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Hitler's Lost Spy

Page 14

by Greg Clancy


  Annette’s transition into the field of espionage was therefore likely to have been influenced by her husband. However, the seeds may have been sown earlier, or even perhaps while in Africa. The pro-German sentiments in South Africa were powerful and may have influenced Annette when news from the world reaching into distant missions was slow and politically filtered.

  Perhaps Annette’s work in South Africa was not an enigma after all. She may well have harboured humane intentions that were directed into volunteer work within a Christian environment – and evidence to the contrary does not exist. The drift into something else would come later.

  Marriage

  Annette’s marriage to Robert Wagner is likely to have caused a giant leap forward in her political transition in the direction of Germany and the Nazis. Robert was born a German, but while his birthplace, Alsace, was now French, a strong contingent of the population retained many of the old German roots and welcomed the German return during Hitler’s invasion of France in May 1940. Robert was not the only connection Annette had with Alsace. She had travelled there to visit her Godmother, Madame Lauth, whose family controlled interests in the textile industry. Alsace, therefore, had held common interests for both Annette and Robert.

  Annette’s Personality

  Stealing a post-dated gaze into Annette’s personality traits is fraught with several difficulties. However, in understanding the fundamental process of why she availed herself to German espionage in Australia, and how effective she was at doing this requires some attention. Taking into consideration the length of time since her death, that personal witness statements can no longer be obtained, general documentary corroboration being sketchy and that little is known of her life and relationships prior to arriving in Australia, the prospects of producing a meaningful account of her character may appear to be remote. Further, Annette was a spy, and this will naturally impact on her ‘normal’ conduct and activities, as well as anyone’s capabilities to find evidence of them. A spy automatically adopts a suitable disposition designed to lead those with whom the spy associates to believe they are someone else. This adds to the complication of assessing Annette. One witness familiar with Annette was Jack Clancy. His descriptions of his involvement with her did not offer any specific leads as to her personality traits, but his enduring smile during his recollections perhaps offered an indirect pointer to his assessment of the lady.

  Difficult as it may be to create a character portrayal of Annette, extracts from her file offer some interesting insights advised by those who had monitored her movements.

  In November 1938, the month following her revealing Port Stephens visit, a report on Annette was issued by the Newcastle headquarters of the Australian Military Forces, 2nd Military District. Under the title ‘Movements of Aliens’, comments on Annette included:

  She is described as being ‘about 30, clever, smart, attractive, good talker and game and makings generally of a good spy’.

  Then there is the Military Intelligence report referred to previously:

  Annette is quite a person in authority. She has been heard telephoning and speaking to people, particularly German men. She does not make requests, she orders.

  A report dated 14 February 1939 includes a commentary on Annette’s friendships with other residents at The Manor.

  She speaks to no one except Jean Morton and Miss Maddox. Lately she includes a third friend amongst those she talks with, Miss E Caspers who lives at No. 2, a daughter of the late Judge Caspers. She was in MI5 during the War. Miss Caspers will attend to getting her the job with Horderns. She does not like Annette but thinks her above ordinary intelligence and also suspect. Annette is very attractive, soigné, and well dressed … Is very competent, downright, good organizer.

  Picking through the above extracts, Annette appears to have been mature, assertive, confident, controlled, well organised, energetic, sharp and private. From these characteristics it is not difficult to envisage Annette producing three more qualities, essential for a highly competent female spy: modesty, discretion and discipline.

  But when we talk of Annette as being downright, confident and controlled, we may expect an interjection. It would be fair to ask, ‘Wait – how do those personal characteristics line up with someone whose final decision in life was to commit suicide by jumping out of a window? How “controlled” is that?’

  The answer is the pervading ghost of Annette’s immediate past – the likelihood that her life was largely dictated by a blind dedication to a lost cause. Annette fitted the mould of a true believer – so regulated by Nazi ideology that its defeat probably left her, like millions of others, with disillusionment in her existence and saddled with a black-hole future.

  As the inevitability of losing the war seeped home to the Nazis, suicides abounded. These resulted from a dread of the anticipated vengeance by the Allies – particularly the Russians – a fear of national retribution, public humiliation in war crime investigations, the need to confront an obliterated economy and the erroneous conviction that the destroyed National Socialist system supposed that after Hitler, there was little to live for.

  That Annette Wagner committed suicide more than a year after the end of the war in Europe suggests it was the last of the above reasons by which she was most influenced.

  There is an accompanying ingredient to the above – and it reaches into Annette’s private world. When the war in Europe concluded, whom could she turn to? What associates or friends were readily available to communicate with and to rely upon? What were her private emotions and feelings for others? In 1946 positive answers to these questions were imaginary. Her parents and ‘adoptive’ parents in England had all passed away, she claimed her marriage had failed, she had few friends in Australia, and probably less elsewhere, she did not have children and visits to her two brothers, who she said lived in Geneva, were rare – if they happened at all. Any friendships with others in German intelligence would have dissipated as Paris was liberated and the German retreat set in. And she may have adopted a new identity. This all sums up to the likelihood that at the war’s end Annette was a very lonely woman.

  Added to the loneliness was the impact of isolation as she secreted herself in her escape from those who now sought to settle old scores. The woman in control – the woman who did not ask questions, but gave orders – was, when she walked across the bridge to the Île de la Cité in July 1946, likely to have been friendless and living with a profound sense of abandonment and hopelessness. As with her spying days in Australia, establishing new contacts always carried a risk, and supporters were difficult to find, and usually suspect – her intelligence experiences would see to that. Added to all this was Annette’s residency in a country of which she was legally a citizen, but which she had betrayed through her work with its occupiers.

  For Annette, the dynamics at work in 1946 were light years away from the relative comfort of her radio broadcasting in Australia. Would she have had regrets? Would she have spent time contemplating the past and bemoaning the decisions that resulted in her departure from Australia? Probably not. Annette’s spying energies were directed to other immediate demands and this, from 1938 until her death, dominated her way of life. Like millions of others at the time, she worked and lived for a future that now lay in ashes.

  While it is not difficult for posterity to review her final act and suggest there was another way for her – anything, except what occurred – Annette’s suicide was not the result of a hurried, poorly calculated, and possibly regrettable decision. The elements of her resolve were complex. They came from a convoluted era when basic and decent personal choices were often influenced by political and social forces difficult to fully comprehend.

  Public opinion in France in the wake of Germany’s withdrawal in the months following D-Day necessitates a brief reference. Much anger from the people flared following the early release from detention of many collaborators and other ‘undesirables’ who went without restriction as internment camps closed. Prisoner
s of war returned home in large numbers. Revenge was in the air, and justice was often little more than arbitrary. Intensifying these community stresses was the return of concentration camp inmates from Germany, many bent on the settling of scores against those fellow citizens who may have been complicit through treachery with the enemy – real or imaginary.

  Finally, there was the effect of the contacts between the German occupiers and French women (the ‘horizontal collaborators’). Whatever the reasons for these relationships – and there was generally more than one – vengeance against the women was often swift as each population centre was liberated. For some women, fleeing from their hometown was the only opportunity to avoid humiliation or to ensure their personal security, or both. Should some form of punishment be deemed fitting for those who slept with the enemy, what could Annette expect for working with the enemy? Her activities were treasonous and she could expect a far worse fate at the hands of a vengeful population than the women experiencing the degradation of having their heads shaved in a public square.

  This was the vulnerable backdrop to Annette’s isolated existence from the time she shed her German intelligence credentials until July 1946. And this, united with her pre-war experiences, produced the tangled atmosphere in which lay the decision to end her life shortly after her thirty-fourth birthday.

  FOOTNOTES

  * * *

  16 Annette’s relative with whom she lived near Newcastle. Clearly, the female agent who obtained this information had successfully accessed the household.

  12

  Conclusion

  Before attempting to gauge the scope of Annette Wagner’s espionage role in Australia, there are five central questions inviting a brief re-examination.

  Which spy agency specifically was Annette’s employer and who were her controllers – i.e. what organisation did she allegedly spy for and which individuals were her contacts?

  What was to be her role in Australia?

  Did the Australian authorities believe that Annette Wagner was a spy, or was she, like many others, only a suspect?

  What were the known essential errors she committed during her period in Australia?

  Was Annette recruited as a spy before arriving in Australia, or following her arrival?

  The full answers to these questions would place Annette’s activities into complete perspective, and together would neatly sign off her case. The remaining unknowns could have then been estimated with some accuracy and slipped into the program of events. There are, of course, other questions, the answers to which would complete the full history of the lady. But her entire story will never be told, due partly to the clandestine nature of espionage and partly to the universal practice of protecting field agents like Annette as the need arises.

  So we will use what we have to answer the important questions of interest and leave the remainder to our imagination and reasoning.

  Addressing the above questions:

  Identifying Annette’s controllers may have been the most valuable information Security officials could obtain following her unveiling. Had this occurred, the potential for the revelation of further exposures of spies, the spy agency and operational techniques that could determine both current and future undertakings may have been possible. However, spies themselves may have no idea who their ultimate employer is – and for good reason. In some instances, a spy may suspect – but not know – which country he or she is working for. They usually function on a ‘need to know’ basis and their vital communications are often with individuals about whom they know very little. It may also be in the interest of a spy’s personal safety, not to mention their employer’s, to know any more details than are necessary. Annette knew she was working for Nazi Germany, but she may not have known which organisation within Germany’s huge intelligence industry was the final recipient of her data – and nor would anyone on the other side attempting to find the answer.

  The surveillance placed on Annette may have yielded a satisfactory result, but it apparently failed to provide solid leads to identify the next level in her spying management structure – her controllers. Most importantly, the monitoring of Annette destroyed the strategies to have her positioned for spying activities following the commencement of the war.

  There was nothing known about Annette that gave any signals about her future spying intentions. It is highly likely that her services were centred on providing shipping information and espionage resources to other spies who were unable to safely carry out an assignment. But just ‘being there’ in case of need was an espionage advantage and good insurance for the future. Her radio programs were a bonus and would almost certainly have been used for safely conveying her clandestine messages.

  Did Military Intelligence know what she was doing in her spare time? With the exception of a few well-monitored events, such as the Newcastle flight, the answer is no. However, evidence that Military Intelligence understood her spying objectives will no longer come to light. But, did they know that Annette was a spy? Yes. There was too much vital information collected to suggest otherwise.

  What were Annette’s critical mistakes? A spy’s illicit activities are usually discovered through carelessness, poor task assessment, being a victim of betrayal, the undertaking of a mission beyond the spy’s capabilities, the result of a vigilant opposition, some bad luck, or a blend of two or more of these possibilities.

  Regardless of being an intelligent and highly competent performer, Annette committed four crucial errors. These were:

  Drawing attention to herself at Port Stephens. Without the ensuing surveillance, her activities may have completely evaded suspicion.

  Being unaware of that surveillance. Perhaps she was careless, or overconfident, or the surveillance may have been particularly effective. Maybe all three, but the result for Annette was the same. She very strenuously safeguarded against contact disclosure, such as avoiding recognition of Arnold Kaemper on the morning ferry rides across the harbour; however, her communication plan was unknown, but whatever strategy she devised to ensure the avoidance of suspicion, it had holes in it. Her revealing meetings at The Manor were monitored by the sheltering agents on the outside, and equally dangerous for Annette, information was obtained from the inside as well. At close quarters, the spy was herself spied upon.

  The CIB interview was the finale in closing the loop on Annette’s security status. Her denials to questions, the answers to which were already known to authorities, completed the case against her.

  Leaving Jack Clancy in the aeroplane at Newcastle airport within sight of her meeting with other German agents was a blunder that exposed her miscalculated overconfidence in securing a friend for the mission. Details of her spy flight in Newcastle were in the hands of Military Intelligence within a few hours of Jack’s return to Sydney.

  Following the CIB interview, Annette’s case was now at a new juncture: what to do with her? From what is known of her activities, she did not break the law. In peacetime, taking photographs of harbours and steel mills is hardly a criminal offence. In Annette’s case, her activities were highly suspect, but they were not illegal. In the circumstances, the most effective option for Security would be a three-stage procedure of having her ‘voluntarily’ removed from the country, forwarding an assessment of her activities to the authorities at her destination, Madagascar, and monitoring her possible re-entry into the country, which she was legally entitled to do. This is precisely what occurred.

  The origin of Annette’s recruitment is not known. The foremost objective of those who arranged her services was concealment, and this was an unqualified success. Knowing when and how Annette was secured would have completed gaps in her narrative and may have provided a clearer basis for understanding the background to her suicide.

  The absence of answers to a range of events and undertakings in Annette’s spying career does not detract from the conclusions in the critical point at issue. The answers would assist in modelling the spying role of Annette Wagner while in A
ustralia. This lack of information does not, however, preclude an assessment of her role, based upon the known facts. Out of this assessment evolve some personal, although guarded, features of Annette, the woman.

  The Posthumous Judgement of Annette Wagner

  In a civil or criminal action, circumstantial evidence has limited legal weight. The evidence against Annette was exactly that – circumstantial. However there is another principle – that of the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, and herein lies the rule that the greater the volume of such evidence, the nearer a case comes to being proven.

  Using the same legal principles, how would Annette Wagner’s innocence or guilt be determined on a charge of spying for an enemy nation? We can ignore the fact that Germany was not an enemy when Annette was conducting her 1939 ‘preliminaries’. The plain question is – was she a spy for a country governed by an unpardonable political system, or has she been unfairly denounced by overzealous internal security procedures of the day?

  Annette’s defence case would rest on the assertion, ‘where’s the proof?’ The reality is that evidence proving she was a spy does not exist. But the prosecution would submit substantial evidence that, examined cumulatively, would outweigh the requirement for absolute proof and produce a line of argument with which any reasonable person could not disagree.

  There are some interesting claims and suggestions about Annette Wagner’s questionable activities that unfortunately carry little in the way of powerful evidence. Her Japanese connection is one such example. Did she work for the Japanese Embassy in London? The records for all Embassy staff prior to 1940 no longer exist. Did she work with the Japanese legation at the League of Nations? Again, the records are not there. Did she attempt to travel to Japan when she left Australia in February 1940? Probably, but no written corroboration appears to have survived.

 

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