Peter G. Tsouras
Page 20
Robertson, John, Australia Goes to War (Doubleday, Sydney, 1984).
Toland, John, The Rising Sun (Random House, New York, 1970).
Trigellis-Smith, Syd, All the King's Enemies: A History of the 2/5 Australian Infantry Battalion (Headquarters Training Command, Australian Army, George's Heights, 1994).
United States, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History. Japanese Monographs series: Monographs 22, 37, 71, 96, 105, 116.
Willmott, H. P., Empires in the Balance (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1982).
, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983).
Notes
1. Churchill, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (Viking Press, New York, 1966), 318-19.
2. Both preceding quotes are taken from “General Outline of Policy of Future War Guidance,” adopted by Liaison Conference on March 7, 1942, as published in Louis Morton, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1962), 611-13.
3. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992), 73-82.
4. Quoted in John Toland, The Rising Sun (Random House, New York, 1970), vol. I, 378.
5. Combined Ugaki quote from Morton, op.cit., 215-16, and Fuchida and Okumiya, op.cit., 75.
6. Quoted with slight rearrangement from Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1, November 5, 1941, in Morton, op.cit., 204.
7. Fuchida and Okumiya, op.cit., 82.
8. Yamashita's plan, see John Robertson, Australia Goes to War (Doubleday, Sydney, 1984), 104.
9. Japanese Army and Navy agreement of February 16, 1942, quoted in Samuel Milner, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Victory in Papua (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1957), 10.
10. Quote from Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal (Penguin, New York, 1992), 44. The 8th Fleet was actually not established until July 1942.
11. Japanese deployments have been advanced by several months. All of these units actually arrived in the general New Guinea area in late 1942 and early 1943. The 17th Army was organized on May 2, 1942, the tank divisions in August 1942.
12. The carrier strike force under Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi included two cruisers, six destroyers, and an oiler, as well as Hara's two carriers.
13. Japanese account quoted in John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1976), 98.
14. Two preceding quotes are from U.S. Pacific Fleet estimates from April 1942 in Lundstrom, op.cit., 79-81.
15. Speech of December 8, 1941, quoted in David Horner (ed.), The Battles That Shaped Australia (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1994), 34.
16. Nimitz to King, May 15, 1942, in Lundstrom, op.cit., 160.
17. MacArthur statements from April 28 and May 6, 1942, in David Horner, High Command (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992), 192-93.
18. With the exception of 14th Brigade (at Port Moresby with 30th Brigade), these were the actual Allied dispositions in May-July 1942. David Horner, Crisis of Command (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1978).
19. Quoted in Horner, High Command, 186.
20. Mrs. M. Bryson, quoted in Horner (ed.), The Battles That Shaped Australia, 120.
21. Blamey's memoirs, quoted in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds.), Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace (Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1988), 263.
22. Inspired by the action of U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima.
*23. Both quotes are invented.
*24. Saburo Hayashi, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Greenwood Press, Westport, 1959), 41-48; and Fuchida and Okumiya, op.cit, 77-82.
*25. H. P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin (U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983), 67-68.
CHAPTER 7
The Japanese Raj
The Conquest of India
David C Isby
The Japanese conquest of the British Indian Empire was one of the most dramatic successes of World War II. It was not a goal of Japan's opening offensive against the Allies in 1941–42 but it followed domino-fashion, from the military success that this offensive achieved. The Empire's fall was the direct result of decades of unrest preceding the outbreak of war, which had undercut the legitimacy of British rule in many eyes, not only in the subcontinent, but also in Britain. It was also made possible by Japan's willingness to use intelligence of this weakness to commit much of their strategic reserve—in ships, divisions, and fuel oil—that had been intended to maintain the defensive perimeter, to an offensive against India instead.
Throughout history, empire has succeeded empire. The British Indian Empire would surely have lasted but a scant few years more had it not been itself defeated and replaced by a Japanese successor as part of the tide of conquest that swept all Asia in 1942. Yet the same forces that doomed the British Raj turned out also to make sure that the Japanese Indian Empire, and its impact on India and the subcontinent, would be even briefer than its predecessor.
Overstretch That Succeeded
The British Indian Empire had been generally peripheral in prewar Japanese strategic thinking, including the issue of how its independence movement could best be used to Japanese advantage.1 However, as the Japanese strategy moved toward one of confrontation with Western imperialism and economic presence in Asia, India took on additional importance.
The Japanese prewar strategic reassessment of India initially saw it as the base of support of hostile forces in the Nan-yo, the resource-rich areas of Southeast Asia that were the Japanese strategic focus. They did not apply much of their limited planning resources to how this base function could be attacked, interdicted, or disrupted, or even what Japan's overall policy should be toward Indian nationalism and anti-imperialism. Yet the absence of planning and long-range thinking was easier to reconcile in the case of Japan than for the other combatants. This was because of the tendency, as strategic options became narrower, to optimistically believe that if enough spirit and guts imbued the leadership, the way would become clear. Thus, rather than a specific plan, or even a commitment to a particular purpose, the Japanese approach to India would be guided by an ability to respond to opportunities. More rationally, the Japanese stressed the achievement of what today would be called a “rapid reaction” capability, or “proactive” behavior. Realizing they were unlikely to prevail in a major battle of attrition, the Japanese made a point of being able to decide, plan, and act quickly to take advantage of transitory advantages. This was a goal of Japanese military thinking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels alike.
So it was not a great stretch or a violation of precepts when, in the opening stages of the war, Japan realized that India would become a key member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, even though prewar strategy had looked to Burma to provide its western perimeter.2 Even Burma was a late addition, and Japanese operations there were originally intended only to cut off the Burma Road to China rather than opening a major front against the Allies.
The liaison conferences held in Tokyo in November 1941 had stressed the use of political and indirect penetration against India rather than direct military conquest.3 This reflected Japanese caution at the potential for an open-ended ground war in Asia, as in China. Yet, within a few months, a number of changes would force the Japanese to reassess their strategic perceptions of India. One factor that drew the Japanese toward a greater strategic focus on the subcontinent was the prospect of interallied cooperation. Even though Japan and Germany were not to be partners in a drive against the Soviet Union, the German successes in North Africa, the Middle East (including the abortive revolt in Iraq), and the possibility of a drive into South Asia from the southern flank of the Soviet Union suggested that German-Japanese cooperation could become a valid strategic concept.
That it did not
was not the fault of Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin. He might never have understood the weakness in much of German strategy and their disinclination to look beyond the immediate operational situation.4But he and his German counterparts could both see that the British had to divert additional resources to the western approaches to India, which could weaken their ability to respond to a Japanese attack from the east. They also raised—but did not resolve—the issue of whether the objective of a move against India would be the disruption of Britain's worldwide lines of communication or be a continuation of Japan's expansion into Burma from Southeast Asia. The Germans, naturally, were most interested in a Japanese attack on Ceylon and subsequent attacks into the Indian Ocean. This would have a more direct potential impact on the Allied position in North Africa and the Middle East than on the battles that would shape Japan's future. In response, in Berlin in December 1941, Am-march on India. “After the capture of Singapore, Japan must turn toward India. When Japan attacks India from the east, it would be most advantageous if German troops threaten India from the west.”5
Yet, even though German troops were never to get within striking range of India, the Japanese were encouraged to look in that direction by what proved to be an illusion of cooperation. This made sure India would be included in the objectives that expanded after the victories of 1941-42, even though it appeared remote from more immediate Japanese objectives.
However, as Japanese prewar planning was swept away after the fall of Singapore, by what came to he called the “victory disease,” the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was redefined to include India.6 It was not a foregone conclusion how this would be implemented since Japanese strategy and planning remained largely service-specific. The Japanese navy reacted to the victories of 1942 by planning larger advances, focusing on Hawaii but also including India.7 In the words of Adm. Matome Ugaki, chief of staff to the Combined Fleet, “Our strategy aimed at an invasion of Hawaii, Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia as well as dominating over India and the destruction of the British [Indian Ocean] squadron.”8 However, the plans for the invasion of Australia were being finalized at this point, and the Japanese recognized that a simultaneous attack on India would pose insurmountable problems.9 Therefore, if both India and Australia were part of Japan's newly expanded strategic objectives, they would have to be prioritized.
The Plan Is Nothing, Planning Is Everything
In early 1942, Prime Minister Tojo was the main supporter of operations against India.10 He was opposed in this by Gen. Count Hisaichi Terauchi (commander in chief of the Southern Army, with headquarters at Saigon) and Gen. Hajime Sugiyama (chief of the Army General Staff), and the various intelligence agency. In addition to concern about Japan's strategic direction, they remained concerned about the dangers of success, which would leave Japan in occupation. They saw the Indians as incapable of establishing an orderly state after the British were driven out. These leaders had little time for non-Japanese allies and even distrusted their own collaborators of the Indian National Army (organized on Tojo's orders), much as they had originally distrusted the Burmese collaborators they were now trying to organize to support Japanese control.11
Yet the army found India a possible option, in part as an alternative to ambitious naval plans for an expansion of the defensive perimeter throughout the Pacific.12 It at least would not result in the piecemeal commitment of forces that the navy's strategy would entail. If a decision was made for a move against India, planning would have to begin in January-February, at the end of the Malaya campaign. Any move against India before the May monsoon might mean delaying the campaign to occupy upper Burma, including the vital airfields at Mandalay and Lashio, controlling access to China. If that happened the forces committed to Burma would have to deal with the remaining British and Chinese forces in upper Burma through the monsoon, with few resources available.
In early 1942 the Japanese saw the same two basic strategic options for offensive operations as the Germans (and British) did. A move against India could either strike at Ceylon, which then gave them the option of threatening Britain's Indian Ocean lifelines around the Cape of Good Hope; or strike directly at India, with a cross-border attack launched from Burma as soon as the campaign there concluded. The mechanisms of attack were also undecided. Naval raids—the navy's preferred option— and invasion were both considered.13 The two invasion options were planned as “Operation 11” and “Operation 21,” against Ceylon and India respectively.14
Japan's attacks against British forces seemed irresistible in the spring of 1942. The triumph of Singapore was followed by the relentless advance in Burma, despite Chinese intervention and the difficult terrain that, together with Japanese shoestring logistics, slowed their advance more than did the British. The question that had to be resolved was where the next target would be. Obviously, the conclusions of November 1941 were now overtaken by events.
The need to improvise follow-on strategic planning—where there was neither the time nor inclination for an extensive analysis of alternatives—started when Japan diverged from prewar planning after the initial objectives of 1941-42 were met.15 The legacy of prewar planning meant that an improvised direct assault against India represented a gambler's throw of resources that could lead to immediate or long-term disaster. However, it was also clear, given the overall strategy, that if they did not win a battlefield victory over the Allies in the first six months, they were unlikely to win in the end. India was obviously the base from which the Allies' industrial superiority would allow the eventual buildup of forces and reoccupation of Burma and, beyond that, Southeast Asia. The Japanese were also under no illusions that the political turmoil in India might prevent this.
Implementing this high-risk strategy would be difficult. It would mean sending the exhausted troops from the Malaya and Java campaigns to India. They would comprise the follow-up echelons. The divisions responsible for the initial assault would have to be brought down from the central reserve in Japan and Manchuria, which itself was a risk. The divisions that had gone into Malaya greatly benefited from intensive training in French Indochina, but there would be no time for that if the follow-up operations were to benefit from the strategic momentum of Japan's victories.
Whether the target was to be Ceylon or India itself, an option including an invasion would require pulling together convoys of Japan's relatively few—and now increasingly vital—fast merchant ships. This meant disrupting scheduled convoy sailings and ensuring that stockpiles of petroleum, steel, and other strategic materials would be reduced to a level far below what was considered acceptable.
In addition to requiring new strategic replanning, the Japanese advances also brought them into contact with new Asian populations. The Japanese came increasingly to see themselves as their propaganda presented them—as the deliverer of Asia from white control. The brutality of their own decades-long rule in Korea and their war against China never entered the calculations of Japanese decision makers. The contradictions increasingly pushing the British Indian Empire toward its end—how an empire that legitimated its mobilization for war on the grounds of democracy and self-rule could deny it to an Indian empire led by an Anglicized elite—were not part of Japanese thinking. Thus, the Japanese were surprised by the increasing tension between ruler and ruled in their new empire, and that it was not limited to the ethnic Chinese who were the first targets of their repression.
The Defense of India
The British were hastily improvising a defense of India. They had not previously considered a threat to India from the east.16With the threat coming so soon after the defeat at Singapore, there was little that could be done. Many of the available reserves—a division of British infantry, a wing of Hurricane fighters—had been lost in that debacle and the subsequent one in Java. Finally, on March 31, the British Joint Planning Staff assessed that if the Japanese decided on a bold offensive strategy against India, there was a danger of British defeat.17
The British were in
a poor position to defend against any of the Japanese options. Churchill explained to a secret session of the House of Commons: “Alternatively [to an invasion of Australia) the Japanese may invade India. There is no doubt of their ability, if they choose to concentrate their efforts, to invade and overrun a large part of India, to take Calcutta and Madras, and certainly to make very cruel air raids upon defenseless Indian cities.”18 The commander in chief in India, Field Marshal Wavell—with only one British and six poorly trained and equipped Indian divisions available outside the Northwest Frontier—saw the main threat as coming overland from Burma, but he was overruled by the chiefs of staff in London, who redeployed his British division to Ceylon. 19
The Bengal administration, adjacent to Burma, was in no shape to be in the front line of a major conflict. It was unable to cope with the influx of refugees and military reinforcements, as well as a resurgence in nationalist unrest. Districts such as Contai, Midnapore, and Dacca were in open revolt much of the time.20 The limited number of British troops available rendered the internal security situation paramount. There was the threat of widespread insurrection, which increased as it increasingly appeared to much of the Indian population that the Japanese advance was unstoppable and that British rule in India was doomed.21
The Indian nationalist leadership divided on the Japanese threat that had appeared on their doorstep. The Congress Party, mainstream of Hindu nationalism, had opposed participation in the war, which had been entered into by the Viceroy without asking Indian approval. However, Congress was not united. Leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru offered stronger Indian participation in the war effort in return for immediate independence or at least its guarantee. Radical members of the Congress Party who had already diverged from the prewar leadership, such as Subhash Bose, saw the Japanese as a positive force and sought their assistance.