Black May

by Michael Gannon

  45. Ibid.

  46. These were U-223, U-264, U-266, U-267, U-377, U-504, U-514, U-533, U-575, U-584, U 621, U-650, U-662, U-707, and U-438, the last of which had been wounded by Canso A “E” on 4 May. PRO, ADM 223/16, U-Boat Operations, f. 87.

  47. Ibid., f. 87; NARA, Roll 2886–2887, KTB-U-264, 5 May 1943; NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17162.

  48. PRO, ADM 223/16, U-Boat Operations, f. 87; NARA, Roll 3377, KTB-U-707, 5 May 1943.

  49. NARA, ADM 237/113, Continuation Report, TAY, 5/6 May 1943, No. 17.

  50. NARA, Roll 3377, KTB-U-707, 6 May 1943.

  CHAPTER 7

  1. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. VIDETTE, 5th May 1943, 2326 1/2 (VID FOUR), 2333 1/2 (VID FIVE). This series of attacks by Vidette was delivered on the night of 5 May, not on the night of 4 May as given elsewhere. See S.1203 forms and PRO, ADM 237/113, Summary of Attacks and Attempted Attacks on ONS.5, attack no. 27. U-531 is identified as the victim of Vidette’s 2326 1/2 attack in R. M. Coppock to the author, 13 November 1996; the attack position is given as 52°48'N, 45°i8’W. For U-707 see NARA, Roll 3377, KTB-U-707, 6 May 1943, p. 10, where times are obscured on the lefthand margin.

  2. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. VIDETTE, 6 May 1943, 0226 (VID SIX).

  3. Ibid., Form S.1203, Report of Atttack on U-Boat, H.M.S. VIDETTE, 6 May 1943, 0408 1/2; Report of Proceedings—ONS.5, H.M.S. VIDETTE, 6 May 1943, VID SEVEN; NHB/MOD, Proceedings of the U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by VIDETTE, 6 May 1943, 0406, f. 258, and notation by R.M. Coppock. R.M. Coppock to author, 13 November 1996. The words “froth-corrupted lungs” are borrowed from World War I poet Wilfred Owen’s “Dulce et Decorum Est. ”

  4. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. LOOSESTRIFE, 5/6 May 1943, 2336, 0040; Report of Proceedings whilst escorting ONS.5, H.M.S. LOOSESTRIFE, Night of May 5th and 6th, pp. 1–2; PRO, ADM 199/2145, Interviews with Survivors, S.S. Bristol City, Captain A. L. Webb, 9th June, 1943. The NHB/MOD reassessment of this attack is “U-192 sunk” in position 53°o6'N, 45°02 W; Coppock to author, 13 November 1996.

  5. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. ORIBI, 8th May 1943; 6 May 1943; R/T Log, H.M.S. TAY, Convoy ONS.5, 6 May 1943, 0252: ORIBI to TAY—“Have rammed submarine.” The Form S.1203 for this attack was not found in the archives.

  6. NHB/MOD, Proceedings of U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by ORIBI, 6 May 1943, 0252, f. 255, and notation by R. M. Coppock.

  7. PRO, DEFE-3, No. 552, 6 May 1943; ibid., ADM 223/16, U-Boat Operations, f. 88; NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17231. The F.T. from U-125 was sent after the ramming by Oribi at 0252, not after Snowflake’s attack on the same boat at 0400 (see below), as given elsewhere.

  8. Folkers made no further F.T.s. The futile hunt for U-125 can be followed in the W/T transmissions from the searchers: NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17231,17244,17249,17292,17293,17302,17329,17331,17332,17333.

  9. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. SNOWFLAKE, 6 May, 1943, 0330 to 0415; Narrative of Events During Passage of Convoy ONS.5, 8th May 1943, Incident SNOW 11, 6 May 1943; R/T log, H.M.S. SNOWFLAKE. NHB/ MOD, Proceedings of U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by SNOWFLAKE, 6 May 1943, 0330, f. 257, and notation by R. M. Coppock.

  10. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, R/T log, H.M.S. SNOWFLAKE: following signals passed and received during events under description, Event n, 6th May 1943.

  11. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, H.M.S. OFFA, Report of Proceedings From 29th April, 1943 to 8th May, 1943, Nos. 47–53; Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. OFFA, 6th May, 1943, 0316; Roll 2937, KTB-U-223, 15.4.43–24.5.43, 6 May, p. 13; RG 457, SRGN 17255, where Wachter signals 3 HOURS DEPTH CHARGES; R. M. Coppock to author, 13 November 1996; PRO, ADM 237/113, Admiral Horton, C-in-CWA, to The Secretary of the Admiralty, 14th June 1943. Thirteen minutes before Offa s attack, Loosestrife, at 0303, attacked a radar/asdic contact with a ten-pattern; the target is believed to have been U-621 (Oblt.z.S. Max Kruschka), which was not harmed. Three and a half hours later, Loosestrife dropped another ten-pattern on a radar/asdic contact, believed to have been U-614 (Kptlt. Wolfgang Sträter), with similarly negative results.

  12. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. SUNFLOWER, 6 May 1943, 0450 (with drawings); NHB/MOD, Proceedings of the U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by SUNFLOWER, 6 May 1943, 0443, f. 259 (the NHB/MOD reassessment agrees on slight damage); R/T log, H.M.S. TAY, Convoy ONS.5; PRO, ADM 199/2145, Interviews with Survivors, M.V. Dolius, Capt. G. R. Cheetham, 15th June 1943.

  13. PRO, DEFE-3, No. 609, 6 May 1943; NARA, SRGN 17270.

  14. NARA, Roll 2979, KTB-U-533, 15.4.43–24.5.43, 6 May, 0655–2400 GST; NARA, KTB-BdU, 7 May 1943.

  15. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. PELICAN, 6 May 1943, 0608 1/2, 0615; PRO, ADM 237/113, First Support Group, Report of Proceedings, 4th-12th May 1943, 6th May, Nos. 4–6; NHB/MOD, Proceedings of the U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by PELICAN, 6 May 1943, 0551, f. 260, and notation by R. M. Coppock; NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943. Also Coppock to author, 13 November 1996. The “cavalryman” image used here is not simply an American affectation: Winston Churchill stated that the Support Groups were “to act like cavalry divisions, apart from all escort duties”; Churchill, Second World War, Vol. 5, Closing the Ring, p. 8.

  16. PRO, ADM 237/113, Report of Proceedings from 29th April, 1943 to 8th May, 1943, H.M.S. OFFA, 6 May, Nos. 56–59. Offa and Oribi made port in St. John’s at 1215 on the 8th. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 75, n. 6.

  17. Ibid., Naval Message, 6 May 1943, TAY to PELICAN, 0800: MY CLOSE ESCORT IS REDUCED TO 1 DESTROYER WHO IF NOT FUELLED TODAY MUST LEAVE FOR ST. JOHN’S N.F. 1 CORVETTE IN ACTION 1 CORVETTE WITH NO DEPTH CHARGES 1 CORVETTE BADLY KNOCKED ABOUT AFTER COLLIDING WITH A U-BOAT AND MYSELF WITH NO ASDICS. REQUEST YOU FORM CLOSE SCREEN. Lieut.-Cmdr. F. H. Thornton, Commanding Officer, H.M.S. SENNEN, to Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PELICAN, 9 May 1943. Naval Message, Immediate to SENNEN and PINK from CinCWA: PROCEED TO SUPPORT PINK WITH STRAGGLERS OF ONS.5. ESTIMATED IN POSITION 53 10 N 46 20 w at 0800 STEERING FOR 50 n 46 w SPEED 8 KNOTS. At 0800 the main body of the convoy was in position 52°09'N, 44°24'W.

  18. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. SENNEN, 6 May 1943, 0753 1/2.

  19. R. M. Coppock to author, London, 13 November 1996.

  20. Ibid.

  21. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. SENNEN, 6 May 1943,1255,1342,1405, 1436,1522.

  22. NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. SPEY, 6 May 1943, 0747, 0802, 0815, 0916; NHB/MOD, Proceedings of the U-Boat Assessment Committee, April-June 1943, Précis of Attack by SPEY, 6 May 1943, 0940, f. 261, and notation by R. M. Coppock; Coppock to author, 13 November 1996; NARA, Roll 3386, KTB-U-634, 15.4.43–23.5.43, 6 May 1943 for description of damage and injury to C.O.; NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17310, for U-634's F.T.

  23. The cease-operations message to Fink BOATS READ: BOATS ON HASENSCHAR CONVOY DISCONTINUE OPERATION. GROUP AMSEL 1 AND 2 HEAD FOR QU BC 33 [50°33'n, 39°15’w]. OTHER BOATS GO OFF IN EASTERLY DIRECTION. See NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17278.

  24. PRO, DEFE-3, No. 512, 6 May 1943; ADM 223/16, U-Boat Operations, f. 88. In underscoring the importance of the first night, BdU repeated a finding of O.R.S. in Coastal Command, which reported in the preceding March: “The engagement between a U-boat pack and a convoy is what scientists would call an unstable equilibr
ium. If the surface escort gets a good start, an entire pack can be beaten off with our air assistance: if the U-boats get a good start, the convoy will suffer very heavy losses.” PRO, CAB 86/3, The Value of the Bay of Biscay Patrols, Annex II. Air Operations in Defence of Convoys, f. 370.

  25. NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943. NARA, War Diary, German Naval Staff (.Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung), Operations Division, Part A, Volume 44 (microfilm), 5 May 1997.

  26. NARA, KTB-BdU, 23 May 1943; R. M. Coppock to the author, London, 13 November 1996.

  27. PRO, DEFE-3, No. 512, 6 May 1943.

  28. NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943; Dönitz, Memoirs, p. 339. In his British Admiralty and U.S. Navy Department-sponsored U-Boat War, Dönitz’s Staff Officer and son-in-law Günter Hessler stated: “The heavy loss of U-boats compelled us to regard this operation as a reverse”; p. 106.

  29. PRO, DEFE-3, Nos. 413, 619, 626, 663; NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17189, 17291,17307. For U-boat success estimates see prologue and chap. 2. Cf. Showell, U-Boats Under the Swastika, pp. 16–18; Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive 1914–1945, p. 151; and Mulligan, Lone Wolf, p. 221 and n. 1.

  30. NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943.

  31. Hessler, U-Boat War, p. 106. The term Metox, from the first Parisbased French company that manufactured it, was used interchangeably with Funkmessbeobachtungsgerät, “radar search receiver,” abbreviated Fu.M.B.

  32. Dönitz, Memoirs, p. 339.

  33. Hessler, U-Boat War, p. 106. The BdU war diary noted: “The recent increase in cases of damage to upper deck containers [of Type IXB and IXC boats] proves that more powerful depth charges are being used”; NARA, KTB-BdU, 6 May 1943.

  34. Ibid.

  35. This point is developed in Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles, pp. 199–200; and again in Rohwer and W. A. B. Douglas, “Canada and the Wolf Packs, September 1943,” in W. A. B. Douglas, ed., The RCN in Transition, 1910–1985 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), pp. 181–182.

  36. PRO, ADM 237/113, Submarine Report No. 2, J. Kenneth Brook, Commodore, R.N.R., n.d. Brook erred in stating here that Gudvor, which arrived safely at St. John’s with Pink and Sennen, was torpedoed on 5 May, or on any date.

  37. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Form S.1203, Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. JED, 6 May 1943, 2367. The last two escorts to make attacks defending ONS.5, SENNEN and JED, would combine later, on 19 May, in sinking U-954 (Kptlt. Odo Loewe). PRO, ADM 237/113, Continuation Report H.M.S. TAY, 6 May 1943, No. 18; Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. VIDETTE, 6 May 1943, p. 2.

  38. PRO, ADM 237/113, Commander in Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic to Secretary, Naval Board, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 9th July, 1943. Here the relieving force is named as WLEF, although, according to Milner, U-Boat Hunters, p. xi, the force name was changed in April 1943 to Western Escort Force (WEF). The exact position of WEST-OMP varied slightly from convoy to convoy; see DHIST/NDHQ, Convoy Reports, ONF. 238-ONS.8, 89/34, Volume 23, Directorate of History and Heritage; the writer is indebted to Ms. Gabrielle Nishigushi for this citation. The WLEF force was joined by the destroyer H.M.S. Montgomery on the 8th, taking over as SO, and by the corvette H.M.C.S. Algoma from the 7th to the corvette H.M.C.S. Algoma from the 7th to the 9th.

  39. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Naval Message, CinCWA to PELICAN, 6 May, 2357; Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. PELICAN, 6–12 May 1943, Nos. 11–17.

  40. Ibid., Convoy ONS.5 Commodore J. Kenneth Brook, R.N.R., in M. V. “RENA” (NOR), Brief Narrative of Voyage, p. 2. On 15 May the Naval Control Service Officer (NCSO), Halifax, signaled Ottawa that S.S. Lorient (sunk by U-125 on 4 May) had not arrived there as scheduled; DHIST/NDHQ, Naval Message, NCSO Halifax to NSHQ Ottawa, 15 May, 1630 (microfilm). Interestingly, there is a German X-B-Bericht interception and summary of an Allied coded message to Lorient: “Port of destination for the steamer Lorient (4737 tons) was changed on the afternoon of 9 May to Boston”; Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau, RM 7/755, X-B-Bericht No. 22/43, Woche vom 24.5.-30.5.1943, folio 194r (s. X-B-Bericht 21/43).

  41. DHIST/NDHQ Naval Message FONF, St. John’s, to CinCCNA, Halifax, 9 May 1943, 2225 (microfilm).

  42. PRO, ADM 234/370, Convoy ONS.5, Battle Summaiy No. 51, Continuation Report, H.M.S. TAY, p. 36; Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, p. 145.

  43. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. SUNFLOWER, “Personnel,” p. 5.

  44. Ibid., Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. SNOWFLAKE, “Summary,” pp. 7–8.

  45. Ibid., Report of Proceedings, H.M.S. PENN, 8 May 1943.

  46. Ibid., CinCCNA to Secretary, Naval Board, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 9 July 1943, copy to CinCWA, p. 2.

  47. Ibid., Submarine Report No. 2, Commodore J. Kenneth Brook, p. 2.

  48. Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander, pp. 145–146.

  49. PRO, ADM 237/113, CinCCNA to Secretary, Naval Board, 9 July 1943, p. 1.

  50. PRO, ADM 234/370, Convoy and Anti-Submarine Warfare Reports, Battle Summary No. 51, Admiral Sir Max K. Horton, K.C.B., D.S.O., CinCWA, to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 20 July 1943, pp. 28–29.

  51. Ibid., p. 38; also NARA, Boxes 1718–1719, Captain (D) Newfoundland, ONS.5—Comments of Senior Officer, Close Escort, n.d. The compliment that immediately follows this quotation in the present narrative is drawn from John Terraine, U-Boat Wars, who also states, appropriately, that “this two-and-a half-ringed officer won a battle that an admiral or a general could be well pleased with”; p. 598 and n.162.

  52. PRO, ADM 237/113, CinCCNA to Naval Board, 9 July 1943, p. 2.

  53. Ibid., pp. 2–4.

  54. PRO, ADM 234/370, Convoy and Anti-Submarine Warfare Reports, Battle Summary No. 51, Commodore (D) Western Approaches to CinCWA, Londonderry, 20 June 1943; C-in-CWA to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 20 July 1943, pp. 28–30; ADM 237/113, Naval Message, CinCWA to Escorts ONS.5, 6 May 1943; in ibid, see also CinCWA to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 20 July 1943, proposing that an instructional film be made of this “classic” on the basis of track charts and other data, which proposal Their Lordships turned down on 29 September 1943. A congratulatory message was sent to the ONS.5 escorts by CinCCNA Rear Admiral Murray at Halifax, who called attention to results achieved with minimum of air cover due to impossible weather at [bases?]; ibid., Naval Message, 6 May 1943. Another compliment for the best effort so far came from NSHQ, Ottawa, on the following day.

  55. PRO, ADM 234/370, Convoy and Anti-Submarine Warfare Reports, Battle Summary No. 51, Captain J. A. McCoy, R.N. (SO), EG3, to CinCWA, 9 May 1943, p. 44; ADM 237/113, CinCWA to The Secretary of the Admiralty, 14 June 1943.

  56. A reproduction of the St. John’s Daily News article is given in Bailey, ed., Battle of the Atlantic, p. 64. See The Times, Thursday, 13 May 1943, p. 4.

  57. PRO, ADM 237/113, Naval Message, Churchill to Escort of ONS.5, 9 May 1943.

  58. PRO, ADM 223/88, Use of Special Intelligence in Battle of Atlantic, Convoy ONS.5, April-May 1943, f. 278, n.d.

  59. Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, p. 375. The Sunday Times review may be found in the edition of 8 February 1959, p. 13. In more recent years the Horton-Winn-Roskill view has been widely accepted (though perhaps not in Roskill’s extravagant expression) by naval historians on both sides of the conflict as well as on both sides of the Atlantic. See, for example, W. A. B. Douglas and Jürgen Rohwer, “Convoys, Escorts,” in Boutilier, ed., RCN in Retrospect, p. 229; J. David Brown, “The Battle of the Atlantic, 1941–1943: Peaks and Troughs,” in Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes, eds., To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic (Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 1994), p. 156; Philip Lundeberg, “Allied Co-operation,” in Howarth and Law, eds., Battle of the At/antic, p. 360; Syrett, Defeat of the German U-Boats, p. 96; and Milner, U-Boat Hunters, who concluded: “In a single night the mystique of the Wolf Packs was broken”; p. 38.

  60. PRO, ADM 237/113, Convoy ONS.5, Report of Proceedings, Third Support Group (EG3), 9 May 1943.

  CHAPTER 8

  1
. The writer has relied on a small collection of documents, what may be called the Raushenbush Papers [hereafter RP], in possession of his widow, Joan Raushenbush, in Sarasota, Florida, for the use of which he is greatly indebted. Raushenbush changed his first name from Hilmar Ernst and the spelling of his surname in the 1920s. Solberg (1894–1964) also served at the time as Officer in Charge of Readiness Division, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

  2. Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. Ill, Part I, p. 263; PRO, AIR 41/48, Peyton Ward, “R.A.F. in Maritime War,” Vol. IV, p. 83.

  3. RP, “Memorandum for Mr. [Oscar A.] de Lima,” 17 pp., 18 November 1948.

  4. Blackett, Studies of War, p. 238

  5. RP, Commander Oscar A. de Lima, “Subject: Stephen Raushenbush of the U.S. Navy,” 7 pp., 25 June 1961.

  6. Quoted in Price, Aircraft Versus Submarine, p. 116.

  7. RP, “Memorandum for Mr. de Lima,” p. 2.

  8. NARA, KTB-BdU, 5 March 1943. Naval operations analyst Dr. Brian McCue calculates that had Naxos-U gone into service in April only seven additional merchant ships would have been lost as a result; U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. 148.

  9. PRO, CAB 86/3, A.U.(43)86, War Cabinet, Employment of Aircraft Against U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. Prepared under instructions of Captain T. A. Solberg by Stephen Raushenbush, 22 March 1943. In an Intelligence Report dated 14 April, called in Washington an “Alusna,” Raushenbush advised the Navy Department that in the document cited above he had erred in predicting that each of 150 U-boats entering the transit channel would receive 2.4 attacks. The accurate number was 1.8. See NARA, RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, Secret Reports of Naval Attachés, 1940–1946, File F-6-e, Stack Area 10W4, Box 252, Folder “Anti-Submarine Operations, Great Britain, Various 1943–1944,” Intelligence Report (Alusna Report 579), Naval Attaché, London, 14 April 1943 [hereafter Alusna].