Tobruk 1941

by Chester Wilmot

  Under cover of this barrage, the dust it raised and the gathering darkness, infantry of the 2nd German Machine-gun Battalion and sappers of the 33rd Panzer Pioneers advanced to the perimeter, deloused the minefield, and blew gaps in the wire at half a dozen places on either flank of 209. Infantry in the forward posts reported that they were being heavily shelled and machine-gunned – so heavily, it now seems, that their fire was neutralized, while the enemy breached the perimeter defences, and then infiltrated between the widely separated posts and established machine-guns behind them.

  As a result of this infiltration, or the shelling, or both, all signal lines between the company on Hill 209 and the 2/24th’s H.Q. were cut by 8.30 p.m., and Spowers could get no news of the position there. At nine, however, a flare went up from near 209 and at once the enemy’s barrage lifted from the hill, evidently to allow his infantry to attack the posts there. At 9.15 some Germans were a mile inside the perimeter, machine-gunning the 2/24th’s reserve company. It was ordered to send out fighting patrols to deal with the infiltrating parties and re-establish contact with the company on 209. These drove some of the enemy back and in one clash captured three Germans and killed several others, but in the darkness they could not find the perimeter posts. Lack of information made action difficult. As Spowers told me later:

  Every attempt to find out what was happening failed. When the signal lines were cut, I sent our carrier platoon forward, but it could not find the passage through the tactical minefield that had been laid between our reserve company and 209. Again and again signalmen and runners went out into the shell and machine-gun fire. Some didn’t get through; others didn’t get back. One man took four and a half hours to cover a mile and three-quarters from his company position to my H.Q., mending the signal line as he went. We sent out patrols, but the men did not know the ground and lost their way in the dark. We could not tell what we were holding, but when the reserve company reported six enemy tanks and a number of infantry east of 209 at 5.15 a.m. it looked as though the posts on the hill had gone.

  At dawn a ground mist hung over the desert and the general position was so uncertain that we were reluctant to turn the artillery on to 209. We sent carriers out to make contact, but they were driven back by German tanks. At last about 7.30 the mist began to clear, and from my H.Q., three miles inside the perimeter, I counted forty tanks on the eastern slope of the hill.

  Soon after eight o’clock the curtain of mist lifted, revealing that the Germans had established a bridgehead about a mile and a half wide. They had captured seven perimeter posts on or around 209, but as none of the Australians in these escaped, we know little of what happened there during the night. From enemy accounts it seems that the heavy shelling had kept the posts quiet while infantry swarmed in to reduce them one by one. Few of these were manned by more than ten men and, even though some held out till dawn, seven posts were overwhelmed by then. In the early fog, Australians south of 209 saw more than a hundred prisoners being marched off. These men, however, had taken the first sting and momentum out of the attack and had upset the enemy’s timetable.

  Warned by their experience in the Easter Battle, the Germans had set out to establish a wide bridgehead before attempting to make a deep armoured thrust; they had estimated that, with this established and their tanks and supporting troops assembled inside the perimeter during the night, they could attack at dawn. But the stubborn resistance on 209 and the early mist delayed them and at 7.30 they were still consolidating and bringing in anti-tank and field guns, lorry-borne infantry and tanks. Unfortunately at this time lack of news and the loss of observation posts deterred the British gunners from shelling the forty tanks forming up on 209. These tanks were to make a direct thrust east towards Tobruk, while another forty helped the German infantry to widen the bridgehead and roll up the perimeter posts on either side of it.1

  In accordance with this plan, shortly after 8 a.m. forty tanks headed east towards the 2/24th’s reserve company position, raking it with their machine-guns and cannon as they advanced. When one group of a dozen tanks got near the Acroma road, they came under fire from guns of the 24th Australian Anti-Tank Company.2 One of these guns, commanded by Corporal F. C. Aston, knocked out a German Mark III, setting it alight, but at once attracted the concentrated fire of eleven others. Two of the crew were wounded but the gun claimed two more tank victims before it was put out of action by direct hits. Two other guns near by suffered a similar fate and in spite of British shelling the tanks continued their advance until they ran straight into the minefield in front of the 2/24th’s reserve company position.

  According to its commander, Captain Peter Gebhardt:

  In a few minutes seventeen of them were immobilized – mostly with damaged tracks. They were a wonderful target, but any anti-tank guns within range had been knocked out, and our field guns were too far back to engage them over open sights with A.P. They shelled them with H.E., but couldn’t shell too heavily for fear of exploding mines and clearing a passage. We engaged them with our Boyes rifles and Brens but couldn’t make any impression. Consequently, during the morning more tanks brought up repair crews, who worked on the disabled tanks under cover of fire from others. Some were towed back and before midday all but five had been repaired or removed. These five operated as pillboxes and stood over our position all day sniping whenever we put our heads up.

  Apparently the Germans didn’t expect3 to find a minefield there, for they brought no sappers or infantry with them to clear gaps. When the leading tanks blew up, the rest didn’t try to find a way through near us. Apart from those which stayed to cover the disabled ones, they sheered off and turned either back towards the perimeter or southwards along the west side of the minefield.

  Those that turned south were shelled as they went and were engaged by several guns of the 26th Anti-Tank Company, which were well placed to fire into the Germans’ flank. The gunners claim to have disabled several, and the remaining tanks, finding this fire too hot, headed back towards the perimeter.

  One of the tanks that was turned back by the minefield and the shelling was commanded by our old friend, Schorm, who starts off his diary for May 1st with the pronouncement, ‘We intend to take Tobruk.’ The note of confidence is less emphatic in these later entries:

  We file through the gap where many of our comrades have fallen. Then we deploy at once. The British artillery fires on us. We attack. Tier upon tier of guns boom out from the triangular fortifications before us. Then things happen suddenly. A frightful crash to the right. Artillery shell hit? No. It must be a mine. I immediately send a wireless message: ‘See if you can turn round in your own tracks.’ Back through the artillery fire for 100 metres. Wireless order: ‘Tanks to retire. The men of the mined tank are all right. Enemy is attacking with tanks, but must be put to flight.’ Retire carefully. Nine heavy and three light tanks of the company have had to abandon the fight owing to mines. Of course the enemy goes on shooting at us for some time. I move back through the gap with a salvaged tank in tow.

  Luckily for the German tanks a duststorm helped to cover their retreat, but they were heavily engaged by the guns of the 51st Field Regiment, which scored a number of direct and indirect hits with high-explosive shells. One of the 51st’s forward observation officers claimed that his guns disabled seven tanks during the morning. This may be so, but it was very difficult to tell which tank casualties were caused by mines and which by shells. It seems likely, however, that more than twenty German tanks were at last temporarily disabled by the combined defences during this eastward enemy move. It was unfortunate that, while so many German tanks were sitting shots in the minefield, there were no British tanks or mobile anti-tank guns in position to attack them; Morshead was fully occupied preparing to meet other and more serious threats. It was not yet certain that the thrust at Hill 209 was Rommel’s main one. The fact that it had been made with so little attempt at surprise strongly suggested that it was only a blind.

  There was already evidence that
a diversion, at least, would be made from the south. During the night a patrol of six men of the 2/13th Battalion, led by Corporal G. V. Hewitt, had ambushed and put to flight about fifty Germans who were heading towards the wire near the El Adem road. As they fled, the Germans discarded their equipment, including a quantity of explosives and Bangalore torpedoes, and one of the six prisoners taken revealed that they were moving up to prepare the way for tanks. Before dawn enemy tanks had advanced to within 500 yards of the perimeter and had been driven back by shell-fire, and about 8.30 a.m. twenty of them made a further demonstration in this sector under cover of a smoke screen. Because of this threat and the possibility of another German attack in greater strength from the west, Morshead was reluctant to commit his few tanks until the enemy had definitely shown his hand.

  PHASE II. WIDENING THE BREACH

  Rommel’s first tank thrust had petered out by 9 a.m., but he was not to be denied, and he still had the bulk of his tanks in reserve. Air reconnaissance soon after dawn reported 400 of them between Acroma and 209. This suggested that Rommel had massed there all the tanks of his two German and one Italian armoured divisions. Another pilot at 9 a.m. could identify only 120 tanks in this area; the other vehicles, he said, were troop carriers. These 120 plus those inside the perimeter and others demonstrating on the El Adem sector made from 180 to 200 in all. This was better news, but it was still very serious, for Morshead’s nominal tank strength was 12 Matildas and 19 cruisers, some of which were out of action through mechanical faults. Consequently his tactics were to hold his tanks back until mines and shells had taken their toll of enemy strength. As in the Easter Battle, he had to pin his faith to the artillery.

  Rommel also knew this and as soon as his tanks were checked in the minefield he intensified his attack on the British field gunners whose fire was covering it. Twice during the morning he sent thirty Stukas to bomb and strafe them and from behind 209 his artillery shelled them heavily but inaccurately. The guns would not be silenced and all through the morning they pounded 209, drove back delousing parties and shelled any tanks that approached the minefield or tried to move southwards along the perimeter.

  This southward thrust became the main German attack when the eastward drive was checked. Since dawn two companies (i.e. squadrons) of German tanks – about forty in all – had supported the Panzer Pioneers and machine-gunners in attacking the posts south of 209. While one tank company moved along inside the line of posts to deal with British anti-tank guns, the other led infantry against the perimeter posts. The general tactics were that four or five tanks sat over each post in turn and drove the garrison below ground, while German infantry moved in for the final assault. At the same time a smaller force of tanks with Italian infantry was fighting its way northward to widen the bridgehead on that flank.

  On the southern side of 209, Posts R1 and R2 had been subdued before 7 a.m., but when the tanks began to move south they were stubbornly opposed by four anti-tank guns of the 3rd R.H.A., which were dug in several hundred yards behind the inner line of concrete posts. Anticipating this opposition, the Germans had established machine-gunners well inside the wire and behind the anti-tank positions during the night.

  Very few of these anti-tank gunners escaped and one Tommy, Sergeant Bettsworth (of ‘J’ Battery, 3rd R.H.A.), whose gun and truck were dug in behind R8, later told me how his and other positions had been overwhelmed:

  We saw the guns north of us shot up one by one as the tanks came down. Eventually they got within range of us and we were having a crack at a tank in front when five more came up on our flank. We swung the gun round to deal with them, and, as we did, German machine-gunners opened fire from behind. All my crew were wounded except the driver, but our truck wasn’t hit and we managed to tow the gun bach to R9. From there I saw another of our guns disable five German tanks before it was wiped out by the same tactics. Our guns could not do much when attacked from front, flank and rear, but even so it was several hours before all those between 209 and R8 were silenced.

  As the tanks advanced along the line of posts, at least a dozen were put out of action by fire from anti-tank guns or anti-tank rifles, but this did not break up the German attacks, and individual posts had little chance against them. The enemy tactics were described to me by Corporal Bob McLeish, who was captured in R4 but eventually escaped from a prison camp near Derna:

  When the fog lifted we saw about thirty tanks lined up near R2 – half a mile to the west of us. The tanks dispersed, four or five going to each of the posts near by. Infantry followed in parties of about sixty. As they got within range we opened up and they went to ground, but four tanks came on. Their machine-guns kept our heads down and their cannon blasted away our sandbag parapets. The sand got into our MGs and we spent as much time cleaning them as we did firing them, but we sniped at the infantry whenever we got a chance. Our anti-tank rifle put one light tank out of action, but it couldn’t check the heavier ones, which came right up to the post. We threw hand grenades at them but these bounced off, and the best we could do was to keep the infantry from getting closer than a hundred yards.

  After about an hour of this fighting the tanks withdrew, but about ten o’clock more came back. They drove through the wire and one even cruised up and down over our communication trench dropping stick bombs into it. We held their infantry off most of the morning, but eventually under cover of this attack they got into one end of the post, where the Bren crew had all been wounded. Then the Germans worked along the trench while the rest of us were still firing from the other pits. By this time more than half our chaps – we’d only had fifteen – had been killed or wounded, and the Germans got command of the post before we survivors realized what had happened. Just then our artillery began shelling it heavily and the German tanks must have been driven off. So there we were, Germans and Aussies stuck in the post together with shells falling outside. A Jerry sergeant said, ‘I don’t know who’ll be the prisoners – you or us. We’d better wait awhile until the shelling stops.’ When the shelling stopped more Germans came in and the sergeant said, ‘You’re the prisoners.’ And we were.

  The Germans did not capture R4 until shortly after midday and although they used the same tactics against R6 during the morning it beat off several attacks by infantry and twelve tanks, one of which was disabled. When the tanks failed to reduce this post German infantry dug in behind it and kept it under fire until further tanks and infantry arrived.

  According to the German diary already quoted, the Panzer Pioneers, even with tank support, had not enough fire-power to push on, and heavy, accurate shelling made co-operation between tanks and infantry difficult. After the initial success against the posts around 209 during the night, the Germans had not expected such stiff opposition from the infantry, particularly after its supporting anti-tank guns had been knocked out. Because of this opposition, the tanks that had been checked at the minefield were ordered at 10.45 a.m. to move south and help with the reduction of the perimeter posts.

  This task, however, was further delayed, when at 11.45 the two tank companies that had been attacking the posts were ordered to move south-east inside the perimeter to aid a force of five medium and twenty light tanks that had been trying for two hours to work its way round the southern flank of the minefield. By 9.30 a.m. this force had penetrated beyond R12 nearly three miles south-east from 209, and between the perimeter and the minefield. It was heavily shelled all the way, but was not checked until it ran into fourteen cruisers of the 1st R.T.R., which Morshead brought into action to counter this thrust. The thin-skinned German ‘lights’ were no real match for the British and were soon forced to take cover under a smoke screen. The 51st Regiment continued to shell them, but before noon some more German mediums came up and, supported by artillery fire, thirty-four enemy tanks now advanced out of the smoke to engage the fourteen cruisers.

  For more than an hour there was intermittent skirmishing at a range of half a mile or more. One British cruiser was hit and burnt out and an
other damaged, but in spite of their greater numbers the Germans did not press their attack. When the cruisers knocked out one medium and two light tanks, this was evidently enough for the enemy and he withdrew under cover of smoke and shell-fire. It had been an inconclusive engagement, but with only fourteen tanks at his disposal, the British squadron commander had done well in checking the German tanks advance, and further distracting them from the task of rolling up the perimeter.

  The enemy was further delayed (according to captured documents) because his tanks had to return to 209 for fuel and ammunition after the morning’s fighting. This took some time and it was early afternoon before he again tackled the posts, turning now to R6, R7, and R8. This renewed offensive was preceded by another Stuka attack on the field guns and more strafing of the perimeter. But steady British shelling still hindered his attacks and broke up several of them.

  Typical of this phase was the experience of the men in R8 which was told to me by the sergeant in command there, Ernest Thurman:

  Soon after one o’clock twenty-four tanks advanced on R8 and R9. but they were slowed down by our anti-tank rifle fire. Riding on the back of some were the engineers brought along to delouse minefields. We sniped them with our Brens and they jumped to the ground. We also held up the infantry who were following some distance back, and the tanks came on alone. Two mediums kept going till they were only fifty yards from us, but then they stopped, apparently afraid of a minefield that didn’t exist. They raked the top of the post with machine-guns and cannon, and the crews even stood up in their turrets and threw stick bombs into our communication trench. But we still kept firing at both tanks and infantry. We’d take a few pot-shots and then duck before their machine-gun bullets thudded into our sandbags. This duel went on until about four o’clock when our artillery came down on them. Shells thundered round the post and the tanks cleared out towards 209. By this time half a dozen of my men were wounded and our Bren was out of action. As we couldn’t have held out against another attack even by infantry, we withdrew to R10. From there we held off another German attack and, by keeping R8 covered with heavy fire, stopped the Germans occupying it.