The argument for 60-plus convoys was the following: If according to operational data six escort vessels lost four merchant ships, nine escorts would lose only three ships per convoy; therefore, 180 ships sailing in three convoys of 60 ships with six escorts each (on the current eight-day cycle) could be expected to result in a loss of 12 ships; the same ships sailing in 2 convoys of 90 ships each with 9 escorts each would lose only 6, cutting losses in half.

  59. PRO, CAB 86/2, War Cabinet Anti-U-Boat Warfare, Minutes of the Meeting on 3rd March 1943, f. 125.

  60. Blackett, Studies of War, p. 233; F. W. Barley and D. Waters, Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, Vol. 1B, Plan 35; Howard, Strategy, p. 304 and n.

  61. PRO, CAB 86/3, A.U.(43)4o, Progress of Analysis of the Value of Escort Vessels and Aircraft in the Anti U-Boat Campaign, Report by Professor Blackett, ff. 241–243.

  62. PRO, ADM 199/434, “The Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches to All British and Canadian Escort Vessels Operated by Western Approaches Including Support Groups, 27th April 1943.” The Tactical Policy of Coastal Command was overtly offensive: “The Primary object of A/S patrols and A/S escort is the destruction of U-Boats”; Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottowa, Canada [hereafter DHIST/NDHQ], Admiralty Atlantic Convoy Instructions (September 1942), Air Operations, p. 201.

  CHAPTER 4

  1. The ONS series, which had reached ONS.171, was renumbered beginning with ONS.1 in March 1943, when this series was sailed to Halifax instead of to New York. The restarted ONS convoys sailed every eight days. The principal sources for ONS.5 are: NARA, “Allied Commands, Canadian, Captain (D) Newfoundland, 19 May 1943 (Vols, r-2)” [hereafter Captain (D) Newfoundland], Boxes 1718–1719; and PRO, ADM 237/113, “Report on Convoy ONS.5.” The NARA collection contains Form S.1203 reports of attacks on U-boats, track charts, plotting table diagrams, asdic recorder tracings, and original hand-copied between-ships messages, all of which are lacking in the PRO file. Ship-to-shore messages of ONS.5 are given in NARA, “Tenth Fleet Convoy and Routing Files,” Box 113, ON 304-ONS 9.

  2. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 108.

  3. Ibid., p. 108. The obituary writer in The Times (London) called him “ruthless” in this respect; 13 November 1992, p. 21. One of Gretton’s escort group Captains, Lieutenant (now Sir) Robert Atkinson, R.N.R., of H.M.S. Tay, described to the writer one of Gretton’s practices. Each morning at sea, at first light, Gretton sent a visual signal to all ships in Latin. At voyage’s end copies of those signals had to be produced by all ships. Any that got the messages wrong were detailed for extra training in port. Interview with Atkinson, Winchester, England, 2 June 1997.

  4. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 120. The corvette Pink was later ordered to search astern for survivors but she found none. Seven men out of the crew of 78 were eventually located by a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat on 12 April and picked up by the rescue ship Zamalek. Frostbite forced the amputation of the legs of three men and the feet of a fourth. See Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Crisis Convoy (New York: Kensington, 1974), pp. 131–134. The U-boats that attacked HX.231 formed Group Löwenhen. Most were on their first mission, and only five launched torpedoes. The same choice had been made during the battle of convoys HX.229 and SC.122 on 16–20 March by Lieutenant-Commander Gordon John Luther, captain of the destroyer Volunteer and SO of the HX.229 Escort Group B4. On the night of 16/17 March Luther left the convoy undefended in order to rescue survivors from the U.S. Liberty ship William Eustis. But later on the same night, realizing that he could not leave the convoy without cover again, Luther ordered the survivors of a second torpedoed American freighter, S.S. Harry Luckenbach, to be left in lifeboats, where they died. Middlebrook, Convoy, pp. 181–186, 305–307.

  5. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 127.

  6. PRO, ADM 223/15, Operational Intelligence Centre, Special Intelligence Summary [hereafter S.I. Summary], for the week ending 19 April 1943; f. 195. Gretton stated in his report on ONS.5 that on 26 April he made “a study of the submarine dispositions”; PRO ADM 237/113, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, p. 1. The X-B-Bericht Weekly Summary of B-Dienst for 10–16 May is found in Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Bestand RM 7/755, X-B-Bericht No. 20/43, Woche vom 10.-16.5. 19433 f-126V. (s.X-B-Bericht No. 19/43).

  7. Norman Franks, Search, Find and Kill: The RAF’s U-Boat Successes in World War Two (London: Grub Street, 1995), pp. 13–14. The sinking occurred at 61°25’N, I9°48W, or south of Iceland; Thomas A. Adams and David J. Lees, Register of Type VII U-boats (London: Warships Supplement, 1990), p. 40. The loss of U-7/0 was acknowledged by BdU on 28 April, when the headquarters war diary observed that, “U-7/0 has not reported since it sailed from Kiel on 15.4 [15 April] … so that its loss through aircraft must be presumed”; see NARA, KTB-BdU, 28 April 1943.

  8. PRO, ADM 237/113, Commodore’s Report.

  9. Ibid., Appendix E, Copy of Naval Messages, p. 2.

  10. Ibid., Report on Collision Between “Bornholm” and “Berkel.” Bornholm made Reykjavik safely. The time of the collision was 2355.

  11. PRO, ADM 237/113, Appendix E, Copy of Naval Messages, p. 3.

  12. On the Kriegsmarine’s grid chart Specht’s original “patrol channels” ran from AJ 6762 to AK 7791. In such orders to establish channels, or lines, BdU specified the order in which the boats were to array themselves; thus, for Specht: U-20j, 438, 706, 630, 662, 584, 168, 270, 260, 92, 628, 707, 358, 264, 614, 226, 125. The original Meise line ran from AK 2386 to 0347. The original Amsel line ran from AK 2966 to 6799. See NARA, KTB-BdU 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, April 1943. These lines constantly shifted position and recombined.

  13. Syrett, Defeat of the German U-Boats, p. 58.

  14. NARA, KTB-BdU, 25 April 1943.

  15. Ibid., 27 April 1943.

  16. PRO, ADM 223/88, Use of Special Intelligence in Battle of Atlantic, Convoy ONS.5, April-May 1943, f. 270.

  17. Ibid.

  18. Escorts assisting ONS.4 sank two U-boats, U-191 and U-203, the latter with participation by a Swordfish aircraft from the escort carrier H.M.S. Biter. Two other boats, U—174 and U—227, were sunk in the last days of April, both by aircraft.

  19. PRO, ADM CO 323/1801/13, OIC and Special Intelligence Monographs, p. 10.

  20. KTB-BdU, 27 April 1943. The following boats formed Group Star. U-7/0, 650, 533, 386, 528, 231, 532, 378, 381, 192, 258, 552, 954, 648, 209, 413.

  21. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5 8 a.m. Positions British Double Summer Time.

  22. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Bestand RM 7/755, X-B-Bericht No. 18/43, Woche vom 26.4–2.5.1943, f. 55r. NARA, KTB-BdU, 27 April 1943.

  23. NARA, Roll 3387, KTB-U-650,10 April 1943 to 28 June 1943; 28 April, p. 7.

  24. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS 5, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, p. 2. Convoy SC.127 would safely pass through the northern quarter of the Star line.

  25. Ibid., p. 2. The description of operation “Observant,” as well as of operations “Artichoke” and “Raspberry” that appear later in the text, come from DHIST/NDHQj. 83/761, vol. II, Atlantic Convoy Instructions [A.C.I.], C.B. 04234 (2), Operations Section, Articles 101–149, PP-51–62.

  26. Ibid. Cf. Ro
nald Seth, The Fiercest Battle: The Story of North Atlantic Convoy ONS.5, 22nd April-jth May 1943 (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 92. Seth personally consulted Peter Gretton about these details.

  27. NARA, KTB-BdU, 1 May 1943.

  28. PRO, ADM 237/113, Appendix E, Copy of Naval Messages, p. 4. The order from CinCWA to Oribi was sent at 2333 on the 28th. The order to Offa and the Support Group was sent at 0026 on the 29th; the other destroyers in this group, to which Oribi also officially belonged, were Penn, Panther, and Impulsive.

  29. Oral History Collection of the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, England [hereafter OHC/RNM], AC 1993/116, interview with Sir Robert Atkinson, conducted by Dr. Chris Howard Bailey, 11 March 1993.

  30. NARA, Convoy ONS.5, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Boxes 1718–1719, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, pp. 2–3.

  31. NARA, KTB-BdU, 11 May 1943; Franks, Search, Find and Kill, pp. 113–115.

  32. PRO, ADM 237/113, ONS.5—Comments of Senior Officer, Close Escort, p. 1.

  33. PRO, ADM 237/113, Report of Proceedings—H.M.S. Sunflower, May 1943.

  34. PRO, ADM 237/113, Narrative of Events During Passage of Convoy O.N.S.5 [by] Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Snowflake, p. 1. While the Chief Quartermaster and telegraphsman stated that the steering order was given by the Officer of the Watch, Chesterman concluded that the fault was phonetic: the Officer of the Watch was misunderstood when he was shouting orders through the voice pipes to the Starboard D/C throwers. Cf. Gretton, Escort Commander, p. 138.

  35. NARA, KTB-U-532, Roll 2979, 29–30 May 1943; NARA, KTB-BdU, 1–2 May 1943; ADM 237/113, Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Snowflake: Narrative of Events During Passage of Convoy O.N.S.5, 29 April 1943; Ibid., Report of Attack on U-Boat, Snowflake, Event 1, 29 April 1943.

  36. NARA, KTB-BdU, 28, 29 April 1943.

  37. NARA, RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Transportation Services, Armed Guard Files, 1940–1945, Mayfield Victoiy-Mechanicsville, Box 462. Mässenhausen’s claims exceeded his results: “At 0924 attacked convoy with three hits on each of four 6000 GRT ships…. Two coups de grâce (Fangschüsse) on a 7000 tonner.” NARA, Roll 2937, KTB-U-25Î, 29–4–43.

  38. PRO, ADM 237/113, ONS.5—Comments of Senior Officer, Close Escort, p. 1; Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, pp.

  39. Ibid., Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, pp. 4- 5. Cf. Seth, Fiercest Battle, pp. 99–103. The position of the McKeesport sinking was 6r°22'N, 35°09W. The U.S. Navy policy on derelicts is contained in the McKeesport folder; NARA, RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Transportation Services, Armed Guard Files, 1940–1945, Box 462. The pursuit of a U-boat by Tay is described in NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Report of Attack on U-Boat, Form 8.1203:1959, 29 April 1943. The BdU mentions it on 2 May; NARA, KTB-BdU, 2 May 1943.

  40. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Report of Proceedings—H.M.S. Oribi, 29th April, 1943 to 8th May, 1943, p. 1.

  41. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 140. Seth, Fiercest Battle, says that another reason was Duncans need to remain stable so that an emergency appendectomy might be performed on a crewman by the ship’s doctor; pp. 105–107.

  42. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, p. 5; Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 141. Gretton noted that Snowflake’s event was the first advance on a convoy at night that had not been preceded by a HF/DF warning. Use of guns against a surfaced U-boat had been practiced by Gretton and his crews off Londonderry following HX.231 in what he called Exercise Pointblank. An instance was known of a U-boat forced to dive at 12,000 yards by gunfire from a corvette; DHIST/NDHQ.81/700, J. D. Prentice, R.C.N., Captain (D) Halifax, “Hints on Escort Work,” 30 March 1943, p. 3.

  43. PRO, ADM 237/113, Brief Narrative of Voyage (ONS.5), 1 May 1943.

  44. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 141. Interview with Atkinson, Winchester, England, 2 June 1997.

  45. NARA, KTB-BdU, 1 May 1943. An example of U-boat reports to BdU about weather that made operations “useless” is that of U-954 (Kptlt. Odo Loewe) at 1800 GST on 1 May, 1943; NARA, SRGN 16655. Loewe also reports the presence of an aircraft “with light like a planet.” Information on operation of BdU’s long-wave communications system was provided to the writer by Korv. Kapt. Hans Meckel, A-4 (Communications Officer) in BdU; interview, 20 October 1987.

  46. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, p. 6; Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, pp. 141–143; NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Report of Proceedings—H.M.S. Oribi, 29th April to 8th May, 1943, p. 2.

  47. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 144.

  48. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Report of Proceedings—Senior Officer in H.M.S. Duncan, p. 6. At this date British Lady had only 100 tons of fuel available; ibid., Appendix E, Copy of Naval Messages, p.7.

  49. Ibid., Convoy ONS.5, Continuation of Report by Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “TAY”—SO Close escort in absence of H.M.S. “DUNCAN”; Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 144; PRO, ADM 237/113, Naval Messages, 3 May 1943. At 0805 on 3 May CinCWA instructed the convoy’s stragglers: “If you are not in contact with an escort proceed directly to Stragglers Route thence to St. Johns keeping as far west as ice permits”; ibid., 3 May 1943.

  50. Ibid., 4 May 1943. The order to First Support Group was sent at 0819. At 0800 ONS.5’s position was 56°5o’N, 42°22’W, convoy course was 196°. Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London [hereafter NHB/MOD], “Convoy Positions 1/5/43–30/6/43 Combined Plot”; the writer is indebted to NHB Head J. David Brown for direction to this source.

  51. Quoted in Barrie Pitt, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977), P-95-For a half-century Bluebell under Sherwood was credited with sinking U-208 west of Gibraltar in December 1941, but a new assessment gives that sinking to H.M.S. Harvester and Hesperus; Adams and Lees, Type VII U-Boats, p. 11.

  CHAPTER 5

  1. Quoted in “Continuous Service,” a pamphlet accompanying “An Exhibition Featuring Flowers of the Sea” (Portsmouth, Hampshire: Royal Naval Museum Publications, 1993), n.p. Extracts from an extended interview with Cyril Stephens together with extracts from interviews with other corvette veterans are given in Chris Howard Bailey, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Corvettes and Their Crews: An Oral History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, I994).

  2. David K. Brown, “Atlantic Escorts, 1939–45,” in Howarth and Law, eds., Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 452–475; Peter Elliott, Allied Escort Ships of World War II: A Complete Survey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 12–16, 171–199; Chris Ellis, Famous Ships of World War 2, in Colour (New York: Arco Publishing Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 16, 175–177. Artist-naturalist Peter Scott originated the Western Approaches camouflage scheme. Commander James Douglas “Chummy” Prentice, R.C.N. (R), Captain (D) Halifax in 1943 and the Canadian courterpart to Commodore (D) Western Approaches, called the corvette “the handiest anti-submarine ship that was ever built”; cited in Milner, U-Boat Hunters, p. 9. Beginning 1 June 1943 Captain Frederic John Walker, R.N., would prove the sloop a worthy competitor.

  3. OHC/RNM, AC 1993/174, interview with Harold G. Chesterman, conducted by Chris Howard Bailey, 26 April 1993; “Captain Harold Chester-man,” The Daily Telegraph, 13 February 1997.

  4. Ibid., AC 1993/43, interview with Howard Oliver Goldsmith, conducted by Chris Howard Bailey, 8 February 1993. For a description of the convoy crews, both RN and Merchant Navy, the reader is directed to the excellent chapter “The Convoy Men,” pp. 19–55, in Middlebrook, Convoy.

  5. NARA, KTB-BdU, 1 May 1943.

  6. The BdU to Specht-Star message is given in PRO, ADM 223/88, Use of Special Intelligence in Battle of Atlantic, f. 271. The number of boats in Specht-Star was actually 30. That U-628 sighted not SC.128 but EG3 is put forward in W. A. B. Douglas and Jürgen Rohwer, ‘“The Most Thankless Task’ Revisited: Convoys, Escorts, and Rad
io Intelligence in the Western Atlantic, 1941–43,” in James A. Boutilier, ed., The RCN in Retrospect, 1910–1968 (Vancouver and London: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), p. 229. The authors point out that B-Dienst decrypted a position report from SC.128.

  7. NARA, KTB-BdU, 3 May 1943. The SC.128 escorts’ feint eastward is described as “skillfully executed” in Admiral Karl Dönitz, Memoirs, p. 338.

  8. NARA, KTB-BdU, 3 May 1943.

  9. Ibid., 4 May 1943. In their order of station from WNW to ESE the original 27 boats of Fink were to be arrayed thus: U-438, 630, 662,584,168,514, 270, 260, 732, 628, 707,358, 264, 226,125,378,192, 648,533,531, 954, 413,381, 231, 332, 209, 650. The OIC U-boat estimate is given in PRO, ADM 223/15, S.I. Summary, week of 3.5.43 to 10.5.43. The writer is indebted to his friend and colleague Dr. Leonidas Roberts for computation of the length in nautical miles of the Fink line.

  10. Hasenschar’s convoy sighting report is timed at 2018 (GST)—B Signal 2018: Geleitzug qu AJ 6271—in NARA, Roll 4185, KTB-U-628?, 8 April to 19 May 1943; 4 May 1943. The “dead reckoning” quote is from NARA, KTB-BdU, 4 May 1943. At 1802 GST on 4 May BdU signaled the assembling Fink boats: southwest bound convoy expected tomorrow onwards; NARA, RG 457, SRGN16933. Convoy ONS.5 daily speeds are given in PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5 8 a.m. Positions British Double Summer Time.

  11. NARA, KTB-U-628, 4 May 1943; NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943. What Hasenschar sighted was “many mast tops” at 380 true from his position. Thereafter, as contact-keeper, he gave regular reports.

  12. NARA, Roll 2886–2887, KTB-U-264, 8.4.43 to 1.6.43; 2150 C.E.T., 4 May 1943: “Ihr steht günstig wie noch nie”, PRO, ADM 223/88, Use of Special Intelligence in Battle of Atlantic, Convoy ONS.5, April-May 1943, f. 272. The BdU war diary states: “In all, 41 boats were stalking the convoy”; KTB-BdU, 4 May 1943. A similar large force of 41 boats had earlier operated against two convoys, HX.229 and SC.122, on 16–20 March 1943.