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Something similar happened when Che precipitously sought to have Cuba withdraw from the International Monetary Fund. Faced with the obligation to send instructions about a Cuban vote through its regional director at the Fund, Che decided to go against the experts’ technical advice. Betancourt recalls the following revealing exchange:
“No, look, we are going to withdraw anyway from the Monetary Fund because we are going to join the Soviet Union, which is technologically 25 years ahead of the United States.” So I said to him, “Comandante, if the government has decided to withdraw from the Monetary Fund, that’s fine. I want you to understand one thing, though: we currently have a 25-million-dollar loan from the Monetary Fund, which we will have to pay if we withdraw, and we only have 70 million dollars in our hard-currency reserves. It is not a good idea for us to use that money now, because we are at the end of the year and we won’t have any dollars coming in until the sugar harvest begins in January.” Che confessed: “Oh, I didn’t know that, I was told that they hadn’t lent us anything.” I said to him, “What you have been told is wrong. The agency that has never lent anything to Cuba, either now or under Batista, is the World Bank; but the IMF has.” Che changed his mind; but Cuba still left the IMF a full year later.22
Che was not yet imbued with the economic theories that a group of Marxist Chileans, Mexicans, and Argentines would soon foist upon him. Nor was he yet familiar with the Soviet ideas he would later adopt. He tried to function with the sitting team at the Bank; but its members decided to leave—first for their homes, and then Miami. His aides would gradually take up the slack. Due to both the arrest of Matos and the removal of Felipe Pazos, as well as their own reluctance to follow Che’s policy at the Bank, most of the senior Bank officials resigned. Although Che learned economics quickly*4 he still needed technicians, and began to recruit as many as he could. They gradually adopted his priorities, which were ethical and political rather than economic. Betancourt recalls the process as follows:
Che was never a fully integrated Marxist. He was a typical Latin American leftist, with some rudiments of Marxism—but he was not trained by the Party. The proof is that he arrived at the Bank and, recognizing that he had a limited knowledge of Marxist economics, asked Juanito Noyola (a Mexican Marxist economist)—who did have that background—to teach him. Che was very organized, very systematic in everything he did, and so he simply took classes with Juanito twice a week so that Juanito could explain to him the basics of Marxist economics.23
Then, as now, the principal progressive recipes for Latin American economic development were few in number and fairly diffuse. They consisted essentially of industrialization through import substitution; the diversification of import and export markets; a central role for the state in the economy; and the need for significant land reform—more or less radical, depending on the country. These all formed what might be called the consensus of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The Latin American left distinguished itself from ECLA by its emphasis on four essentially quantitative criteria: faster industrialization, greater diversification, more radical land reform, and a more powerful state in the economy and society.
At first, Che’s economic views did not go far beyond the ECLA consensus. He contemplated measures similar to those proposed by his leftist advisors like Noyola, the Chilean Alban Lataste, the Ecuadorean Raúl Maldonado, and the Argentine Néstor Lavergne, and others. Among them, as Maldonado recalled, nationalizing the island’s foreign trade—which represented half of the domestic product—figured prominently. Che’s aim for the National Bank consisted precisely in its transformation into a sort of Foreign Trade Bank.24 He would gradually conclude that the state monopoly of all trade with the rest of the world was a necessary condition for the type of institutional relationship he would seek to negotiate with the Soviet Union toward the end of 1960 during his visit to the socialist countries.
However, these strictly economic criteria would soon be overtaken by his political strategy for confrontation with the United States and the Cuban oligarchy. This was the weak point in Guevara’s ideology—or its strong point, depending on one’s view. Until the end of his life, Che believed that the economic sphere should be secondary, in politics as in life. He operated from an ethical and humanistic stance rather than a Marxist or historical one; Che always called for the abolition of mercantilistic relations among people, and insisted that society should be governed by something other than money. Hence the escalation of his conflict with the Americans in several areas: the sugar quota, the refinement of Soviet oil, arms purchases from Europe and then the U.S.S.R., and the expropriation of American assets. On all these fronts, he decided to negotiate as little as possible, and only when necessary. This forced the Cuban regime even further to the left, leading to a gradual break with the United States which Che perceived both as an end in itself, and a powerful platform for change. By this stage, Fidel was much closer to his stance than before. As Che saw it, “the presence of an enemy stimulates revolutionary euphoria and creates the necessary conditions for radical change.”25
In a secret document dated March 23,1960, the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence emphasized Che’s role in his government’s antagonism toward the United States:
Under the direction of Fidel Castro’s brother Raul, and under the influence of Che Guevara, the armed services, police, and investigative agencies have been brought under unified control, purged of Batista professionals as well as other outspoken anti-Communist elements, and subjected to Communist-slanted political indoctrination courses; a civilian militia composed of students, workers, and peasants is being trained and armed.26
To counterbalance this confrontational attitude toward the U.S., Che sought closer relations with the Soviet Union in a move that he considered both desirable and necessary, due to the conflict with the United States and the urgent need to find other buyers for Cuban sugar. He also tacitly hoped that these first two tactics would expand the state’s function in the Cuban economy—both as a goal in itself, and as a way to banish economic criteria from the realm of human relations. If the state controlled everything, then relations among people would improve as they became free of the problems arising from money, salaries, exchange, competition, and rivalry.
The land expropriation program had accelerated in the last months of 1959 as a result of grassroots peasant pressure for land and Fidel Castro’s shift toward the left. Compensation payments were still pending: when they did occur, they fell far short of U.S. requirements. They were not prompt, adequate, or immediately effective. Other internal and external pressures mounted throughout 1960, especially between January and July, when two crucial events took place. First, the U.S. canceled its purchase of the government’s sugar quota. Then Castro expropriated the foreign-owned oil refineries after they refused to refine the Soviet oil that had replaced Venezuelan supplies. Che played a decisive role both in bringing on the July crisis and in finding and implementing a Soviet solution to it.
Relations with Moscow had been intensifying from the outset. In October 1959, Antonio Nuñez Jiménez was approached by a character central to this account: Aleksandr Alexeiev, an intelligent and sensitive man who thirty-five years later maintained an immense affection for Cuba and its people, as well as the Revolution which brought him into contact with history and the tropics. He arrived in Havana on October 1 as an official of the Foreign Ministry. Alexeiev was traveling with a delegation of Soviet journalists and also had a journalist’s visa. Though he was regarded as a correspondent, he never concealed his true mission.*5 He quickly arranged a meeting with Fidel in order to deliver a gift and establish contact on behalf of his government. But he first met with Che, whom he considered “almost a Communist”27: “He was the first Cuban leader to receive me, on October 12, 1959, at INRA.”28 According to Alexeiev, “our assessments of numerous different world events were identical, with no substantive divergencies.”29 Che quickly set up a meeting with Castro on October 16.
/> Their conversation gave rise to an important idea. After the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan attended the United Nations General Assembly in November, he was scheduled to inaugurate a Soviet industrial exhibit in Mexico. The suggestion was made that the exposition could then travel to Havana, where it would be officially opened by Mikoyan. Alexeiev flew off to Mexico to take up the matter with Mikoyan, who promptly accepted the invitation. Tentatively, November 28 was chosen as the date. But the Cubans then decided they preferred that the Soviet visit not coincide with a religious conference scheduled for those days and postponed it to the following year. Che’s man Ramiro Valdés and Héctor Rodríguez Llompart, an aide of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, were shipped off to Mexico to reschedule everything.†3 Days later, the Cuban government announced that Anastas Mikoyan would inaugurate the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Havana on February 3, 1960.
At this point a curious Soviet personage appeared on the scene: Nikola Leonov, the KGB officer who had met Raúl Castro in Vienna in 1953 and Che in Mexico in 1956. He accompanied Mikoyan to Mexico in 1959 as his interpreter and bodyguard. When Mikoyan subsequently traveled to Cuba Leonov went with him, entrusted among other things with a delicate task: to choose gifts for their Cuban hosts. To Che and Raúl, he presented an ode selection: “for Che, who likes arms, we bought two weapons: a very fine pistol and another high-precision sports model, along with ammunition. For Raúl I bought a chess set, as he was a very good chess player.”30 Upon his arrival in Havana, Leonov visited Che’s home in Ciudad Libertad, where—to the Russian’s surprise—he had to be awakened at mid-morning. They met as old friends, perhaps with greater affection and familiarity than was warranted by their earlier, fleeting acquaintance in Mexico. Only four yean had passed since their previous encounter, but what a difference. As Leonov remembers, when they opened the box with the weapons, “he tried then without firing them; he liked them.”31
Che was highly active in the negotiations with Mikoyan, especially concerning the amount, time frame, and strategic significance of Soviet cooperation. After welcoming Mikoyan at the airport with Fidel, Che attendee their next meeting in secret; it was of historic importance. Leonov described it as follows:
Che was present at the key conversation, which took place at a little fishing place Fidel had on the Laguna del Tesoro. We made the trip in a Soviet helicopter which was part of the exhibition. Fidel brought Che along as the second member of the Cuban delegation. The Russian delegation consisted of Mikoyan and the Soviet ambassador in Mexico and myself as an interpreter and note-taker, as we were not using tape recorders for the sake of security. The helicopter landed outside the little fishing cottage, where we all stayed. The conversation took place in an absolutely spectacular setting: we were not indoors, but walking along wooden bridges over the swamp, amid the croaking of the bullfrogs and the sounds of the tropical night. The conversation centered on two or three basic points: the establishment of relations; it was February and we had no embassy. Mikoyan said that in order to be in contact we needed to open embassies both here and there, to have formal contact, and this was quickly agreed upon. Then another matter arose, that of loans; and here Che Guevara participated, supporting Fidel’s position. The essence was that Mikoyan had instructions to promise only 100 million dollars. Fidel said it was too little, that 100 million dollars would not be enough to begin reorganizing all economic activity, and this during a full-fledged conflict with the United States. What he was planning was the economic reorganization of Cuba within the Socialist camp, and 100 million dollars was too little. Mikoyan said: “Well, let’s use the 100 million and then we’ll go on talking to obtain more.” Che said, “When taking a historic step it is better to have a far deeper commitment, providing greater security for the future; it’s no joke to reorient a country from one side to the other. If you drop us halfway with 100 or 200 million dollars, we won’t solve anything.”32
According to Alexeiev, “Che was the principal architect of Soviet-Cuban economic cooperation,”33 though not in all of its aspects. For instance, the possibility of Soviet arms sales to Cuba was not discussed during Mikoyan’s visit.*6 As Alexeiev recalls it, Castro secretly asked the Soviet Union for arms (via Alexeiev) only one month later, after the explosion of the French ship La Coubre in Havana on March 4, 1960. Over a hundred Cubans were killed and an entire shipment of rifles and ammunition was destroyed. Raúl negotiated the terms the following July in Moscow.34
Thanks to Mikoyan’s visit, the revolutionary regime accomplished several of its goals. It obtained a loan of 100 million dollars, no strings attached, and it consolidated the Soviet Union’s commitment to continue buying sugar. (A small transaction had been negotiated earlier, and in reality Moscow had been purchasing Cuban sugar since Batista’s time.) In addition, the two countries established diplomatic relations. Faure Chomón, the former Revolutionary Student Movement leader who had fought at Che’s side in Santa Clara, was named Cuba’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Sergei Kudriavtsev, earlier entrusted with an espionage mission in Canada, represented his country in Havana. Finally, the Cubans ensured the receipt of Soviet oil shipments in significant and increasing volume, in exchange for Cuban sugar.
Cuba’s oil situation was desperate indeed, and the problems it raised constituted Che’s first confrontational international experience. The American refineries in Cuba imported crude from Venezuela, sold it to clients in pesos, and charged the National Bank in dollars so as to pay their Venezuelan suppliers. Che began delaying payment to the companies, which in turn started to pressure him. The first shipment of Soviet oil arrived at Havana on April 19, 1960. Negotiations with the American companies were at a standstill. Their representative, Tex Brewer, complained bitterly of Che’s threats and obstinacy. Finally, Che agreed to a last payment on debts outstanding, on the condition that the refineries buy 300,000 barrels of Soviet oil. The companies refused to refine the Soviet crude, with the complicity of the U.S. Treasury and without consulting the American Embassy in Havana. On June 6, Ambassador Philip Bonsai described to his superior in Washington, in an “eyes only” report, a meeting he had held with Brewer:
The policy of his company (ESSO) had been, on the assumption that the US Government would take no stand in the matter, that it would be inevitable to refine the Russian crude: as desired by the Cuban Government. The assumption, however, turned out to be contrary to fact. At a meeting held perhaps on June 3 in Secretary Anderson’s office with Tom Mann representing the Department and Mr. Barnes (CIA), Texaco and Standard (ESSO) were told by Secretary Anderson the following: That a refusal on their part to refine Russian crude in Cuba would be consistent with over-all US policy toward the Cuban Government. On the basis of this statement of US Government policy, Standard (ESSO) and Texaco have decided to refuse to refine Soviet crude. The effect of this policy … will be to present the Cuban Government with the alternative of either accepting the decision or of assuming full responsibility for the operation of the refineries and for the procuring of the necessary crude from Russian or other available sources. I think the companies will be intervened and that the Government will make every effort to increase shipments of Russian crude. On the other hand, if the Government manages to operate the refineries and to maintain an adequate flow of products, it will have gained a significant victory, comparable to that of Egypt when it demonstrated its ability to operate the Suez Canal.*7
A cable from the British ambassador to the Foreign Office, dated June 22, emphasized Che’s role in the negotiations and their final outcome. Guevara stated unabashedly that the Soviet Union “is a Power which has the petroleum, the ships to transport it, the willingness to transport it and the decision to do so.” Her Majesty’s ambassador drew the appropriate, if un-American, conclusion: “If this is so, I cannot see that diplomatic pressure and threat of withholding supplies altogether would be of any avail.”35
Castro proceeded accordingly, ordering the refineries to process the Soviet oil or face the conseq
uences. Their nationalization on June 29 was decreed by Che Guevara, who had won his first international battle. The collision course he had chosen was the right one: the inevitable confrontation with Washington had radicalized the masses, and raised their consciousness; Moscow’s support had proven both reliable and decisive.
Days later, the Eisenhower administration suspended the purchase of Cuban sugar. Che and Castro, invoking their agreement with Mikoyan in February, asked Khrushchev to take on the equivalent of the U.S. quota, if only for symbolic purposes. Thanks to the earlier negotiations and Nikita Khrushchev’s sympathy for the Cuban Revolution (which was not necessarily shared by the rest of the Soviet leadership), the next day the Kremlin announced that it would buy the total amount of the U.S. quota for that year.36 There was another reason, however, for Khrushchev’s decision. Moscow was fully engaged in its struggle with China—though in Cuba there was little information about or awareness of the issue. The first public clash between the two giants of socialism had taken place just weeks earlier, at the Congress of the (Workers) Communist Party of Romania, held in Bucharest on June 21. Khrushchev privately described the Chinese delegation as “crazy,” “Trotskyist,” and “warmongers.”37 The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party met two weeks later and adopted Khrushchev’s proposal to withdraw all Soviet technicians from China. As the French journalist K. S. Karol noted in 1970, the Soviet Union’s support for Cuba was the perfect alibi for its anti-China offensive. Nobody could accuse the Soviets of being soft toward the United States, or failing to support the Third World, at a time when they were saving Cuba from international ostracism and economic disaster.38
From early 1960, Che had launched a campaign against the sugar quota, presenting it as a form of slavery which forced Cuba to keep producing sugar cane. He was now proven right, and could boast of his victory.*8 He alone sought the elimination of the quota, promoted an alliance with the Soviet Union, conducted the economic negotiations with Mikoyan in February, and finally succeeded in substituting Moscow for Washington. On July 9, at the height of the conflict with Washington over oil and sugar, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet armed forces would defend Cuba with missiles, if necessary. Castro confirmed the announcement, but warned that it should be interpreted “metaphorically.”