Companero

by Jorge G. Castaneda

  The nearest hill had already been captured by the enemy. The last, sacrificial battle seemed imminent. The Cubans insisted on a formal request for their departure: “You must give us a document saying that you believe the Cuban advisers should withdraw, as their presence here has exacerbated the repression.” Che reiterated, “Look, they are already here, the issue for us is to be ready for a final confrontation. The situation is clear: resistance and death, or retreat.”95 Finally the Congolese agreed, and the Cubans prepared to board the boats that would carry them to safety.

  Che strove one last time to keep his dream alive. Just as they were about to embark, he advised Aragonés and Fernández Mell that he would rather stay behind with a few men and begin a long march—over 1,500 kilometers through the Congo to Kwilu—to join Mulele in the west and resume the struggle. His friends were stupefied. Fernández Mell threw his hat on the ground and finally lost all patience. Aragonés, older and wiser, argued, “Listen, Che, I have obeyed everything you have said here without discussion, to the letter, as your subordinate. But Che, let me tell you this: don’t even think that you can dare to tell me to leave while you stay here.”96 Che relented, but only outwardly; he still had one card to play.

  Quick to find a last pretext, he then proposed: “I’ll stay here with five strong men to recover our dead or missing in action. … The idea of leaving completely and departing as we had arrived, leaving behind defenseless peasants and armed but defenseless men, given their little capacity to fight, defeated and feeling that they had been betrayed, hurt me deeply.”97 The boats were filling with women and children, families from the rebel villages fleeing the mercenary advance. Lawton, the Cuban in charge, was horrified to see his precious boats filled with civilians pleading not to be left behind, while his commander refused to embark. Che withdrew to his last line of defense: the women and children must go first. Lawton objected that he had other orders, explaining to Che: “Look, those blacks belong here in the jungle, they are willing to live here. These blacks are not whom the mercenaries are after. They are after you and the black Cubans.” Che insisted, “When they get here, they are going to massacre these people.” Lawton retorted, “Yes, but my orders are that those who must not be massacred are yourselves, and I have to get you out. I respect you, but I am here under orders from Fidel; if I have to tie you up to take you out of here, I will.”*26 Che acceded.

  As Che wrote at the beginning of his Congo journal, the entire venture was the history of a failure.98 There were many reasons. Some he accurately recorded; others escaped him, and have become apparent only after thirty years. As Ben Bella lamented, Che arrived in the Congo too late. His rhythms, impulses, and inner demons were not those of the struggle in Africa. He tried to replicate in the Congo his epic of the Sierra Maestra, but neither the copy, nor the original, was rooted in reality. But perhaps the crudest negation of his delusion lies in a peculiar footnote, which may serve as an epitaph to this chimerical episode.

  Three authoritative sources have posed the same question and offered different answers, in a bizarre re-creation of Machiavelli’s Mandragola. How was it possible for one hundred Cubans and dozens of Rwandan and other rebel fighters from Kibamba to cross, in the light of dawn, and under zealous pursuit by their adversaries, a lake which was intensively patrolled by speedboats from South Africa, the CIA, and the Congolese army?

  Benigno raises the issue with greater precision. The Cubans were ready to fight to the last man, as they traversed the lake in their leaking and overcrowded vessels, surrounded by enemies who were fully aware of their schedule and itinerary. But they did not have to. Either nobody saw them, or those who did decided not to attack.†7 The outcome was hardly believable: the Cubans, though surrounded, were able to escape safely.

  The Belgian military mission was furious; they were not convinced that the Cubans had left for good. Devlin offers a plausible explanation in the African context: “I assigned a boat to prevent the Cubans from crossing the lake; but it broke down, and the Cubans got away. I will never forgive myself.”99 Major Hardenne recalls his own perplexity:

  Weather conditions had improved, so the command post and OPS/SUD were directing operations from a plane. They realized that the Cubans were fleeing on several boats, crossing the lake or navigating southward along the coast. For reasons that will never be explained, the ANC planes and boats piloted by mercenaries were not only not there despite orders, but did not respond to calls from the plane. … This bad execution of orders allowed the Cubans to escape.100

  But Jules Gérard-Libois, who has been studying the wars in the Congo for thirty years at the Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-politique (CRISP) in Brussels, finds incomprehensible the failure of the Belgians, South Africans, and anti-Castro Cubans to prevent Che from leaving the Congo. In his view, OPS/SUD ordered the Congolese battalions under its jurisdiction to let the Cubans get out alive. The two Belgian CIA pilots were confined to their hotel rooms. According to Gérard-Libois, the CIA station chief in Albertville confessed to two Belgian officers that he had received instructions to avoid any incident with the Cubans before December 1. The CIA ordered its aircraft and boats to effect an “operational destruction of the enemy,” but the order was not obeyed.101

  Gérard-Libois relates the mystery to another event that was taking place at the same time, on the other side of the planet: the so-called Camarioca immigration agreement between Cuba and the United States. Negotiated through the Swiss ambassador in Havana, it contemplated the emigration, over several months, of tens of thousands of Cubans wishing to leave the island. During the first year of the agreement’s application, more than forty-five thousand Cubans would fly to Florida.

  On October 27, Castro had announced that he was willing to allow those who wished to leave to do so; the only problem, he said, was that Washington refused to grant them entry visas. Castro’s speech eventually led to the agreement, made public through simultaneous press releases in both capitals on November 4. Gérard-Libois believes that the accord—on a terribly delicate issue, which would resurface during the Mariel exodus of 1980 and in the summer of 1994, with the Cuban raft people—led the United States to avoid any conflict which might have blocked its implementation. In this perspective, it seems logical that Washington should have instructed its missions abroad to avert any friction or confrontation with the Cubans during those weeks, until the Camarioca agreement had been fulfilled. Obviously, the U.S. government had not foreseen that its general guidelines would allow Che Guevara to escape. Officers in the Congo may well have misinterpreted the instructions, and allowed the encircled Cuban fighters to flee from Kibamba.

  None of the U.S. officials involved in these mysteries and contradictions recalls any such indication, or gives the interpretation much credence. Devlin says he never received any such order and, at the request of this author, consulted with his former subordinates in Albertville (particularly Richard Johnson, the CIA base chief); they do not remember anything of the sort either. Gustavo Villoldo swears that he never would have followed such an order if he had received it—but he did not. William Bowdler, the U.S. diplomat who negotiated the Camarioca agreement, does not remember any such trade-off or unilateral decision by Washington.102

  However, the mystery remains: how and why was Che allowed to leave the Congo? It would be only one of many ironies in his life if he survived his African expedition thanks to this strange coincidence. Perhaps the two years of borrowed time left him were the result of an uncanny convergence of interests involving Fidel Castro, the immigration and diplomatic authorities of the United States, the CIA, and South African mercenaries, all coming together on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. If his life had ended there, his sacrifice would have been just as noble, and his myth still one of the greatest in our century. But it would have been different.

  Che himself wrote the best appraisal of his role in the Congo campaign. He concluded the next-to-last and still unpublished book of his life with a stark evaluation of
his performance in Africa:

  My hands were tied by the somewhat unusual way I entered the Congo, and I was never able to overcome that disadvantage. My reactions were uneven; for a long time I had an attitude which might be termed complacent and, at times, I had very offensive and hurtful outbursts, perhaps due to something innate in me. The only people with whom I had appropriate relations were the peasants, for I am more accustomed to a political language, direct explanations and teaching through example, and I think I would have been successful in that field. As for relations with my men, I think I sacrificed myself enough that no one can reproach me in any personal or physical aspect, though I was able to satisfy my two great addictions in the Congo: tobacco, which I hardly ever lacked, and reading, which was always abundant. The discomfort of having tattered boots or a dirty change of clothes, or eating the same food as the troops and living in the same conditions was not a sacrifice for me. Especially, the fact that I could withdraw into my reading and flee from daily problems tended to separate me from the men, aside from certain aspects of my character which make intimate communication difficult. I was hard, but I don’t think I was excessively so, or unfair. I used methods which are not practiced in regular armies, such as leaving [soldiers] without eating; it is the only effective method I know in guerrilla warfare. At first I tried to apply moral coercion, and failed. I wanted the troops to see the situation the way I did, and I failed. They were not ready to look optimistically toward a future hidden by the black fog of the present. I was not brave enough to demand the ultimate sacrifice at the moment of truth. This was an internal, psychic block in me. For me it was very difficult to stay in the Congo. From the point of view of a fighter’s dignity, it was the right thing to do. From the point of view of my future, though it was not the best thing to do, that made no difference at the time. While I struggled to make a decision, I knew how easy it would be to make the ultimate sacrifice—and this worked against me. I think I should have imposed that final gesture upon a few chosen combatants; just a few, but we should have stayed. I have emerged believing more than ever in guerrilla warfare; but we failed. My responsibility is great; I will not forget this defeat or its valuable lessons.103

  *1 The time lag is worth noting: the period encompassing independence, the death of Patrice Lumumba, and the “Katanganese gendarmes” had drawn to an end almost five years before.

  †1Place names in the former Belgian Congo were changed in the 1970s. The country itself, previously known as Congo-Leopoldville, was renamed Zaire. The capital, Leopoldville, became Kinshasa. The capital of the eastern provinces, originally called Stanleyville, was rebaptized Kisangani. Elisabethville became Lubumbashi, and Albertville, Kalemie. This account will use the former names, which were current during Che’s lifetime.

  *2 According to Ben Bella, these leaders had a group of their own within the OAU; they regularly consulted and conspired among themselves. Ahmed Ben Bella, interview with the author, Geneva, November 4, 1995.

  *3 Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Cable, Statements of Ernesto Che Guevara on the Primary Purpose of His Mission to Africa (Secret). The cable quotes information dated late December 1964, and is itself dated January 15, 1965, NSF, Country File, Cuba, vol. 4, LBJ Library. Its main thrust is supported by the fact that Che publicly expressed his anger at the Soviet Union six weeks later, precisely in Algiers. This account of Che’s warning against close relations with the USSR and China was repeated in a report by the State Department’s Intelligence and Research section, signed by Director Thomas Hughes, and addressed to the Secretary of State. Knowing the professionalism of Hughes and Adrian Basora, who wrote the reports on Cuba during those years, it is difficult to imagine that they would have given credence to any dubious information. See INR/Thomas Hughes, April 19, 1965, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Activities of Leading Personalities, no. 18 memo, LBJ Library.

  †2 At least this is the account provided by Oscar Fernández Mell, who met Kabila in Dares-Salaam and spent four months with Che in the Congo. Oscar Fernández Mell, interview with the author, Havana, August 24, 1996.

  *4 Heikal’s recollections should be read with caution—not because Heikal is falsifying the truth, but because he inevitably furnishes a somewhat blurred image of events. Still, the thrust of Nasser’s commentary dovetails with other descriptions of Che at that time. Mohammed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973).

  *5 Ernesto Che Guevara, “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (el Congo),” unpublished manuscript, Havana, p. 86. As was noted in Chapter 1 (see footnote, p. 5), Che’s text, based upon his field journals in the Congo, remains unpublished, though it has been quoted by various authors. The authenticity of the manuscript has been ratified by several readers familiar with the original text.

  *6 Jorge Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 68–69. This view was also held by the Intelligence and Research Section of the U.S. State Department: “In the winter of 1964–1965, Cuba moved definitely toward the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. On four key issues—relations with the Chinese communists, Cuban-U.S. relations, Latin American revolution, and Cuban economic problems—the Soviets were able to pull Castro substantially toward their own positions.” Thomas Hughes to the Secretary, INR Research Memorandum 21, The Cuban Revolution: Phase Two, August 10, 1965 (Confidential), pp. 9–10, NSF, Country File, Cuba, W. G. Bowdler File, vol. 1, no. 46 memo, LBJ Library.

  *7 Pro-China Latin Americans and the Chinese themselves did little to ease the situation. A U.S. military intelligence report noted in March 1965 that a pro-China group in Peru— the Movement for Reformist Unity—had distributed to its militants Che’s essay “La Guerra de guerrillas: Un método,” subtitled “Una interpretación de la Segunda Declaración de La Havana.” Department of Defense Intelligence Report No. 2230027265, Cuban-Supported Political Subversive Activity, March 25, 1965 (Confidential), Miami.

  *8 Emilio Aragonés, interview with the author, Havana, February 10, 1995. Aragonés’s quip that Piñiero did not really know where Che was or when he was due to arrive in Algiers confirms that Che organized his African trip very much on his own, with only Serguera’s help, informing Havana as little as possible of his movements and intentions.

  *9 According to U.S. military intelligence, there was a further agreement: “Guevara on his trip through Africa made propositions for the delivery to GOC of Cuban prisoners that had been fulfilling [U.S.] missions in the Congo. Cosme Toribio (T), a Cuban exile pilot, is a prisoner of the Congo Rebel Troops. Fidel Castro had Guevara propose that Toribio be turned over to the GOC as a condition for Castro to initiate the sending of 400 to 500 men to the Congo to fight with the Congo rebels.” Department of Defense Intelligence Report No. 2210002365, Proposed GOC Aid to Congo Rebels, March 23, 1965 (Confidential), Miami.

  *10 “We discussed his speech all night; he was fully aware of what he was going to say. He was an enormously charming man, but terribly dogmatic and stubborn in his ideological positions.” Ben Bella, interview.

  *11 Rafael del Pino, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1995. Cienfuegos had accompanied Raúl Castro to Moscow. The distance Del Pino observed between him and Che during the flight was perhaps a sign of things to come when they returned to Havana.

  †3 The rumor appeared in two secret cables, one from the British Embassy in Havana, the other from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the Foreign Office. The second cable notes that the information originated in the State Department; in the first cable, the rumor is given little credence. See Lord Harlech to Foreign Office, No. 581, March 10, 1965 (Secret), FO/371/AK1015, Public Record Office, London, and Mr Watson to Foreign Office, No. 186, March 13, 1965 (Secret), FO/371/AK1015, ibid. There is also a U.S. cable about it: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Cable, “Alleged Current Activity of Che Guevara,” June 2, 1965 (Secret), NSF, Country File, Cuba, Activities o
f Leading Personalities, #14 cable, LBJ Library.

  *12 British Embassy in Havana, Research Memorandum, “Che Guevara’s African Venture” (Secret), undated, Foreign Office Archive FO371/AK1022, Public Record Office, London. Aside from a few additional comments such as that quoted above, this report is identical to one by the Intelligence and Research Section of the Department of State in Washington, under the same title, dated April 13, 1965, and registered as RAR-13 (copy LB J Library). This only confirms that U.S. and British intelligence services cooperated very closely in Cuba, as in many other countries. See Thomas Hughes to the Secretary, Che Guevara’s African Venture, INR/DOS, April 19, 1965 (Secret), NSF, Country File, Cuba, Activities of Leading Personalities, no. 18 memo, LBJ Library.

  *13 On October 9, 1996, the Bolivian daily La Razón published Che Guevara’s evaluations of his men’s performance during the guerrilla campaign in Bolivia; the document was captured together with Che’s diaries in October 1967, but had never been made public. Che’s evaluation of Benigno reads as follows: “11-3-67 (three months): Very good, a simple young man, with no duplicity, strong, modest and extremely hard-working, always with his morale up; 11-6-67 (six months): Very good, has had some minor problems in food distribution; in everything else, first rate; 11-9-67 (nine months): Very good, he is learning, has totally overcome his former minor problems.” Compared to the evaluations of other men, Benigno’s rating constitutes an example of admiration and trust on Che’s part comparable only to that which he extended to one or two other combatants.