The New York Times Book of World War II, 1939-1945

by The New York Times

  Josip Broz, also known as Marshal Tito, leader of the Yugoslavia resistance in 1944.

  The statement of Mr. Law regarding Britain’s view on Yugoslav matters and the share of aid Tito is getting tended to impress Yugoslav official circles here.

  There has been much regret in some moderate circles over the sharp wording of the Yugoslav Government’s statement Sunday condemning Marshal Tito’s temporary government, and, indeed, an effort was made twenty-four hours too late to withdraw it.

  The Yugoslav Government press office today published a series of communiqués purporting to emanate from General Mikhailovitch’s headquarters on Dec. 3. It was stated therein that “apart from the Communist party, which never has been particularly powerful in Yugoslavia, no political organization supports this government [Tito’s]. All Serb political parties decided to support the National Committee of Resistance, which also supports the Yugoslav Regular Army [Mikhailovitch’s].” It is further claimed that no Slovenian or Croatian political parties back Marshal Tito.

  DECEMBER 11, 1943

  INVASION PROGRAM SHAPING IN BRITAIN

  Phases of Allied Supply and Transport, Air Support and Striking Force Take Form

  FEBRUARY A TIMING POINT

  Weather in Western Europe Is Major Factor—Britons Due For Big Part in Opening

  By Cable to The New York Times.

  LONDON, Dec. 10—The organizing of the prospective Anglo-American invasion of northwestern Europe is progressing swiftly, despite the magnitude of the task set for officers and men of the Allied armies, navies and air forces, it was indicated today.

  Difficulties of supply and transport are being overcome, command personnel problems are being worked out and the planning stage appears to be over. The American and British staff officers are clothing the bones of the great enterprise with blood and iron.

  A very considerable fighting force amassed in Britain has been going through extensive training in combined operations.

  WEATHER A FACTOR IN TIMING

  Security necessarily blurs the outline of the plan, yet conditions here and Allied experiences in other theatres give partial guidance to speculation on the invasion. Consideration of these factors leads to the following conclusion:

  The weather conditions needed to apply the maximum pressure at a time when the enemy is hard pressed on the eastern and southern fronts may delay operations on a large scale until after the middle of February.

  The two allies are well aware of the strength of the German bomber force lying in wait in western Europe and are extremely unlikely to launch the invasion without overwhelming air support, which means the blow will be directed at some section of the European coast line within effective range of land-based Anglo-American fighters.

  Initial landings will probably be spread over a considerable section of the coast, with the troops uniting for operations inland once the Germans’ coastal defenses have been penetrated.

  One of the many suitable ports of northwestern Europe is probably among the primary objectives so that the invading forces can get reinforcements and supplies from Britain and, as was the case in Sicily, directly from the United States.

  Since the British have the greater number of veteran divisions available, despite the greater numerical strength of the United States Army, it is possible Britons will form half or more of the original ground force that will encounter the severest fighting.

  AIR-BORNE ATTACK LIKELY

  The success of the Allied airborne troops in Sicily points to a possible, further-expanded use of air-borne forces in this operation, principally to seize airfields upon which to base fighter support in the second phase of the invasion and to bar routes to the battle areas over which enemy reinforcements could travel.

  The problem of supply of the forces that ultimately will total well over 1,000,000 men is at present as important as these strategic and tactical problems. Another difficult task is coordination of the ground forces with the Allies’ tactical air force.

  Moreover, strategy, tactics and logistics—the trilogy of war—have been joined by propaganda. The machinery for political warfare is already being organized.

  The supply position in certain categories of quickly expendable material, such as ammunition, is excellent. Great concentrations of all stores have been piling up here. The fighting men on the “second front” will be lavishly equipped.

  Maritime transport remains an all-important matter. For some months the Allies have had to switch from one operation to the next, the type of transport used before a port is captured. The invasion of northwestern Europe will require a far greater number of landing craft and small, fast transports than in any previous Allied overseas adventure.

  The British figure a combat division requires 400 to 600 tons of supplies a day. Considering the stubbornness of the Nazi resistance in Sicily and Italy, it seems probable that the maximum amount for each division will be needed and that most of it will have to be taken to the beaches by landing craft or by small, fast transports with strong anti-aircraft armament

  A considerable proportion of the Allied heavy bomber strength will presumably be diverted to the bombing of the enemy’s communications and strong points as part of the air preparation. This is another reason for believing the invasion will not come until mid-February, although the Allies may make several diversionary landings earlier to pin down the Germans.

  DECEMBER 13, 1943

  Rommel Reported Switched to West

  Marshal Said To Be in Charge Of Anti-Invasion Defenses

  LONDON, Dec. 12 (AP)—German reports reaching Stockholm today said that Field Marshal Gen. Erwin Rommel had been named anti-invasion chief to prepare for the Allied attack on western Europe.

  Marshal Rommel, who has been directing the over-all command of German troops in both the Balkans and Italy, has been reported to be inspecting Denmark’s coastal defenses all week.

  Berlin dispatches said that, although the tension was still great in the Balkans over a possible Allied invasion, German military experts expected the biggest Allied attack in the west. The Scandinavian Telegraph Bureau, reporting Marshal Rommel’s appointment, said that German commanders viewed the defense of western France and northern Germany as more important than that of Italy. Vichy reports, via Madrid, confirmed this report and said that the Germans in France believed that the Allies had withdrawn some of their best troops from the Italian front and many warships from the Italian area for use on another front. The Germans were said to believe that a major Allied attack would come soon but apparently could not decide whether it would come only in the English Channel or simultaneously with a thrust in the Mediterranean.

  DECEMBER 17, 1943

  AMERICANS ASHORE

  Landing Made Without Loss of Ship Or Plane on Southwest Coast

  GOALS QUICKLY WON

  MacArthur’s Men Take Peninsula, Seize Rule of Vitiaz Strait

  By Wireless to The New York Times

  ADVANCED ALLIED HEADQUARTERS IN NEW GUINEA, Dec. 17—American forces have landed on New Britain Island and established a firm bridgehead.

  Large elements of Lieut. Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth Army made a seventy-mile jump north from New Guinea and swarmed ashore near Arawe Wednesday from all types of landing craft. This important barge base on the southeast corner of the biggest island of the Bismarck Archipelago is about 270 miles from Rabaul, Japan’s New Britain naval plane base protecting the southern approaches to Truk, the enemy’s Pacific bastion 798 miles to the north.

  With the landing in New Britain, Gen. Douglas MacArthur is squeezing Rabaul from two directions, since marines and soldiers under his command landed on Bougainville last month.

  ONE FORCE IS REPULSED

  The green-clad soldiers hit the beaches at two points on narrow Cape Merkus and one on Pilelo Island, just offshore, in amphibious tanks and rubber boats after a naval bombardment in which hundreds of shells exploded in the main landing area at Orange Beach.

  One of the three lan
dings made by a commando-trained party was repulsed with heavy loss in lives, the Japanese puncturing the rubber boats with machine-gun and mortar fire. Despite counter-fire other commandos captured the radio station at Pilelo. But after naval bombardment and intensive strafing by American planes there was no opposition at the main beach. Troops were able to beat off, with only two casualties and no damage, a fierce attack launched by more than twenty Japanese planes while the landing was still progressing. Ack-ack crews ashore and guns of the landing craft drove off the raiders and knocked down two enemy planes.

  United States soldiers arriving ashore at Cape Gloucester, New Britain Island, Papua, New Guinea 1943.

  TEXAS FLAG FLIES FROM BEACH

  Two commando parties neared shore at 5:20 A. M. in moonlight, but the first tracked “alligator” did not hit the main beach with its fighting men until 7:49 in the morning, since a treacherous, narrow passage only a few feet wide had to be traversed between Pilelo Island and Cape Merkus. One group planted the flag of Texas on the beach.

  Soldiers equipped for jungle fighting immediately pressed up the three-mile peninsula, which, if entirely occupied by the force that landed, is virtually impregnable against attack because of a narrow neck joining it to the mainland.

  Because of shoals and currents, the operation was most delicate.

  Only careful preparation and the closest cooperation between sea, ground and air forces made this amphibious operation successful.

  The task force was commanded by Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey and the landing force by Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham. General MacArthur is with General Krueger at headquarters, a point north of New Guinea, generally directing operations. The good weather, which was bad for this operation since the moon shone brightly, was probably responsible for the disaster that befell one commando force. It made impossible what was expected to be a surprise foray to obtain control of a roadblock. The Japanese atop a 250-foot cliff over the beach poured on a withering fire at point-blank range, not opening up until the fragile rubber craft were nearly ashore. Some men were in the water three hours, some were wounded, some died and some few who got ashore probably were wiped out or captured. Nevertheless their sacrifice was not in vain for the Japanese apparently thought this effort on Blue Beach was the main landing.

  VITIAZ STRAIT CONTROLLED

  Little is known about the fight on Pilelo Islet except that we received messages from the radio station at the appointed time.

  This jump away from New Guinea where the fighting has been going on so long was the first all-American show in the Southwest Pacific theatre.

  It gives the Allies effective control of Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain, only forty miles wide at its narrowest point.

  The landing followed the establishment of airfields on the Huon Peninsula following the capture of Lae and Finschhafen, the air cover from the fighters on the operation being excellent as we had an overwhelming number of planes.

  This correspondent has flown over most of New Britain. It is about 320 miles long but only fifty miles across at its widest point. Its jungles are, if anything, denser than those of New Guinea and Guadalcanal and others in the Solomons.

  The coastal range runs the length of the volcanic island where live volcanoes still play, particularly around Rabaul, where a 600-foot island was shoved up during the cataclysmic 1937 earthquake and volcanic eruptions.

  DECEMBER 19, 1943

  De Gaulle—Enigma and Symbol

  He puzzles critics and friends alike, but there is little doubt that he speaks for France.

  By MILTON BRACKER

  Algiers (By Wireless).

  THROUGH the skylight of Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s borrowed villa here, you can see the Tricolor on the roof whipping in the breeze from the harbor far below. On brisk days you can actually hear it, too. It is said by his intimates that the general himself always hears it, that he is as closely attuned to the needs of his oppressed homeland as if he maintained telepathic connection.

  Whether or not this is true de Gaulle has now emerged as the single most important Frenchman in the world and his somewhat enigmatic personality is a factor Allied statesmen are likely to have to reckon with for an indefinite period in the future. That some of them do not like him is not news to the general or to any one else, but that all of them now accept him as the dominant spokesman for his people is increasingly obvious. And it is perhaps an indication of the whole trend of the de Gaulle movement that the general remains more a “spokesman” or symbol than a personality.

  De Gaulle is a complete introvert. He is shy, gauche and without warmth. He has never learned to smile easily. His oval face has the faintly yellowish look of a man who works primarily indoors and doesn’t sleep too well. His deep-set eyes, underlined with blue, reveal a combination of sensitivity and shyness, uncertainty and caution, impatience and purpose.

  De Gaulle’s height (6 feet 3) is his most obvious physical characteristic; it is accentuated by his high-crowned olive-drab field cap. He isn’t fluid or graceful, like an athlete.

  Even those closest to him are prone to talk more of his ideas, his “role” than of his personal idiosyncracies. De Gaulle himself despises detail and trivial matters and relegates such things to subordinates who, he earnestly hopes, will dispose of them without bothering him. His aide de camp usually calls for him in a car about 9:45 A.M. and at 10 they arrive at the Villa des Glycines, one of the many modern Moorish establishments overlooking the harbor from the vast hill into which Algiers is built.

  The Glycines has only two floors and the general’s staff, including secretaries and clerks, counts not more than twenty-five. De Gaulle has a way of virtually gliding in on silent feet, darting his eyes nervously here and there, taking everything in. He says little. His private office in the rear of the ground floor is dominated by a highly polished desk and six brown leather chairs. The general welcomes some visitors from his place behind the desk; with others he wants to put at their ease, he comes around in front and takes one of the outer chairs himself.

  Everything about the setting in which he works is businesslike. No family pictures or gadgets are about. The only touch of sentiment is steeped in the present struggle of France. It is the original pen-and-ink eight line ultimatum sent to Gen. Josef Koenig at Bir Hakim by Marshal Rommel. It hangs on the wall over the general’s left shoulder.

  The general usually spends his mornings receiving people. But on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays he drives to the Lycée Fromentin, formerly a girls’ school, where he presides over meetings of the French Committee of National Liberation. He sits at the south end of a big square table. A quaint rocking-chair blotter is the only thing at his place not at the other members’ places. A vase on the high ledge near the window has come to be known as “the general’s ash tray.” He smokes while he paces.

  De Gaulle breaks his day at 1:30, when he returns home for lunch. Usually he has two or three guests. The table is simple and so is the fare. Like everyone else in Algiers, he has no butter. His one luxury is an after-lunch cigar. Mme. Yvonne de Gaulle, an intensely French woman of still recognizable charm, fits into the general scene like a picture in a frame.

  Back in the office, de Gaulle is likely to spend the afternoon alone. His closest aide perhaps is Gaston Palewski, who is de Gaulle’s chef de cabinet as he was formerly Paul Reynaud’s. Palewski speaks of de Gaulle in hyperbole. During the Corsican campaign he told the writer that while France defined General Giraud as a “good soldier, a fine and upright man,” it saw in de Gaulle “the will of the nation to live in its greatness.”

  The general goes home for dinner, usually again with guests, and he is in bed by 11, if possible. He does not like people as such, but he regards them as part of his job. He is hospitable without being genial, thoughtful without being warm. He keeps his distance and expects you to keep yours. He never really relaxes and nearly always gives the impression of being under strain. Politically of course he is.

  French
General Charles de Gaulle delivering an address at the end of the Allied Armistice Day parade in Algiers, 1943.

  BUT there is no question that he has enlarged his stature since June, 1940. In those days he was not only shy and uncertain but utterly lacking in even elementary diplomatic sagacity. He would walk into a press conference and open it gravely with a long set speech. He would tolerate a question or two, then stand up and stride out at his own convenience.

  Now he sits back and is complete master of the situation. He is ready for any question that comes along and when someone asks a rather embarrassing one about his attitude toward becoming first President of the new Fourth Republic he smiles wanly and says, “You’re the first to offer me the job.”

  Similarly he has taken on more and more the external attributes of the politician. He still wears a uniform—except on Sunday when he invariably drives with Mme. de Gaulle in a flagless car to attend mass at near-by Le Biar—but on ceremonial occasions he is as much the politician as the general.

  On Armistice Day, for instance, he and General Giraud (who had just signed his political death warrant as co-president of the French Committee of National Liberation) climbed one of the interminable flights of stairs leading to the war memorial they were about to decorate.

  At every single landing de Gaulle paused and went out of his way to shake hands with men and women along the route. While Giraud stood by plainly uncomfortable, de Gaulle did his handshaking and murmured grave pleasantries. And this went on all the way up and again all the way down after the observance.