Jefferson Davis, American

by William J. Cooper

  Although Davis’s imprisonment would have sparked a response from the South under any circumstances, the publicity highlighting his travails at Fortress Monroe helped build his image as a martyr and generated a surging reaction. Varina worked successfully to get her version of her husband’s treatment into the press; for example, Dr. Cooper’s drastic report appeared in several papers. In addition, Democratic journals often condemned Davis’s jailing and treatment. But a book that came out in the summer of 1866 turned into the single most important item in this pro-Davis campaign. Entitled Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, Embracing Details and Incidents in His Captivity, Particulars Concerning His Health and Habits, Together with Many Conversations on Topics of Great Public Interest, and purportedly written by Dr. John Craven, Davis’s first physician at Fortress Monroe, the work allegedly recounted details of harsh treatment as well as lengthy conversations between doctor and patient.42

  Yet Prison Life had both more complicated origins and a more far-reaching design. Although Dr. Craven participated in creating the book, his was a distinctly secondary role. The man who conceived the idea for Prison Life and actually wrote it was not the doctor, but a strong Democratic partisan and an ardent supporter of President Johnson who also happened to be friendly with Dr. Craven. Searching for ways to advance Johnson’s policies and hurt Republicans, Charles G. Halpine, an Irish immigrant, Union war veteran, and New York journalist, decided an account of Davis in prison that presented him as a victim of inhumane treatment stemming from Republican vindictiveness would help accomplish this mission.43

  Prison Life did portray Davis as a heroic victim of evil men. Halpine pictured Davis as a devoted Christian and a keen student, who appreciated literature and other intellectual subjects, but had been cruelly manacled and brutalized by his wicked captors. Halpine’s Davis was a kind man, who forgave those who tormented him; he even had Davis befriending and feeding crumbs to a mouse. In addition, this Davis spoke admiringly of Lincoln and numerous Union generals. According to Prison Life, Davis worried much more about the fate of his family and the South than about himself. Summing up this paragon of virtue, Halpine wrote: “Mr. Davis is remarkable for the kindness of his nature and fidelity to friends. Of none of God’s creatures does he seem to wish or speak unkindly; and the same fault found with Mr. Lincoln—unwillingness to sanction the military severities essential to maintain discipline—is the fault I have heard most strongly urged against Mr. Davis.”44

  Halpine succeeded, but only in part. The book reached a wide audience, becoming a bestseller and making money for both Halpine and Dr. Craven. It also helped create Jefferson Davis the Martyr. As a former Confederate official noted upon reading Prison Life, “it shows him to be what the world will one day confess him, one of its greatest men.” But Halpine made little headway on the political front. Republicans increasingly gained the upper hand over Johnson. Winning an overwhelming victory in the congressional elections of 1866, they took control of Reconstruction policy.45

  Davis understood the purpose of Prison Life. He knew it had little connection with the reality of his time at Fortress Monroe. As early as July 1866 he had a copy of the book, which he discussed with visitors. One acknowledged that the book was accomplishing much good for those working to free Davis, but said that Davis deemed it “sensational in parts” and “in some things incorrect.” The hero himself found it “particularly disagreeable.” Davis went on to annotate his copy, pointing out the errors and falsehoods; he commented on more than 180 passages. Moreover, he felt that he had been used by Dr. Craven, whom he had considered a friend. In his mind Craven had betrayed confidences and falsified Davis’s statements for financial gain. He never reconciled with Dr. Craven.46

  Jefferson Davis remained entrapped by the vexing political and legal tangle at the heart of Reconstruction. The president, his cabinet, Congress, and the chief justice of the United States all had a stake and an influence, which often clashed. Forming the basic framework of Reconstruction was the ferocious conflict growing between the president and Congress that eventuated in the first presidential impeachment.

  Andrew Johnson had assumed the presidency with unusual credentials at an unprecedented time. A strong Democratic partisan before the war, Johnson, as a United States senator from Tennessee, opposed secession and refused to follow his state out of the Union. In 1862 Lincoln appointed him military governor of his home state. Two years later, as Lincoln strove to rally Democrats who backed the war to his side, he selected Johnson as his vice-presidential running mate. Upon Lincoln’s death Johnson became president of the United States.47

  When Johnson took over as chief executive, all his political experience had been in the South. He had no northern base. At first he struck fierce oratorical blows at the vanquished Confederates, whom he condemned as traitors and rebels. As a champion of non-slaveholders before 1861, Johnson viewed secession and the resulting war as plots of slaveholding planters, who deserved the wrath of the victorious North. Jefferson Davis, with whom he had quarreled in the antebellum Congress, led the pack and merited especially stern handling.

  Yet Johnson wanted to follow Lincoln’s policy of reconciliation. In May he proclaimed amnesty for all ex-Confederates, excepting several categories of high-ranking officials and wealthy people who had in 1860 owned taxable property worth more than $20,000. Property, except for slaves, would also be restored. To the excluded groups he offered executive clemency upon individual applications for pardon. Johnson also moved to get the former Confederate states back into the Union as quickly as possible. Under his plan those states reconstituted themselves largely under leaders who had been prominent before 1860. They had to repudiate secession and the Confederate debt, and accept the destruction of slavery. After they had done so, Johnson expected the states to rejoin the Union, their representatives and senators once again sitting in Congress.

  A reappearance of numerous southerners in Congress could of course lead to a substantial strengthening of the Democratic party. Moreover, in these new governments whites attempted to exercise close and harsh control over the freed slaves through laws known as Black Codes, which severely restricted the rights and economic opportunities of blacks. Neither of these developments troubled President Johnson. A resurgent Democratic party might very well look to him for leadership. And because he shared the general white southern view of race relations, the shackling of the freed people caused him no great difficulty. For the political and ideological goals of the Republican party, the party identified with the North and the victorious Union war effort, he had little sympathy.

  Furthermore, in 1865 and 1866 Johnson made liberal use of his authority over prisoners and pardoning power. When the individuals excluded from his Proclamation of Amnesty applied to him for pardon, his response was overwhelmingly positive. Major figures like Alexander Stephens, Stephen Mallory, and John Reagan were paroled, released from prison, and permitted to return to their homes. In April 1866 the president freed Davis’s fellow inmate, Clement Clay. In that same spring he also issued a pardon that had special meaning for Jefferson Davis. Joseph Davis received presidential clemency in March and in September had all his land restored to him.48

  Republicans watched the evolution of Johnson’s Reconstruction policy with horror. Former chieftains were again taking charge in the southern states, even former Confederate leaders. From the Republican perspective, it seemed that the war had caused no change. If such men returned promptly to Congress, Republican prospects would darken. A reunited and revivified Democratic party might again dominate the national government. Such a revival threatened the Republican hold on power, endangering Republican goals for the nation and grinding down the emancipated slaves. Although Republicans did not agree on the appropriate treatment of blacks, with the most radical wanting to give land and the vote, all advocated equality before the law, meaning basic civil rights. To Republicans the Black Codes seemed no more than a slightly revised version of the old slave codes. Moreover, the race riots t
hat broke out in several cities, especially Memphis and New Orleans, in 1866 appeared to indicate that southern whites did not even intend to ensure physical safety for blacks. Republicans began to fear they had won the war only to lose the peace.

  They moved forthrightly. Johnson’s initiatives had taken place with Congress out of session. Upon reconvening in December 1865, Congress denied seats to the senators and representatives from the Johnson governments. The Republicans also passed measures intended to guarantee fundamental civil rights for blacks. In so doing they increased the power of the central government and challenged the power of the president. In the spring of 1866 Johnson vetoed these bills, which Congress then repassed over his veto.

  Relations between the president and the Republicans that broke down in early 1866 only got worse. Although some congressional Republicans tried to reach an agreement with Johnson, accommodation proved impossible. They had sharply different visions of what the United States should become; he still clung to the traditional Democratic credo of states’ rights, with a small, basically inactive federal government. Moreover, he and the Republicans had increasingly divergent political goals. The great battleground became the congressional elections of 1866. Both sides campaigned hard, but only in the North, for the southern states had not been readmitted. The Republicans routed the president, winning a veto-proof majority in both houses of Congress, an outcome that meant the Republican Congress, not the president, would direct the course of Reconstruction.

  Although Jefferson Davis was never a paramount concern for either side, he became part of the political equation. Drumming the message that they had saved the Union from traitorous rebels, Republicans depicted Davis as the archfiend of the rebellion. Attempting to garner some Republican support and increasingly struggling to keep Congress at bay, Johnson needed Davis in prison to show he held the head of the Confederacy accountable. Thus, neither side could easily countenance releasing Davis.

  President Johnson could not doubt that a sizable segment of the northern populace considered Davis a criminal who should be severely punished, perhaps even executed. Just as southerners sent torrents of mail to Johnson urging mercy and clemency for the state prisoner, northerners inundated him with demands for the sternest treatment. One petitioner wanted Davis to get life at hard labor with his own name branded on his forehead. Another recommended that Davis be exhibited throughout the country in female dress. Johnson also received advice to hang Davis on the Fourth of July as a national celebration.49

  Not surprisingly, President Johnson talked to visitors and associates about the wide range of advice he received, and he also expressed different opinions to different people. Hugh McCulloch recalled Johnson’s berating Davis as the “head devil among the traitors, and he ought to be hung.” To Richard Taylor he indicated he wanted to let Davis out as soon as politically possible. When Varina Davis visited the White House, the president received her civilly. According to her, he said he never believed Davis had anything to do with Lincoln’s assassination. Moreover, he told her he would have withdrawn the proclamation accusing Davis of complicity, but because of his insecure political position he could not do so. Only the passage of time and a softening of public opinion would permit him to act.50

  Congressional Republicans also wavered in their conviction about enforcing the trial of Davis. In the spring of 1866, testimony before a House committee proved conclusively the spuriousness of evidence connecting Davis to Lincoln’s murder. Earlier, wanting to know why the state prisoner had not been tried, the House had demanded information from the administration. After a delay of four months, a response was sent explaining the difficulties of getting Davis into court. Congress did not take issue with the brief presented in those documents. In sum, it accepted the status quo, which, of course, left Davis in Fortress Monroe. At times individual Republicans or a congressional committee expressed interest in the Davis case, but Congress never took any significant steps to control the fate of Jefferson Davis.51

  When President Johnson, with the advice of his cabinet, decided in the summer of 1865 to try Davis before a federal court, the goal was to have the nation’s highest courts define secession as treason. Directing the government’s case, Attorney General James Speed, along with specially appointed private counsel, decided the trial would have to take place in Virginia, where Davis had actually commanded a war against the United States. They discarded as unworkable and probably unconstitutional the proposal that Davis go on trial in a northern state under the theory that he had been constructively present when his military forces invaded northern territory.

  Yet the choice of Virginia presented two quite serious, quite different problems. First, court would be held in Richmond, and Speed and his associates had to face the question of whether any fairly and impartially impaneled jury in Davis’s former capital would ever convict Jefferson Davis of treason. Failure to obtain a guilty verdict would have one fundamental result: the United States had fought a victorious war, which a Virginia jury declared unlawful.

  The second difficulty involved the judges. Presiding over the Federal District Court in Virginia, Judge John Underwood did not have a reputation as a judicial heavyweight. A native New Yorker, Underwood had lived in the part of Virginia that became West Virginia during the war. Even though he had resided in a slave state, he became decidedly antislavery and a stalwart Republican, who stumped several northern states for Lincoln. In 1864 President Lincoln made him a federal judge. But Judge Underwood would not hear the Davis case by himself. Joining him on the bench would be Salmon P. Chase, chief justice of the United States. The district judge and the Supreme Court member sitting together constituted the Federal Circuit Court. Having Chase as a trial judge would add dignity and authority to the court and its decision.

  But Chase also brought burdens. Long a nationally prominent Republican leader, the Ohioan had been in Lincoln’s cabinet and still harbored presidential ambitions. Political considerations were a congenital part of his makeup. He even flirted with the Democrats. More important at the moment, Chase refused to hold court in any former Confederate state. The majesty and the independence of the federal judiciary and his place in it assumed paramount importance for Chase. Until the declaration of a formal peace and the removal of all military authority, Chase asserted that a shadow of military influence hovered over the judiciary. He could reconcile himself to the district judge’s holding court, but no more. As he wrote President Johnson in October 1865, “a civil Court in a district under martial law can only act by sanction and supervision of the military power; and I cannot think that it becomes Justices of the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction under such conditions.”52

  The year 1866 brought no changes. Despite Johnson’s spring proclamation declaring peace, Chase still refused to sit because certain military processes continued. In May, Judge Underwood tried to move the matter by getting his grand jury to indict Davis for treason. An indictment carried with it the probability of a trial date. The administration was not prepared to commence the prosecution, however, and requested a continuance. Although neither the president nor the attorney general seemed averse to bail for the state prisoner, zealous congressional Republicans and a cabinet member convinced Underwood that he should not grant bail. In refusing, Underwood asserted that because Davis was in military custody, he could not intervene.

  In the summer a new attorney general took office, but Henry Stanbery could effect nothing consequential. Because in August President Johnson had issued a final peace proclamation, Stanbery wanted Davis’s case brought before the court session scheduled for October. But an inadvertent oversight by Congress enabled Chase to wreck this plan. When lawmakers reduced the number of justices from nine to seven, they made no new circuit assignments for them. Chase concluded that without this legislation neither he nor any other justice had the legal right to hold circuit courts. In finding ways to avoid actually bringing Davis to trial, Chase always had his hand on the political and public pulse. While a stri
dent Republican minority wanted Davis tried and convicted, a majority was unsure what to do. Facing Chase’s new barrier, Stanbery advocated removing Davis from military to civil custody. He maintained that because the war had now officially ended, military imprisonment was illegal. Within the administration Secretary of War Stanton successfully opposed Stanbery’s ploy on the grounds that the absence of any federal prison in Virginia would necessitate transferring Davis to a state prison. There, Stanton argued, he could not be as securely held or as well cared for as at Fortress Monroe.

  Thus, after eighteen months, Jefferson Davis was still lodged in Fortress Monroe. The perceived demands of politics, concern about legal issues, the stance of the chief justice, and legislative mishap had together kept the government from ever bringing Davis to trial, or deciding to parole or bail him. Davis’s continued confinement did not result from the quiescence of his backers. His supporters from the political arena pressed President Johnson to act on his behalf. Frank Blair, Sr., Richard Taylor, Reverdy Johnson, former governor of Maryland Thomas Pratt, and others kept trooping to the White House pleading for a speedy trial or prompt release from prison. Horace Greeley presented a “Memorial” to the president with an identical plea.53

  Horace Greeley occupied a unique niche among Davis’s important northern supporters. Most of them had always been and remained staunch Democrats, but Greeley was counted among the nation’s leading Republicans and edited arguably the most influential Republican newspaper in the country, the New York Tribune. From the time he received a letter from Varina Davis shortly after her husband’s imprisonment, he climbed on Davis’s bandwagon. He knew and respected Charles O’Conor, and introduced him to major political figures. He also lobbied in Washington, even writing on Davis’s behalf directly to the chief justice.