Jefferson Davis, American

by William J. Cooper

  Davis viewed Kansas through two lenses, one political, the other official and administrative, though they surely became intermingled. Politically he wanted Kansas to end up slave country and eventually a slave state. Success in Kansas would redound to the credit of Pierce and his administration, including Jefferson Davis. Between 1854 and 1857 Kansas remained a federal territory, much of it frontier with a strong Indian presence beyond the area of white settlement in the eastern part. The U.S. Army was responsible for controlling these Indians and for maintaining order if the territorial civilian authority broke down. But there were not enough troops to do both jobs thoroughly.73

  Secretary Davis knew about the manpower problem. He wanted a militia established in Kansas to operate under the command of the regular army. He even requested the governors of Kentucky and Illinois to make militia available for use in Kansas, if necessary. Confronting increasing pressure to operate against the Indians in order to protect emigrants traveling westward through the territory, Davis did recommend moving regular troops west, but the president decided against him. A loyal subordinate, Davis strove to have the army carry out its mission in settled Kansas.74

  He assumed an active role in army affairs. Following Pierce’s directives, Davis instructed his officers to support the civilian officials and refrain from becoming involved in the increasingly nasty political fracas. The army found itself in a most difficult situation because the unending political strife led to the election of two legislatures, one proslavery, the other free-soil. In addition, with almost all Kansans armed, violence became endemic and killings commonplace. Still, Davis ordered his commanders not to consider sectional origins of settlers or their political outlook, only to make sure that all abided by the law. On one occasion, he reprimanded an officer for disbanding the free-soil legislature, even though it was extralegal. Yet many raised complaints that the army did not act so forcefully as it should have against the armed bands, especially the so-called “border ruffians” who came over from Missouri chiefly to burn and pillage. With its small numbers and instructions to support civilian control, the military conducted itself responsibly.75

  Even with the army’s presence and even with Pierce’s trying three different territorial governors, affairs in Kansas did not improve. The fury and storm in the infant territory kept it on the front pages of the nation’s newspapers. Failure to manage events in Kansas plagued Pierce and helped deny him nomination for a second term in the White House. When Jefferson Davis left the War Department in March 1857, he did not leave Kansas behind. It would reappear nine months later in a critical form in the Senate, where Davis then represented his state.

  Although Davis’s administrative and political duties in Washington took up much of his time, he always directed a major part of his political attention toward Mississippi. Even as Davis entered Franklin Pierce’s cabinet, his chief political goal was to redeem himself in Mississippi. Greatly distressed because Mississippi voters had rejected him for a man he called “an empty demagogue,” Davis talked about running for governor again in 1853 on his platform of 1851 in order to obtain a ringing affirmation of his views. He also thought about the United States Senate; he and his political associates believed that because he had resigned in 1851 for his party, he deserved to be returned. In fact, even before Davis agreed to join the cabinet, he told President Pierce the Mississippi legislature might send him back to the Senate, and if it did so, he would accept.76

  The Mississippi legislature was to elect a United States senator in January 1854, and during 1853 Davis received conflicting advice on the course to follow. While his friends wanted him in the Senate and believed their party owed him the post, they differed on whether he should make himself available. Davis was told that if he indicated a wish for the Senate seat, no other contender would challenge him and with the “utmost ease” he would prevail. But other advisers urged him not to enter the contest because he might lose. And because of his status, a defeat would injure the cause of states’ rights and deliver a terrible blow to the Democratic party in Mississippi.77

  Davis confronted a dilemma. He clearly wanted to return to the Senate, often saying, “I preferred the Senate to any other public post.” The Senate also meant vindication; Davis spoke about “the pride I would certainly feel in receiving such an endorsement as would answer the industriously circulated report that I had been tried and condemned by constituents.” To the inquiries asking him to declare his preferences, he provided the same equivocal answer. He always underscored his “rule of conduct which require[s] me as a democrat to serve my party where they require me, not where my taste or ambition may indicate.” He also consistently asserted: “to advance the doctrine of state rights is my first wish and whatever will most promote this end will be most acceptable to me.” But just as insistently he refused to commit himself: “If the use of my name would serve to strengthen the Democracy, it is, as it has been at their service; but if it would tend to divide and weaken them, I ask of my friends to consider all personal feeling for me as but dust in the balance, thus I will be assured they justly appreciate me.” An astute politician, Davis recognized that in the fierce contest of 1851 he had become “especially odious” to Union Democrats, who had now rejoined their State Rights brethren. Thus, Davis realized he might have to wait for those wounds to heal completely. Such an outcome he could understand and accept. As he wrote confidentially to a close political colleague, “in my present position I am sufficiently content and have a field of usefulness wide enough to satisfy me.” Davis clearly could not bear the possibility of another defeat, and would take no initiative that risked one.78

  At the same time, he kept in close touch with partisan affairs in his home state. Regular and full reports of activities and rivalries arrived in his mail. Central in this correspondence was the success of the reunited Democrats in holding together despite Henry Foote’s efforts to disrupt the state Democratic convention held in May 1853. In the summer and fall of that year, the Democrats mounted a vigorous and successful campaign, electing their candidate for governor, John J. McRae, an avowed Davis partisan, and winning control of both houses in the legislature. McRae and his fellow Democrats certainly heeded Davis’s admonition “to teach all the necessity for organization and the value of party allegiance.” This triumphant Democratic performance ended Foote’s political career in Mississippi. Now a man without a party, he gave up hope of getting his Senate seat back, and in January 1854 left for California. A pleased Jefferson Davis watched the political destruction of the hated Foote as Mississippi once again became a Democratic bastion flying the states’ rights banner. A letter from Governor McRae attributing Democratic success to Davis’s position in the cabinet surely gratified the secretary of war.79

  The newly chosen legislature would select a United States senator. The chief combatants of 1851 did not clash again; Foote was no longer in the state, and Davis’s name was never brought forward. The post went to Congressman Albert G. Brown, who politicked vigorously for it. A popular and veteran Democrat, who had also been governor, Brown was a confirmed and vociferous champion of southern rights; he had been an ideological mate of Quitman and a stalwart of the State Rights campaign of 1851. At that time he and Davis had been close political associates, and Brown recognized Davis as party leader. But with his election to the Senate, the ambitious Brown became Davis’s rival for dominance among Mississippi Democrats. Brown had found an ally in Quitman, who resented Davis’s role in preventing his Cuban venture and who also had reservations about Davis’s firmness on southern issues. Even before the senatorial election, Brown felt rebuffed by what he considered Davis’s noncommittal response to his personal request to be given the consulship in Havana. Afterwards their relationship deteriorated. To friends Brown denounced Davis as arrogant and overbearing; one of them noted that Brown “hates Davis as he does the Devil.” Without doubt Brown chafed at Davis’s strength in Mississippi. Describing the control Davis and his associates exercised in the state Dem
ocratic convention of 1855, Brown groaned that they made it “impossible for me to do my friends or myself justice.” Despite Brown’s popularity and his growing animus, he could not shoulder Davis aside. As one of Brown’s senatorial allies discerned, Davis was “too strong” for him.80

  One reason Davis held such sway in Mississippi was the careful attention he paid to the political fundamentals of patronage and service. In the cabinet he exerted great influence over federal jobs in Mississippi. The positions of federal timber agents and postmasters and the like came under his scrutiny. He also reassured a Mississippi congressman that a favored newspaper would get “a fair show” in the distribution of federal printing. His former constituents continued to seek his aid on a range of topics, including the reinstatement of a midshipman expelled from the navy. When a Mississippi geologist unknown to Davis visited Washington, the secretary welcomed him at home, then took him to the White House for an introduction to the president, and on to the War Department to meet engineer officers. Grumbling about Davis’s success in dispensing patronage and providing service, a political opponent recognized that those “who held office from his kindness” and those who “have felt his kindness & received his favors,” including “the most influential Democratic editor in the State,” would stand on Davis’s side.81

  By 1855, Davis no longer doubted the proper way to plan for his political future. He now concentrated on the Senate seat the Mississippi legislature would fill in January 1856 for a full six-year term to begin on March 4, 1857. To emphasize his claim on Mississippi Democrats, he made his only trip home during his secretaryship to coincide with the state Democratic convention of 1855. Traveling much of the way by train, he departed Washington on May 26, having a most unusual experience en route. Although the surrounding circumstances are unclear, a family accused Davis and an army officer accompanying him of theft. The two men were arrested in Augusta, Georgia, but when the accusers learned who Davis was, they dropped the charges in embarrassment.82

  Davis arrived in Jackson on June 2; he spoke that night, addressed the conclave of Democrats two days later, then moved on to Vicksburg, where he made another speech. An observer there noted Davis’s “dignified manner, and easy, confident and agreeable oratorical style.” In his remarks Davis decried antislavery activities and defended the Pierce administration, but his chief interest was the convention itself. He and his loyalists totally dominated the body. A miffed, albeit admiring, Albert Brown described the scene: “Davis was present directing affairs in person. His friends got possession of the convention and managed every thing their own way.” “I need hardly add,” Brown continued, “that every possible opportunity was given Davis to make an impression. He made it.” Brown could only fall back on a hope, “Whether for good or evil time will tell.”83

  Aware that he could not afford another season of equivocation, Davis made his wishes widely known. A Mississippi congressman reported on Davis’s attitude: the secretary would feel “personal gratification” for the world to see that “Mississippi still loves him as his devotion to her assumes.” When legislators wrote asking about his intentions, Davis “replied to all of them that a Seat in the Senate is the only position he would now accept.” Davis also made known his distress that other senators who had stood with him in fighting the Compromise had had their stances validated by reelection, and he had not. Davis’s closest political friends informed him they would be in Jackson to protect his interests. In December he prepared for publication a letter to his longtime supporter Collin S. Tarpley announcing that he would proudly accept the Senate seat, if offered. He grounded his case on his proven loyalty to Mississippi and his desire to ensure political victory for states’ rights.84

  In the approaching contest Davis had once more to contend with sectional rivalry in Mississippi. Because Brown lived in the southern part of the state, a number of north Mississippians maintained their region should have the other seat. Proclaiming the rights of north Mississippi, Jacob Thompson made yet another try for the Senate. Thompson declared that he could hold most northern legislators and draw enough strength from other areas of the state to stop Davis. In his campaign, he had Brown’s aid. Thompson did make an effort, and was evidently willing to employ almost any tactic. The Democratic editor in Vicksburg alleged that Thompson, in a futile attempt to gain his support, offered “pecuniary favors to any reasonable amount.”85

  The legislature convened in January 1856. Before the balloting for senator, Davis’s letter to Tarpley was printed as an extra and placed on the desk of every legislator. Thompson proved no match for the Davis juggernaut. On January 14 the Democratic caucus gave Davis 59 percent of its 85 votes and the senatorial nomination. Two days later the Democrat-controlled legislature cast 91 votes for Davis, with 33 scattered, to award him the prize he coveted. When his cabinet term ended, he could move straight to the Senate.86

  In spite of all his exertions to gain victory, just a week before the election Davis proudly announced in a letter to a loyal political operative that he had not joined other hopefuls in politicking for the seat. Here, he surely rationalized. He was right when he said that he had not been in the state for the meeting of the legislature, but he had worked very hard and his trusted confidants were in Jackson. In fact, an opposition newspaper had sharply criticized him for his highly visible campaign. Perhaps he was preparing himself for possible defeat, or perhaps he was defining the politics of this election quite narrowly. Whatever his thinking, with his win he concluded a most impressive political performance.87

  As Jefferson Davis anticipated returning to the Senate, fundamental changes reshaped the political landscape. By 1856 the venerable Whig party had disappeared, ravaged by the battles over slavery and pummeled by new disputes arising over immigration and religion. Two parties appeared seeking to replace the Whigs as the second major party and Democratic opponent. Generated by a sharp increase in Roman Catholic immigrants chiefly from Ireland and Germany, a growing nativism and anti–Roman Catholic sentiment gave rise to the American party, popularly called the “Know-Nothings.” Originating in secret lodges, chiefly in northern cities, this party quickly became a home for many old Whigs, both North and South. Another group struggling to gain favor was an organization that embraced the concept of free soil and condemned the South—the Republican party. Directing their message only toward the free states, the Republicans had no interest in cultivating support in the South, which they branded as basically un-American.88

  Both the Know-Nothings and the Republicans troubled Davis. He denounced the former for secrecy and animus toward immigrants and Roman Catholics, castigating their program as “both saddening and disgusting.” He refused to believe that many Americans would join any political party espousing such doctrines, and was sure it would quickly depart the political scene. In this view, Davis proved correct. After meteoric success in numerous contests in 1855, the party failed in the presidential election of 1856. It rapidly disintegrated, plagued by sectional differences over slavery and smashed in the North by the surging Republican party.89

  The Republican party was a different creature altogether. The party platform of 1856 ringingly affirmed the virtues of the Wilmot Proviso while condemning slavery as a “relic of barbarism.” No major party had ever before so completely repudiated the South. From the southern perspective, the party loomed like a giant tidal wave ready to thunder over and crush the political world finely crafted by three generations of southern politicians. The mere possibility of a Republican president terrified most southerners. When the Republicans in 1856 carried eleven of the sixteen free states, no one could doubt that their message had found a responsive audience in the North. Among southerners, for the first time since the crisis of 1849–51, this realization prompted widespread talk of severing the Union.

  Davis certainly heard the calls to break up the Union. He still believed in the right of secession, and he did not cut his political ties to the sectional extremists, often called “fire-eaters.” In May
1856 Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina responded to a vitriolic attack by Senator Charles Sumner on his state and a kinsman by brutally assaulting Sumner on the floor of the Senate. Although flayed by Republicans, Brooks was praised by southern extremists and fêted in his home district. Davis sent a message to a dinner in Brooks’s honor: “I have only to express to you my sympathy with the feeling that prompts the sons of Carolina to welcome the return of a brother, who has been the subject of vilification, misrepresentation, and persecution, because he resented a libellous assault upon the reputation of their mother.”90

  At the same time, as in 1851, Davis did not believe the situation of the South warranted drastic action. Writing to a major Georgia political leader, he summarized his view: “In a single sentence then my idea of our present condition is, that we should make all the preparation proper for sovereign States—should hasten slowly, and be temperate in all things.”91

  Davis still had confidence in the Democratic party and its adherents in the North. In his opinion, all who stood on the Democratic platform of 1852 honored southern rights. His association with Pierce and with fellow cabinet members like Cushing convinced him that many northern Democrats were prepared to stand by what he saw as the South’s constitutional guarantees. For 1856 he argued that political necessity required a northern candidate for president because it was the North that must settle the only issue which “disturbs and endangers the harmony of our Union”—slavery. Thus, he thought it best to have a northern leader “entirely worthy of the trust.” He preferred Pierce to be nominated for a second term, but that was not possible. Many Democrats blamed the Pierce administration for the massive defeats the party had suffered in state and congressional elections in 1854–55. But Davis gladly accepted his party’s nominee for the presidency, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, whom he knew well. And Buchanan’s victory in 1856 confirmed his faith in his country.92