Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit tcml-4

by Tom Clancy

  Right now, the biggest problem facing the Osprey program is the planned rate of procurement. Originally, the Clinton Administration had planned to buy less than two dozen a year. This meant that the buy would run out to the year 2025. General Krulak is planning to speed this up to around thirty-six a year, so that the procurement of MV-22B will be completed before 2010. In this way, he hopes to avoid a funding conflict between Osprey and the planned JSF buy.

  Getting There: The Gator Navy

  Amphibious warfare is one of the most expensive and risky forms of combat ever devised. You have to move difficult and unruly cargo (combat troops), feed and care for them, and safely bring them through hostile waters to an enemy shore. You have to then deliver them, with all of their equipment and supplies, onto a beach to fight their way inland. And then they have to wait for follow-on forces or evacuation at the end of the mission. Today, most nations with coastlines have radar-equipped planes and patrol boats to locate an incoming force over the horizon. They are armed with guided missiles, coastal artillery, and mines.

  When they were planning the Normandy invasion, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in 1944 faced this problem. But things have changed a lot since then. The weapons of our time are far more lethal than those of World War II; and General Eisenhower had the unlimited resources of American, British, and Allied industry to build over five thousand ships and landing craft to "kick-in-the-door" of Nazi-occupied France. Today, a theater commander in chief (CinC) might be lucky to have a dozen such craft within a single amphibious ready group (ARG). Eisenhower could land five divisions with over 100,000 men on D-Day (June 6th, 1944). Today's CinC might have only 2,500 fighting men and women to throw onto a hostile coast. Clearly, in the fifty years since we invaded our way to victory in Europe and the Pacific, the problem has become more difficult.

  The drawdown of amphibious shipping and landing craft by the U.S. over the last few decades has been so precipitous that it has occasionally destabilized the global balance of power. When the Royal Navy announced plans in 1982 to decommission its tiny amphibious force — two Assault Ships (LPDs), and six Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs) — Argentina promptly invaded the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Similarly, the perceived inability of the United States to project power into the Persian Gulf in 1979 encouraged the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants. By early 1996, our amphibious shipping force had fallen to its lowest level since before Pearl Harbor. This leaves the United States and her allies with just two options. One is to simply abandon the ability to influence events in global crisis areas beyond our shoreline. The other choice is to make the best use of the limited assets we retain. Luckily, we have adopted that one. This is the core of From the Sea and Forward from the Sea. The concept of operations outlined in these documents allows the U.S. to maintain a "kick-in-the-door" capability, without bankrupting the treasury or compromising other commitments.

  We don't yet have all the tools to accomplish the missions spelled out in From the Sea/Forward from the Sea. U.S. amphibious forces during the next decade or so will be a mix of older equipment and ideas and newer "over-the-horizon" (OTH) concepts. As older ships retire, a limited building program will eventually stabilize the amphibious fleet at about thirty-six ships. There will be several hundred landing craft of various types, three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRONs) with a dozen or so ships, and a few older ships in the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). And that will be it. Anything else we need will have to be borrowed from the British or another ally, or chartered from commercial shipping.

  The good news is that it will all probably work, at least under the current world order, or rather, disorder. The key is a new view of amphibious warfare that has quietly taken hold within the military over the last twenty years or so. This is the OTH concept. Instead of closing within a few thousand yards/meters of a beach to unload troops and equipment, the big ships will stay between 25 and 250 nm/46 and 457 km offshore, out of range of enemy sensors and weapons. High-speed vehicles like the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC), the new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter will deliver the assault forces to their assigned targets. With these vehicles and aircraft, there will be less need to be so picky about beach topography (sand, shale, beach incline, etc.) or oceanographic conditions (tides, seastates, etc.). This will mean that the area of operations (AOR), or "battlespace," can be vastly expanded, making the problems of defending a coastline more difficult. The result of all this will be to increase the value of our limited amphibious forces, while decreasing the risks they face. Meanwhile, those thirty-six amphibious ships will be the most capable and powerful ever built.

  This chapter will introduce you to the Navy's amphibious vessels. It will give you some feel for how the men and women of the 'Gator Navy live, as they do their hard, dangerous jobs in the "littoral regions" of the world.

  Amphibious Shipping/Landing Craft Development

  The fragile, lightweight oared warships of antiquity could be hauled up on a beach, but they were awkward platforms for amphibious assault. Alexander the Great's siege of the island fortress of Tyre on the Lebanese coast in 332 B.C. saw early examples of ingenious improvisation on both sides, with ships lashed together to provide platforms for siege towers and battering rams. The Viking longships of the Dark Ages demonstrated amazing seaworthiness and adaptability — the amphibious raiding strategy of the Norsemen dominated Europe for centuries. During the age of wooden sailing ships, various nations built landing barges with assorted fixtures (ramps, cranes, etc.) to load and unload troops, horses, and equipment. This is all well and good, but having a big navy and lots of troops does not guarantee a successful amphibious assault. The Spanish Armada in 1588 and Napoleon Bonaparte's aborted invasion of England in 1805 are classic examples of failures. The land-oriented military doctrine of continental empires could never quite solve the problem of crossing even the 30 nm/55 km of English Channel. In 1940, German General Staff planners thought crossing the Channel would simply be a "river crossing along a wide front." Wrong!

  Many factors go into the execution of a successful amphibious assault, including air supremacy and sea control. But crossing the interface of land and water, known to most of us as "the beach," is the most difficult part, technologically and militarily. The beach or littoral zone can be a dangerous place, even if you just want to swim and sun yourself. Now try to move thousands of troops, hundreds of vehicles, and thousands of tons of equipment and supplies across it. It takes a lot of horsepower and engineering to create machines that enable men to do the job, and more than a little political capital. That is where our story about landing craft and amphibious ships starts. During the period between the World Wars, the problem of beach landing obsessed several groups of officers and engineers on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, Marines searching for a new mission to justify their continued existence saw amphibious assault as their future. During the 1930s they observed with interest a series of small operations by Japanese naval landing forces in China, utilizing specialized landing barges.

  On the other side of the ocean, British officers, studying the failure of their 1915 invasion at Gallipoli, looked for ways to cross the beach rapidly to conduct mobile operations inland. The Gallipoli landing was the idea of the former First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill; and when it bogged down into a bloody stalemate, it nearly ended his political career. These problems became even more urgent for Churchill in World War II, after another disastrous landing in Norway and the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940. For all of his many shortcomings as a strategist, Churchill clearly saw the need to build ships and landing craft in vast numbers if Europe was to be liberated from Hitler.

  Even as the Battle of Britain was being fought in 1940 to fend off German invasion, the British were designing their first purpose-built landing craft, the Landing Craft, Assault (LCA, the American designati
on when we built them from the British design). Just over 40 ft/12.2-m long and powered by a pair of 65-hp Ford V-8 gasoline engines, they could haul thirty-five troops and 800 lb/364 kg of equipment some 50 to 80 nm/91 to 146 km. The open-topped LCA had a long, flat bottom suitable for beaching, an armored front to protect the embarked troops, and a bow ramp for rapid off-loading. LCAs could hang on a transport ship's davits, like large lifeboats. Assault troops boarded them by climbing down rope ladders and nets. The same features would appear on almost every landing craft, including the Landing Craft, Utility (LCUs), and Landing Craft, Medium (LCMs), still in use today. From the LCA design came literally dozens of specialized landing craft that would be used for the next half century. At the same time, American engineers were coming up with their own designs, such as the famous "Higgins" boat, which was based on a surf-rescue craft. Evolutionary improvements led to standard designs like the Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP), built in the thousands as the backbone of the landing craft fleet that helped win World War II.

  Once the landing craft had been developed, the next problem was getting the frail little boats across the oceans. Amphibious operations are fought against the elements of the ocean and the shore, as well as the enemy's defenses. The flat-bottomed assault boats, while handy in the shoal waters of beaches and atolls, needed larger "mother" vessels to move them close to their objectives. This requirement led to specialized attack transports, grouped into amphibious "tractor" groups. Early attack transports were converted freighters and passenger liners. They lacked cranes and other handling gear for hoisting out and loading embarked landing craft and troops. Later in the war, purpose-built ships were significant improvements, but they still had to run in close to the beaches to unload; and they were vulnerable to enemy coastal artillery, mines, and aircraft.

  An important development was the Landing Ship, Tank (LST — their crews said it stood for "large, slow target"). This was an oceangoing vessel that could beach itself, open its bow doors, drop a ramp, and then off-load vehicles up to the size of heavy tanks directly onto the beach. The last U.S. Navy LSTs (built in the 1960s) only recently retired from active service. Another special-purpose amphibious ship was the Landing Ship, Dock (LSD), equipped with ballast tanks and an interior well deck that allowed landing craft to load in relative safety. By flooding the well deck, the landing craft could easily float out, without the need for hoists or cargo nets to load the boats. The well deck was so successful that all thirty-six of the U.S. Navy's amphibious ships in the 21st century will have one. Other specialized amphibious ships built during World War 11 included amphibious command ships and fire-support vessels carrying rockets and guns.

  These bizarre craft provided the sealift to liberate North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. Soon after the victory they helped to win, virtually all of the landing craft and amphibious ships were sold for scrap or mothballed. The atomic bomb seemed to signal an end to amphibious warfare. This attitude would not last. The Korean War marked the rebirth of amphibious operations. Recalled from the moth-ball fleets, World War II amphibious ships provided General Douglas MacArthur with the lift for his brilliant landing at Inchon in the fall of 1950. Some of these same ships served off Lebanon when that troubled land erupted in 1958. While the amphibious vessels of the Second World War held the line in the 1950s, the U.S. Navy began to design new amphibious ships, suitable for the atomic age. The most important of these was the assault helicopter carrier (LPH), designed to carry a Marine battalion and land it by helicopter onto an enemy shore. The first LPHs were converted World War II aircraft carriers, but the purpose-built Iwo Jima class (LPH-3) was in production by the early 1960s. By the end of the decade, in addition to the LPHs, new classes were in production — the Newport class (LST-1179), the Charleston class amphibious cargo ships (LKA-113), and the Anchorage class (LSD-36), as well as new designs like the Austin class (LPD-4), which was equipped with a well deck. These ships maintained a credible amphibious lift capability through the Cold War years. Despite all this building, the tactics of assault with landing craft through the surf-line from a few thousand yards offshore had changed little since World War II. Landing craft themselves had changed little, with conventional medium (LCMs) and utility landing craft (LCUs) constructed as late as the 1980s.

  While the technology of amphibious assaults had not changed much by the close of the 1960s, the soldiers they carried would. After the experience of Vietnam, with its conscripted combat troops, military leaders were forced to accept an all-volunteer force as the basis for a new, professional military in the 1970s. This change had many consequences. One not often noted affected the U.S. Navy: Realizing that it would have to take better care of all-volunteer crews, the Navy began to improve the habitability of warships. In the 18th century, Samuel Johnson observed that serving on a warship was like being in jail, with an added chance of drowning. This was not quite true on the World War II-vintage ships of the Vietnam era, but they were hardly designed for comfort. Naval architects try to pack as many men as possible into a warship. Personnel are needed to operate a maximum of weapons, sensors, and other systems. The emergence of the all-volunteer Navy in the 1970s meant that future warship designs would need improved habitability standards.

  Another Navy goal in those days was to make warships capable of accomplishing more various missions. The results were seen in the Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyers and the Tarawa-class (LHA-1) helicopter assault ships. The LHAs were revolutionary; they were capable of operating both landing craft and helicopters, plus the new AV-8 Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers. Lessons learned from the Spruances and the Tarawas were applied to every future class of U.S. warship. Unfortunately, both types suffered rapid procurement-cost growth. The Tarawas were originally priced as a class of nine, but only five could be bought during the double digit inflation of the 1970s. The late 1970s were a bad time for the Navy in general, and amphibious forces in particular. The Administration of President Jimmy Carter took an axe to the Navy budget, particularly in shipbuilding, operations, and maintenance. And by 1979, when a series of crises broke out in Southwest Asia, the U.S. had only a minimal amphibious capability. Amphibious forces are expensive to build and tough to maintain. They are often among the first items cut in times of austerity.

  As a result of the Carter austerity, planners reconsidered the capabilities of merchant shipping to supplement the specialized 'Gator ships. The first use of containerized merchant ships for amphibious forces was to be seen in the creation of Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons to provide a mobile, floating base for Marine task forces. Three such squadrons would be created, with additional units for the U.S. Army and Air Force. During the 1982 South Atlantic War, the British employed "Ships Taken Up From Trade" (STUFT) to transport the bulk of their landing force and supplies. Both programs showed the limitations of civilian ships to support military operations.

  The inauguration of President Reagan in 1981 led to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's ambitious plans for a six-hundred-ship Navy. This included a follow-on class of LHAs, the Wasp (LHD-1) class, and a new class of LSDs, the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class. And procurement of a radical new landing craft began, the LCAC (Landing Craft, Air Cushioned). LCAC was the first new technology for amphibious warfare since the helicopter; its introduction allowed the big ships for the first time to stand away from coastal landing zones. Meanwhile, amphibious warfare capabilities that had been lost after Vietnam were slowly rebuilt. Unfortunately, building ships takes time. The Reagan Administration was history, and the Bush Administration was well along before the new ships began to join the fleet. In fact, the LHD and the LSD-41 building programs continue, more than fifteen years after they were started.

  In the 1990s the amphibious forces of America and her allies have been busier than at any time since World War II. In addition to supporting the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, amphibious forces have been constantly engaged in crises and contingencies from Haiti to Somalia. The future of amphibious shipping is of i
nterest to everyone from Marine privates to the President of the United States.

  The 'Gator Navy

  The U.S. Navy is divided into three distinct communities. There is a submarine navy, with its nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. There is naval aviation, with its carriers and aircraft. And last, but not least, is the surface navy, with squadrons of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, to escort carrier battle groups and vital supply ships. Shoehorned into a corner of the surface navy are a few dozen ships and few hundred small boats and landing craft called the 'Gator Navy. 'Gator refers to the alligator-like ferocity of the Marines when their combat power is combined with the mobility of the Navy. Like their reptilian namesakes, 'Gators can give you a nasty bite, in the water or out.

  Command of amphibious shipping was once viewed as a second-class assignment, with less prestige than command of a real warship like a cruiser or destroyer. No more. Today, officers who command amphibious ships and ARGs hold some of the most coveted assignments in the Navy. Wasp-class (LHD-1) helicopter assault ships are the largest vessels that a non-aviator can command in the U.S. Navy (only aviators can command big-deck aircraft carriers). At over forty-thousand-tons displacement, with a crew of more than 1,100, carrying almost 1,900 Marines with all of their gear, as well as over forty aircraft and helicopters, an LHD is a major warship! The other new amphibs, like the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry class (LSD-41/99), are also very large vessels. For comparison, the biggest amphibious ships built by the former Soviet Union were three eleven-thousand-ton Ivan Rogov-class LSDs.