Race Differences in Ethnocentrism

by Edward Dutton

  This seems entirely reasonable, but from this he moves on to criticizing the sociobiological perspective and inclusive fitness. Miller seems to reduce human morality and pro-social behavior down to sexual selection for these traits. Males have little to lose from the sexual encounter, so the best strategy is to copulate with as many young and healthy women as possible, with beauty being a proxy for genetic health. Thus, men tend to be attracted to youth and beauty (Buss, 1989). Miller rightly notes that males, if they must invest in a female, will select for one who is honest and caring because she will make a better mother to his children and she will be less likely to cheat on him. Moreover, these qualities could imply a more complex brain and thus better genetic quality. Females will select for these traits even more so than males because they will want a male who will look after them while they are pregnant and who will care for the children they may already have by other men. Moreover, they will want a male who will not cheat on them, who will look after them and their children, and who can attain high status, with cooperativeness being, to varying degrees, associated with this. As such, Miller notes that ‘kindness’ is the single most important psychological characteristic, for both males and females, when selecting a partner. Miller summarizes the sociobiological argument (that it would have been adaptational to recognize kin and care for them more than non-kin) but he maintains that this cannot be used to explain kindness to ‘non-kin’ (Miller, 2000, p. 300).

  This, I would suggest, is something of a misunderstanding of the sociobiological perspective which has occurred through the making of a binary division between ‘kin’ and ‘non-kin’ which does not exist in the real world. We may regard our ‘second cousin’ as kin and our third cousin as ‘not kin’ but this is simply a random border and there are probably those who see certain third cousins as ‘kin’. From the sociobiological perspective, kinship is a spectrum, not an ‘either/or’. It can be argued that we are evolved to be kinder to ‘closer kin’ than to ‘distant kin’ and that we are evolved, putting the social construct of kinship aside, to be kinder to the ‘more genetically similar’ than to the ‘less genetically similar’. An organism that developed an unconscious way of discerning genetic similarity to self would be at a huge advantage because it could maximize the degree to which it passed on its genes; in other words it could maximize its inclusive fitness. It could do this by breeding with a person who occupied the optimum genetic distance from self to reap the maximum benefits from genetic diversification — avoiding harmful ‘double doses’ of mutant genes and passing on possible useful new genes to the offspring — and genetic similarity, passing on more of one’s own genes. It could perform the same feat in terms of friendship: genetic differences permitting a useful quid-pro-quo relationship as against genetic similarity allowing one to help a genetically relatively similar person through life. So, the sociobiological argument is that, in general, how moral we are depends on whom we are dealing with, we will be more altruistic to those who are more genetically similar to us, and that this is explicable in terms of inclusive fitness. Below, we will survey the impressive amount of evidence for the veracity of this model, which is known as ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’.

  The fourth criticism of the sociobiological perspective is a moral one. American biologist Richard Lewontin (1978), for example, effectively argued that the sociobiological model — wherein human behaviour is substantially explained by biology — implies that we cannot create a better world and those who are disadvantaged are in such position due to their own nature, rather than due to discrimination or poor circumstances. Moreover, the sociobiological perspective effectively argues that ethnic nepotism is a natural, evolved capacity, as it is an extension of general nepotism. Sociobiology’s most ardent critics have argued that if we accept Sociobiology then we must accept the inevitability of ‘racism’16 and we must accept that eugenics is potentially a good idea (as differences are mainly biological). Indeed, this kind of reaction manifested itself in Edward O. Wilson having a bucket of iced water poured over him by a Leftist group called ‘Science for the People’ in 1978. Such researchers commit the so-called ‘moralistic fallacy’ (Davies, 1978). Science is not moral and the morality of a position is completely irrelevant to whether or not it is logically and empirically justifiable. A more subtle moral criticism was presented by Richard Lewontin, who suggested that, for moral reasons, the burden of proof should be higher when making evolutionary speculations about humans. This renders humans somehow separate from animals when, from an evolutionary psychological perspective, humans are a form of ape. Moreover, it introduces the danger that biased scholars will tendentiously argue that there is never sufficient proof for hypotheses that they dislike.

  The fifth criticism of Sociobiology is that it engages in speculation. Often disputes, once our definition of science is accepted, over whether or not something is science, relate to a specific debate within science. Finnish sociologist Ullica Segerstråle (2000, p. 255) argues that for those in the ‘experimental tradition’ of science, ‘good science’ is science which is, to a great extent, proven, beyond doubt (Segerstråle, p. 256).17 Scientific naturalists, by contrast, are in an older tradition of science where you wish to understand nature and speculate, based on the available evidence, in an attempt to understand the natural world as a whole. Darwin’s theory of evolution (Darwin, 1859) was in this tradition. Darwin was a naturalist and, based on his observations, he suggested his theory of evolution. It was not absolutely proven when he suggested it but there was certainly a body of evidence for it. It rendered the animal world congruous with the materialist underpinnings of science and made sense of various disparate empirical observations. Accordingly, there was a degree to which it was ‘speculative’ but it was also a contribution to science because it attempted to understand the nature of the world based on empirical evidence. Experimentalism is to be praised for its exactness but it is problematic because it demands such exacting standards of evidence before an assertion can be made. This leaves too little room for intelligent discussion, based on the evidence, and for the public, collegial dimension to science whereby ideas are freely discussed. Moreover, we may never be able to make any assertions if the level of proof required is so absolute that, for example, Richard Dawkins’ attempts to understand, historically, why certain animals have evolved the features they have is ‘bad science’ as Richard Lewontin suggests it is (Segerstråle 2000, p. 257). In that scientific discovery is ongoing, it is always possible, as German psychologist Hans Eysenck (1916–1997; Eysenck, 1991, p. 41) observed, to claim that there is not sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion or that the evidence is open to dispute, as it always is. Scientists can merely reach conclusions based on what best fits the evidence.

  Naturalism can be problematic if it becomes too speculative. ‘Speculation’ is generally defined as ‘reasoning based on inconclusive evidence, conjecture or supposition’. As such, the exact border of ‘speculation’ is intuitive. This leads to an impasse which can be solved through philosophical pragmatism. So, in everyday situations, how much evidence, we might ask experimentalists, is enough for you to act differently in accordance with it? Would you, in everyday life, follow the method, used in this study, of making inferences from indirect or not wholly conclusive but nevertheless noteworthy evidence? Do you ever, for example, judge a person’s intellectual ability based on their educational credentials? Does this lead to successful results? Based on such a method, whom would you call upon to solve a particular and specifically intellectual problem: the person with the PhD or the person with just a school leaving certificate who had dropped out of university? We suspect, all things being equal, it’s the person with the doctorate rather than the university dropout, even if there are some highly intelligent university dropouts, such as Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg. This is because, on average, those with PhDs are more intelligent than university dropouts (see Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 143). Likewise, naturalism permits successful predictio
ns to be made, which have real life consequences, even if the perspective does not offer absolute proof.

  So, the criticisms of this model can be responded to and it must be stressed that, of those presented, it explains the most with the fewest assumptions, rendering it the most scientific model. Firstly, it is congruous with Darwinian Theory and therefore consilient and based only on the assumptions of science: logic and empirical method. Secondly, it explains ethnic nepotism in all cases, in all time periods, and it even explains related behavior among animals. Thirdly, it neatly explains why ethnic groups tend to have a folk belief in common ancestry and kinship. They hold this belief because there is some truth in it.

  8. What Causes Ethnocentrism?

  The debate over the causes of ethnocentrism approximately parallels the debate over how ‘ethnic group’ should be defined. It divides between the sociobiologists — who advocate a significantly biological approach — and those who espouse an almost entirely environmental explanation. These explanations are effectively extensions of the model of ‘ethnicity’ which they employ.

  Threat and Conflict Explanations

  It is argued that ethnocentrism is a defensive reaction by people or groups who feel under threat in some way. There are a number of explanations within this category.

  Realistic Conflict Theory

  Sumner (1906) argued that ethnocentrism was instrumental in defending the in-group against the out-group and advancing in-group interests over those of the out-group. LeVine and Campbell (1972) averred that a group that finds itself in conflict is more likely to defend its own interests if it is ethnocentric. As such, ethnocentrism is a response to conflict. The problem with this as a standalone explanation is that people display some degree of ethnocentrism even if they are in no immediate conflict or they are under no immediate threat (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We will see later that this is the case in ordinary, everyday life, such as when people select friends, sexual partners or even family members whom they wish to spend time with. In effect, they employ aspects of ethnocentrism — preferring those who are similar to them — but there is no obvious conflict situation when this occurs. In addition, this theory does not explain some of the more extreme examples of ethnocentric behavior. Why, for example, would people be prepared to sacrifice their lives for their ethnic group?

  Psychodynamic Theory

  Following Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), advocates argue that ethnocentrism is caused by ‘intrapsychic’ threats and conflicts. Freud argued that ethnocentrism occurs because living in a community causes tension and people cope with this by ‘displacing’ their feelings onto members of an out-group. The most well-known theory along these lines is German philosopher Theodore Adorno’s (1903–1969) ‘Authoritarian Personality’. He argued that strict parenting causes children to experience conflicting feelings, and to cope with these they employ the defense mechanisms of displacement and externalization. This can be seen in projecting negative feelings onto members of other ethnic groups. The difficulty with this theory is that it really only explains general prejudice, only partially explains ethnocentrism, and, moreover, fails to appreciate the highly heritable nature of personality, which we will discuss later.

  Terror Management

  Prominent advocates include Solomon et al. (1991). According to this theory, people feel threatened by an awareness of death and their cultural value system buffers them against this existential anxiety. More generally, a large body of research has shown that prejudice and in-group ethnocentric behavior do appear to increase as a result of certain kinds of threat, especially threats to general group welfare, threats to group values, and finding an out-group irritating or frightening (e.g. Riek et al., 2006). Again, the problem with this model is that people have been shown to behave in an ethnocentric manner and hold to ethnocentric views when they are under no obvious threat at all. Moreover, animals are unable to experience existential anxiety but, as we will see later, they still display behavior which is effectively ethnocentric: they show a preference for those who are more genetically similar to themselves. So, having explored ‘threat and conflict’ explanations, let us turn to the next kind.

  Self-Aggrandizement Theories

  Tajfel and Turner (1979) have been the most prominent advocates of these models. They argue that ethnocentrism makes people feel good by boosting in-group self-esteem and it is for this reason that ethnocentrism develops. They showed that under laboratory conditions strong groups can very easily be created and people can display group-centrism even when there is no interaction with the other group, almost no knowledge about it, and when discriminating against members of it would not be in the individual’s self-interest. However, the difficulty here is that Tajfel’s team were not dealing with groups divided along ethnic lines and it may that ethnic groups show even stronger forms of ‘group-centric’ behavior, raising the question of why there might be this qualitative difference. The theory also begs the question of why ethnocentrism — as distinct from other forms of group-behavior — should be so widespread and powerful. In addition, as we will see, even in groups that are mono-ethnic people will tend to consort along the lines of genetic similarity, in others words in a way that would be predicted by a sociobiological model.

  The Marxist Model

  A related model is the Marxist Model. This argues that by making the in-group feel good about itself ethnocentrism is useful in allowing one group to gain power over another group, whom they can then exploit. The problem with this model is that it begs the question of why ethnic identity, specifically, should be so appealing in this context? Why do dominant and submissive groups in the conflict divide along ethnic lines at all? Why is one ethnic group positive to its members but actively hostile to non-members? And, again, why should people engage in self-sacrifice in the interests of their ethnic group?

  Social Dominance Theory

  Another Self-Aggrandizement Theory is Social Dominance Theory. According to this perspective, a certain kind of personality — a ‘dominant’ personality that craves ‘security’ — tends towards ethnocentrism (Duckitt, 2001). Clearly, the difficulty here is that people of all personality types behave in a manner that is ethnocentric, and this can especially be seen in whom they socialize with, as we will see.

  Socialization and Normative Explanations

  These are yet another form of explanation. Advocates of this model note that those with similar personalities still display differing levels of ethnocentrism. This is explained by the process of socialization. Children learn, it is argued, to be ethnocentric and they learn to divide people into racial categories. This raises the question of how ethnocentrism should have developed in the first place, such that it could even be taught. Moreover, there is evidence that babies will respond more positively to members of their own ethnic group than to members of another ethnic group (see Sagi et al., 1985), implying that ethnocentrism is innate rather than taught. Moreover, what we might call the ‘building-blocks’ of ethnocentrism — valuing those who are similar over those who are less similar — can be seen even in animal behaviour and it is not feasible that they have been taught to categorize in an ethnocentric way.

  The Sociobiological Model

  We have already discussed why the sociobiological model is the most persuasive model of ‘ethnicity’ and it is also the most persuasive model of ethnocentrism. It is consilient as it grounds ethnocentrism in Darwinian Theory and it explains the most with the fewest assumptions, meaning that it does not leave questions unanswered, as the other theories do. To summarize, in-group preference and out-group negativity are useful because genes can be passed on not only from parents to offspring but also via kin. Accordingly, kin-preference will increase one’s ‘inclusive fitness’. This model explains the most as it is underpinned by evidence that animals prefer kin over non-kin and will sometimes engage in acts of self-sacrifice for relatively distant kin. So, this theory does not merely explain ethnocentrism in humans bu
t also in animals — it explains more — and it is consilient, congruous with the Darwinian view that humans are an advanced form of ape. This model does not rule out the importance of conflict, stress, or personality differences in increasing ethnocentrism and these contributory factors will be accepted if they, likewise, can be shown to be consilient. The sociobiological model simply argues that ethnocentrism is most parsimoniously understood via a partly biological theory wherein the ethnic group is a kind of extended family.