Hidden History: The Secret Origins of the First World War.

by Gerry Docherty

  In fact, the London conference brokered only a temporary truce. Nothing was permanently resolved. The one thing that could be guaranteed was continual bickering and aggressive anti-Austrian antagonism emanating through Serbia. Georges Louis, while still the French ambassador at St Petersburg, had no doubt that Hartwig was stirring Serbia against Austria. He reported that Hartwig had incautiously remarked that ‘the affair of Turkey is settled. Now it is the turn of Austria.’23 That the plan was set is undeniable, but Ambassador Louis was not a player in the Secret Elite’s grand scheme. He was removed for his troubles.

  Despite the many pressing demands at home, the Secret Elite had stepped up their preparations all through the period of Balkan strife. On 5 December 1912, Isvolsky reported:

  Lately, in the most rigorous secrecy, the Chief of the English General Staff, General Wilson, arrived in France, and on this occasion various complementary details have been elaborated … Not only military but other representatives of the French Government have participated in this work.24

  Two weeks later, Isvolsky telegraphed Sazonov, warning that the Austrian cabinet might make a critical move, causing a Russian response ‘which in turn would inevitably and automatically drag first Germany and then France into the war’.25 Poincaré viewed this possibility with perfect calm, aware of French obligations under the alliance, and firmly resolved to act. All the necessary steps had been taken. Mobilisation on the frontier had been examined, war materiel was in place and processes and procedures for going to war with Germany were understood and agreed with the military command.26

  Raymond Poincaré was on the point of introducing his three-year army bill to increase the time enlisted men would stay in the forces from two years to three. It rapidly led to a huge increase in French military manpower. Edward Grey secretly assured Poincaré that Britain would support France and Russia as ‘an obligation of honour’ should the Balkans trouble lead to a European war.27 Sazonov telegraphed Isvolsky asking him to reassure the French that Russia too was ready. He rebutted claims that Russia had done nothing to build up its forces. In fact, some 350,000 reservists had been retained within the colours. In addition, 80 million roubles had been allocated for extraordinary army requirements and for the Baltic Fleet, while some of the divisions in the Kiev command had been brought closer to the Austrian frontier.28

  To all intents and purposes, Britain, Russia and France were in a state of alert, checking on one another’s readiness. The question being asked in the dark corridors of power in London, Paris, St Petersburg and across other European capitals was: is a general war going to break out this time? French and Russian military preparations continued unabated. All that was needed was a ‘satisfactory’ incident in the Balkans to precipitate the war. The French people were subjected to a campaign of anti-German and anti-Austrian propaganda in the papers whose editors and writers were being bribed by funds obtained by Isvolsky.29 Newspapers in the UK had spent the better part of a decade softening up the British public for war. Behind a mask of indifference to the Balkans, the warmongers in Britain were almost ready.

  Perhaps the most telling evidence that Europe stood on the brink in 1912 comes from Belgium. In November 1912, the parliament in Brussels held a secret sitting at the insistence of King Albert to consider urgent precautionary measures. The king disclosed to a hushed chamber that he had evidence that Belgium was in dire and imminent danger. A drastic and far-reaching military programme that had been first advocated by his predecessor, Leopold II, some 30 years previously, was adopted immediately. The strength of the Belgian army was raised to 150,000 men in the field, with 60,000 in auxiliary services and 130,000 allocated to defensive garrisons: 340,000 men in total. It was an enormous expansion of armed forces in a supposedly neutral nation of 7,500,000 people.30

  What was the nature of King Albert’s evidence? Where did it come from and why was it given directly to him? These were not the normal channels through which secrets were passed. The accepted protocol was for kings and royalty to liaise with each other while government ministers shared and exchanged news and views. So who alerted the king? The only reason he would have taken such exceptional action was a warning that a European war was imminent. A second cousin to the late King Edward, Albert had an absolute trust in the British royal family.31 Though no evidence could be produced to prove that this was his royal source, none would have had more impact.

  There was another aspect to the Belgians’ sense of impending crisis. According to evidence later published in New York, the Belgians were advised in November 1912 by the British military that as soon as a European war broke out, 160,000 men would be transported to Belgium and northern France, with or without the permission of the Belgian government.32 Bear this in mind: ‘with or without the permission of the Belgian government’ – the British planned to be in Belgium when war broke out. This sense of ongoing crisis was fully justified because the Balkans were far from settled.

  Following the first Balkan War, Bulgaria claimed rights to territory she had taken from Turkey. Her claim rested upon the pre-war treaty agreed with Serbia by which definite portions of the captured lands were to be allocated to each country. Serbia, disgruntled at having been ordered by the Great Powers to vacate areas allocated to her in Albania, demanded a portion of the land she had previously agreed should go to Bulgaria. Bloated by early success, Serbia strutted threateningly, like the young thug who knows he can flex his muscles against a bigger boy because he has the protection of an older bully. Serbia relied on the promised support of Russia to push for more than she had already gained. Russia was their provider, guarantor and arbiter. Bulgaria, having suffered by far the greatest number of war casualties, refused and insisted that the terms of the treaty be adhered to. She called on Russia to fulfil her agreed role as arbiter. Much to the anger and resentment of the Bulgarian government, the czar responded by paying an overtly friendly visit to Bulgaria’s old adversary, Romania. To make matters worse, Russia backed the Serbian claims and in so doing forfeited Bulgaria’s friendship.

  The League was split irrevocably. Skirmishes between Bulgarian and Serbian troops on their communal border led to a Second Balkan War in June 1913. Serbian forces, aided by Romania and Greece, committed terrible atrocities as they penetrated deep into Bulgaria. Russia, France and Britain looked on passively as Bulgaria was soundly beaten. The Turks took the opportunity to invade Bulgaria and snatch back some of their territory ceded after the first Balkan War. The Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913 brought a second temporary peace to the region but at considerable cost to Bulgaria, which had lost most of the territorial gains made from the First Balkan War. In stark contrast, Serbia doubled its territory and ‘now posed an even greater threat to Austria-Hungary, both externally and by encouraging the sizeable Serbian minority within the dual monarchy (Bosnia-Herzegovina) to demand its independence’.33

  There was a feral nature to Balkan warfare that accepted atrocities as the natural course of events. The Serbian practice of decapitating the dead or captured enemy and impaling their heads on poles was positively medieval. The extermination of entire villages or the merciless bayoneting of women and children was commonplace. The Russian press, and that of Western Europe, was excoriated by Trotsky, Durham and others ‘for its conspiracy of silence about the atrocities being committed by the Slavs of the Balkans against the Turks’.34

  Disgusted by the behaviour of the Serbian army, Edith Durham left the Balkans for London and rushed to the Foreign Office to plead the case for a Muslim population that was being systematically subjected to humiliation, torture and death. Muslims were being coerced into conversion to Christianity. She recorded that, each day, civilians were taken from their villages and summarily executed, writing: ‘as the victims fell the earth was shovelled over them, whether living or dead … Men were plunged into ice-cold rivers and then half roasted till they cried for mercy. And conversion to Christianity was the price.’35 Medieval barbarity was reintroduced with a vengeance. The Car
negie Commission that was later set up to investigate such crimes against humanity made clear that the accusations were true. These atrocities were planned and executed by the Serbian Black Hand.

  Durham was fobbed off by the Foreign Office. The British Establishment did not want to know. Sir Edward Grey had deemed it a ‘just’ war on the grounds that Christians could now be protected from the Ottomans.36 In truth, the Secret Elite needed the murderous Black Hand and their leader, Colonel Apis, for a hugely important task.

  In the summer of 1913, Serbian troops re-occupied Albanian territory, even although it was supposed to be protected by the Great Powers. Yet more atrocities followed. Britain was approached directly by the Austrians to use its influence as a matter of urgency to effect a Serbian withdrawal. Sir Edward Grey happened to be ‘out of town for the weekend’ and his under-secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, declined to take action on the grounds that he did not think that Grey would approve a demand for immediate withdrawal by the Serbs.37

  Austria-Hungary was seething and prepared to send aid to Albania. A major European war became more likely by the hour. An emergency telegram was sent to the Russian army from the czar stating that an order for mobilisation in the western military command caused by any political complications on the western frontier was to be treated as an order for the start of hostilities against Austria and Germany.38 In other words, the military command had to treat an order for general mobilisation emanating from St Petersburg as an indication that the talking had ended. Such a mobilisation meant war, and it meant war with Austria and Germany.

  The temperature kept rising as the pent-up frustrations in the Balkan pressure cooker rose to bursting point. European war was only averted in 1913 because Russia ordered Serbia to move back from the brink after the Austrians served an ultimatum on Belgrade. The Serbians were furious but had no option but to comply.

  Why did Russia take this decision in 1913 but respond to a similar situation in 1914 with a full mobilisation of its armies? Was it a function of their state of readiness for war? Possibly. But, as far as the Secret Elite was concerned, the raison d’être for the Balkan crisis was to get Austria to react to severe provocation in order to draw Germany in. This was not, at its core, about Austria. It was about Germany. It had always been about Germany.

  Kaiser Wilhelm would not be drawn. He was not willing to support an Austrian onslaught against Serbia. Instead, he consistently focused on low-risk diplomatic solutions, to the extent that there was considerable frustration in Vienna at his apparent inability to understand the serious threat that Austria believed she faced from her enemies in Belgrade.39 Contrary to the ubiquitous image of the warmongering Kaiser Bill, so beloved of British propaganda, Wilhelm urged Austria to make concessions to the Serbs and seek peaceful co-existence. When Germany pressurised Austria to accept a diplomatic resolution, a continental war in 1913 became impossible. Germany had to be at the forefront, had to be seen as the aggressor.

  And what had the Secret Elite learned from it all? It was clear that the British public had little stomach for war over a Balkan nation. With so many local distractions – Ireland, the suffragette demands, strikes and social unrest – public interest in the Balkans was virtually non-existent, and sympathy for Russia was at a low ebb. Many Members of Parliament, especially the Liberal Radicals, spoke disparagingly about the czarist regime with its pogroms and repressions.40 Serbia, Bosnia, Slavic nationalism: these were not the concerns of the British people in 1913. If a war did break out, ‘hell mend them’ was the attitude. It had nothing to do with Britain, had it? Not only had more work to be done to fully prepare the British people for war, but Germany wasn’t taking the bait.

  The Secret Elite understood the history of genocide and massacre in the Balkans, and had a grasp of undetermined disputes that could be put to great advantage. They could see that Austria was bristling with frustration. Its national pride, its international standing, its very patience was being undermined by Serbian aggression. Austria lay like a coiled spring that Serbia continued to prick and prod in the hope and expectation that one day it would explode. And when that happened, Germany would be pitched into action. Surely.

  SUMMARY: CHAPTER 19 – FROM BALMORAL TO THE BALKANS

  Sazonov met with Sir Edward Grey and King George V at Balmoral in 1912. Both he and Grey claimed not to have discussed the Balkans. The lies and disinformation that stemmed from those four days of meetings offer a perfect example of how the Secret Elite covered their real business.

  Sazonov reported to the czar that Britain was secretly committed to support France in a war with Germany both by land and sea.

  Secretly backed by England, the Balkan League attacked and humiliated Turkey.

  All-out war was avoided because the kaiser would not contemplate it and called for a peace conference in London.

  The Second Balkan war targeted Bulgaria and Austria’s allies. The Secret Elite chose to ignore the evidence of brutal massacres by Serbian troops.

  Austria was consistently undermined and challenged by Serbia. The treatment of Albania was deplorable, but Germany refused to let her ally be suckered into war because of Serbia.

  Yet again the kaiser would not be drawn into the conflict. He favoured diplomatic solutions.

  The lesson learned was this: Austria was seething at the abuse she suffered from Serbia and was at her wit’s end. Austria would be the Achilles heel.

  CHAPTER 20

  Sarajevo – The Web of Culpability

  THE SECRET ELITE FAILED TO find their spark for the international conflagration in the Balkans because Germany, in the person of the kaiser, restrained Austria-Hungary from overreacting to Serbia’s deliberate provocation. Indeed, the Dual Monarchy was concerned that the German ambassador in Belgrade in 1914 was decidedly pro-Serb and had influenced the kaiser to take a comparatively benign attitude towards the Serbian cause.1 Yet it was clear that Austria could only absorb so much pressure before the integrity of the state was destroyed.2 The war-makers required an incident so violent, threatening or dangerous, that Austria would be pushed over the brink.

  Austria-Hungary was aware of the dangers that lay across the Serbian border. Their military intelligence had intercepted and deciphered a large number of diplomatic telegrams that detailed Russian involvement with several Serbian activist groups.3 They knew that Isvolsky’s placeman in Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig, was manipulating the Serbian government to destabilise the region. They knew that Hartwig was in control of the internal politics of Serbia. They knew of his links back to Sazonov in St Petersburg, and to Isvolsky and Poincaré in Paris, but they were not aware of the real power centred in London. No one was.

  The links in the chain of command from London went further, deeper and more sinister when extended from Hartwig into the Serbian military, their intelligence service and the quasi-independent nationalist society, the Black Hand. And deeper yet into the young Bosnian political activists who were willing to pull the trigger in Sarajevo – students whose ideas on socialism and reform were influenced by revolutionaries like Trotsky. As each level in the web of culpability extended away from the central Secret Elite chain of command, precise control became less immediate. Sazonov in St Petersburg considered that Hartwig in Belgrade was ‘carried away occasionally by his Slavophile sympathies’4 but did nothing to curtail him. Hartwig in turn supported and encouraged men whose prime cause he willingly shared and whose actions he could personally approve but not at every stage control.

  Hartwig, the Russian ambassador, worked in close contact with his military attaché, Colonel Viktor Artamanov, who had been posted to Belgrade to advise and liaise with the Serbian army. These men were intrinsically linked to the assassins in Sarajevo by their chosen agent, the founder and dominating figure in the Serbian Black Hand and the most influential military officer in Serbia, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, or Apis.5

  The English traveller and Balkan commentator Edith Durham described the Black Hand as a mafia-type society, Masonic in
secret self-promotion, infiltrating the Serbian military, civil service, police and government. It produced its own newspaper, Pijemont, which preached intolerance to Austria-Hungary and ‘violent chauvinism’. It became the most dangerous of political organisations, a government within the government, responsible to none. Crimes were committed for which no one took responsibility. The government denied any knowledge of it, yet King Petar was elevated to the throne by these men. Efforts by responsible politicians to tackle the subversion of good government by the Black Hand came to nought.6 Hartwig’s friendship and respect for Apis may be measured by his description of his group as ‘idealistic and patriotic’,7 and there is no doubt that it suited Hartwig’s purpose to approve Apis’s promotion to chief of intelligence in the summer of 1913.

  It is important that we clearly identify every link in the chain of responsibility that surrounded the fateful assassination in Sarajevo in June 1914. Apis was deliberately given responsibility for an intelligence organisation financed from Russia and informed by Bosnian Slavs. His life’s purpose was the establishment of a Greater Serbia. He was first, foremost and always a Serb. He worked in collusion with Hartwig’s military attaché, Artamanov, and secured a promise from him that Russia would protect Serbia should Austria attack them in the wake of his actions.8 For Apis, what was required was a demonstration of Serbian self-determination that would bring about permanent change and force the issue once and for all.

  The Austrian government presented the opportunity in March 1914 when they announced that Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg dual monarchy, would visit Sarajevo in June. Political assassination as a means to an end was not a new concept. In the five years prior to 1914, lone assassins, mostly Serbian citizens of Austria-Hungary, made a series of unsuccessful attempts against Austro-Hungarian officials in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.9 In 1912, two unsuccessful attempts were made on the viceroy of Croatia and royal commissioner for Austria-Hungary, and in 1914 a similar attempt on the life of a royal commissioner was foiled. The Austrian government had reliable information that Serbian agitators ‘in conjunction with influential Russian circles’ wished to strike a decisive blow against the Austrian monarchy,10 but had no precise details.