Ostkrieg
Page 63
At the same time that the reality of war was being brought home to the German civilian population of East Prussia, an even more costly military drama was playing out in the Baltic as the Soviets now targeted Army Group North. Heretofore largely spared the full fury of the enemy summer offensive, the army group had, nonetheless, seen its strength dwindle as it had been forced to deliver more and more units to the defense of other sectors, even as its southern front expanded because of the disaster befalling Army Group South. By midsummer, it, too, faced a debilitating enemy superiority of up to eight to one across the board, yet Hitler forbade any withdrawal to shorter, more defensible lines. In this case, the Führer’s decision reflected less his typical hold-fast mentality than the key significance of certain political, economic, and strategic considerations. Always sensitive to the vital importance of Finnish nickel and Swedish iron ore to the German war effort, Hitler was determined to hold the Baltic as a guarantee of the continued deliveries of these ores. At the same time, he clung to the hope that new weapons technologies, both rockets and submarines, could produce a dramatic change in Germany’s fortunes. In the case of the latter weapon, the German navy was in the process of developing and testing two markedly superior types of U-boats that offered a glimmer of hope that the Battle of the Atlantic could yet be won. To complete sea testing, however, Hitler believed it was essential to hold on to the eastern Baltic coast, although his military (and even naval) advisers regarded this as a luxury Germany could not afford.42
By early July, Army Group North found its position increasingly jeopardized by the collapse of its neighbor to the south. With Soviet forces racing west through the “Baltic hole,” a twenty-five-mile-wide gap between Army Groups North and Center, the commander of the former army group, General Georg Lindemann, not only had to defend more front with fewer troops but also faced the prospect that the advancing enemy might cut off his forces entirely. Lindemann, of course, reacted to the threat with the rational request that Hitler allow him to withdraw his forces to safety. Just as predictably, Hitler not only refused to give up territory but also ordered Lindemann to launch a counterattack with his nonexistent reserves. The latter responded by renewing his demand to be allowed to evacuate his troops in order to escape encirclement as well as halting the senseless counterattack. These actions left Hitler no choice, and, on 4 July, he replaced Lindemann with General Johannes Friessner, who, although initially determined to carry out Hitler’s orders energetically, soon discovered the correctness of his predecessor’s prescription. By mid-July, both Friessner and Model pleaded with Hitler to allow a withdrawal of Army Group North, which, as the most intact and battleworthy force on the eastern front, could be used to build the operational reserve so desperately needed to stabilize the front. These divisions, having been spared the brunt of battle in 1942 and 1943, had a level of primary group cohesion and combat effectiveness rare in German units at this point in the war and, thus, would have been invaluable as a backstop. Their fighting ability was on ample display in these weeks of summer fighting when, despite its overwhelming superiority in strength, the Red Army had been unable to achieve an operational breakthrough, instead being forced at high cost to push Friessner’s units back. Despite his dogged defensive success—in one month, his troops, mostly in close combat with the lethal handheld Panzerfaust, destroyed almost eight hundred enemy armored vehicles—Friessner met the same fate as Lindemann. On 23 July, he was relieved of his command, although formally he exchanged positions with the commander of Army Group South Ukraine, General Ferdinand Schörner. The latter, although given unusual command authority by Hitler, had no answer to the problems of the “poor man’s war” that the Germans were now fighting, and he too demanded withdrawal to sensible positions, which the Führer ignored. By the end of the month, the Soviets finally reached the Baltic coast just west of Riga, effectively trapping Army Group North. Although a tenuous connection to Army Group Center was reopened on 20 August, the position of Army Group North remained highly precarious.43
After a temporary respite in order to prepare its forces, the Red Army on 14 September resumed its hammer blows against Army Group North. With any attempt to hold its exposed position untenable, Hitler finally relented two days later, following an impassioned appeal by Schörner, and approved the evacuation of Estonia, which commenced on the eighteenth. Still, he insisted on maintaining a bridgehead around Riga as well as holding on to Courland. Since Finland agreed to an armistice and left the war on 19 September, Hitler’s decision seemed to be based on his desire to continue testing the new-type U-boats. In any case, the Soviets continued their pounding attacks along the northern front, their forces increasingly augmented by units transferred from Finland, and, on 10 October, once again reached the Baltic coast. Although the Red Army paid a high price, suffering over 280,000 casualties and losing over five hundred armored vehicles, it had once more trapped Army Group North, with 250,000 troops and over five hundred armored vehicles, this time for good. Over the course of the next weeks and months, neither rational arguments (these tough, battle-hardened units could better be used as an operational reserve to defend Germany than sitting in Courland) nor emotional appeals (since most of the troops were from the eastern provinces, they would fight more fiercely than a bunch of untrained boys and elderly men in the Volkssturm) altered Hitler’s determination to hold on to Courland. Nor, despite a series of battles until the end of the war that cost the Red Army a ridiculously high number of casualties, were the Soviets able to take it.44
Of all Hitler’s controversial decisions in 1944, none has seemed to demonstrate so well his irrational stand-fast mentality as the decision voluntarily to entomb German troops and tanks sorely needed to defend the Reich in a backwater place such as Courland. As an illustration of his irrationality, however, it might be better to seek explanations on the strategic rather than the tactical level, with the key to the Courland puzzle lying in the Ardennes rather than the Baltic. As is generally known, Hitler hoped with the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 (originally scheduled for late November) to achieve a sudden turnaround in the war through an operation remarkably similar to Sickle Cut of May 1940. In this latest version, Great Britain was to play the role of France, with the United States, emulating the English, expected temporarily to withdraw from European affairs. Having dealt a savage blow to his Western enemies, and at the same time perhaps finally splitting the unnatural coalition arrayed against him, Hitler could then mass his remaining forces in the east to repel the Soviet invaders. In effect, he was clinging to the strategy outlined in November 1943 for the coming year: seek a turnaround in the war by striking in the west and holding on in the east. His forces had failed to achieve the desired results in both areas, but, Hitler believed, one last opportunity beckoned. For this plan to work, however, Courland had to be held as a springboard for a new offensive deep into the Soviet rear, while at the same time the new-model U-boats could be unleashed in the Atlantic. Although this interpretation is clearly a flight of fantasy, much speaks in support of it, not least the timing of Hitler’s final decisions to hold Courland and launch the Ardennes offensive, made within two days of each other in late October. Just as importantly, such a scheme fit his all-or-nothing mentality, his conviction, as Speer noted, that the war could be won only through offensive action. The Führer yearned to throw off the “eternal defense” into which Germany had been forced and again seize the initiative, but, when his “Blitzkrieg without gasoline,” as Karl-Heinz Frieser termed the Ardennes offensive, failed, he was left with the bankruptcy of his strategy. Only now, in early 1945, did he permit some units to be evacuated from Courland and sent back to Germany, although, even here, he could not quite fully abandon the illusion of a miracle that would again turn the war in his favor.45
Even as the OKH struggled to build a stable front line out of the ruins of Army Group Center, it faced another disaster in the south in the area of Army Group South Ukraine, itself a mixed German-Rumanian conglomeration. The winte
r/spring campaign of 1943–1944 had left it in tatters, but under General Schörner’s energetic leadership the army group had managed to reestablish its structure, order, and discipline. Nor did it hurt that its front remained quiet as the dramatic events played out to the north. It held seemingly strong forward positions with the formidable obstacle of the Carpathian Mountains at its rear but faced the inescapable German dilemma—in order to cobble together forces to stem the Red tide in the north, Guderian had stripped Army Group South Ukraine of six of its eight panzer divisions and six infantry divisions, leaving it little in the way of a mobile reserve. It was also hampered by a tenuous logistic situation, with its Rumanian allies often diverting supply trains for their own use, while its other nominal ally, the Hungarians, seemed more intent on fighting the Rumanians and Slovaks than the Russians. For political reasons, in order for the Rumanians to hold on to Bessarabia (Moldova) and protect the cities of Iassy and Kishinev as well as to guard the Ploesti oil fields, the Germans were compelled to defend an extensive front that bulged eastward from the Carpathians and then along the Dniester to the Black Sea. Although the wise military move would have been to shorten this line and pull back to more defensible positions, this proved impossible, both because Hitler would not have approved such a move and because of the tenuous political situation of Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian leader. Still, on paper, it seemed a strong force, with approximately 500,000 German troops and 170 armored vehicles, along with some 400,000 Rumanians, although the quality of the latter was, as always, maddeningly uneven. Some units could be counted on to fight bravely and fiercely, while others would simply melt away at the first sign of battle. Having witnessed the debacle to the north, German commanders were in little doubt that the next major Soviet blow would come against them.46
Nonetheless, the power of the enemy attack and the speed of the Rumanian collapse took the Germans by surprise. Even at this stage of the war, they seem to have underestimated the striking power of the Soviets, not least since they knew that the Stavka, too, had pulled units from the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in order to feed the demands of the larger operation to the north. In addition, although the Red Army in this sector disposed of large numbers of troops, a sizable percentage of them had little or no training. These men, primarily Ukrainians who had been swept up to make good manpower losses as the Red Army liberated Ukraine, filled out the ranks, although German analysts were convinced that Soviet infantry divisions did not have quite the striking power as before. This was likely true, but the Red Army made up for this deficiency by relying more on artillery, tanks, and air support, to devastating effect once the attack had begun. Typically, the Russians amassed a huge force of over 1.3 million men with almost nineteen hundred tanks and assault guns for the offensive. As in Belorussia, the Soviets planned to concentrate their forces at key points in order to achieve an operational breakthrough. The original intention seemed to be just to force the Germans to divert troops away from the central front, thus opening the Warsaw-Berlin axis to further attack. Ultimately, however, the Soviets devised an ambitious new plan that aimed to encircle and destroy enemy forces around Iassy and Kishinev, then advance deep into Rumania to seize Bucharest and the Ploesti oil fields.47
The attack began on 20 August, but, despite the fall of Iassy the next day and Kishinev on the twenty-fourth, it did not initially proceed as smoothly as the Russians had hoped. While, in many areas, Rumanian troops put up little opposition, German units resisted stoutly. Not atypically in Rumanian history, politics played a key role in determining the outcome of the battle. Prompted by the attack, opposition leaders in Bucharest, who had been seeking a way out of the war for months, launched a coup against the pro-German government of Antonescu on 23 August. Troops loyal to the new government under the young King Michael, who had promptly taken Rumania out of the war, then successfully prevented a German countercoup. This incited Hitler, who had evidently counted too heavily on the anticommunism of Rumanian politicians and, thus, was taken completely by surprise by the political turn of affairs, to order the bombing of Bucharest, an action that only motivated the Rumanians to enter the war on Russia’s side (which allowed them the additional benefit of fighting the hated Hungarians as well as recovering Transylvania). Within a few days, Rumanian troops in some sectors thus went from working alongside the Germans to fighting against them. Although German troops responded to the unexpected collapse of their ally with their usual skill and tenacity, by early September Army Group South Ukraine had suffered a fate similar to that of Army Group Center: the Sixth Army had been destroyed (again), the German front in Rumania had completely collapsed, and both Bucharest and the Ploesti oil fields had been lost. Although earlier in the war the loss of the latter would have occasioned German economic collapse, by this stage it proved largely meaningless. Persistent American bombing raids over Ploesti had virtually ended production at its refineries even before the Russians arrived, while the Germans had long since turned to synthetic production to supply most of their fuel needs. Still, at a relatively small cost of 67,000 casualties, the Red Army had again shattered an entire front, destroyed twenty German divisions, and inflicted a loss of more than 200,000 soldiers on the Germans. The renamed Army Group South, with only some 200,000 men left, now embarked on a lengthy retreat across the Carpathians that did not stop until Soviet forces had penetrated Bulgaria and turned west into Hungary.48
As the Soviet advance continued into Hungary, however, it ran into more problems from logistics than from German opposition. By the end of September, Russian forces had swept aside the rather light German and Hungarian forces covering the Carpathian passes and had passed into Hungary. The Stavka now directed that German and Hungarian forces be destroyed and Hungary knocked from the war, but this was to prove much more difficult than anticipated. With the loss of the Ploesti oil fields and refineries as well as the extensive damage done by American bombers to the synthetic fuel plants, Hitler put great store in the oil fields southwest of Lake Balaton as well as those on the Hungarian-Austrian border. Still, with German defenses in Hungary rather thin, the Soviets advanced rapidly, seizing Debrecen, about 120 miles east of Budapest, on 20 October. There they stalled, brought to a halt by a concerted German counterattack. The Soviets now tested the Hungarian defenses to the south of Budapest, taking Szeged, little more than a hundred miles southeast of the capital, on 10 November. Once again, however, stiff German resistance, as well as bad weather, stopped the Russian advance. The Red Army kept up steady pressure, however, and by 3 December had reached the shores of Lake Balaton, no more than forty miles southwest of Budapest. The Soviets tried again in a two-pronged attack on 5 December to seize the city, but, despite a successful opening advance, the Germans shifted forces and prevented the capital either from falling or from being encircled.49
Having ousted Admiral Horthy, the aged Hungarian leader, from power following his unsuccessful attempt in mid-October to take Hungary out of the war, Hitler was more determined than ever to hold on to Budapest. In early December, he dispatched two panzer divisions and three sixty-tank Tiger battalions for a counterattack. The question, however, was, Where? In the north or in the south? General Friessner, over-matched and destined along with Busch to become the least successful of German eastern front commanders, saw the greatest danger in the south, while Guderian believed that the main danger lurked in the north. In the end, Hitler approved Friessner’s dispositions, with the result that the infantry from the panzer divisions was deployed in the north while the unsupported armor was left to defend the line in the south. These odd deployments meant that, if the Soviets beat the Germans to the punch, the latter were in serious trouble. Bad weather and a bout of caution caused the Russians to delay their assault, but, despite repeated urging from Guderian, Friessner hesitated to attack before the ground froze. As a consequence, much as Guderian had feared, the Soviets struck first, launching a massive two-pronged assault both north and south of Budapest on 20 December. By the twenty-seventh
, they had encircled the city, but Hitler was determined to hold the Hungarian capital since, in his mind, success in the Ardennes and success in Hungary were linked. In addition, since it lay athwart the main route to Austria and Bohemia and was the main rail hub in the region, the Russians could not simply bypass it, so, for the first time in the war, the Soviets found themselves laying siege to a major city. Budapest, with its civilian population swollen to 2 million, was to be assaulted in savage air and artillery bombardments to force its surrender.50
To break the enemy encirclement, the Germans diverted scarce resources from Army Group Center, most importantly, the Fourth SS Panzer Corps with the Totenkopf and Viking Divisions, a decision that would have dire consequences when the Soviets resumed their offensive on the Vistula in January. These units proved unable to lift the siege, but bitter fighting continued through the end of December and into the new year. Ironically, in assaulting a major urban area whose buildings provided good cover for the enemy and negated their own strength in armor and air power, the Soviets now got a taste of their own medicine. By mid-January 1945, Pest, on the eastern bank of the Danube, had been secured, but fighting still raged for Buda and the citadel on the west bank. Perhaps most damaging to the Germans was Hitler’s decision on 16 January to send the Sixth SS Panzer Army, recently withdrawn from the Ardennes, to Hungary instead of Poland. This decision was incomprehensible from a military perspective since the Russians had already begun the Vistula-Oder offensive but might well have betrayed Hitler’s vague hope of forcing the Soviets to the negotiating table by achieving at least a partial military success. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, which neither could afford, as the fighting approached that of Stalingrad in ferocity. Not until 12 February did the last remaining Germans seek to break out. They were repulsed by the Soviets in a bloody slaughter, and, the next day, the citadel finally fell. Even now, however, Hitler refused to relent. On 6 March, Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth SS Panzer Army launched the last German counteroffensive of the war, Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring Awakening). It aimed to push the Russians back from the Danube and retake Budapest. The German force of ten panzer divisions was considerable, including the still formidable Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Hitlerjugend Divisions. The Soviets resisted bitterly, however, and after ten days of heavy fighting, largely out of fuel and bogged down in mud, Dietrich was forced to break off the effort. As at Kursk in 1943, it had been a waste of valuable German tank forces to no purpose: it did not seriously distract the Soviets and, with the Red Army on the Oder only forty miles from Berlin, had been a senseless use of elite German units. Lacking any reserves, Germany’s other eastern armies could only await the inevitable Russian offensive toward Berlin with resigned trepidation.51