The New York Times Book of World War II, 1939-1945

by The New York Times

  In this global warfare it is a question of nice military judgment as to just where the available manpower and resources should be utilized to obtain maximum results. Nobody will today challenge the wisdom of the aid to Russia or the African landing which averted a German-Japanese junction in the Middle East. And if there was not enough left to provide more aid to the Far East than was actually sent, that was not a fault of distribution but a result of the original sin of all democracies—the sin of being unprepared for war.

  FEBRUARY 10, 1943

  U.S. Submarine Flaunts a Broom For Clean Sweep Off New Guinea

  By ROBERT TRUMBULL

  By Telephone to The New York Times.

  ABOARD THE U.S. SUBMARINE WAHOO, at a Pacific Base, Feb. 9—An engagement with a Japanese destroyer in a finger-like bay of Mushu Island, north of New Guinea, followed by a running torpedo and gun battle with a four-ship convoy the next day, gave this new submarine of the Pacific Fleet the right to wear a broom tied to her periscope when she came into port. The broom, by naval usage, denotes a “clean sweep.” The Wahoo earned the unofficial decoration by sinking all four ships of the convoy, in addition to the destroyer.

  The Wahoo’s captain, Lieut. Comdr. Dudley W. Morton, 35 years old, of Miami, Fla., and his executive officer, Lieut. Richard H. O’Kane, 32 years old, of San Rafael, Calif., told the story of this and later engagements that took place after the Wahoo had fired all her torpedoes. Regarding one of these, Lieut. Comdr. Morton remarked: “It was another running gun battle—destroyer gunning, Wahoo running.”

  FIVE CROWDED DAYS OF PERIL

  The Wahoo’s adventures on this patrol in the New Guinea area were compressed into five days crowded with peril. Once two members of the crew were wounded “as a result of enemy action.”

  A pharmacist’s mate had to amputate two toes of one of the men while the submarine was still under fire. Lacking surgical tools, he used a pair of wire-cutting pliers for the operation. The patient, Fireman H. P. Glinsky, is now doing well.

  This pharmacists’s mate, L. J. Lindhe of Wisconsin, affectionately dubbed “the Quack,” has been giving the back of Lieut. Comdr. Morton’s neck a daily massage for the past five days to relieve tenseness of muscles resulting from the action.

  “A form of being scared, gentlemen,” Lieut. Comdr. Morton told the press, explaining how he got the sore neck.

  At the time of the action Lieut. Comdr. Morton was exploring the new Japanese harbor of Wewak on the northern coast of New Guinea. We-wak is one of the advance bases being established by the Japanese as General Douglas MacArthur’s conquering forces drive them from their former strongholds in the regions of Buna and Gona. Wewak Harbor was then uncharted, but one of the enlisted men on the Wahoo had a 25-cent atlas that shows the location. Lieut. Comdr. Morton’s officers traced the area from the atlas and enlarged this by photography to obtain a satisfactory map.

  Mushu Island lies a short distance off Wewak. While nosing around there submerged, Lieut. Comdr. Morton spotted a ship in Mushu’s narrow bay. It was a Japanese destroyer at anchor, possibly an escort for the convoy the submarine wiped out the next day farther north.

  As the Wahoo fired a torpedo and missed, the destroyer upped anchor and drove in to attack. The Wahoo fired several more torpedoes, but all missed because the range was too long to hit a fast target. The last immediately available torpedo was fired at a range of 800 yards The destroyer steamed on, firing her guns and met the tin fish almost half-way, or at 500 yards.

  The torpedo hit amidships, scrambling the destroyer’s vital installations, and she burst in two. Into the sea went a large number of white-clad Japanese sailors who had been acting as lookouts in the riggings, on the yardarms, on top of the turrets, every place a man could hang on. The warship went down in two sections, bow first, in five minutes.

  Two days later, on Jan. 26, the Wahoo sighted the convoy of two freighters of 7,000 to 9,000 tons, a 7,000-ton transport and a tanker of about 6,000 tons. The transport was loaded with troops, of whom Lieut. Comdr. Morton believes there were no survivors.

  The Wahoo torpedoed and sank a freighter first, then the transport. It wounded the other freighter, then knocked off the tanker before pursuing the crippled ship. There ensued a running battle.

  “We were inclined to laugh at the freighter’s erratic firing,” Lieut. Comdr. Morton said, “but a shot that landed right in front of us wiped the smirks off our faces.”

  We finally sank the freighter at about 9 P.M.

  FEBRUARY 11, 1943

  GANDHI STARTS FAST TO PROTEST ARREST

  Plans to Subsist 21 Days on Fruit Juice and Water

  BOMBAY, Feb. 10 (AP)—With India apprehensively alert, Mohandas K. Gandhi started a twenty-one-day hunger strike today, to subsist on citrus fruit juice mixed with water, but not to “fast unto death” as he threatened on previous abstentions. His fast is in protest against his confinement behind barbed wire in the palace of the Aga Khan at Poona.

  The 73-year-old independence leader imposed the limited diet upon himself after long correspondence with the Marquess of Linlithgow in which the Viceroy advised against it for reasons of health. The Viceroy asserted it constituted “political blackmail for which there can be no moral justification.”

  Mr. Gandhi went ahead, however, with the objectives of compelling the government to alter its policy of locking up members of the All-India Congress party “for the duration” and to protest against the “leonine violence” which he accused the government of using to suppress the civil disobedience campaign.

  REFUSED FREEDOM FOR FAST

  The correspondence of Mr. Gandhi and the Viceroy was published by the Government of India today with an accompanying statement that the government had informed Mr. Gandhi he would be released for the purpose and for the duration of the fast and, with him, any members of his party who wished to accompany him.

  Mohandas K. Gandhi in 1943.

  “Mr. Gandhi,” the statement added, “has expressed his readiness to abandon his intended fast if released, failing which he will fast in detention.”

  The government statement said “it is now clear that only his unconditional release could prevent him from fasting.”

  “This the Government of India is not prepared to concede,” it added.

  Mr. Gandhi in his letters to the Viceroy denied that the Congress party was responsible for slayings, train-wreckings and other violence of the past few months. He demanded his unconditional release from the palatial surroundings where he has been confined since last Aug. 9 after a new civil disobedience campaign broke out against British rule.

  This is Mr. Gandhi’s ninth fast in twenty-five years. The first in October, 1918, lasted three days in support of a cotton mill workers’ strike at Ahmedabad. The second, in February, 1922, lasted five days, in condemnation of his Indian followers for burning a policeman alive. The third, of twenty-one days, was in September, 1924, on behalf of Hindu-Moslem unity.

  In Yerawada jail he undertook a “fast unto death” which lasted thirteen days in September, 1932. It ended when the British Cabinet withdrew its decision to have separate elections for Untouchables, which Mr. Gandhi contended would split Indian ranks.

  His fifth fast lasted twenty-one days in May, 1933, and was undertaken as a form of purification for his followers. The sixth, in August, 1934, was directed against over-zealous reformers. His seventh, in the same month, lasted a week. He undertook it to compel the British to permit him to edit his weekly publication Harijan from jail. He went without food again for four days in April, 1939, over a local political problem.

  The hunger strike has also been used against Mr. Gandhi. In October, 1934, he declared himself “a dead weight” on the Congress party and offered his resignation. Seven of his followers fasted until he changed his mind.

  FEBRUARY 17, 1943

  Editorial

  ACTION IN THE SOLOMONS

  An official summary of extensive air and naval operations in the Solomons area from Ja
n. 29 through Feb. 7 reveals at least part of what happened during the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal. No ships met in battle except some torpedo boats and destroyers. Those lost on both sides went down under air attack. We did not prevent the evacuation, and suffered substantial naval loss. The American heavy cruiser Chicago was sunk by torpedo planes on the second day of continuing engagements in which we also lost an unnamed destroyer and three PT boats. Against this we claim two enemy destroyers certainly sunk, four probably sunk and eight others, with three smaller craft, damaged.

  Our loss was not “extremely light,” as first reported. The Chicago was a fine 9,300-ton vessel, mounting nine 8-inch guns. She is undoubtedly the “battleship” which the Japanese announced they had sunk off Rennell Island, together with another “battleship” and three cruisers. The Chicago was damaged by aerial torpedoes and succumbed to torpedo plane attack the next day while under tow. Fortunately, most of her crew were saved. Exaggerated Japanese claims may be based on other damage inflicted on our ships, but not yet reported by us.

  Apparently the descent of the Japanese rescue fleet with battleships and carriers on Guadalcanal almost coincided with the approach of an American task force convoying transports to our island base. The troops were safely landed; but at dusk, south of Guadalcanal, our fighting ships were sharply attacked by enemy carrier planes and dispersed. Meanwhile, twenty enemy destroyers were taking the remnants of their beaten force from Cape Esperance. One at least was sunk in this attempt. When our main naval forces swept northward the Japanese capital units, which had come down from Truk, withdrew to safer waters, pursued by our ships and planes. In this flight the Japanese suffered their chief loss, not too heavy from their standpoint, considering the risk involved. Apparently our battle fleet was ready and eager to engage the enemy, but that opportunity still lies ahead.

  A German U-Boat in 1943.

  FEBRUARY 21, 1943

  The Battle of the Wolf Packs

  By Rear Admiral Emory S. Land,

  Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission, and Administrator, War Shipping Administration

  The greatest threat confronting the Axis is the steady translation of American resources and industrial might into fighting power. Germany, Italy and Japan know that the strength of this nation, added to the already fully mobilized forces of our Allies, will eventually crush them unless by some means they can prevent complete utilization of that power in the grand strategy of the United Nations.

  This is the reason for Germany’s intensive submarine campaign in the Atlantic. If the Nazis are to avert the full impact of American productive power on the battlefront, they must neutralize that power before it can be hurled against them. Since they have not destroyed our cities, shipyards and factories, they must concentrate on attempting to send our ships to the bottom.

  The “Battle of the Atlantic” is but one phase of our efforts to meet the challenge. It has been a spectacular phase, and one in which the naval forces, the air forces and the merchant marine of the United States and Great Britain have distinguished themselves. But other phases of the war of production and transportation have been carried on with equal intensity and are having their effect in gradually wearing down the power of Germany’s undersea “wolf packs.”

  The submarine threat to the maintenance of our transatlantic lifelines is being met in three ways: (1) by striking at enemy submarine construction, repair and servicing bases, (2) by accepting the challenge at sea through convoy and patrol operations and (3) by building new merchant ships to replace our losses and to increase our available tonnage. Information about the first two items is restricted, for reasons of military censorship and security. Concerning the third item, one may express some very definite views.

  The question most frequently asked of those administering the merchant shipbuilding program is: “Are we building ships at a rate faster than the rate of sinkings?” The implication is that the United States has set out to solve the sinking problem by sending out more ships than the Nazis can sink. The question seems to imply the placing of an unfair burden of responsibility upon the shipbuilder when, in fact, the answer to the problem is only partly in his hands.

  The fortunes of war are subject to much more rapid change on the battlefront than on the production front. The rate of sinkings can rise or fall more quickly than the rate of shipbuilding. Moreover, as I have frequently emphasized, you can sink a ship far faster than you can build one—even in these times when we are turning out Liberty Ships in an average time of fifty-five days.

  Whether submarine activity will grow worse in the future is something one cannot predict. It is a fact, however, that this type of naval thrust at our shipping is more active in the Winter months, when nights are longer and conditions at sea are less favorable to surface craft and more favorable to submarine operations. With the coming of Spring and Summer it is possible that we may see some slackening off in the activity of German U-boats. But that will be governed by the exigencies of war. The Nazis, we may be sure, will send their submarines wherever they are most useful as the United Nations press onward with the offensive begun in the closing weeks of 1942. Submarines go where “the fishing is best.”

  The amazing progress of shipbuilding in the United States during the last year is an indication of the ingenuity and enterprise of the American people and our determination to win this war. Fortunately, a fair start had been made on the Maritime Commission’s long-range building program when the call for sudden expansion of facilities and stepping up of the program came with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. At that time the commission was working on its schedule of building fifty ships a year for ten years, and some of these vessels had already been turned out.

  The start was slow, but the progress has been rapid and gratifying—if not startling. To speed production and utilize the type of engines that could be produced in large numbers, the commission settled on a standardized design in the Liberty Ship of 10,500 deadweight tons. It took an average of 235 days to build the first two of these vessels, which were delivered in December, 1941. In December, 1942, when eighty-two Liberties were delivered, the average building time was reduced to fifty-five days. Performance like this, combined with an increase of more than 600 per cent in shipbuilding facilities, made it possible to turn out 746 ships, totaling 8,090,800 deadweight tons, in 1942.

  The commission’s directive from President Roosevelt was to build 8,000,000 tons of ships last year. Our directive for 1943 is for at least 16,000,000 tons, which will give us a total of about 2,300 vessels, totaling 24,000,000 tons, in the two years. I am confident that we will fulfill the President’s directive this year.

  FEBRUARY 21, 1943

  The ABC of Point Rationing

  By JANE HOLT

  The point rationing of processed foods, according to the Office of Price Administration, is the most far-reaching rationing yet imposed by war necessity. It affects almost every man, woman and child in the nation

  Only A, B and C stamps may be used during the first month. Point values will fluctuate as food supplies vary nation. Here, briefly, are some questions that may occur to you in connection with the program, together with answers that are intended to help you adjust yourself to the regimen:

  Q: How does point rationing differ from other methods of rationing?

  A: This is best answered by a brief definition of the three systems now in use. The simplest is coupon rationing, which is used in rationing single commodities—sugar and coffee, fuel oil and gasoline. By this time you are thoroughly familiar with its workings.

  The second system, rationing by purchase certificate, is the one now in use for the rationing of automobiles, bicycles, heating stoves, heavy-duty rubber footwear, tires, tubes and typewriters. Here is how it functions: A person desiring one of the items listed applies to his local Rationing Board, which issues a form for him to fill out. The applicant supplies the information, and if this complies with the requirements the board issues a Purchase Certificate, which the c
onsumer must present when he purchases the item.

  The third point rationing is a method for rationing many articles in one group of related commodities, which may be used interchangeably. The remainder of this column is devoted to an explanation of how point rationing operates.

  Q: Why do we need point rationing?

  A: Point rationing is a system for rationing all items in a group of closely related commodities. If only some of the goods in such a group were rationed—the scarcest ones, for example—consumers would rush to buy the others and they would soon disappear from the stores. On the other hand, if all the goods were rationed separately—as coffee and sugar and gasoline have each been rationed—different stamps for every individual product would have to be issued. This might mean hundreds of various ration stamps, which, in turn, would mean endless confusion for all concerned.

  Q: What is a point?

  A: A point is a ration value, much as dollars and cents are money values. Each rationed food will be worth so much in currency and so much in points. The size of the supply will determine the number of points given to an article; the price and quality will have no bearing. Thus, for example, if peas are more plentiful than beans, peas will have a lower point value than beans. You can see that this system enables the government to steer consumers away from buying scarce items and encourages them to purchase those that are comparatively abundant.