The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945

by Richard Overy

  The one lesson that the RAF and the government failed to learn from the German experience was, paradoxically, the reality of relative failure. German bombing did not dislocate the economy seriously nor did it undermine civilian commitment to the war effort, as the Air Ministry could clearly see. It was difficult to argue that German ‘morale’ would somehow crack if British morale had remained intact after nine months of remorseless assault. When the new directive was shown to the American chiefs of staff at the Argentia meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941, they found it hard to reconcile the morale bombing of Germany with the ‘valorous experience’ of the British people under German bombardment.110 The RAF could not ignore this paradox. It was resolved by suggesting that the Germans lacked the qualities of endurance and pluck displayed by the British under fire. The general prejudice among senior airmen was that the German people, as one intelligence report put it, ‘will not stand a quarter of the bombing’ dished out to Britain, though there were few sensible grounds for believing it.111 A report in July 1941 following a meeting in Lisbon with American diplomatic personnel from Germany, suggested that the average German worker displayed a ‘lack of moral fibre’.112 An Air Staff memorandum produced in September 1941 accepted that in the British case bombing tended to stiffen rather than weaken morale, but went on to argue that the Germans had based their campaign on judging the poor morale of their own people. Made of sterner stuff, British morale had not given way, but, the report concluded, ‘the wheel has gone full cycle, and it has become increasingly clear that one of the most (if not the most) serious chinks in the German armour is the morale of the civil population’.113 The paper concluded with an unambiguous statement of the purpose that now lay behind the British bombing offensive:

  The ultimate aim of the attack of a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To achieve this we must achieve two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim is, therefore, twofold, namely, to produce:

  (i) Destruction, and (ii) The fear of death.

  Here was a German lesson to be taught to the Germans.

  BOMBER COMMAND IN CRISIS: 1941–2

  By the time the July 1941 directive was issued, the war had suddenly changed its character. Heavy German bombing of British cities stopped in early June, and on 22 June as many as 4 million Axis forces poured across the Soviet border in the largest invasion in history. That same evening Churchill broadcast to the nation, pledging British support for the Soviet Union against ‘the bloodthirsty guttersnipe’ who had now unleashed war against another suffering people. He announced that he had offered Stalin all technical and economic assistance, but the one military pledge he made was to promise ‘to bomb Germany by day as well as by night with ever-increasing measure’ to give the German people a taste of their own medicine.114 On 7 July Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin explaining that the best Britain could offer as direct military assistance was bombing; this, Churchill continued, would force Germany to divert fighters to the west, and ease the pressure on the Soviet front.115 Churchill hoped privately that the new campaign would prompt Soviet bombers to attack Germany from the east: ‘A lot of German war industry should be vulnerable especially if we are bombing from the other side.’ Stalin replied that he would prefer Britain to open a second front in northern France or Scandinavia.116

  Churchill exaggerated what Bomber Command was capable of achieving and misunderstood the nature of Soviet air strategy, which favoured ground support over long-range bombing. But Bomber Command used the German-Soviet war as a way to improve its low political stock. On 21 July 1941 Churchill and Attlee were invited to view a demonstration by the heavy bombers that were scheduled to come into large-scale service over the coming year. The party watched as five heavy four-engine bombers flew past at low altitude: a Short Stirling, an Avro Lancaster, a Handley Page Halifax and two American bombers promised to Britain under the Lend-Lease scheme authorized in March 1941, the Boeing B-17 ‘Flying Fortress’ and the Consolidated B-24 ‘Liberator’. The party was impressed in particular by the Lancaster, but there were reservations in the RAF about the American bombers with their more limited bombloads.117 The political imperative of supporting the Soviet war effort suited Bomber Command in summer 1941 because it gave the Command a prominence that its poor operational record scarcely warranted. Churchill needed bombing as something to trade with Stalin. Later in the war Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peck, in a speech surveying the course of British bombing, reminded his audience that in summer 1941 the air forces were given the task of supporting Russia by bombing Germany: ‘Not everyone has appreciated,’ he continued, ‘the extent to which the bomber offensive was applied to aid the Russian armies.’118

  The political imperative masked the operational reality. On 22 June, the night of the German invasion, 70 medium bombers raided the north German port of Bremen; it was covered in haze and the bombing was scattered. The following night 62 bombers raided Cologne where a few bombs fell on the city but there were no reported casualties; 41 bombers raided Düsseldorf with no clear result; 26 aircraft attacked Kiel with little effect and one death.119 These were no larger than the attacks still being mounted by the exiguous German force left in northern France – raids on Birmingham with 94 and 88 aircraft, on Hull with 78, 64 and 114, on London with 60 – and considerably less destructive.120 Most RAF attacks were still being made on targets on the French coast. On 7 July Churchill complained to Portal that he should stop bombing these Battle of the Atlantic targets and concentrate on ‘the devastation of the German cities’ to take the weight off Russia. The war diary written up at Hitler’s supreme headquarters failed even to mention any of the British raids.121

  Summer 1941 was not the first time that bombing had been promoted for political reasons, but the fear that Germany might defeat the Soviet Union and turn back to Britain with all the resources of Eurasia at its disposal gave bombing an added urgency. It also made the operational inadequacy of Bomber Command more obtrusive. In early July Churchill complained to Lindemann, Portal and the Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, that the bomber force was little larger than it had been the year before, though it was supposed to be ‘indispensable for victory’.122 High losses and the slow build-up of bomber production had indeed reduced the plans for expansion. There was worse to come. In July 1941 Lindemann asked Bomber Command whether he might investigate bombing accuracy by analysing photographs taken during operations. This was a project that had only become possible since the early summer. When the war broke out the RAF had day cameras but none suitable for night photography. Trials were carried out with the standard F.24 camera using a shutter mechanism and a large flash unit released manually through the bomber’s flare shute. When the flare was at maximum intensity, one of the bomber crew had to close the shutter. The result was a complex operation designed to be undertaken at the most dangerous point over the target. Research began on an automatic night camera but it was not ready until 1942. The force had to make do in 1941 with a simplified camera with no shutter, which produced a poorer image but one regarded as adequate. In December 1940 there were still only 13 cameras available; Peirse asked for 500 so that most bombers could carry them. By March 1941 there were 75, by September there were 200.123 Taking an effective photograph was always difficult, with the ground obscured by smoke and the camera confused by flares, gunbursts and searchlights. Pilots disliked the order to keep a level flightpath while the picture was taken. Nevertheless, from June 1941 a growing stream of images became available for the first time, interpreted by a special unit set up at RAF Mednenham. Now that a fuller photographic record was possible, Portal willingly agreed to Lindemann’s request, perhaps not fully aware of what the results might show.124

  Lindemann instructed a young economist on his staff in the Statistical Section, David Bensusan-Butt, to examine 650 photographs taken from 100 raids between 2 June and 2
5 July 1941. The report was ready by 18 August. The analysis showed that in general only one in five of all bomber aircraft sent on a mission reached within five miles of the assigned target; of those recorded as actually bombing, the proportion was one in four over Germany, one in 10 over the Ruhr industrial area, and on moonless or hazy nights one in 15.125 Churchill was alarmed by the revelations: ‘It is an awful thought,’ he wrote to Portal, ‘that perhaps three-quarters of our bombs go astray.’126 The RAF response was, not surprisingly, defensive. Portal pointed out that weather over Germany had been very poor in June and July; that the Butt Report covered only one-tenth of Bomber Command sorties; that inexperienced navigators probably took images too long after the release of the bombs (almost certainly the case, given the difficulty of operating the camera and seeing the bomb burst below); and, above all, that German raids tracked over Britain showed only 24 per cent of German bombers reaching the target area. Even Lindemann admitted that conditions had not been ideal for photographic analysis in the summer months.127 Portal was no doubt correct to argue that the Butt Report was subject to substantial methodological flaws, but the RAF’s own operational evidence gathered since 1940 had consistently shown a very wide margin of error between what the crews reported and what had actually been bombed. Given Bomber Command’s continued practice of sending raids to two or three cities on the same night, and in relatively small numbers, the aircraft likely to be hitting a particular aiming point in Germany on any one raid would be in single figures.

  The Butt Report has generally been regarded as a turning point in the British bomber offensive, but its significance can easily be exaggerated. Peirse had asked the Air Ministry in December 1940 to speed up camera supply so that a proper survey of accuracy and bombing effort could be made.128 Detailed examination of photographic evidence had already been carried out by Bomber Command in April, and again in June 1941, each time showing how over-optimistic were the reports of the crews and how wide the margin of error. Exaggerated reports were common to both sides in the bomber war, but the sober reality was often understood by those who flew. Robert Kee, a bomber pilot and future historian, later reflected on what his diary entries from late 1941 showed him:

  … it read pretty depressingly in terms of successful operations … Here is an attempt to bomb Brunswick, hopelessly dark, bombed some incendiaries at what we hoped was Hanover. Düsseldorf also hopeless, bombed searchlight concentration. Kiel, this is three in succession. Kiel, hopeless again, very bad weather … Mannheim, too much cloud, bombed searchlights.129

  In October the Operational Research Section of Bomber Command, established at Peirse’s request in September under the direction of Dr Basil Dickens, reviewed accuracy for the three months following the Butt Report. It was found that the average performance was even worse than feared: only 15 per cent of aircraft bombed within five miles of the target point.130

  In truth, the Butt Report highlighted just one of the many problems facing the force in the late summer of 1941, important though it was. Losses began to increase substantially as the result of stronger German defences, placing a heavier burden on a training programme which turned out a growing number of crewmen with limited understanding of what was required of them. ‘The one failing of the whole training system,’ recalled a rear gunner, ‘was that we weren’t told more of what to expect. We just learned it strictly from experience.’ Peirse told the Air Ministry that up to 40 per cent of the operational squadrons’ work consisted of essential additional training, which resulted in regular accidents. Most of the non-operational flying was done during the day, which also prepared crew poorly for what to expect of night-time conditions.131 In August Bomber Command lost 525 aircraft destroyed or severely damaged (a wastage rate of 13 per cent, many lost to accidents) but received only 106 replacements. In the following three months a further 578 aircraft were written off, many again on non-operational flights. Raids carried out on Berlin for political effect had losses of 30 per cent.132 Between July and December 1941 the force showed a steady decline in its capability (see Table 5.1).

  There are many explanations for the crisis now confronted by Bomber Command. The new strategy of attacks on city areas was only possible with better equipment, and the directives failed to take sufficient account of what technology was currently available. The most pressing need was for larger aircraft capable of carrying a much greater tonnage, dropped with greater accuracy. This was an obvious solution and the pressure to accelerate output and improve navigation came from all sides. Yet the heavy bombers that Churchill had been shown in July were still only available in very small numbers because of persistent problems with technical development, while improved navigation was still at the experimental stage despite more than 18 months of war. The Stirling and the Halifax made their first sorties in February and March 1941. The Short Stirling Mk I was the only one of Britain’s wartime bombers designed from the start to have four engines. First commissioned in 1936, the prototype made its first successful flight in December 1939 and the first aircraft came into service late in 1940. Powered by four Bristol Hercules engines, the Stirling had a top speed of 270 mph and a range of 590 miles with a full bombload of 14,000 lbs. It had a limited flying ceiling but good defensive capabilities with three powered turrets, yet it was plagued with technical problems which had to be ironed out in 1941 and early 1942. The same was true for the Handley Page Halifax, which also stemmed from a 1936 specification and was originally designed as a twin-engine medium/heavy bomber. In 1937 it was converted to four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines and the prototype flew in October 1939. The Halifax Mk I was developed rapidly and was in service by November 1940. Its first operation, against the French port of Le Havre, was made in March 1941. It had a low operational ceiling of 18,000 feet, a top speed of 265 mph and a range of 1,260 miles with a maximum bombload of 13,000 lbs. The aircraft exhibited persistent development problems, had slow handling characteristics and took high losses. Output continued because it was difficult to disrupt production schedules already laid down, but it was an unpopular aircraft with bomber crews.134

  Table 5.1: Bomber Command Statistics, July 1941–February 1942133

  Month Bomb Tonnage Bomber Sorties Aircraft/Crews (average) Aircraft Missing

  July 1941 4,384 3,989 449 152

  August 4,242 3,988 486 156

  September 2,889 3,021 485 95

  October 2,984 2,715 517 86

  November 1,907 1,765 507 83

  December 1,794 1,582 530 47

  January 1942 2,292 2,226 410 56

  February 1,011 1,506 374 41

  (Aircraft missing are missing on operations. The number damaged or lost to accidents was higher; figures include all heavy, medium and light-bomber operations)

  Sources: TNA, AIR 9/150, DBOps to DCAS, 11 Sept 1941; AIR 22/203, War Room Manual of Bomber Command Operations, 1939–1945, 20–21; AIR 41/41, RAF Narrative, ‘The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany: Vol III’, App C, E1.

  The third heavy bomber, the Avro Lancaster, grew out of another twin-engine development, the Manchester, also first specified in 1936. The Manchester was designed around twin Rolls-Royce Vulture engines, but these proved to be a constant source of technical delays. The prototype flew in July 1939, the first service aircraft were delivered in November 1940. The first raid was against the French port of Brest in February 1941, but repeated engine failure led to the cancellation of further production and only 209 were built. In late 1940 a Manchester Mk III was produced with four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines. It was renamed the ‘Lancaster’ and for Bomber Command it was an unexpected godsend. The Lancaster had a much better performance, a top speed of 287 mph, a ceiling of almost 25,000 feet and a range of over 1,000 miles even with its heaviest load of 22,000 lbs. The usual load was somewhere between 14,000 and 18,000 lbs and the range correspondingly farther. Its carrying capacity was larger than any other bomber used in the European theatre, and four or five times that of the standard German medium bombers. Some 6,750 Lanca
sters were produced during the war, the mainstay of the later force. Unlike the Halifax, the Lancaster had a more modest loss rate (3.92 per cent compared with 5.75 per cent), absorbed less production effort, carried an average of almost twice as much bomb weight and was easier to service.135 But it only began operations in modest numbers in 1942. In 1941 the small total of heavy bombers dropped only 4,000 tons against the 31,500 tons dropped by the Wellington medium bombers.136

  The advent of heavier aircraft would mean that the RAF could take advantage of both a new generation of heavier bombs under development and the rapid expansion of bomb production. The prospect of increasing the aggregate payload was regarded as the critical factor in the offensive, but it had to be postponed until the heavy-bomber force became available. The 250-lb and 500-lb General Purpose bombs were still extensively in use in 1941; larger 1,000, 2,000 and 4,000-lb bombs, more suitable for the larger bomber models, were developed during the Blitz and brought into use in small numbers. These Medium Capacity (MC) and High Capacity (HC) bombs had a higher charge-to-weight ratio, a thinner metal shell and a much greater blast effect. However, they still lacked aluminized explosive, which would have increased that effect more than threefold; only later in the war was Lindemann finally able to persuade the RAF to adopt it. The 4-lb incendiary bomb remained standard equipment but was supplemented by the larger 30-lb firebomb with a blend of phosphorous, rubber and benzol gel, 400,000 of which were ordered in June 1941 and 3 million used by the end of the war.137 All these bombs became available in quantities too large for the existing bomber force to use. In April 1941, 12 million incendiaries were ordered for the rest of the year and 36 million for 1942; because of magnesium shortages, however, output was only 2.2 million in the nine months of 1941 and 11.8 million in 1942, but these figures were more than enough for a force not yet converted fully to mass incendiary bombing. By the end of 1941 there was a surplus of more than 2 million bombs and monthly production was double monthly expenditure.138 By summer 1941 around 11,000 tons of high-explosive bombs were being produced and filled every month, though Bomber Command had dropped an average of just 948 tons a month between January and April and averaged only 1,884 tons between July and December. In October 1941 there were unused stocks of 121,000 tons of bombs.139 This was the reverse of the German problem during the Blitz, when there had been the aeroplanes but insufficient filled bombs; the RAF had the bombs but not enough heavy and medium bombers to use them.