Companero

by Jorge G. Castaneda

  When Che visited the camps from Dar-es-Salaam in mid-February, he perceived these difficulties as well as the fierce divisions among factions in the area. But he did not recognize that the groups on the western shores of Lake Tanganyika did not constitute a combat front in any real sense. Thus can be explained his insistence on sending Cuban troops to train and reinforce the Congolese—though not to fight alongside them, much less instead of them, as would in fact occur. Later, Che would spend long and frustrating months in the Congo waiting, in vain, for Laurent Kabila to lead his own troops into combat. Even when he finally departed from Africa, Guevara remained somewhat confused about all of this, though he had by then grasped what was actually happening in other areas:

  There are two zones in which one might say there is an organized attempt at revolution: the area where we are, and part of the province held by Mulele, who remains a big mystery. In the rest of the country there are only isolated bands surviving in the jungle; they lost everything without even fighting, just as they lost Stanleyville without a fight.*5

  In reality, the struggle in Che’s area depended almost entirely upon the Cubans. As for Mulele’s uprising, it was dying a slow and painful death. The revolution in the Congo was over before it even began.

  Three Cuban sources have confirmed that Che decided to join the Congo rebellion before he returned to Havana. The first is Cuba’s former ambassador to Tanzania Pablo Ribalta, dispatched to Africa by Che as his advance man in February 1964. Ribalta believes without a doubt that Che had determined to take the revolution beyond Cuba ever since his trip to the United Nations.16 According to Serguera, the second source, “There was already a conspiracy afoot when he left Algiers, he was already determined to go to the Congo.”17 The third source is Colonel Dariel Alarcón Ramírez—“Benigno,” one of the three survivors of the guerrilla campaign in Bolivia—who from the time he enrolled in the Congo expedition until the day of Guevara’s capture in Bolivia played a crucial role in Che’s life and is an invaluable witness for the following two years. Benigno states in his memoirs18 that he ran into Che in Algeria late in 1964. He believes that Che resolved to go to the Congo while still in Algeria:

  I believe he made the decision in Algeria because it was then that Che was first accused of being pro-China and a Trotskyist. He sent me from Algeria to the Congo: go with Ribalta and wait [for me] there.19

  So by mid-January 1965 Che was obviously inclined to head for Africa permanently. Three elements were missing for a final decision. One was his trip to Beijing at the end of January. Another was his speech—famous because it marked his break with the USSR—at an economic planning seminar in Algiers on February 24, 1965. The third was his week in Tanzania, when he visited the supposed guerrilla camps in the Congo and verified the ideal rearguard position tacitly provided by the republic founded by Julius Nyerere.

  The trip to Beijing took place at a time of growing tension between Cuba and China. Fidel Castro had increasingly aligned himself with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet conflict during the previous year. Cuba’s neutrality first tilted toward an effort at mediation—the Latin American Communist Party mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and cold-shouldered by Mao— and then culminated in a virtual identification with Moscow. Though frictions remained, Cuba’s affiliation was now self-evident. Its progressive alignment between 1964 and 1966 has been described as follows by the most distinguished scholar of Cuban foreign policy:

  Seven days later—just after Guevara’s charges in Algiers about Soviet collusion with capitalism—Raúl Castro went to Moscow to attend the meeting of Communist parties. The meeting was boycotted by China, which finalized the split in the international Communist movement. Cuba, which had not responded to previous invitations to attend meetings of Moscow-oriented Communist parties in March and June 1964, at last did so, siding with the Soviets against the Chinese. On March 13, Fidel Castro warned the Chinese that “division in the face of the enemy was never a correct strategy, never a revolutionary strategy.” Rapid deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations followed, along with momentary improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations. By mid-1965, China was flooding Cuba with its own propaganda, aimed especially at military officers. China also announced that it would buy [less sugar than expected], and … sell Cuba [less rice than had been agreed]. It refused to extend further credit to Cuba. … On January 2, 1966, in his opening address to the Tricontinental Conference, Fidel Castro denounced the Chinese government.*6

  A meeting of Communist parties in Havana in November 1964 was crucial, both for the Soviets and the Cubans. The latter achieved a stronger commitment and greater backing from the Communist parties of Latin America.20 This was not insignificant, if one recalls Che’s perpetual complaints about their lack of support. In exchange, the Soviet and Latin American party leaders wrested two major concessions from the Cubans. First, local parties would be in charge of coordinating and unifying pro-Cuba groups throughout the continent, in order to build broad political fronts and campaigns on a continental scale. Secondly, the meeting’s final declaration included a strong condemnation of “public polemics and fractionalized activities,” in an oblique but obvious denunciation of China and its supporters in Latin America.21 Perhaps Castro considered that the deeper purpose of the conference was to avoid division and promote unity without taking sides. But Mao and the Beijing Communists saw the conference resolution quite differently, as part of the Soviet Union’s “revisionist” offensive.

  Some Latin Americans, and possibly the Cubans themselves, realized that the explicit condemnation could create problems with China; thus the November 1964 mission to Beijing, in order to soften the blow. It wrought the opposite effect. Perhaps due to the inclusion of old Communists like Rodríguez and the Chileans, the November démarche exacerbated China’s irritation and failed in its attempt at mediation. Even worse, an open dispute erupted between Rodríguez and Mao Zedong. When they discussed the situation in Latin America, Mao had nothing but disdain for the Cuban Revolution. Mario Monje, Secretary-General of the Bolivian Communist Party, recalls the Great Helmsman’s contemptuous attitude and the Cuban’s reaction: “Mao said it was an expression of petit-bourgeois nationalism. Carlos Rafael leaped up, declaring that he would not permit such statements about the Cuban Revolution, or any doubts to be cast on Comandante Fidel Castro.”22

  Nonetheless, Che and the Cubans (perhaps for different reasons) decided to undertake a second attempt at mediation, for Cuba’s sake, or Che’s, in the worst of cases. Guevara had several direct and immediate reasons to try. He wanted to see for himself whether the November run-in between Mao and the Latin Americans had been the fault of the Chinese or of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, his chief adversary in Cuba.23 In Havana, Castro confided to Monje that “we decided Che should go because we knew about your problems in Beijing, so we sent the person closest to us to find out the truth, and it was confirmed. Che verified the confrontation that took place; it was China’s fault, period.”24

  In addition, Che knew it would be very hard for him to shake off his pro-China stigma, which he had been complaining about since 1963. Any open conflict between Havana and Beijing—as would take place in the coming months—entailed a serious and perhaps insurmountable dilemma for Che Guevara. He had learned long since to flee this type of predicament. The ambivalence in being the only pro-Chinese Cuban—or the only one who was not anti-Chinese—at the height of political and ideological tensions was probably unbearable for him.*7 Better by far to avoid confrontation than be consumed by it.

  Che also realized that any Cuban initiative in Africa, at least in the Congo and Tanzania, could not dispense with Mao’s approval. Beijing had amassed a great deal of experience in the area: its technical assistance—for instance, helping to build a railroad from Tanzania to the Atlantic—had been well received. Nyerere possessed an enduring affection for China’s leaders; Zhou Enlai would visit Dar es Salaam in October 1965. Pierre Mulele, the most strongly rooted leader among the Congolese rebels, was als
o a sinophile. So without a green light from China, there could be no African expedition—either for Cuba or for Che.

  Havana decided to try its hand as a go-between again in late January 1965. The mission comprised this time the Secretary of Organization of the new Cuban party, Emilio Aragonés, a friend and close aide of Che’s, and Osmany Cienfuegos, who had the full trust of Fidel Castro; no members of the former PSP were included. Che was still in Algiers according to the official organizers of his trip, interior deputy-minister and intelligence chief Manuel Piñeiro’s team in Havana. After waiting for him in vain for more than a month in Algiers, where Piñeiro’s team presumed him to be, Aragonés and Cienfuegos traveled to Paris; there they finally hooked up with the errant Argentine.*8 They spent several days in the French capital, resting and meeting with various contacts, and waiting for a flight for Beijing. Then they left for Pakistan (to avoid a stopover in Moscow, which might have offended the Chinese) on their way to Beijing.

  By most accounts, the trip was an unmitigated disaster. Mao initially refused to receive the delegation. Discussions with Liu Shaoqi, President of the Republic, and Deng Xiaoping, Secretary-General of the Party, led nowhere. Any chance of a reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing, even any easing of tensions, was now out of the question. Zhou Enlai agreed only to send one boat with weapons to the Congolese rebels, on the understanding that they would be trained by Cuban advisers. Perhaps the Cubans did not realize—they had no reason to—that the most populous country in the world was on the eve of one of its recurrent convulsions: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao would shortly launch. In that context, there could be no agreement with the USSR or with Cuba.

  As Emilio Aragonés remembers, the Chinese held fast to their basic opinion, which was that

  The Cuban Communist Party had wrongly aligned itself with the Soviets. We were not evil, we were good, we were Communists, but we had been taken in. We did not accept that, nobody had taken us in, they were the ones who were confused.25

  Despite Che’s careful preparations and brilliant opening presentation, the mission foundered. Aragonés hoped the Chinese would come around to the Cuban view, with all its solid argumentation and indisputable principles. Indeed, when the Cubans rose from the first meeting they were ecstatic, certain that they had dispelled Beijing’s inaccurate impression of their alignment with the Soviet Union. They were astounded when Deng Xiaoping launched into the same litany on the very next day, as if nothing had occurred. The Cubans were speechless; they were not yet familiar with the Chinese negotiating style, which basically consisted of repeating the same thing over and over again regardless of any objection. Che might have won a few debates; that did not mean he had carried the discussion. When Liu Shaoqi complained that the Cuban government had invited to Havana Gilberto Vieyra, the Colombian Communist leader who had compared Mao to Hitler, Che replied with his biting porteño irony: “If you have rehabilitated Pu-Yi, the last emperor, why shouldn’t we rehabilitate a poor Colombian Communist?”26 The remark had no perceivable effect whatsoever.

  Despite these underlying disputes, the Chinese treated their Cuban guests with their traditional exuberant hospitality. They even insinuated toward the end of the visit that a request to see Mao might be well received. On closing the last meeting, the Chinese delegation inquired if Che and his companions had any further wishes, aside from touring the Great Wall. They were really proposing an encounter with Mao, who would presumably forgive and absolve them. Perhaps the Cubans made a mistake in not accepting the offer, though it would have meant recognizing that the Cuban Communist Party had been “taken in” by the “revisionists.” As Aragonés recalls, “Che, Osmany and myself decided to ask nothing further, so as not to allow them that satisfaction.”27

  After his ten days in Beijing, Che arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on February 13. He was welcomed at the airport by a second-level minister, and the visit was relegated to inner pages by the local press. Perhaps Julius Nyerere already had an inkling of what was afoot. Che soon perceived the effects of his failed mission to China. The official dinner, hosted by the foreign minister, was attended by all the African ambassadors and the Soviet representative, but there was nobody from the Chinese Embassy.28 In any event, Che promptly began discussing with Congolese leaders the technicalities of Cuban assistance. He explained to Kabila that the problem in the Congo affected the entire world, not just Africa; in consequence he offered “on behalf of the government to send about thirty instructors and whatever arms we could. He accepted them gladly, recommending that we hurry, as did Sumaliot; the latter leader also suggested that the instructors be black.”29

  Che then talked at length with the freedom fighters, to gauge for himself their willingness to enter combat. It was a large meeting, with over fifty participants from about ten countries. Che responded to their appeals for help with caution and firmness:

  I analyzed the requests they had expressed, almost unanimously, for financial help and training. I explained the cost of sending people to Cuba, the amount of money and time required, and the little certainty that they would return as combatants useful to the movement. … So I proposed that training take place not in our faraway Cuba, but in the nearby Congo, where the struggle was not against a puppet like Tshombe, but against United States imperialism. … I spoke to them of the fundamental importance … of the liberation struggle in the Congo. … Their reaction was more than cold; though most refrained from making any comments, some asked for the floor to reproach me violently for my advice. They argued that their people, mistreated and debased by imperialism, would claim if there were victims that they would have died not for their own country, but to liberate another State. I tried to make them see that this was not a struggle bounded by any border, but a war against a common enemy, present everywhere … but nobody saw it in this light. It became clear to us that there was a long way to go in Africa before achieving a truly revolutionary leadership, but we were glad to have met people who were ready to fight to the end. From that time, our task was to select a group of black Cubans, volunteers of course, and send them to reinforce the struggle in the Congo.30

  There were precedents. Since 1961, Cuba had been grooming revolutionaries from Zanzibar. There were also training camps for the Algerian People’s Army in the Kabilia mountains, where ten Cuban technicians were instructing Algerians and Africans from several countries including Tanzania.31 Che’s many talks with Congolese leaders in Algeria and Africans in Mali, Brazzaville, and Conakry also established an antecedent. The content and conditions of Cuban assistance were gradually taking shape. Initially it was intended to include arms, communications equipment, and thirty advisers who would have no combat role. Cuba also pledged to help coordinate and unify the different groups operating in the Congo, and enlist the support of other African countries if necessary: Algeria, Egypt, Congo-Brazzaville, and so on.*9 There was no mention of Che himself conducting the operation; on the contrary, the Cuban presence would be as discreet as possible, so as not to attract attention or reprisals by the Western powers. The future Cuban advisers soon began their drills on the island. Rafael del Pino recalls that he was ordered as early as January to commission a group of black air force officers from Pinar del Río to a special location.32 With or without Che, the groundwork for the operation was already underway. Only a few personal decisions of Che’s were still pending.

  Che returned to Algiers from Southeast Africa to attend an economic seminar of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. He met once again with Ben Bella to review his experience in China, and discuss the next step. At that point, Che had probably not quite yet decided to leave Cuba for the Congo. He wrote as much in his journal, noting that he had not shared with Kabila his intention of leading Cuban operations in Africa.33 He was only at the halfway point of his journey, and several decisive events had not yet occurred—in particular, the Algiers speech in which he would break with the Soviet Union, on February 24.

  One of the factors leading up to t
he speech was probably the signing in Moscow, on February 17, of a long-term agreement on trade and payment mechanisms between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The accord included a higher volume of bilateral trade, as well as a substantial increase in Cuban sugar deliveries. Negotiations had dragged on for three months, suggesting tensions and reluctance on both sides. The Cubans were especially concerned by the high prices charged them for Soviet machinery and equipment. There were even rumors that Castro had dismissed his chief negotiator, the economist Raúl Maldonado. Whatever his mood, though, Fidel had no choice but to cut a deal, despite Che’s opposition and the fact that Moscow was clearly taking advantage of Cuba’s dependence on it.

  Guevara’s Algiers speech began with a reiteration of his traditional views. But then, in the next paragraph, Che embarked on a genuine diatribe against the Socialist countries:

  The development of those countries now entering the path of liberation must be paid for by the Socialist countries. … We must not talk any more of a mutually advantageous trade based on prices which the law of value … imposes on backward countries. What is the meaning of “mutual advantage” when [some countries] sell at world prices the raw materials that cost backward countries infinite sweat and suffering, while they buy at world market prices the machines produced in large, mechanized factories …? If we establish this sort of relations between the two groups of nations, we must agree that the Socialist countries are, to a certain extent, accomplices of imperial exploitation … and of the immoral nature of this exchange. The Socialist countries have a moral duty to cease their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West.34