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Guevara did not attempt to conceal the subversive activities which Cuba was undertaking. He explicitly admitted that they were training revolutionaries and would continue to do so. He felt that this was a necessary mission for the Cuban Government since revolution offered the only hope of progress for Latin America.78
This happened just as Fidel Castro was trying to trade his support for Latin American revolution in exchange for peaceful coexistence with Washington,*22 and when the new Soviet leadership appeared willing to ease tensions with the United States. At that precise moment, Che used the highest-level contact Cuba had had with the United States in years to boast of Havana’s international ventures. The episode can only evoke his behavior fifteen years earlier, at the immigration bureau in Mexico City, when the brash young Argentine doctor proclaimed himself a Communist, damning the consequences.
His animosity toward the United States had by now reached new heights. Che openly expressed his feelings during a speech in Santiago, Cuba, before leaving for New York:
We must learn this lesson, learn the lesson about the absolutely necessary abhorrence of it [imperialism], because against that class of hyena there is no other help than abhorrence, there is no other medium than extermination.79
This growing anger at the U.S. was perhaps a symptom of how the world was closing in on him. Throughout 1964, especially in the final weeks of the year, Che had displayed a growing restlessness and need for change. Many friends and acquaintances sensed that he was on the brink of a threshold in his life. Though none predicted a tragic outcome, many had political and personal glimpses into the change ahead. An official at the British Embassy had been cabling premonitory reports to London since 1964: “It would not surprise me if Guevara himself were soon to receive a more appropriate post—or a sinecure designed to free him for his important duties as liaison with other Latin Americans.”80 Another observer who predicted a shift in Guevara’s existence was Gianni Corbi, an Italian journalist for L’Espresso who visited Cuba during the summer of 1964 and spent countless hours in conversation with Che: “I should not be at all surprised to see Che Guevara and his buddies, those traveling salesmen of the permanent revolution in Latin America, shake the dust of Castro’s Cuba off their feet and head for the hills. When next heard of, they’ll be heading partisan bands in the barren peaks of the Andes.”81 For the moment, his destination was Africa.
Che’s time in Cuba was drawing to a close. Though he would return for several months in 1966, in convalescence and in training for Bolivia, his Cuban saga came to an end, for all practical purposes, after his trip to New York in December 1964. The African and Algerian chapters of his history remained to be written. But the die was cast, particularly in that small space where two of the great epics of our age had intersected: his own, and that of Fidel Castro.
During that long year of 1964, when he lost both friends and battles, undertaking endless struggles over topics crucial to the fate of the Revolution, Che discovered two indisputable facts about his role in Cuba. One was that Castro held him very dear, indeed; he would back him in all his projects for Argentina, Algeria, Venezuela, and now Africa. Fidel never disputed the place Guevara had carved out for himself, or reproached him for his errors or outbursts. Che could nurture no grudges on that account. But Guevara also understood that Fidel, consummate politician that he was, did not really commit himself to Che’s stances. He had to wage his own battles, and suffer his own defeats. Without ever disputing his sporadic victories, Castro never extended Che Guevara his full consent. At times, he even sided with his opponents, either because révolution oblige, or because he simply did not agree with Che’s ideas.
Moment by moment, battle by battle, Che gradually realized he was alone: neither with nor against Fidel. But Castro was everywhere; lacking his support, Che had nothing, no ground to stand on. His situation was untenable: the slogan of neither marriage nor divorce with Fidel became unsustainable for Che. Nothing could have affected Che more than this tangle of ambiguities and contradictions—the half-tones of his twilight in Cuba. Once again, it was time to leave.
*1 See, for example, Matt D. Childs, “An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara’s Foco Theory,” Journal of Latin American Studies (Cambridge University Press, London), no. 27, 1995, pp. 593–624. This shift in Guevara’s arguments was not necessarily reflected in the way his followers interpreted his point of view.
†1 A further, conclusive sign of the difference is that, this time around, Che’s essay received a Soviet response. An article signed by Dimitri Levonov appeared on November 11, 1963, in the Spanish-language Revista de la URSS, under the title “La coexistencia pacífica fortalece el frente de la lucha contra el imperialismo” (Peaceful coexistence reinforces the front in the struggle against imperialism). According to the British Embassy in Havana, “the article might in fact be read as a reply to Guevara’s article on guerrilla warfare of last September in Cuba Socialista, with which it is in marked contradiction.” Havana Telegram to Foreign Office, Counter-Revolutionary Activities, January 10, 1964 (Confidential), Foreign Office, FO371/174003, Public Record Office, London. A top-secret cable from the Soviet Embassy in Havana branded the essay “ultrarevolutionary bordering on adventurist.” According to the embassy, Che “ignores basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.” Embassy Cable no. 47784, January 28, 1964 (Top Secret), Russian National Archive, Center for the Conservation of Contemporary Documents, File no. 5, List no. 49, no. 655, Moscow.
*2 They came to almost four hundred, according to one of them. Carolina Aguilar, quoted in Marta Rojas and Mirta Rodríguez, Tania: La guerrillera inolvidable (Havana: Instituto Cubano del Libro, 1970), p. 108.
†2 Amalio Rey, interview with the author, Cordoba, November 25, 1994.
‡1 “In September of 1961 [Cooke] no longer spoke as a Peronist … but as a Communist.” Ernesto Goldar, “John William Cooke de Perón al Che Guevara,” in Todo es historia (Buenos Aires), vol. 25, no. 288, pp. 26, 27.
*3 Commenting upon Khrushchev’s fall in November with his friend and teacher Anastacio Cruz Mancilla, Che said: “I will never forgive Khrushchev for the way he resolved the missile crisis.” “Memorandum of Conversation of November 6, 1964, of E. Pronski with Havana University Professor Anastacio Cruz Mancilla,” November 13, 1964 (Secret), Russian National Archive, File No. 5, List No. 49, Document No. 759.
*4 The FBI, which for some strange reason was also interested in Cuba, but whose ideological expertise was severely limited, commented in a secret intelligence report: “Castro has, since July 26, 1963, demonstrated discontent with and coolness toward the Soviet Union, while exhibiting a tendency to favor the Chinese communists in their dispute with the Soviet Union. Cuban diplomatic officials have even indicated that Cuban leaders are completely disappointed in their treatment by the Soviets, that the Cuban Government is closer than ever to the Chinese communists, and that this is known to the Russians.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Current Intelligence Analysis” (Secret), November 27, 1963, p. 2, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Gordon Chase File, LBJ Library.
*5 Quotations are taken from several documents pertaining to the U.S.-Cuba exchange, which took place between September and November 1963. See William Atwood’s memorandum to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. Dated November 8 (Secret), it reports on Atwood’s contacts with Lisa Howard, Carlos Lechuga, and René Vallejo in Havana.
†3 Cf. especially Gordon Chase’s memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, dated March 25, 1964, where Chase comments on the program’s excellence and suggests that Howard’s request that he write the ABC Vice-President for News to that effect be granted. Chase to Bundy (Top Secret, Eyes Only), March 25, 1964, Memorandum, The White House (copy LBJ Library).
*6 In Ahmed Ben Bella, Connaître Che Guevara, Cayenne (French Guyana), October 1987, p. 53. Gleijeses quotes Ulises Estrada and other members of the Cuban expeditionary team, in Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961–1965,” Journal
of Latin American Studies, no. 28, London University, Spring 1996, p. 188. Efigenio Amejeiras, head of the Cuban mission in Algeria, gave a similar account to Paco Ignacio Taibo II and others in September 1995 in Havana. Taibo, as on other occasions already cited, shared the interview with the author.
*7 Masetti’s son Jorge places his father’s return to Argentina in 1962. Masetti last appeared publicly in Cuba at the televised trial of the Bay of Pigs prisoners; he then disappeared from Cuba. Cf. Jorge Masetti, La loi des Corsaires (Paris: Stock, 1992). He confirmed this account in a telephone conversation from Paris with the author on September 5, 1996.
†4 Ricardo Rojo notes that he, Masetti, and Che met several times in Havana between early February and mid-April 1963. Rojo’s recurring chronological imprecisions render his account somewhat unreliable. Ricardo Rojo, Mi amigo el Che (Buenos Aires: Editorial Legasa, 1985; first edition, 1968), pp. 171–172.
*8 In the words of Castellanos, “Many people say it’s a lie, but Che was going to leave here in 1963; he even sent me to wait for him. I had not said this before.” Alberto Castellanos, interview with the author, Havana, January 23, 1996.
*9 This hypothesis has been suggested by Ulises Estrada, who was Tania’s companion for a year—she mentions him in letters to her parents—and who also believes Che’s original intention was to join the Argentine expedition: “Two Cuban officials were in Masetti’s column; Che always saw that guerrilla attempt as something for later, as a mother guerrilla which he would later join. Tania was part of all of that.” Ulises Estrada, interview with the author, Havana, February 9, 1995.
*10 MID-463-26. XII. 63. Oleg Daroussenkov, “Memorandum of Conversation of December 20, 1963, with Minister of Industries Ernesto Guevara,” December 26, 1963 (Secret), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow. Beginning in mid-1963, when Cuba was formally excluded from the Socialist bloc, all cables from the Soviet Embassy in Havana were also sent to the Central Committee department in charge of relations with the Socialist countries. The head of this department was none other than Yuri Andropov. The first direct accusation leveled at Che of being pro-Chinese appears in Soviet cables in February 1963. It comes from a high official of the Hungarian Communist Party, who spent several weeks in Havana: “Some Cuban leaders (Che Guevara, Vilma Espín) are under strong Chinese influence.” “Memorandum of Conversation, February 28, 1963, of Istvan Tempe,” March 4, 1963, Russian National Archive, p. 419n, File No. 5, List 49, Document No. 653.
*11 Years later, Sergo Mikoyan recalled the following scene in Geneva, during an UNCTAD conference: “Che nodded toward a Chinese man seated on a bench and smiled, saying that some considered him pro-Chinese. These poor people were here to follow all his movements and contacts. And indeed, the inscrutable and silent Chinaman was still there three hours later when, after going for a walk and having a long talk in the room, we finally left Che seated before a pile of documents.” Sergo Mikoyan, “Encuentros con Che Guevara,” in América Latina, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Latin American Institute, No. 1, 1974, p. 193.
*12 Indeed, the Americans recognized that “There is no conclusive evidence linking Castro with direct responsibility for the rioting. There is nothing to show that the Cuban leader was in consultation with Panamanian Castroists in the planning and direction of the recent disturbances or that he delivered material support for use in the riots.” INR to Secretary, “Castroist and Communist Involvement in the Panamanian Disorder,” RAR-3, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (Secret), January 31, 1964, NSF, Country File, Cuba, vol. 1, LBJ Library.
*13 A CIA report in 1965 noted that industrialization in Cuba had failed due to a shortage of equipment, raw materials, and skilled labor; a lack of experience in heavy construction; and a lack of discipline in budgets and economic planning. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, Cuba: “Delay and Misdirection of the Industrial Production Program, 1960–1965,” November 1965 (Secret), p. 1, NSF, Country File, Cuba, W. G. Bowdler File, vol. I, no. 8 report, LBJ Library.
*14 Fidel Castro, “En el acto central por el XX aniversario de la caída en combate del Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara,” Cuba Socialista (Havana), November-December 1987, p. 93. “One of the greatest heresies committed in this country was to assume that what we were doing between 1967 and 1970, the economic disruption that prevailed, took place … in the name of Che.”
†5 The Socialist countries had even asserted that they would fulfill aid commitments through 1964 but could promise nothing beyond that, as reported by the London Financial Times, July 29, 1964.
*15 The following conversation between Che and Alexeiev illustrates the growing controversy on the subject: “Guevara told me that at this time in all industrial branches work norms would be introduced with the help of Soviet experts. He disagreed with progressive salaries and declared that he would only apply moral incentives. I told him he was wrong thinking that it was possible to increase productivity without material incentives. He replied that at this point the aim was not to increase productivity but to raise consciousness and to introduce new technologies.” Aleksandr Alexeiev, “Memorandum of Conversation December 25, 1963 with the Minister of Industry Ernesto Guevara,” January 29, 1964 (Secret), Russian National Archive, File No. 5, List No. 49, Document 760.
*16 At first, Che did not give much importance to the emergence of the new ministry: “There are to be two new ministries. … One of them, naturally, is that of Sugar under Borrego, which is nothing more than an offshoot of the existing Ministry. …” Ernesto Che Guevara, Meeting of July 11, 1964, Ministry of Industries Minutes, p. 508.
*17 The following passage makes the point very succinctly: “The discussion of ‘moral incentives’ is being made the center of all issues, and moral incentives in themselves are not the center. … Moral incentives are the predominant … form which incentives must take in this phase of the construction of socialism … but they are not the only form. … Material incentives are also valid.” Ernesto Che Guevara, Minutes, p. 345.
*18 Lilia Rosa Pérez kindly indicated the origins of her son’s name, as well as the circumstances under which she met Che, in a letter to the author dated November 2, 1996.
†6 One in particular, Mirko, was even under investigation for a time during the eighties.
‡2 Lilia Rosa, in the cited letter to the author, confirmed the story while noting that she had not taken the initiative to reveal it. Lilia Rosa López, letter to the author, November 2, 1996.
*19 Che’s evaluation was similar to that of a CIA national intelligence estimate dated August 5, 1964 (drafted in the spring of that year), which began by saying: “In recent months, regional dissidence and violence have assumed serious proportions, even by Congolese standards, and produced the threat of a total breakdown in governmental authority. The difficulties confronting Prime Minister Tshombe are enormous.” Director of Central Intelligence, “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo,” August 5, 1964 (Secret), Declassified Documents Catalog, Research Publication (Woodbridge, Conn.), vol. 16, #5, Sept.–Oct. 1990, file series no. 2439.
†7 Havana Telegram No. 48 to Foreign Office, Cuban Political Situation, November 23, 1964 (Restricted), Foreign Office Archive FO371/174006, Public Record Office, London. Che was already on bad terms with Bank officials, especially its Soviet advisers: “You know that we have always had rather strained relations with the Bank, practically since I left the Bank. It has always been, through its Czech and Soviet advisers, the champion of financial self-management.” Ernesto Che Guevara, Meeting of July 11, 1964, Minutes, p. 530.
*20 “Numerous LA delegations have protested what they feel to be unnecessarily helpful US publicity to Fidel Castro result of CBS TV interview of Guevara. … LAs also miffed no US press coverage LA replies to Che Guevara in GA.” Department of State, Incoming Telegram, Cuba: Che Guevara CBS Interview, December 14, 1964 (Confidential), NSF, Country File, Cuba, Activities of Leading Personalities
, Cuba, no. 62 cable, LBJ Library.
*21 The first foreign official Che met with in New York, Enrique Bernstein of Chile, later reported to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago that Che had completely embraced “the position of Beijing.” WTDentzer/AmEmbassy Santiago to ARA/DOS Washington, December 21, 1964 (Confidential), NSF, Country File, Cuba, Activities of Leading Personalities, Document no. 57, LBJ Library.
*22 In a long interview with Richard Eder of the New York Times, Castro “proposed an agreement to cease helping the guerrillas in Latin America” if Washington suspended its own assistance to the Cuban exiles in Miami. New York Times, July 6, 1964, front page.
Chapter 9
Che Guevara’s
Heart of Darkness
In the words of Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria, “We arrived in the Congo too late.”1 Ernesto Che Guevara would spend the next-to-last year of his life supporting a struggle that was already over, in a dismembered country at the heart of a continent torn by age-old divisions and foreign incursions both tragic and comic. The latest intervention pitted revolutionary Cubans led by Guevara against Cuban-born pilots recruited by the CIA, thousands of miles from their birthplace. Certainly, there was a rebellion in the Congo; unquestionably it was the most important armed uprising in sub-Saharan Africa since its struggle for independence.*1 But by the time Che began preparing for his Congo expedition, the rebellion had been crushed by Belgian paratroopers, Rhodesian and South African mercenaries, and U.S. transport planes. Opération Dragon Rouge was the code name for the new and old colonial powers’ attempt to retake the city of Stanleyville.†1