Ostkrieg

by Stephen G. Fritz

  1. For a good sense of the atmosphere at the front on the eve of Barbarossa, see Grupe, Jahrgang 1916, 149–51; Lubbeck, At Leningrad’s Gates, 84; Knappe, Soldat, 178–80; Schröder, “German Soldiers’ Experiences,” 309–24, and Die gestohlenen Jahre; Wette, “ ‘Es roch nach Ungeheuerlichem,’ ” 71–73; Fuchs, Wer spricht von Siegen, 12; Kuby, Mein Krieg, 95–99; Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, 160–62; and Hitler’s “Aufruf an die Soldaten der Ostfront vom 22. 6. 41,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 319–23.

  2. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 192; DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut? 40–50; Hoffmann, “Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs,” 88–99; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Glantz, Barbarossa, 27; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–54; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 195.

  3. Halder, War Diary, 22 June 1941, 410–12. Proponents of the idea that Stalin intended a strike against Germany include Suvorov, Icebreaker; Topitsch, Stalin’s War; Raack, “Stalin’s Plans for World War II”; and Hoffmann, “The Soviet Union’s Offensive Preparations in 1941.”

  For good historiographic assessments and critiques of this argument, see Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy”; Pietrow-Ennker, Präventivkrieg? and “Deutschland im Juni 1941”; Förster, “Die Grosse Täuschung”; Ueberschär, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ gegen die Sowjetunion”; and Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” and “Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion.” For a balanced assessment of Stalin’s perceptions of the Wehrmacht, see Arlt, “Die Wehrmacht im Kalkül Stalins,” 105–11.

  4. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–50, and Grand Delusion, chaps. 8, 12; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 55; Litvinov quoted in Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” 72.

  5. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky, Grand Deception, chap. 6, and “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–47, 355–56; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 32–41; TBJG, 16 June 1941.

  6. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 284–85, 290–92, 295–96; Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy,” 635–36; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 32–37.

  7. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 32–37; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 493; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler’s Attack on the Soviet Union,” 357–59.

  8. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 172; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 26–31, 42–43, 46–51. Although, as is often supposed, the Soviets had made no special effort in the 1930s to expand industry across the Urals, they had created new factories in the eastern part of European Russia between Moscow and the Urals.

  9. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 44–46. For a good assessment of German intelligence failures, see Thomas, “Foreign Armies East.”

  10. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 41–43; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 48; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, chaps. 5–6; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 456–57; Bock, War Diary, 31 January 1941, 196–97.

  11. Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, chap. 2.

  12. Hayward, “Hitler’s Quest for Oil,” 99–103; Cooke and Nesbit, Target, Hitler’s Oil, 16; Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau, 117–18.

  13. On the problems of horse-drawn transport, see DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut? 40–50.

  14. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 201; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 234–35. On Soviet military dispositions, see Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 115–30, 227–45; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 37–41; and Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 286.

  15. TBJG, 23 June 1941.

  16. Glantz, Barbarossa, 35; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 192–93; Kershaw, War without Garlands, 37, 51–52, 55.

  17. Glantz, Barbarossa, 37–39; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 55–59; Overy, Russia’s War, 73–79. Stalin supposedly commented to Timoshenko and Zhukov, “Lenin founded our state and we’ve fucked it up,” then drove to his dacha at Kuntsevo, where he remained incommunicado until 30 June, when members of the Politburo went to demand he again actively lead the state. Stalin quoted in Radzinskii, Stalin, 451–52.

  18. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 525–26; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 46–47; Glantz, Barbarossa, 37.

  19. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 527–32; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 47; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 158–66; Bock, War Diary, 23, 25–26 June 1941, 225–28.

  20. Halder, War Diary, 22–29 June 1941, 410–32; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 194–95; Bock, War Diary, 25 June 1941, 227.

  21. Halder, War Diary, 22–29 June 1941, 410–32; Bock, War Diary, 22–29 June, 2 July 1941, 224–33, 235–36; Kershaw, War without Garlands, 76–77, 94; TBJG, 28–30 June 1941; Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 531–32, 536. Soviet figures put the losses at 340,000 men, or half the strength of the Western Front at the outset of the invasion, 4,800 tanks, and 9,400 guns and mortars, figures higher even than the Germans estimated. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 60.

  22. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 537–41; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 45–46; Glantz, Barbarossa, 42–46.

  23. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 546–69; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 47–49; Glantz, Barbarossa, 46–53.

  24. Glantz, Barbarossa, 55; Stolfi, “Barbarossa Revisited,” 35–36, and Hitler’s Panzers East.

  25. Halder, War Diary, 3 July 1941, 446–47; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’ ” 146–47.

  26. Kroener, “Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs,” 567–69; “Sonderakte,” in Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 4 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1020; “Vortragsnotiz über die Besetzung und Sicherung des russischen Raumes und über den Umbau des Heeres nach Abschluß Barbarossa,” in ibid., 15 July 1941, 1022–25; “Besprechung Chef OKW mit den Wehrmachtteilen am 16. 8. 41 über Die Auswirkung der Richtlinien des Führers vom 14. 7. 41 sowie die Durchführbarkeit der sich daraus ergebenden neuen Schwerpunkt-Programme,” in ibid., 16 August 1941, 1047–54; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’ ” 149–50; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 219; Reinhardt, Moscow—the Turning Point, 26–31, 40–43.

  27. Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’ ” 147; Halder, War Diary, 8 July 1941, 458; TBJG, 9 July 1941; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 400–404; Jochmann, ed., Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 5–6, 11–12, 27 July, 1–2, 8–11, 19–20 August, 17–19, 22–26 September 1941, 38–71; Jürgen Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1235.

  28. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 403–4; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 23–26 September 1941, 66–71.

  29. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 404–5; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 23–28 September 1941, 65–72; Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 187–218, and “ ‘We are trying . . . to change the face of the world.’ ”

  For interpretations that emphasize Hitler’s modernity, see Zitelmann, Hitler; and Prinz and Zitelmann, eds., Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung. See also Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, introduction, chaps. 2, 5; Smelser, “How ‘Modern’ Were the Nazis?”; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 1–10; and Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries.

  30. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 462–63; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 448. See also Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, passim.

  31. Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 13 October 1941, 78; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 434; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 469–70. For a comparison of Nazi Germany’s conduct to that of historical colonial powers, see Zimmerer, “Holocaust und Kolonialismus.” For a more critical assessment of this interpretation, see Gerwarth and Malinowski, “Der Holocaust als ‘kolonialer G
enozid’?” and “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts.”

  32. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 466–76; Aly, “Final Solution,” 149–60; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 253–55; Pohl, Von der “Judenpolitik” zum Judenmord, 89, 95–97; Schulte, Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung, 248; Madajczyk, “Synchronismus.” On Generalplan Ost, see Madajczyk and Biernacki, eds., Generalplan Ost; Rössler and Schleiermacher, eds., Der “Generalplan Ost”; and Wasser, Himmlers Raumplanung im Osten.

  33. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–56, 268–77, and “Controlled Escalation”; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 452–53; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 141, 179; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 28–33. See also Matthäus, Ausbildungsziel Judenmord? and Kwiet, “Erziehung zum Mord,” “From the Diary of a Killing Unit,” and “Rehearsing for Murder.”

  34. Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 142–43, 151–78; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256–59; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–71; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 454–55, and Hitler: Nemesis, 463–64.

  35. Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 38–54; Diary of SS-Hauptscharführer Felix Landau, 7 July 1941, in Dollinger, ed., Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? 87–88; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256, 268–77; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 68–69; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 463–64.

  36. Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 5–6, and Keine Kameraden, 110–12; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–69; Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, 159; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 260; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 184, 204–14, 226, 237, 249–51, 278; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 405–6; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 90–92.

  While agreeing with the central theme of Wehrmacht cooperation with and participation in these criminal actions, Christian Hartmann nonetheless makes an important distinction between frontline troops and those in the rear: much the greater part of Wehrmacht crimes were committed by security divisions or units behind the front. See Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, 675–98, and “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?”

  37. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 180, 189–90.

  38. Kershaw, War without Garlands, 142–43; Schulte, “Korück 582,” and German Army, 69–85, 117–49; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 8–9, and Keine Kameraden, 42–44; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1211–16.

  39. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1189–1234.

  40. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hitler quoted in Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 25.

  On Soviet atrocities, see De Zayas, Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, 273–77, 284; Rass, “Menschenmaterial,” 334; and Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes.” It has been estimated that 90–95 percent of German prisoners of war perished in 1941–1942 (De Zayas, Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, 277).

  On the propaganda uses of alleged Soviet atrocities, see generally the entries in TBJG for July 1941 (quote from entry of 17 July 1941). Two days earlier, Goebbels had asserted, “Just as every soldier returns from Poland as an anti-Semite, so they will come back from the Soviet Union as an anti-Bolshevik.”

  41. Prüller, Diary of a German Soldier, 5 July 1941, 75; Richardson, ed., Sieg Heil! 3 August 1941, 122; Kershaw, War without Garlands, 136–38. See also Schulte, German Army, 117–49, 211–33.

  42. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1189–1234; quote from Manoschek, “Es gibt nur eines für das Judentum,” 33. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 271–72. The letter was eventually displayed in the show windows of various Viennese businesses (ibid., 292 n. 62).

  43. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 30–31; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1189–1234; Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 45–47; Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien, 114–16; Schulte, German Army, 234–39; Diary entries of Robert Neumann, 7 July, 5, 7 October 1941, in Dollinger, ed., Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? 88, 100–101.

  44. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1189–1234; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 6–7; Förster, “Hitler Turns East,” 130.

  On the complexities of the partisan war, see Anderson, “Die 62. Infanterie-Division,” and “Germans, Ukrainians and Jews”; Birn, “Two Kinds of Reality?”; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 19–20, 24–30, 49–57, and Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, 383 (quote).

  While the army’s criminal culpability as an institution is extensive, and despite the spread of racist ideology through the ranks, it is well to remember that only a strikingly small percentage of Landsers actively participated in the murders of Jews. As Christian Hartmann has argued, soldiers, especially those at the front, primarily focused on daily war tasks and the problem of survival. See Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 17–20, 31–32, 64–74. See also Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 151, 169–71, and “Die Wehrmacht und der Mord,” 50.

  45. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 288–94; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 587–88, 593, 609–13, 628–39; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 73–74; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 275–82; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 377–79; Schulte, German Army, 224–34.

  46. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 115–17; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 162–69; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 141–54; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 71–75; “Auszüge aus verschiedenen ‘Ereignismeldungen UdSSR’ über die Tätigkeit der Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, und D im Osten vom Juli 1941 bis zum März 1942,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 314–22. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 260–96; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?”; and Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew.”

  47. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 118–19; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 498–506; Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew,” 53; Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 118, 127.

  48. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 119–20; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 164–65; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 493; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 128, 3 November 1941,” in Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 68; Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 119.

  49. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 120–28; “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 490–95; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 63–68; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 106, 7 October 1941,” in Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 132 (see generally 117–36); Krasnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 237; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 92.

  50. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1217–18, and “Hitler Turns East,” 130; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 259–64, 277–78; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 195–224; Anderson, “Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews,” 339–40; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 69–70; Polian, “First Victims of the Holocaust”; Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, 73–74; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 25 October 1941, 106; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 464, and Fateful Choices, 457; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 7.

  51. TBJG, 8 July 1941; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 469–70, and Fateful Ch
oices, 434–36, 455; Förster, “Securing Living Space,” 1237.

  52. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1237; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 434–36; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1:84–90.

  53. “Geheime Absichtserklärungen zur künftigen Ostpolitik: Auszug aus einem Aktenvermerk von Reichsleiter M. Bormann vom 16. 7. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 330–31; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 309–10; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 265–66; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1235–36; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’ ” 148–49; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 405.

  54. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 310–11; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 455–56; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 267; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’ ” 1237; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 469. See also Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah; Förster, “Das andere Gesicht des Krieges,” 155–57; Birn, “Zweierlei Wirklichkeit?”; Büchler, “Himmler’s Personal Murder Brigades”; and Lozowick, “Rollbahn Mord.”

  Himmler had returned to the Führer Headquarters the day before the meeting but was perhaps occupied by the news of the capture of Stalin’s son.

  55. TBJG, 9 July 1941; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2:204–5; Völkischer Beobachter, 24 July 1941; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 110–11. See also Benz, “Judenvernichtung”; and Kaufman, Germany Must Perish!

  56. TBJG, 24 July 1941, 3, 13, 19–20, 26, 29 August, 22 October 1941; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2:205–7; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 111–15; Benz, “Judenvernichtung,” 620–22; Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, 31 July 1941.

  Top Nazis seem to have come to believe their own propaganda about the Kaufman book or, more precisely, to have had their irrational, paranoid conspiracy fantasies confirmed. No longer merely a crank, Kaufman was elevated to a close personal adviser to Roosevelt and a decisive influence on American policy. Adolf Eichmann, e.g., suggested in his posthumously published memoirs: “Kaufman intended to bring about the complete extermination of our people. . . . It is probable that in our highest leadership circles, the Kaufman plan served as a stimulating factor for [our] own extermination plans.” This sense of a preventive measure fit well the Nazis’ mind-set, which typically justified their own murderous actions as simply a response to the plans of others or as just retribution for past crimes. See Aschenauer, ed., Ich, Adolf Eichmann, 177–78; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 324 n. 87.