Hannibal continued south but did not march on Rome itself. He did not possess the necessary siege train required to take such a formidable city, and seizing the city was not part of his overall strategy of breaking up the Roman confederation. Ancient sieges often took months to successfully complete. Had he invested Rome, he would not only have had to contend with an impressive fortification which would have taken months to reduce with a large siege train, he would also have had to deal with large Roman relief armies capable of pinning him in place. Wisely, Hannibal skirted the capital and headed south, confident in his ability to beat the armies of Rome on the battlefield.
Crossing the Apennines again from west to east, Hannibal led his army through Umbria and by way of Picenum to the Adriatic Sea, collecting so much plunder along the way that ‘they could neither drive it or carry it with them’.168 The Carthaginian army arrived on the coast in late July and made camp. After resting and taking on supplies, the Punic army marched south through Samnium, burning and pillaging as they went. In the Roman province of Apulia Hannibal was once again challenged by a substantial Roman army, but this time, the Romans had adopted a new emergency strategy to deal with the Carthaginian invaders.
When news of the overwhelming defeat at Lake Trasimene reached the streets of Rome weeks earlier, the Senate took the drastic step of appointing as military dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus, a well-respected consul in the years 233–232, when he won fame defeating the Ligurians in northwest Italy, and again in 228–227. The election of Fabius as dictator in the summer of 217 was by popular vote, breaking from the tradition of choosing a man nominated by an active consul on Roman soil. Flaminius was dead and Servilius was cut off from the capital by Hannibal’s march, forcing the Roman people to take matters in their own hands. But Roman politics even influenced this vote. Fabius was not allowed to pick his own second-in-command (known as the Magister Equitum or ‘Master of the Horse’), instead, the Senate pressed upon him Marcus Minucius Rufus, a former consul and aggressive commander.
By nature a cautious general, Fabius would refuse to meet the Carthaginian army in battle, preferring instead a strategy of delay and harassment, earning him the nickname Cunctator or ‘the Delayer’. Rome’s ‘Fabian’ strategy was designed to force Hannibal to keep moving in order not to exhaust local food and forage.169 Fabius based his strategy on a combination of factors: his ability to refuse battle; on the tactical power of the defence; on his control of walled cities faithful to Rome, and on his excellent logistics.170 This seemed like a prudent strategy considering the Roman losses at the Ticinus, the Trebia and Lake Trasimene over the previous two years, but it was not widely popular. There did exist Roman factions that wanted to defeat Hannibal in a set-piece battle, and Fabius’ lieutenant, Minucius, was among them. After raising new legions to replace the losses sustained at the Trebia and Trasimene, Fabius took command of six legions and set out after Hannibal.
When Fabius caught up with Hannibal in Apulia, the Carthaginian general drew up his army for battle. But Fabius refused to engage, instead taking and holding the high ground above Hannibal’s line of march and attacking Punic foraging parties. By attacking foragers and stragglers, Fabius was using small raids to whittle away at Hannibal’s forces.171 Hannibal understood this strategy of attrition would eventually bleed his army white while simultaneously emboldening the Romans, so he decided to provoke Fabius into a battle by ravaging the countryside. He marched west, crossing the Apennines again, and descended into the fertile plains of Campania, burning and looting one of the agricultural crown jewels of southern Italy – the ager Falernus. But try as Hannibal might, the Roman dictator would not be pulled into a set-piece battle. Moreover, many of Rome’s key allies in southern Italy did not immediately abandon the confederation as Hannibal had hoped.
Unwilling to winter in the devastated ager Falernus, Hannibal sought to return to Apulia. To do so, he needed to cross a pass occupied by 4,000 of Fabius’ legionaries, sent there to ambush the Carthaginians. Hannibal, in a masterful ruse, gathered 2,000 head of cattle and tied bundles of wood to their horns. Setting the wood ablaze, he herded the beasts up a spur near the pass at night. When the Romans guarding the pass saw the line of ascending torches, they mistakenly believed the Punic army was outflanking them, and abandoned the pass. Hannibal led his army across the pass and back into northern Apulia to winter in the city of Gerunium.
Meanwhile, Fabius had been recalled to Rome to stand before the Senate and defend his strategy of delay and harassment. His second-in-command, Minucius, was left to shadow the Punic army. While foraging outside of Gerunium, Hannibal was drawn into a substantial skirmish with the Roman Master of the Horse, a skirmish the Carthaginian commander lost. Though not strategically decisive, when news of this minor victory reached Rome, the Senate, growing tired of the ‘Fabian’ strategy, rewarded Minucius with half of the dictator’s army. Overconfident, Minucius engaged Hannibal again near Gerunium, but this time his army would have been destroyed had it not been for the timely arrival of Fabius. With the campaigning season now drawing to a close, a contrite Minucius rejoined Fabius and the Roman and Carthaginian armies returned to their winter quarters.
Cannae: Hannibal’s ‘Killing Field’ (216 BCE)
In December 217 Fabius’ six-month dictatorship expired and the Roman Senate opted to return to the selection of consuls to run Roman military affairs. Hannibal’s swath of destruction in Campania left a bad taste in Rome’s mouth, and many prominent Roman citizens were calling once again for a military solution to the Punic menace. Abandoning the Fabian strategy, the Senate decided to seek out and crush Hannibal once and for all in a decisive military engagement at a time when Rome had overwhelming numbers on its side. To accomplish this, the Senate elected Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro as consuls in March 216 and began an emergency levy to put two new legions in the field. Four legions were already encamped outside of Gerunium watching Hannibal, and Paullus and Varro would march two new legions to buttress the 60,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry already shadowing the Punic army. Hannibal broke camp in early June and marched south to the ruined citadel at Cannae, the location of a Roman magazine and plenty of forage for the Carthaginian army. Hannibal took this strategically important site to provoke a battle with Rome, and he was not disappointed.
Marching from Rome at the head of more than 20,000 troops, Paullus and Varro rendezvoused with the Roman army and set out with a massive force consisting of eight legions and an equal number of allies to track down and finally defeat Hannibal’s forces. In the August of 216 BCE, the Romans caught up with Hannibal near the village of Cannae in Apulia. The resulting battle of Cannae pitted a Roman army of 80,000 infantry and 6,400 cavalry against Hannibal’s Punic army of 45,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in one of the most famous battles in military history.172
Hannibal camped west of the Aufidius River, while the Romans camped two-thirds of their army opposite the invading army, the remainder staying on the opposite side of the river to limit Carthaginian foraging. Varro, whose day it was to command the Roman army, lined up for battle on the east side of the river, placing his legionaries in the centre in an extra deep formation (in places, between thirty-five and fifty men deep) because of the narrowness of the plain. No more than 2,000 legionaries could engage the enemy at one time.173 Moreover, many of the legionaries were fresh recruits recently added to make up for the horrendous loses suffered at Trebia and Trasimene.174 Varro’s strategy was simple: overwhelm the Carthaginian centre with the sheer weight of his legionaries. Betting on his heavy infantry to win the day, he then placed his inferior Roman cavalry on both wings to check the advance of the more numerous Carthaginian horse.
Understanding the threat to his centre, Hannibal arranged his troops south of the Romans, placing his Celtic and Spanish infantry in the centre in a convex formation and making the centre deeper than the flanks in order to match the Roman frontage and delay the legions’ advance. Hannibal kept his more reliable Afr
ican infantry in reserve behind each flank of the crescent, and placed his cavalry on the flanks opposite the Roman horsemen. Hannibal, assisted by his youngest brother Mago, would command the centre. His staff officer Hasdrubal Gisgo led the Carthaginian left, while Hanno commanded the right, with the brilliant Maharbal leading the Numidian light horse. Outnumbered two-to-one in total numbers, the Carthaginian general placed his hope on his cavalry that was superior to the Romans in both numbers and quality.
As was typical of classical engagements, the battle opened with skirmishing, then Varro ordered the weighted Roman centre to close with the Carthaginians. At this moment, Hannibal ordered the cavalry on his wings to strike the weaker Roman cavalry opposite them. As the Romans engaged with the leading edge of the Carthaginian infantry, the centre yielded to the Roman advance, slowly transforming from a convex to a concave formation. On the wings, the Carthaginian cavalry routed the Roman horse on both sides. As tens of thousands of legionaries were sucked into the centre of this rapidly developing ‘killing field’, Hannibal’s African cavalry ran past the Roman flank and swung into the rear of the Roman army. ‘The result’, according to Polybius, ‘was exactly what Hannibal had planned’:
The Romans by pressing too far ahead in pursuit of the Celts were trapped between the two divisions of Africans. They could no longer hold their maniple formation, but were compelled to turn singly or rank by rank to defend themselves against the enemy who were attacking their flanks.175
The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE, Phase I. Due to the narrowness of the plain, Varro is forced to deploy his legionary infantry in a very deep formation (1). The infantry, many of whom are raw recruits, are flanked by poor quality Roman cavalry. Hannibal, assisted by his brother Mago, deploys his Spanish and Celtic infantry in a convex formation in the centre (2). His reliable African infantry, commanded by Hasdrubal Gisgo on the left and Hanno on the right, is in reserve at each infantry flank (3), and his strong cavalry formations form the wings, with his elite Numidian light horse led by Maharbal (4).
The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE, Phase II. The action begins with skirmishing by both sides (1). As the light troops trade blows between the two armies, Varro orders his infantry forward (2) towards the Carthaginian line.
The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE, Phase III. As the Roman infantry closes with the Punic centre (1), Hannibal orders his cavalry to charge the Roman horse (2). As Varro’s legionaries engage the enemy, the Carthaginian centre begins a controlled withdrawal (3).
The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE, Phase IV. The Carthaginian cavalry puts their Roman opponents to flight (1). The Carthaginian centre continues to withdraw, changing the formation from convex in shape to concave (2). The tightly-packed Roman infantry is slowly being drawn into a u-shaped ‘killing sack,’ from which escape may prove impossible.
The Battle of Cannae, 216 BCE, Phase V. Breaking off their pursuit of the fleeing Roman horsemen, the Carthaginian cavalry turns its attention to the Roman infantry, charging into the rear of Varro’s formation (1). As the Roman legionaries attempt to avoid the Punic horse, they begin to push against their comrades in the front. Men are knocked to the ground and trampled as the press gets tighter and tighter, beset on all sides by enemy troops (2). Varro’s army is annihilated with perhaps as many as 60,000 killed and 10,000 captured.
Perhaps 60,000 Roman soldiers, including the consul Paullus, were killed and another 10,000 soldiers were taken prisoner as a result of this classic double envelopment.176 Both of the consuls’ quaestors were killed, as were twenty-nine of the forty-eight of Rome’s military tribunes. Cannae also robbed Rome of no fewer than eighty senators or men of high office who would have likely become senators.177 So thorough was the Roman defeat that never again did the Romans risk a large field army against Hannibal on Italian soil.
The defeat at Cannae underlined the vulnerability of the Roman heavy infantry-based tactical system. At Trebia, the legions managed to break through the Carthaginian centre, shattering the cohesion of the enemy army. At Cannae, the Romans massed their centre, determined to break through the Spaniards and Celts forming the centre of Hannibal’s line. But this was the tactic of a pike phalanx and a misuse of Roman swordsmen. By massing the centre, the Romans were so tightly packed that they could not manoeuvre or wield their short swords effectively, especially with rank upon rank pushing from behind. The situation was further aggravated as the Romans, pushed from behind, ‘tumbled’ over their own and enemy dead, further disrupting their ranks.178 Hannibal’s men had no such problem as they gave way into a concave formation, setting up the killing field. Polybius puts Hannibal’s losses at Cannae at about 4,000 Celts, 1,500 Spaniards and Africans, and 200 cavalry, while Livy states a total of about 8,000 men were killed.179 The war treasure recovered from the battlefield of Cannae was also considerable. Besides prisoners and horses seized, arms and armour, horse trappings, and baggage was taken. Ancient sources report that the gold signet rings stripped from the fallen Roman knights alone amounted to three bushels in weight.180
The Battle of Cannae stands out as one of the most decisive and most written about engagements in history. Hannibal’s execution of a perfect double envelopment has captured the imagination of generals, military theorists and historians ever since. Although Cannae was an important engagement in the annals of military history, it was not a watershed event in the history of the Second Punic War. Despite appalling casualties, Rome’s will to fight was not broken and the battle did not provide a significant strategic advantage to Hannibal and his army.
After Cannae
The day after the victory at Cannae both Polybius and Livy inform us that one of Hannibal’s favourite lieutenants, Maharbal, encouraged the Punic general to march on Rome, purportedly only five days away. When Maharbal sensed the apprehension in his master’s voice, he reportedly replied, ‘You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory’.181 Livy maintains that this failure to follow up on the spectacular success at Cannae saved the Eternal City.182 Hannibal’s refusal to besiege the Roman capital has generated a great deal of debate among modern historians. The march to Rome would have taken Hannibal’s army twenty days, not five, plenty of time for the Romans to mount a spirited defence. Moreover, Hannibal’s army was certainly fatigued from the Battle of Cannae itself, and not in the appropriate shape to not only make the forced march across the Apennines, but also take and hold the city.183 The reduction of Saguntum in Spain two years earlier had taken Hannibal eight months, and the defences of Rome’s capital city were of an entirely different order of magnitude.184 Besieging a city in hostile territory was an even more difficult option. In ancient warfare, most successful sieges required prolonged periods of time and huge manpower reserves to move timber and earth, set up cordons, build and man siege engines, and maintain pressure against the enemy’s fortifications, while simultaneously remaining vigilant against relieving enemy forces. This in turn required a reliable logistical line to friendly territory, something Hannibal did not have in the summer of 216. Moreover, Hannibal’s sedentary Carthaginian army would have been at the mercy of Roman armies restricting his supply area and killing or capturing his foragers. Unwilling to die the death of ten thousand cuts, Hannibal not only refused to be bogged down in a dangerous siege, his logistical situation and lack of a sufficient siege train precluded him from even trying.185
In two years of campaigning, Hannibal had killed or captured between 80,000 and 100,000 legionaries and their commanders, robbing Rome of a third of its standing military force.186 Seemingly, the loss of three Roman armies in as many years should have satisfied Hannibal’s plans for the defeat of Rome, but once again the Roman Republic survived, refusing to capitulate to the Punic invaders. When Hannibal sent an envoy to Rome, he was rebuffed by the newly elected dictator’s lector, relaying the message back to his general that Rome would not discuss terms of peace with a foreign enemy on Italian soil.187 When he gave the Roman Senate the opportunity to exchange prisoners (a first s
tep in peace negotiations), it declined, stating it had no use for the vanquished.188 Rome was down, but not out. Rome would return to its Fabian strategy after Cannae, denying Hannibal another major victory on Italian soil.
Unable to coax his enemy into another set-piece battle, Hannibal was forced into a defensive posture in Italy and reduced to fighting smaller wars in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia and Illyria to damage Rome.189 His army would be further reduced garrisoning defected cities. To further complicate Hannibal’s strategic position in southern Italy, the bulk of the reinforcements he requested from Carthage were denied him, sent instead to buttress the failing Spanish frontier.190
That is not to say that Hannibal did not have some success in weakening the Roman confederation. By 212 most of the region of Campania and forty percent of Rome’s other allies had defected to the Punic cause, with other regions like Etruria and Umbria wavering.191 Even twelve of the thirty core Latin colonies refused to provide their annual levies to Rome in 209.192 Yet despite these fissures in the Roman confederation, Hannibal was incapable of bringing the Second Punic War to a decisive conclusion, and time was now on the Romans’ side.
The destruction of a large percentage of the Roman officer class at Cannae would give younger soldiers the chance to command. One of these men, a twenty-year old military tribune, survived the carnage at Cannae to emerge as one of these new commanders and the eventual hero of Rome. Like his distinguished father who shared his name, young Publius Cornelius Scipio understood the abilities of his Carthaginian enemy, and would spend the next fourteen years building a military reputation and a veteran army capable of finally defeating Hannibal once and for all.
Hannibal’s Last Battle Page 9