Chapter 3
The Early Campaigns of Scipio
Scipio’s Early Life and Building a New Army
The future saviour of Rome, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was born in Rome in 236 BCE. Little is known about his childhood, though we do know he was born into one of the most powerful of Rome’s families, the Cornelii, a family which provided the Eternal City with consuls and magistrates for over a century. His family had become especially powerful during the decade leading up to the Second Punic War. In fact, of ten consuls elected in the years 222–219, three came directly from the Scipio family, while another four would have very close ties (most notably the consul killed at Cannae, Lucius Aemilius Paullus). Livy maintains that Scipio the Younger was a pious man, never engaging in any business, public or private, without first visiting the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill. There is also some evidence that he was plagued by illnesses as a child, and that these maladies followed him throughout his life.
Scipio the Younger’s military career began at seventeen years of age when he joined his father’s consular army as it set out to intercept Hannibal in southern Gaul in September 218. Failing to stop Hannibal from crossing the Alps, Scipio the Elder sent his army on to Spain under the command of his older brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio. He then returned to Italy with his son, taking command of the Roman army in the Po Valley. It was here, at the small battle on the Ticinus, that young Scipio reportedly saved his father’s life.
Emboldened by the Roman success against Carthaginian cavalry in the skirmish on the Rhone River, the elder Scipio offered battle with Hannibal, though he was outnumbered. Young Scipio was kept in the rear on a hill out of harm’s way, protected by his own bodyguard. The momentum turned quickly against the Romans as the superior Numidian cavalry routed the Roman horse and light troops. Suddenly surrounded, the elder Scipio was wounded and knocked off his horse. Seeing his father in danger, the younger Scipio spurred his horse toward his father’s position. Fearing the death of their charge, the bodyguard followed the teenager into the fray, scaring off the pressing Punic attackers.193
After the defeat at Ticinus, the Romans retreated and waited for the arrival of reinforcements from Tiberius Sempronius Longus, marching in from the Adriatic. Sempronius arrived in December and immediately decided to offer battle. He was soundly defeated at the Battle of the Trebia by Hannibal’s forces, though a large portion of the Roman army actually succeeded in breaking through the Carthaginian centre and returning to Placentia. Recovered from his wounds, Scipio’s father left for Spain to join his brother who had already scored several successes against the Carthaginians in Spain. We know nothing of Scipio the Younger’s activities in 217, but in the course of this year, Hannibal destroyed the Roman consular army of Gaius Flaminius at Lake Trasimene, forcing the Roman Senate to proclaim a dictatorship under Quintus Fabius. But, as we have seen, the Romans soon soured on the delaying and harassment strategy advocated by Fabius and Rome prepared to meet and defeat Hannibal in a set-piece engagement.
In preparation for this upcoming battle, Scipio the Younger was elected as a military tribune, no doubt helped by his relationship with his father and the fame he had won at the Ticinus. Most probably he was already engaged to Aemilia by this time, the daughter of the current consul, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and would serve under his prospective father-in-law at the Battle of Cannae, probably on the right side of the formation.
As the Battle of Cannae wore on and Hannibal’s superior cavalry surrounded and annihilated the tens of thousands of Roman soldiers caught in the Carthaginian ‘killing field’, Paullus chose to stay and die. Scipio, on the other hand, was able to escape the carnage, fleeing with about 10,000 refugees to the large Roman camp. Most of these survivors waited in the camp to surrender, stunned by the magnitude of the defeat. But about 4,000 legionaries, among them Scipio, left the camp after nightfall, evaded Hannibal’s cavalry patrols and made their way towards Canusium in Apulia. Along the road and still in great danger, the remnants of the army had an impromptu council and elected the twenty-year old Scipio and Appius Claudius as their new commanders.194
Livy tells us that while in council, news was brought to the new commanders of a mutinous plot by the son of an ex-consul, a man named Philus. Roman nobles, led by Lucius Caecilius Metellus, were contemplating fleeing Italy and taking service overseas with foreign kings. Scipio, seeing an opportunity to quell the rebellion before it took shape, moved quickly:
‘Come with me’, [Scipio] cried, ‘instantly, sword in hand, if you wish to save our country. The enemy’s camp is nowhere more truly than where such thoughts can arise!’ With a few followers he went straight to where Metellus was staying. Assembled in the house were the men of whom Philus had spoken, still discussing their plans. Scipio burst in, and holding his sword over their heads, ‘I swear’, he cried, ‘with all the passion of my heart that I shall never desert our country, or permit any other citizen of Rome to leave her in the lurch. If I willfully break my oath, may Jupiter, Greatest and Best, bring me to a shameful death, with my house, my family, and all I possess! Swear the same oath, Caecilius; and, all the rest of you, swear it too. If anyone refuses, know that against him this sword is drawn.’ They could not have been more scared had they been looking into the face of their conqueror Hannibal. Every man took the oath and gave himself into the custody of Scipio.195
The rebellion disarmed, Livy tells us that Scipio and Appius moved their army to Venusia, reuniting with Varro and the remainder of the Roman army.
Rome’s strategic position continued to deteriorate after the debacle at Cannae. The prosperous city of Capua, located about a hundred miles southeast of Rome, rebelled and joined the Punic cause. Capua was the most important city to defect to Hannibal. Its population held Roman citizenship and many of its nobles had close relations with senatorial families.196
Italy During the Second Punic War
Hannibal then went on to capture the strategically important Roman city of Casilinum in Campania, controlling the land routes from the capital southward along the via Appia and via Latina.197 Recapturing Casilinum became a Roman priority, and this city would be retaken by Rome in 215. In Sicily, the Greek city of Syracuse, formally an ally of Rome, joined Hannibal in 214, threatening Roman control over the island Rome had fought so hard to wrest from Carthaginian control in the First Punic War. Most ominously, the king of the Hellenistic kingdom of Macedon, Philip V (238–179 BCE), intrigued with Hannibal in 215 and declared war on Rome, initiating what would be the first of four conflicts between Rome and Macedon known to history as the Macedonian Wars (215–146 BCE). Philip began to mass men and material in Illyria with the intent of invading eastern Italy. Rome now faced a two-front war on their home soil.
Despite these setbacks, Rome did enjoy a significant manpower advantage over its Punic invaders. From 216 onward, record numbers of legions were enrolled for the defence of Italy and fighting the war in Spain and against Philip V. There were at least twelve legions in service in the spring of 215 and eighteen in 214.198 At the peak of Roman mobilization in 212–211 there were some twenty-five legions in play representing a theoretical strength of 100,000 legionaries and 7,500 cavalry, supported by a similar number of allied auxiliaries.199 In the decade after Cannae, between four and seven consular-size armies (comprised of two legions) and several single-legion armies patrolled and garrisoned Italy, keeping a watchful eye over the Roman confederation. There is some evidence that the Romans relaxed their property ownership requirements in order to make these goals, increasing the number of able-bodied men eligible to serve.200 Hannibal, on the other hand, did not have large manpower reserves to draw on; and, like Rome, Carthage was fighting a war on multiple fronts in Italy and Spain.
In 214 Philip moved a small fleet to Illyria to threaten Roman interests there. In response, the Senate dispatched the proconsul Marcus Valerius Laevinus with a fleet of fifty ships to Apulia to watch Philip’s activities in the Adriatic Sea. When Philip marched o
n Roman allies, Laevinus quickly crossed over to the eastern shore of the Adriatic near the city of Apollonia, forcing the Macedonian king to burn his own small fleet to prevent its capture.
Undeterred, Philip marched north up the coast of Illyria, capturing several cities and threatening to invade Italy itself. In response, the Roman Senate sought allies in Greece. In 211 the Romans approached the Athenian-led Aetolian League and formed an alliance against the Macedonians. Two years later, in 209, King Attalus of the Anatolian kingdom of Pergamum joined the Aetolians, though nothing came of this arrangement, and Attalus soon withdrew back to Asia Minor. Seeing an isolated foe, Philip invaded central Greece in 208 and after a few years of hard campaigning forced the Aetolians to sue for peace in 205. Still, the Romans got what they needed from the arrangement – Philip was neutralized and Italy was never invaded by Hannibal’s Macedonian ally. The First Macedonian War was over.
Rome Resurgent and the Elder Scipios in Spain
The turning point in the Second Punic War came in 212 when Rome began to improve its strategic position and recover some of its losses in Italy. Roman armies had successfully kept Philip V at bay in Illyria, allowing the Roman Senate to concentrate on the Punic invaders in southern Italy. Hannibal had capitalized on his success at Cannae in the years since 216, capturing Thurii, Metapontum, Heracleia, and the very important port city of Tarentum. Only the strategic port city of Rhegium remained loyal to Rome. But in 212 the Romans captured Syracuse, taking a powerful Greek ally away from Hannibal’s camp. With Syracuse in Roman hands, the Italians strengthened their control over the Strait of Messina and the sea approaches to Sicily and Italy, reducing Hannibal’s ability to get sea-borne reinforcements from Spain and North Africa.
In 211 the Romans retook the mutinied city of Capua after a prolonged siege, beheading its leaders and enslaving its inhabitants as a warning to other potential defectors. Hannibal attempted to raise the siege by first attacking the Romans besieging Capua, and when this failed, marching on Rome itself. Beaten, Hannibal abandoned Capua and returned to friendly territory in southern Italy. But even the Punic general’s successes there would be reversed when Rome recaptured Tarentum in 209, further reducing Hannibal’s abilities to resupply by sea. The tide was slowly turning against Hannibal in Italy, and his brothers Hasdrubal and Mago were having similar problems in Spain facing two Scipios and their legions.
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio had been operating in Spain since the war began in 218, having been sent there after the failed interception of Hannibal on the Rhone. Encouraged by Gnaeus’ successes, the Roman Senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain under the command of his younger brother, Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder). Publius joined his brother in late 217, arriving with twenty or thirty ships and 8,000 men.201 Together the two Scipios had advanced deep into the heart of Spain, marching their legions over the next few years south of the Ebro and deep into Carthaginian territory. Scipio the Elder was especially adept at persuading Spanish tribes to join (or sometimes rejoin) the Roman cause. In 214 they had even successfully recaptured the city of Saguntum, whose fall to Hannibal in 218 had started the war.
But, three years later in 211, Roman fortunes in Spain changed dramatically.202 Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal Barca, recently back from North Africa where he had quashed a revolt, was attempting to join with his brother Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo and confront the growing Roman presence. The Romans had added 20,000 Spanish allies or mercenaries and considered themselves strong enough to confront the two Punic armies before they linked up, with Publius confronting Hasdrubal while his brother Gnaeus marched toward Mago and Gisgo’s armies.203 Hasdrubal Barca soon reasserted his influence over the Celtiberian tribes during secret negotiations and Gnaeus found his line of communication back to Roman Gaul in jeopardy and much of his newfound Spanish support evaporating. Greatly outnumbered, Gnaeus withdrew his troops.
Spain During the Second Punic War
Unknown to Gnaeus, his brother Publius had already suffered disaster. As the Roman troops drew near the camps of Mago and Gisgo near Castulo, their column was harassed mercilessly by Numidian light cavalry, commanded by a young prince named Masinissa, a warrior who would later figure prominently in the Second Punic War. After making and fortifying their camp, the Romans discovered that the Carthaginians were about to receive reinforcements from a powerful Spanish chieftain named Indibilis leading 7,500 of his Ilergetes tribesmen. Boldly, Publius decided to intercept this force before it arrived, leading the night march himself. The engagement, near the city of Castulo, was confusing, with neither side managing to form a proper line. To make matters worse for the Romans, Masinissa and his Numidian horsemen found them and attacked their exposed flank. Soon the main Punic army was surrounding the Roman position. With the Roman situation dire, Publius rode his horse in front of the troops to raise their spirits and organize their defence. Here, Publius was struck by an enemy javelin and killed. News of his death caused the Roman forces to rout, and the retreating legionaries and their allies were cut down by the pursuing Numidian cavalry and Punic light infantry.
Seeing an unprecedented opportunity to crush another Roman army, Mago and Gisgo rushed to join Hasdrubal before news of Publius’ death reached his brother. Gnaeus’ retreating column was eventually overtaken by the Numidian cavalry in the Punic army’s vanguard, and knowing he could no longer march and fight, chose to make a stand around a rocky hill in an engagement known as the Battle of Ilorca. The ground here was too rocky for the legionnaires to dig their usual ditch and rampart, so the Romans made a makeshift barrier with their baggage and packsaddles. With the main Punic army joining the fray, the Romans’ impromptu hill fort was eventually overwhelmed and Gnaeus was killed either defending the high ground or in the pursuit afterwards.
In less than a month’s time, two of Rome’s most celebrated generals and brothers were engaged in separate actions and killed, destroying two Roman armies and reversing seven years of progress in Iberia. Collectively, the two Roman defeats at Castulo and Ilorca are known as the Battle of the Upper Baetis. A few Romans did escape the slaughter, led by the equestrian Lucius Marcius. Marcius rallied the survivors of the two dead Scipios’ armies and retreated north of the Ebro, holding some territory there as the last toehold for Rome south of the Pyrenees.
The psychological impact of losing the Roman armies in Spain is difficult to overestimate. For years the only good news the Roman people heard came from the exploits of the Scipio brothers, whose military accomplishments in Spain helped take the sting away from so many debacles in Italy. Moreover, years of Roman successes against Carthaginian forces for mastery of Iberia forced Carthage to send reinforcements to Hasdrubal and Mago instead of to Hannibal, thereby weakening the eldest Barca’s position in Italy.
In 210, the Roman Senate sent Gaius Claudius Nero to Spain as a temporary commander. Nero did manage to stabilize the situation at the Ebro, but Rome’s strategic situation in Spain was desperate, so desperate that on the day of the election in the capital no senior magistrates stepped forward to offer themselves up for the task of commanding Roman forces against the Carthaginians. Livy tells us the assembled citizens watched the faces of the likely candidates exchange apprehensive glances at one another:
A murmur arose that things were desperate, that hope of saving the country had been so utterly lost that no one dared accept the Spanish command. Such was the general feeling when suddenly Publius Cornelius Scipio, son of the Publius Scipio who had been killed in Spain and still a young man of about twenty-four, announced his candidature for the command.204
Scipio’s election to the command was unanimous. And though Livy explains that many of those present later had second thoughts about entrusting Imperium to such a young man and about sending another Scipio to Spain to fight where his father and uncle had been slain, Scipio won them over in an assembly.205 Another Publius Cornelius Scipio would command in Spain.
Scipio the Younger and the Capture of New Carthage
Scipio the Younger arrived in Spain in late 210 at the head of an army of 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and thirty quinquiremes, securing a winter base at Tarraco (modern Tarragona) along the coast.206 Throughout the winter he met with envoys from as many Spanish tribes as possible in an attempt to repair the damage caused in recent years. Like Hannibal, Scipio seemed to possess a certain confidence and charm which allowed him to get along with people from other cultures. Although a member of the class, Scipio did not exhibit the arrogance usually associated with Roman aristocrats, and his brilliant statesmanship and ability to make personal connections with local chieftains laid the foundations of what would later become one of Rome’s most prosperous provinces – Roman Spain.207
While in winter quarters, Scipio learned that his enemy had divided his forces into three armies to pacify the peninsula. Hasdrubal Barca camped near Saguntum, his brother Mago fought in the interior, while Hasdrubal Gisgo patrolled the southwest region around Gades at the southern tip of Spain. Noting the dispositions of his enemy, Scipio decided to target the capital of Carthaginian Spain, New Carthage (modern Cartagena), in one bold direct attack. This city was a natural stronghold located on a narrow peninsula protected by an isthmus some 300 yards across. It was located on the direct sea route to Carthage and possessed deep and protected harbours perfect for large naval forces. The 1,000-man garrison also protected the Carthaginian treasury, and with strong Carthaginian armies within ten days’ march of the city, the city guard did not fear attack.
Leaving 3,000 men with his official second in command, Marcus Junus Silanus, Scipio crossed the Ebro in the spring of 209 with 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, shadowed by his Roman fleet of thirty quinquiremes under the command of his senior legate, Gaius Laelius.208 After arriving at New Carthage, Scipio ordered his ships to blockade the city from the sea while his legionaries constructed a line of contravallation facing outward to protect the besieging Roman army from Punic relief forces. According to Livy, Scipio clearly understood the importance of New Carthage to the Punic war effort on the Iberian Peninsula, and he explained to his men his reasoning for beginning the campaign with a siege:
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