Tobruk 1941

by Chester Wilmot

  2 This contingent comprised part of 20th Brigade H.Q., the 2/13th Battalion, two companies of the 2/15th Battalion, and a few of the Divisional Staff.

  CHAPTER 21

  WHAT A RELIEF

  BY the beginning of November 1941 Rommel was nearly ready to attack Tobruk again. For the previous six months he had concentrated on amassing strength to overwhelm the Fortress once and for all, so that he could be free to drive on towards Suez. His failures in April and May had shown that for any future assault on Tobruk he would need far more German infantry and artillery than had then been available. Now, in addition to the infantry in his two German armoured divisions, Rommel had at least three battalions of the 90th Light Division, and four other German battalions plus a regiment of special assault troops known as the ‘ZBV Group’. To support these he had more than 200 pieces of field and medium artillery outside Tobruk and his tank strength was greater than ever.

  Each German Panzer Division had at least 130 tanks and 75 per cent of these were Mark IIIs with 50 mm guns or Mark IVs with 75 mms. When he brought the Afrika Korps to Cyrenaica, Rommel had roughly 145 tanks in each of his two divisions, but nearly half of these were light tanks. Since then the number of mediums and heavies had been increased by 20 per cent and the tanks themselves greatly improved. The Mark III now mounted a 50 mm not a 37 mm gun, and the new Mark IV was more heavily armour-plated. The Ariete Division, now using M13 Mediums throughout, had been well-trained and partly officered by Germans. It could no longer be taken lightly.

  Rommel had paid a heavy price for these reinforcements. During the three months ending October 31st 85 Axis vessels were sunk and 61 damaged between Southern Europe and Libya by naval or air attack. In the first week of November British warships and submarines had their greatest success – sinking 19 Italian ships. By increasing use of the Crete–Derna air ferry, Rommel had partly made up for these losses, and the R.A.F. estimated that in October transport planes towing gliders were lifting from Crete as much as 400 tons a day. This was about 20 per cent of the daily needs of the Axis forces in Eastern Cyrenaica, but interception by Beaufighters and bombing of airfields around Derna destroyed much of this freight. Rommel’s main problem was that since July the R.A.F. had definitely had the best of the air battles over the frontier. For an attack on Tobruk, however, this was not so vital a matter, for the R.A.F. could not operate from the Fortress nor could it effectively intervene over Tobruk with fighters based in Egypt.

  With the Afrika Korps strengthened Rommel was confident that he could take Tobruk and the Axis Mediterranean Command had evidently withdrawn its earlier objection to offensive action in Libya now that the Russian campaign was going so much in Germany’s favour. Rommel needed to capture Tobruk before the Eighth Army was ready to attack. Held by the British, it weakened his defensive position because his forces could be caught between two jaws. It also debarred him from attacking elsewhere.

  By early November the bulk of his forces were concentrated around Tobruk preparing to storm it before the end of the month. He had an Italian infantry division astride each of the three main roads that lead to Bardia, El Adem, and Derna, and had another in reserve at Gazala. He had a German infantry regiment and some Italians in the Salient; but he was planning his main thrust from the south-east, where he had assembled the ZBV Group and part of the 21st Armoured Division to the north of Ed Duda, a low knoll eight miles from the perimeter. In October, as we have seen, the enemy had driven back the garrison’s outposts in the south-eastern sector, had closed the gap between the Italian positions astride the Bardia and the El Adem roads, and had brought all the perimeter posts under direct machine-gun and mortar fire. To cover his preparations and to guard against any attempt by the garrison to break out towards Ed Duda, the enemy had prepared between the perimeter and that knoll a series of strongposts which the garrison had named ‘Tiger’, ‘Butch’, ‘Lion’ and ‘Wolf’.

  The rest of Rommel’s forces were disposed so as to frustrate any British attempt to come to Tobruk’s rescue. On the frontier strong defences ran from Halfaya to Sidi Omar – twenty miles inland. They were manned by the Savona Division, some German gunners and three battalions of German infantry. It was unlikely that the British would try to fight their way through this line with all its minefields and anti-tank guns.

  South of Sidi Omar the open desert flank was unprotected, but Rommel had his 15th Armoured Division in the Bardia–Gambut area, and the Ariete Armoured Division at El Gobi, fifty miles west of Sidi Omar and forty south of Tobruk. Both were strategically placed to attack the flanks of any British force that swept around the end of the frontier line and made for Tobruk. The Ariete Division was also protecting the Axis forces at Tobruk in case of attack from the Giarabub Oasis, 160 miles to the south. There, with considerable fuss, the British had been preparing what they wanted Rommel to believe was their major offensive base. Reuter’s correspondent late in October was ‘permitted’ to write a full description of the extensive preparations at Giarabub and to speculate on the possibilities of attack from there. Actually, the Giarabub force consisted of only 5000 British and Indian troops and fifty dummy tanks made of wood.

  Rommel was so obsessed with the idea of taking Tobruk, of justifying himself with his own Supreme Command, and of getting his revenge on the garrison, that he had evidently lost sight of the threat from the frontier. His success in June had made him scornful of British tank commanders; he knew that their tanks and guns were inferior to those of the Germans and he evidently believed that the British could be smashed as certainly as before.

  He did not appreciate what extensive preparations they had been making since June. The new C.-in-C., Middle East, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, had converted the Western Desert Force into the Eighth Army and appointed as its commander Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, brother of the C.-in-C., Mediterranean Fleet. Sir Alan had led the British and South Africans in Abyssinia with great distinction, but he was an infantry commander with little experience of armoured warfare and none of the Western Desert.

  He vigorously tackled his first major problem – that of organizing supply services for a force large enough to attack with reasonable hope of success. This was not easy, for he eventually gathered 115 000 British, Dominion, and Indian troops in the Western Desert and it was estimated that they would require 2500 tons of ammunition, food, water and petrol per day during an offensive. To provide for this, the coast railway was extended eighty-five miles west of Matruh, and the pipeline that brought water from Alexandria was laid a further twelve miles beyond the railhead. Huge supply depots were established near the frontier and as much as thirty-five miles inside Cyrenaica well south of Sidi Omar.

  Having overcome these supply difficulties, Cunningham mustered 700 tanks in the Western Desert and Tobruk compared with Rommel’s 415. To support an attack his colleague, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, the R.A.F.’s desert commander, had thirty-six squadrons with more than 600 front-line fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers. In Libya Rommel had slightly more aircraft than his, but only one-third of them were flown by Germans, though reinforcements could rapidly be brought from Europe.

  The primary object of all these preparations was ‘the destruction of the enemy armour’ – to quote the Cairo Military Spokesman. The relief of Tobruk would naturally follow and, using it as a base, the Eighth Army was then to drive westward through Cyrenaica and on to Tripoli. The Axis was to be cleaned out of North Africa. (This intention was, of course, never declared publicly, but Air Vice- Marshal Coningham told correspondents on November 23rd that he had bet a ‘fiver’ that we would be in Tripoli by January 15th.) This was by no means an impossible task, provided the enemy tanks could be destroyed quickly and comparatively cheaply. The Eighth Army, however, had not intended to attack before the end of November, for the railway would not be completed until the 14th, and the necessary supplies could not be accumulated in less than a fortnight after that. But when Cunningham’s Intelligence sources warned him earl
y in November that Rommel intended to attack Tobruk about the 22nd these plans were changed. He decided the Eighth Army must strike first.

  The force at his disposal then comprised:

  13th Corps: 4th Indian Division; 2nd New Zealand Division; 1st Army Tank Brigade (with 153 ‘I’ tanks and Valentines).

  30th Corps: 7th Armoured Division (455 cruiser and light tanks); 1st South African Division; 22nd Guards Brigade.

  Tobruk Garrison: 70th British Division; Polish Carpathian Brigade; 32nd Army Tank Brigade (93 ‘I’ Tanks and Cruisers).

  Army Troops: 2nd South African Division; 29th Indian Brigade Group (at Giarabub).

  Cunningham’s plan was this:1 the 30th Corps with the 7th Armoured Division as its spearhead was to outflank the frontier defences and strike north towards Gambut, deal with the German armour and then move west to relieve Tobruk. On the third morning its garrison was to start fighting out to Ed Duda, and Eighth Army H.Q. was confident that by the fifth day Tobruk would be open to landward supply columns.

  To protect the flanks of the armoured division during its deep thrust, the 1st South African Division was to watch the Italians at El Gobi; the 4th Indian Division was to make a demonstration against the frontier line; while the 2nd New Zealand Division skirted Sidi Omar and advanced north to Capuzzo and Bardia, thus isolating the frontier sector. To provide a further diversion, the Indians at Giarabub were to advance westward across the waist of Cyrenaica, towards Agedabia on the main Tripoli–Bengazi road, and strafe Axis supply columns moving along it.

  The R.A.F. planned to subject enemy airfields as far back as Tripoli to an all-out blitz with the object of grounding the Axis air forces and gaining such superiority that Coningham’s squadrons would be free to concentrate on direct support for the ground troops. By the evening of November 17th the attacking divisions were at their battle stations ready to move at dawn, after intensive bombing of Axis dromes. But that night thunder and lightning split the Libyan skies and the heaviest downpour in memory flooded the desert. Not one British aircraft left the ground and next morning the R.A.F. could not immediately swing its full strength into action. But the enemy suffered far more seriously. His airfields were in the coastal belt, where the rain was heaviest and the soil like glue; for two days almost every Axis aircraft was grounded.

  Because of this and the failure of German airmen to detect the Eighth Army’s approach march the day before, Rommel was taken completely by surprise. It was late in the afternoon of the 18th before his H.Q. knew that the British had attacked. ‘It has come in a way we did not expect,’ wrote a German officer on Afrika Korps H.Q., ‘and there’s hell let loose. On the evening of the 18th while I was still continuing my afternoon sleep, there came a telephone call summoning me to pack my kit immediately. Position: the enemy is attacking with very strong forces in the southern sector.’ Actually, by this time the leading column was near El Gobi – fifty miles west of the frontier.

  At dawn that morning the 7th Armoured2 and the 1st South African Divisions had sallied into Cyrenaica through huge gaps in the frontier barbed-wire fence. The rain had made the going slow, but by dark the attacking force was spread out in four main columns along the Trigh El Abd – a track which ran from Sidi Omar to El Gobi – ready to advance northwards next day.

  On November 19th the most westerly column (the 22nd Armoured Brigade) attacked Italian tanks near El Gobi and disabled forty-five of them, but lost twenty-five of its own tanks during the action. The Ariete Division withdrew and the 1st South African Infantry Brigade moved into El Gobi to secure the left flank. Meantime the most easterly column had made the right flank safe by moving in behind Sidi Omar. The two middle columns now advanced north. On the left the 7th Armoured Brigade headed for Gambut, but found the going too heavy and swung north-westward towards Sidi Rezegh. On the right the 4th Armoured Brigade moved towards the Bardia–Gambut road.

  Disregarding the 7th Brigade, Rommel sent an advance guard of sixty tanks to check the 4th and the first clash came late on November 19th. The Germans were considerably outnumbered but their tanks had a marked advantage over the American ‘lights’ in armour and fire-power. At dusk the Germans withdrew after an even battle in which they lost twenty-six tanks and the British twenty. Next morning the 4th Brigade attacked again, but overnight Rommel had concentrated about 180 tanks – the main strength of his two German Armoured Divisions – to meet it. He saw a chance of cutting off the two westward British brigades, which were now seventy miles inside Libya heading for Tobruk. If he could drive south between them and Sidi Omar, he might be able to sever their supply line, keep the British tank forces divided, and deal with them piecemeal. An additional reason for hitting the 4th Brigade first was that its ‘General Stuarts’ were no real match for the heavier German tanks. If he could cripple this brigade, he might then turn back and deal with the others.

  Massing his strength in this way and attacking his opponent in detail was typical of Rommel’s technique. Throughout November 20th the tank battle raged thirty miles west of Capuzzo. This time the 4th Brigade was not only out-gunned, it was also out-numbered; but it fought so strongly that, although driven back, it put thirty-six German tanks out of action and lost only forty. Battered, but by no means disgraced, the British withdrew at dusk, leaving the enemy in possession of the battlefield and able to salvage many of his tanks.

  While this battle was in progress, the 7th Armoured Brigade had captured Sidi Rezegh aerodrome and the 7th Support Group had established itself on the escarpment north of it and only ten miles south-east of the Tobruk perimeter. All day on the 20th the garrison had waited anxiously for the order from 30th Corps to begin its drive on Ed Duda. According to the original plan, it was to have broken out on the morning of the 20th. When no warning arrived on the 19th, hopes fell, but now the code-word came and all through the night the men in Tobruk were busily preparing to attack at dawn on November 21st.

  If they could reach Ed Duda while the Eighth Army held Sidi Rezegh it would be an easy matter to join forces across the 2-mile gap between the ridges. But at dawn on the 21st, as the garrison began its attack, the 7th Armoured Brigade found the full force of Rommel’s armour bearing down upon Sidi Rezegh. The British tank brigades were still split. The day before, when Rommel had struck at the 4th, the 22nd had rushed across from El Gobi to help it, but had arrived too late. Now that these two brigades had linked up, Rommel stole off in the night to tackle the 7th on its own. When they discovered the Germans had gone, the 4th and 22nd set out in pursuit, but battle had been joined around the Sidi Rezegh drome long before they reached it.

  The 7th Brigade and the Support Group stopped the two German divisions at first but suffered heavy casualties. The Germans had more and better tanks and guns and it would have been wiser for the British to have yielded ground and kept their armour intact until the other brigades joined them. In the circumstances their attempt to hold ground was suicidal. Most of that day the 7th Brigade clung to Sidi Rezegh, hoping the others would arrive. But the 4th had been checked by an enemy column and the 22nd did not get there until late in the afternoon. By then the 7th had lost three-quarters of its tanks but was still in possession of the drome and escarpment. It was reinforced by the 5th South African Infantry Brigade, but its hold was still precarious. The Germans had gained armoured superiority and were clearly preparing for another big assault next morning. The 4th Brigade had not yet appeared.

  The crucial question was this – could the British hold Sidi Rezegh until the Tobruk garrison reached Ed Duda? Its attack that morning had been led by the 2nd Battalion of the Black Watch and ‘I’ tanks of the 4th R.T.R. Piped into battle, the Highlanders had taken one enemy strongpoint – ‘Tiger’ – in a brilliant bayonet charge, in which nearly half their men became casualties. The tanks had also suffered heavily from minefields and anti-tank guns. Another strongpoint, ‘Butch’, was taken that afternoon and the toll of prisoners reached 1100 – half of them German. At the end of the day, however, the leading T
obruk troops were barely a third of the way to Ed Duda and there was still much hard fighting ahead of them. The German defences were stronger and deeper than had been expected, and they were manned by the crack troops whom Rommel had assembled for the assault on Tobruk. The gap between the garrison and the relieving forces was only seven miles, but it was clear that Ed Duda could not be reached the following day as had been planned.

  Meantime the concentration of German armour around Sidi Rezegh had left the area immediately behind the Halfaya–Sidi Omar line clear of German tanks, and the Eighth Army could now complete the envelopment of the frontier defences. The 2nd New Zealand Division, supported by ‘I’ tanks, did this by thrusting northwards behind the line on November 21st. By next morning it had captured Capuzzo, cut the water pipeline, which supplied Halfaya, and placed a brigade to picket Bardia. There was now little chance of the Axis forces on the frontier joining in the main battle around Sidi Rezegh.

  This was renewed with increasing vigour on the morning of November 22nd. The Germans made a feint from the east at dawn and then slammed in their main assault with a hundred tanks from the west. For a while the 7th and 22nd Brigades held them off, but their losses were so heavy that, even with the arrival of the 4th Brigade, the British were still outnumbered. In the afternoon the Germans attacked with tanks and lorried infantry, supported by an intense artillery barrage. The 7th Support Group was driven from the Sidi Rezegh escarpment and the British tanks had to withdraw from the airfield. By nightfall the Germans were in full possession of the area. More important, in three days they had wiped out the numerical advantage with which the 7th Armoured Division had started.

  In a determined effort to restore the situation, Cunningham ordered the New Zealand commander (Major-General B. C. Freyberg) to leave one brigade masking Bardia and Capuzzo, and to move westward with the bulk of his division and strike at the rear of the German armour between Gambut and Sidi Rezegh. If it could attack west, while the Tobruk garrison moved south and the 7th Armoured Division and the South Africans drove north, the Germans might yet be forced from Sidi Rezegh. That was the plan on November 23rd. The southward thrust from Tobruk was slow, but the New Zealanders came up from the east like a storm. By midday their 4th Infantry Brigade had taken Gambut and their 6th had linked up with the 5th South African Brigade, which was holding a position south-east of Sidi Rezegh, covering the 7th Armoured Division while it reorganized.