Ostkrieg

by Stephen G. Fritz

  When Hitler called Field Marshal Brauchitsch, General Halder, Admiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and General Jodl to a gathering at the Berghof on the last day in July, then, he intended not to ask their advice but to inform them of the decision he had made. Ironically, much of the conference was devoted to an intense discussion of Operation Sea Lion. While army leaders pressed for action against Britain directly or through operations in the Mediterranean, Raeder expressed serious reservations about any cross-Channel invasion in September, proposing instead a postponement until the spring. Hitler, too, appeared mindful not only of the enormous risks of an invasion but also of the dangers in delaying the operation, since the British position could only improve with the passage of time. Nonetheless, he reassured Raeder that a landing would be attempted only if the air campaign against Britain proved successful. When Brauchitsch pressed for action in the Mediterranean in support of the Italians, Hitler dismissed the suggestion as a diversionary maneuver, one that depended on the problematic staying power of the Italians.23

  What, however, would be done if an invasion did not take place? In that event, Hitler asserted, “our action must be directed to eliminate all factors that let England hope for a change in the situation.” He now revealed his preference for a swift decision in the east to a war of attrition against the British Empire. “Britain’s hope lies in Russia and the United States,” Halder noted, retaining the Führer’s emphasis in his diary:

  If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan’s power in the Far East. Russia is the factor on which Britain is relying the most. . . . With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope would be shattered. Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack serves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots with one blow. . . . Resolute determination to eliminate Russia. . . . Object is destruction of Russian manpower.

  Although Hitler justified his decision with reference to strategic arguments, this was, as Barry Leach has noted, a weak charade: a German attack was the most certain way to bring about the alliance he professed to fear. The key to Hitler’s thinking lay instead in his emphasis on the absolute destruction of the Soviet Union, a necessity if Germany was to be able to fight and win a protracted war of attrition against the Western democracies.24

  War against the Soviet Union, which had formed the core of Hitler’s ideological-racial conceptions for years, now assumed the key role in his comprehensive military-strategic-economic outlook: victory in the east would cut the Gordian knot and allow Germany at last to break free of its external constraints. Ideological obsessions had now come to the fore. As Goebbels noted after a conversation with Hitler on 9 August, “Bolshevism is world enemy number one. . . . The Führer thinks so too.” Noteworthy as well was the absence of any opposition to Hitler’s plans from the army leadership, in distinct contrast to the mood of autumn 1939, when he had faced an incipient revolt with his determination to attack France. Traditional disdain for the Slav, fear and contempt of Bolshevism, agreement on the necessity of securing the economic resources of the east, the long-term threat of Russia to German hegemony, the temporary weakness of the Red Army owing to Stalin’s purges, belief in German military superiority: the Army High Command shared all these attitudes with Hitler and, thus, saw no reason to object to his momentous decision. Time was also a factor. If Hitler was to retain the strategic initiative and realize his goal of living space in the east, he had to act now, before the United States mobilized its extraordinary potential might. Strategic, economic, and time factors thus reinforced Hitler’s fundamental inclination: the struggle for Germany’s existence would be won or lost in the east. In this case, calculation and ideology, rational thought and dogma, proved complementary, a fact that must have convinced Hitler of the correctness of his decision.25

  Hitler’s 31 July decision to attack the Soviet Union was not confirmed in a military directive until 18 December. In the interim, the Germans muddled through a period of strategic confusion during which they squandered the momentum of their earlier triumphs and struggled to regain the initiative. Having decided to strike at Russia in the spring of 1941, they now found it desirable to force Britain to make peace in order to eliminate the threat of a two-front war. None of the options at hand offered the prospect of a quick victory, a fact that Hitler both understood and had difficulty accepting. Over the next four months, the Germans pursued a variety of means by which to compel Britain to surrender, even as Hitler, at the height of his power, again lapsed into typically vacillating behavior, preferring to choose not to choose. Military planning, Halder complained in exasperation on 27 August, went in all directions: “Spain is to be brought into war, but the economic consequences . . . are ignored. North Africa is viewed as a theater of operations against Britain. . . . Rumania is to be drawn into our orbit. . . . We are going to be ready in the north when Russia attacks Finland. The army is supposed to have everything nice and ready without ever getting any straightforward instructions.” Strategically, only two realistic alternatives emerged: the creation of a Eurasian continental bloc and a peripheral war in the Mediterranean.26 Although both these ideas were complementary in that they were directed against the Anglo-American powers, they differed crucially in their attitude toward the Soviet Union.

  Typical of the chaotic style of rule in the Third Reich, differing factions championed each initiative, while Hitler chose to keep his options open as long as possible. The idea of a Eurasian bloc was the brainchild of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who for years had sought to build a global anti-British coalition. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 had been his crowning achievement since, despite the ideological differences, it seemed to wed the Soviet Union to the anti–Comintern Pact members, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The alliance with Stalin, however, had stunned the Japanese, which resulted in a reorientation of their policy. In the summer of 1940, Ribbentrop now tried to revive and extend his old plan: with the inclusion of the Soviet Union, he hoped to create a bloc that would be anti-British as well as prevent the United States from intervening in European affairs. Japanese policy, influenced by the German defeat of the European colonial powers, which opened unexpected avenues of expansion in Southeast Asia, had changed as well.27

  Ironically, that same German triumph had cooled Hitler to the idea of a military alliance with Japan since he expected an early end to the war. Only with the realization by the late summer that Britain would not accept his peace offer and the conclusion of the destroyers-for-bases deal that signaled American intention to support England did Hitler again warm to a deal with Japan as a way to deter the United States. Renewed negotiations culminated on 27 September 1940 with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, under which Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to assist each other in the event one of the signatories was attacked by an external power not involved in the European or Sino-Japanese conflict. This, of course, was clearly meant to warn the United States against either opposing Japanese expansion or intervening on behalf of Great Britain. The result, however, was the exact opposite as American pressure on Japan increased while the Roosevelt administration deepened its economic and political support for Great Britain.28 Still, despite the American reaction, Hitler did not categorically shelve the idea of a continental bloc, preferring instead to see how the other option developed.

  The Mediterranean strategy, advocated primarily by Admiral Raeder and the Naval Staff, as well as Jodl at the OKW, also aimed at pressuring Great Britain into leaving the war and preventing the Americans from entering. Its supporters argued that the best way to strike a decisive blow at Great Britain was to weaken its empire through war in the Mediterranean. By seizing Gibraltar in cooperation with the Spanish and the Suez Canal in a joint operation with the Italians, the Germans would strengthen the Axis position enormously: Vic
hy French colonies in Africa would be safeguarded, vital raw materials from the Balkans would be secured, Turkey would tilt toward the Germans, oil from the Middle East would be readily available, British possessions in the Indian Ocean would be threatened, and Axis control of the Iberian Peninsula and Atlantic islands would push its power well to the west, thus menacing American supplies to England. The unspoken assumption, of course, was that Churchill’s government could not survive such a succession of blows and, thus, would either collapse, opening the way for a more sympathetic government, be forced to make peace itself, or at the very least be rendered incapable of action while Germany disposed of Russia. In addition, the realization of such a program would put the “Russian problem” in a completely different light as numerous avenues of invasion would open up.29

  This last was an important consideration for Hitler since he quickly grasped that, in contrast to the continental bloc, the Mediterranean strategy did not necessarily rule out an attack on the Soviet Union but could be seen as a complement to it. When Raeder briefed Hitler on 26 September, the Mediterranean strategy had gained new urgency since a few days earlier the Free French Forces had attacked Dakar, in West Africa, which also put in question Vichy control of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Hitler indicated both agreement with Raeder’s arguments and willingness to implement the basic strategy but pointed to two key failings: the inadequate size of the German fleet and the necessity of gaining the cooperation of Spain, Italy, and Vichy France. Both, in turn, highlighted the deeper German dilemma: in order for the Mediterranean strategy to work, Germany had to depend on the support of what Hitler suspected were unreliable allies. Since Germany lacked the requisite military strength in the Mediterranean to achieve its aims on its own, it was now hostage to Hitler’s ability to come to satisfactory agreements with leaders whose aims were mutually antagonistic.30

  Perhaps sensing the impossibility of his mission—satisfying all the conflicting demands, he remarked, would require a gigantic fraud—in his diplomatic offensive in October 1940 Hitler seemed hesitant and halfhearted. In July, such a mission might have succeeded: France was reeling from defeat, Franco and Mussolini eager for easy gains. By the autumn, however, the failure of Germany to subdue Great Britain had changed the situation dramatically. French and Spanish leaders were markedly more wary of any commitment to fight, while Mussolini seethed at his reduction to an afterthought in the alliance. In addition, the price each demanded for aiding Germany had risen enormously, while their territorial claims still collided. Hitler’s meeting with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on 4 October went well, with both expressing support for a Mediterranean strategy, which pleased the Italians since it promised to raise their status. Eight days later, however, the cordiality faded when Mussolini heard, without warning, of Hitler’s decision to act unilaterally to protect the Rumanian oil fields, seemingly excluding Italy from an area it regarded as within its own sphere of influence. The duce’s retaliation was to present Hitler with a fait accompli at the end of the month, the invasion of Greece, which Hitler had repeatedly warned against and which resulted in a near disaster for the Axis.31

  A meeting with French foreign minister Pierre Laval on 20 October went well enough, with Laval hoping through cooperation with Germany to secure French colonial possessions and release from heavy reparations. Hitler did not make any commitments but did request a meeting with Marshal Petain, which Laval agreed to arrange. Hitler’s train then traveled on to Hendaye, on the Spanish border, where he met with Franco on the twenty-third. This meeting lacked all promise from the beginning. Hitler knew that Spanish entry into the war would put a serious economic strain on Germany, and he was also aware that he could not offer Spain any territorial concessions from France since he was attempting to get the latter to enter the war against Britain. He thus had little to offer the Spanish caudillo, even as Franco intended to extract maximum gains for Spanish entry into the war. From this unpromising beginning, negotiations floundered almost immediately. Franco’s train arrived late, and Hitler took an almost instant dislike to the short, garrulous dictator. After a long monologue on Spanish economic difficulties, Franco offered to join the war against Britain in January 1941, but only if Spain acquired extensive French territories in Africa and received exorbitant quantities of food, raw materials, and armaments from Germany. Further irritated by Franco’s observation that Britain would likely continue the conflict indefinitely, given American support, Hitler at one point got up and seemed ready to walk out of the talks. Although they continued, nothing was accomplished. Hitler, still seething at Franco, remarked to Mussolini a few days later in Florence that he “would prefer to have three or four teeth taken out” than have another discussion with the Spanish dictator.32

  Nor were the talks the next day in Montoire with Petain and Laval any more profitable, even if they were more pleasant. Despite Hitler’s bluster about the strength of the German position, both Petain and Laval remained noncommittal, hinting that French cooperation hinged on generous treatment by Germany and the acquisition of British colonies after a peace settlement. Although Hitler professed himself satisfied with the talks and impressed by Petain, in reality discussions with these potential allies had revealed not German strength but German weakness. Hitler had nothing substantive to offer either Spain or France since he could not satisfy one without antagonizing the other, nor could he move closer to France without alienating Italy. Moreover, any long-term benefits of Spanish and French participation in the war against England had to be weighed against the enormous short-term drain on the already hard-pressed German economy.33 Finally, Germany lacked the requisite naval and air strength to go it alone in the Mediterranean, a fact that hardly escaped the notice of the other leaders. Despite Hitler’s assurances that the British were practically out of the war, the view from Madrid and Vichy looked decidedly different; to them, waiting to see which way the wind blew appeared at the moment to be a far safer bet.

  As Hitler, discouraged by his failure to make any headway with the Spanish and French, traveled by train back to Italy for another meeting with the duce, the conviction grew that his initial instincts were correct: the solution to Germany’s dilemma lay in action in the east. He once again emphasized to Keitel and Jodl his intention to attack and defeat the Soviet Union in the spring, after the threat to the German flank in the Balkans had been removed. Still, in late October and early November, he had not definitively decided on a course of action. He retained some hope that Franco might yet be pressured into cooperating in seizing Gibraltar, but the goal now had faded from forcing Britain out of the war merely to protecting the German rear as decisive victory was sought in the east. During his talks with Mussolini, Hitler mentioned the upcoming visit to Berlin of Soviet foreign minister Molotov and his hope of directing Russian expansive energies against Great Britain in the Persian Gulf and India. In early November, however, the Führer observed to his military leaders that Russia remained “the great problem of Europe” and that everything had to be done “to prepare for when the showdown comes.” At the meeting, Hitler had seemed to his army adjutant, Major Engel, “visibly depressed,” as if “at the moment he [did] not know how things should proceed.”34

  The discussions with Molotov had, in fact, come at the behest of Ribbentrop, who hoped to realize his plan for a continental bloc by incorporating Russia into the Tripartite Pact. Although the spheres of interest of the four powers would touch, Ribbentrop hoped that they need not clash. For his part, Stalin seemed genuinely interested in the prospect since it would prolong the “capitalist war,” provide time for the further growth of the Soviet war economy, and add to the booty he had acquired from the 1939 pact with Germany, which had also allowed him to push the Soviet security zone to the west. The Germans, however, were much less sanguine. The Soviet acquisition of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina had prompted direct German involvement in Rumania in order to protect its oil supplies. This not only raised protests from Moscow that Berlin had violated the 1939
agreement but also strained German relations with Italy while exacerbating a Hungarian-Rumanian territorial dispute. All this threatened unrest in the one region that Hitler most needed calm. German intervention stabilized the situation, but Mussolini’s pique had also been one of the motives behind the invasion of Greece, which now threatened to destabilize the region anew. The increasing German dependence on deliveries of vital food and raw materials from Russia also drove fears that the long-term interests of Germany and the Soviet Union were incompatible.35

  Although skeptical of any agreement, Hitler nonetheless bowed to Ribbentrop’s argument that Soviet inclusion in the Tripartite Pact would prove decisive in the struggle against Great Britain. Still, on 12 November, the very day Molotov arrived in Berlin, Hitler signed Directive No. 18, which, after laying out the various combat possibilities inherent in the Mediterranean strategy, finally declared, “Political discussions for the purpose of clarifying Russia’s attitude in the immediate future have been initiated. Regardless of the outcome of these discussions, all preparations for the east for which verbal orders have already been given [i.e., military operations against the Soviet Union] will be continued.” Though no military options had been closed in this directive, the implication seemed to be that Hitler had grown very doubtful of the possibilities offered by alternative schemes and increasingly viewed the strategy he had always favored, attack on the Soviet Union, as the only realistic way to achieve a swift victory.36