Hidden History: The Secret Origins of the First World War.
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Long before he announced it to his own party, Balfour gave Grey, Asquith and Haldane advance warning that he intended to resign as prime minister, giving them additional time to organise their political strategy. The immediate problem with this handover of power was Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. The man who would become the next prime minister had no knowledge of the Secret Elite. He was a radical. He was anti-war. He was a genial draper’s son from Glasgow.24 He was not one of them. But Campbell-Bannerman, who was committed to political change, had the overwhelming support of his party.
Though he was certain to lead the Liberals into government, the Secret Elite conspired with their trusted men to undermine Campbell-Bannerman’s influence and power from within. The three conspirators, Asquith, Grey and Haldane, engaged in a plot worthy of Ancient Rome. They met in September 1905 at Grey’s private fishing lodge at Relugas, a remote village in the north of Scotland, determined to be rid of Campbell-Bannerman. His acerbic opposition to Lord Milner had been very offensive to them, and indeed to Milner, who was by then the acknowledged leader of the Secret Elite. They resolved to demand that unless he agreed to go to the House of Lords and leave the leadership of the Commons to Asquith, none of them would serve in his Cabinet.25 Haldane, who was always the driving force within this tight-knit group,26 wrote immediately to the king’s private secretary, warning that unless he, Grey and Asquith were in a position to shape policy inside the Liberal Cabinet, continuity of the grand plan would be impossible. Three weeks later, he was summoned to a meeting of the inner core of the Secret Elite at Balmoral. Present with the king were A.J. Balfour, prime minister and leader of the Conservatives, Lord Lansdowne, the foreign secretary, and the ubiquitous Esher. Thereafter, Haldane wrote triumphantly to Asquith that their Relugas plot was ‘thoroughly approved in all its details’ and that ‘we have secured very cordial and powerful assistance’.27
An awesome conspiracy to thwart the Liberal Party’s plan for peace and retrenchment was endorsed by the Secret Elite. They rubber-stamped a coup to undermine the democratic process, neuter the first man of the Liberal Party, and take control of the new government’s foreign policy. Incredible though it might appear, the two most senior Conservative leaders were actively conspiring with the king and an unelected lord to decide the composition of a Liberal Cabinet. What would Liberal Party members have thought had they known that three of their most senior representatives were plotting in secret against their stated interests? How would they have felt had they known that the leader of the Conservative Party, their political adversary, was intimately involved? The prime minister in waiting, Campbell-Bannerman, had no notion that his ‘loyal’ colleagues had loyalties that lay elsewhere.
The ‘Relugas Three’ had sworn that they would not serve under Campbell-Bannerman’s leadership, but the king stressed how important it was that they, the Secret Elite’s chosen men, should be inside the Liberal Cabinet. Guided by Lord Esher, he personally asked Haldane to take the War Office.28 King Edward then tried to persuade Campbell-Bannerman to go to the House of Lords, leaving control of the Commons to Asquith, Grey and Haldane. Campbell-Bannerman almost gave way to the pressure but was dissuaded by his wife, whose determination propped her wavering husband and temporarily thwarted the ambitious triumvirate. In an eventual compromise, they agreed to support Campbell-Bannerman provided Asquith was made chancellor of the Exchequer, Grey got the Foreign Office and Haldane the War Office. Continuity would be guaranteed. Control of foreign policy would remain in trusted hands, and a complete root-and-branch reorganisation of the War Office could begin under the watchful eye of the Secret Elite. Furthermore, by placing Grey and Haldane in these key posts, the Secret Elite kept firm control of the political leadership of the Committee of Imperial Defence and so ensured that only their men in the Cabinet fully appreciated the depth of preparation for eventual war with Germany.
And the beauty of it was that they were shielded from view by a radical Liberal Party intent on major social reform, content to let Edward Grey get on with his job in the Foreign Office, whatever that might be. How the Secret Elite must have laughed in their champagne at the notion of parliamentary democracy. The entire manoeuvre was agreed months before Arthur Balfour had even announced to his other colleagues that he was resigning. He did so in December 1905, and the king immediately invited Campbell-Bannerman to introduce his Liberal Government. Hey presto! Grey, Asquith and Haldane were appointed to the three senior Cabinet posts exactly as planned. The Secret Elite had all the king’s men in place.
The Liberal Party had been invited to form a government in December 1905 without facing the electorate, but a general election was called in the New Year. Members went back to their constituencies to campaign, but the Relugas Three did not sit on their hands waiting for the result. Invigorated by the threats that stemmed from the confrontation with Germany over Morocco, they hit the ground running.
In the throes of the general election, and before the matter had been discussed with the prime minister, let alone the Cabinet, Grey and Haldane gave permission for joint Anglo-French naval and military planning for war against Germany to continue. During the previous government, the Committee of Imperial Defence, itself an organ of the Secret Elite, had established a permanent sub-committee to prepare schemes for combined naval and military operations.29 Under the auspices of this top-secret committee, Lord Lansdowne had approved ‘military conversations’ with France for a possible immediate war against Germany. The French ambassador, Cambon, was deeply concerned that the Liberal government, which stood on an anti-war platform, might not maintain Lansdowne’s commitment because Sir Edward Grey had not acknowledged it. There was a sense of panic in the Quai d’Orsay. Would Britain continue her support and stay true to all that had been promised to Delcassé? Advised of this by the Times war correspondent Charles Repington, Grey asked him to reassure the French that: ‘I have not receded from anything Lord Lansdowne has said, and have no hesitation in confirming it’.30 Armed with this reassurance, Repington dined with General Grierson, director of military operations and member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who stated that Britain could put two divisions into Namur in Belgium within 13 days.31
Who was this journalist, Repington? Why was a war correspondent for The Times actively involved in the deepest secrets of British foreign policy? Eton old boy and ex-army officer, Repington had been dismissed for dishonourable conduct with a brother officer’s wife. He was later employed at The Times by George E. Buckle, a close associate of Milner and the Secret Elite.32 Professor Quigley demonstrated that The Times was their published voice and had been controlled by them since the 1890s.33 What now became evident was that The Times, through its war correspondent, was directly involved in the secret machinations of the Foreign Office. How could a journalist know more about top-secret British commitments to France than the incoming prime minister?
With the final results of the general election still unannounced, General Grierson wrote to Brussels advising the Belgian chief of staff that the British government was prepared to put ‘4 cavalry brigades, 2 army corps and a division of mounted infantry’ into Belgium, with the explicit intention of stopping a German advance.34
Plans to move British troops into Belgium? What exactly was going on? From 1905 onwards, Britain’s military link with Belgium was one of the most tightly guarded secrets, even within privileged circles. General Grierson, who was director of military operations and a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, was present with Lord Roberts, Admiral Fisher, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour and the director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Charles Ottley, at the CID meeting on 26 July 1905. They agreed to treat the special sub-committee that would take forward joint planning with French and Belgian military personnel as so secret that minutes would not be printed or circulated without special permission from the prime minister.35 They discussed the legal status of Belgian neutrality. A secret memorandum of 1 August 1905 included Gladstone’s opinion that the 1839 Treaty of Lo
ndon (which recognised the neutrality and independence of Belgium), was not binding but added that British interests were ‘now more than ever’ opposed to the violation of Belgian neutrality.36 The crucial point that the Treaty of London was not binding would be conveniently dropped in August 1914.
Grierson was tasked to drive forward the links with France and Belgium. On 16 January 1906, he opened official military ‘conversations’ with Major Victor Huguet in France, and on the same day wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston, the British Military Attaché in Brussels, advising him that a British Force of 105,000 would be sent to Belgium if a war broke out between France and Germany.37
Documents found in Belgian secret archives by the Germans after they had occupied Brussels disclosed that the chief of the Belgian general staff, Major-General Ducarne, held a series of meetings with the British military attaché over the action to be taken by the British, French and Belgian armies against Germany in the event of war. A fully elaborated plan detailed the landings and transportation of the British forces, which were actually called ‘allied armies’, and in a series of meetings they discussed the allocation of Belgian officers and interpreters to the British Army and crucial details on the care and ‘accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies’.38 Grierson was kept fully informed and approved the joint agreements, but the documents show that confidentiality was stressed repeatedly, and above all the necessity of keeping the conversations secret from the press was explicitly spelled out.39 Some observers have claimed that the Belgian government went no further than these preliminary talks because they were afraid that they might offend Germany and France,40 but this flies in the face of other secret diplomatic revelations.
Historically, Anglo-Belgian ties ran deep. Queen Victoria was a favourite cousin of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, and Edward VII understood best how to close the deal between Britain and Belgium through him. The British government later cemented the relationship by allowing Belgium to annex that area of Africa called the Congo Free State. The quid pro quo was a secret agreement that was in everything but name an alliance. King Leopold II sold Belgian neutrality for African rubber and minerals, and Britain acknowledged the annexation of the Congo in return for military cooperation that continued in absolute secrecy from that point forward. Thus Belgium bargained away her status as a perpetually neutral country by entering into a military compact with Britain.41 The huge significance of this may not be immediately apparent but will become so when Sir Edward Grey’s fateful speech of 3 August 1914 is thoroughly analysed.
In those dark January days, with the Moroccan crisis still unresolved, the Secret Elite intrigue drew Sir Edward Grey from his election meetings in Norfolk back to London for an urgent briefing from Lord Esher and Sir George Clarke,42 a former Governor of Victoria who had become the first secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Grey was ‘well pleased’ to learn that the armed forces had begun to coordinate planning for joint operations against Germany.43 He wrote to Haldane on 8 January to advise him that war could be imminent and that he had been reassured by Admiral Fisher that the navy was so ready that it could ‘drive the German fleet off the sea and into shelter at any time’.44 The inference was that Haldane, as minister of war, should be equally prepared.
They met at Berwick on 12 January, where a momentous decision was taken. Haldane told Grey to inform the French that military communications should proceed directly and officially between General Grierson and the French Military Attaché.45 They thus gave permission for a senior military director to coordinate planning with his French counterpart for war, without the knowledge or approval of the prime minister, the Cabinet, Parliament or the British people. From whom did their authority stem? No two men would dare commit Britain to such action unless they had the assured backing of an immensely powerful force. And they did. Haldane knew that Esher and the Committee of Imperial Defence approved of these moves. The king would certainly have been informed by Lord Esher. This was clearly driven by the Secret Elite.
At the same time as these ongoing machinations, the Liberal Party was vigorously campaigning across the country on a promise of ‘Peace, Retrenchment and Reform’. Campbell-Bannerman began the campaign with a rousing rally in the Albert Hall, where he denounced war and promised that the Liberal foreign policy would be ‘opposed to aggression and to adventure, animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities and to cooperate with them in the common work of civilisation’.46 He added: ‘We are fighting against those powers, privileges, injustices and monopolies which are unalterably opposed to the triumph of democratic principles.’ These prescient words were further expanded into a vision for his government:
It is vain to seek peace if you do not also ensure it. The growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world. What nobler role could this great country assume than at this fitting moment to place itself at the head of the League of Peace?47
On such a promise, Campbell-Bannerman led his party to a landslide victory in 1906.
These were two irreconcilable positions. Campbell-Bannerman and his government were committed to peace, while Grey and Haldane had set the country on a course for war. Precedent dictated that agreement should be sought from the prime minister and the Cabinet, but this never happened. How did they manage to pull off one of the most devious deceptions in Parliamentary history? No official records survive to confirm what precisely happened, and the conspirators themselves sowed the seeds of confusion. Haldane claimed in his ‘notoriously unreliable’48 autobiography that he dramatically abandoned his election campaign over the weekend of 13–14 January to travel to London to advise Campbell-Bannerman of what had been agreed with the French and seek his approval.49
According to Haldane: ‘He at once saw the point, and he gave me authority for directing the staff at the War Office to take the necessary steps.’50 Charles Repington confirmed that Haldane told him that Campbell-Bannerman ‘was very firm and clear on the point that we should be prepared for all emergencies and that conversations between the two staffs were permissible …’51 This cannot be true. Campbell-Bannerman was not in London that weekend. He remained in Scotland throughout the elections and did not travel south to London until the night of the 26th. Drafts of various notes were allegedly copied to Campbell-Bannerman, but there is no evidence to support assertions that they were ever cleared with him.52 Furthermore, Haldane later claimed: ‘I saw Colonel Huguet [the French Attaché] and authorised him, Sir Neville Lyttelton and General Grierson to study together’ plans for joint action against Germany.53 If Haldane’s recollection of these events, written privately in 1916, is accurate, the British secretary of state for war personally met with the French attaché and authorised plans that would have seen British troops rushed to Belgium in 1906. But at the time, and in the years that preceded the First World War, questions raised in Parliament about the British government’s commitment to France were repeatedly answered with a reassurance that there were no such commitments.
Grey agreed with Esher that the prime minister should ‘for the time being’ be kept in the dark about military contacts.54 On 9 January, he wrote to both Campbell-Bannerman at his home in Scotland and Lord Ripon, Liberal leader of the House of Lords, to inform them that he had promised the French diplomatic support but no more.55 Several days later, the prime minister received a note from his trusted Liberal colleague Lord Ripon, stating: ‘Our engagements with France are, I understand, confined to a promise of full diplomatic support, and I have no doubt that the French government understand that we are bound to nothing beyond that.’56 It is clear that Grey contacted both Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Ripon but was lying to them. The evidence proves that he and Haldane agreed to joint military preparations with France but told the prime minister that these were merely diplomatic conversations. It was a deliberate deception by Secret Elite placemen.
Arthur Ponsonby, Campbell-Bannerman’s principal private secretary, knew nothing about the military talks. He was
astounded by later claims made by Grey and Haldane that they had kept the prime minister fully informed. Ponsonby was adamant that ‘C-B never apprehended the significance of conversations with France, nor did he see how we were being gradually committed.’57 Had Campbell-Bannerman known what Grey and Haldane were up to, he would have confronted them. Given his staunch anti-war credentials, he would never have allowed Grey and Haldane to proceed.
In Grey’s autobiography, he deliberately dissembled on the question of why the ‘conversations’ were never brought to the attention of the Cabinet, making out that the prime minister was ambivalent about when it might be discussed. He admitted that he ‘ought to have asked for a Cabinet’ meeting but could not remember why he failed to do so, claiming memory loss.58 This is unbelievable. Just a few days later, the first Cabinet meeting of the new government passed without Haldane or Grey making mention of their cataclysmic decision. What seems even more incredible is that Campbell-Bannerman never raised the issue himself. Why? It is patently obvious that the wool had been pulled over his eyes. Numerous documented instances will be presented in our narrative which prove that the Relugas Three repeatedly lied to the Cabinet and Parliament about the existence of military agreements with France. It is a perfectly reasonable assumption that they were lying in their memoirs in suggesting that Campbell-Bannerman was kept fully informed. The problem remains that there is no evidence other than that given by the conspirators themselves in cynically sterilised accounts written long after Campbell-Bannerman was dead. No one was then in a position to refute their claims.