Hannibal’s Last Battle

by Brian Todd Carey; Joshua B. Allfree; John Cairns

  Eventually, the first-line mercenaries gave way and actually started to attack the Carthaginians in the second line, compounding the confusion of their retreat. Although Polybius suggests that it was Hannibal’s strategy all along to place his least reliable troops (mostly Gauls and Ligurians and the remnants of Mago’s troops) in the first line, and that the retreat of the first line ‘actually forced the Carthaginians to die bravely in spite of themselves, for when they found they were being slaughtered by the mercenaries, they were obliged to fight both the barbarians and the Romans at the same time’.351 Polybius’ low opinion of the Punic forces might cloud his appraisal, for it is certainly possible that the mercenaries were not allowed to retreat through the Carthaginian second line, forcing an armed response.352 Pressed between a Punic phalanx and the advancing Roman first line of hastati, the mercenaries were cut down.

  The Carthaginian second-line’s counter-attack did throw some of the hastati maniples backward in confusion, but the Roman officers commanding the principes held their ranks firm, and the attack was blunted either by the principes or the recovering hastati. Soon, the Carthaginian soldiers of the second line broke and ran, but Hannibal refused to let these men retreat through the ranks of his veteran third line, forcing these men to take refuge on the wings or in the open country.353 Polybius describes the battlefield that lay between Scipio and Hannibal at this moment:

  The space between the two corps which still remained on the field was by now covered with blood, corpses and wounded men, and the physical obstacle created by the enemy’s rout presented a difficult problem for the Roman general. Everything combined to make it hard for him to advance without losing formation: the ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying in blood-drenched heaps, and the spaces between encumbered with [weapons] that had been thrown away at random.354

  Taking this moment to tend to his wounded and redress his lines, Scipio ordered the wounded to be carried to the rear and recalled the hastati that were pursuing the enemy with bugle blasts. He then commanded the principes and triarii to deploy on the wings of the reformed hastati until one long line was created. Some of these older legionaries had actually fought at Cannae and were no doubt eager for their revenge. Confident in this new formation, Scipio ordered his legionaries forward toward Hannibal’s remaining veterans.355

  When the Roman and Carthaginian infantry clashed, Polybius points out that the antagonists ‘were equally matched not only in numbers but also in courage, in warlike spirit and in weapons’, and that the battle ‘hung for a long while in the balance’.356 The tipping point came with the return of Masinissa and Laelius to the battlefield, whose cavalry fell on the rear of Hannibal’s third line, killing most of the Punic soldiers where they stood. Those few who escaped this slaughter were easily run down in the open country by the Numidian and Roman horse. Scipio pursued the enemy as far as their camp, which he sacked, before returning to his own. Hannibal managed to escape with a few of his horsemen, riding hard until he reached the safety of his base at Hadrumetum.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase I. Hannibal deploys a mix of line infantry, slingers, and archers in his first line, his Carthaginian levies in the second, and his veteran infantry in the rear. Tychaeus leads the Numidian cavalry on the left flank. The Carthaginian cavalry is placed on the right and the army is screened by 80 elephants. Scipio deploys in an unusual manner, aligning rather than staggering his three ranks of legionaries, thus creating lanes in his formation. These lanes are rendered invisible to Hannibal by deploying velites in the intervals. Masinissa commands the Numidian horse on the right, Laelius and Dacamas a mixed cavalry force on the left.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase II. The action opens in typical fashion as each side deploys skirmishers (1) and engages their opposite number on the plain between the two armies (2). Neither side gains an advantage.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase III. Hannibal orders his elephants to charge (1), hoping that the large number of massive beasts will be able to strike a decisive blow against the Roman infantry. The skirmishers of both sides disperse (2) as the pachyderms surge forward, goaded on by their mahouts.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase IV. Hannibal orders his army forward in the wake of the elephant charge (1). As the animals draw closer, trumpets and horns blast out from the Roman ranks, causing some of the beasts to turn and stampede back through the Numidian cavalry on the Punic left (2).

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase V. Masinissa sees his opportunity and charges Tychaeus’s disrupted formations (1), sweeping them from the field (2). Meanwhile, many of the elephants in the centre close with the Roman line (3), some being killed, others driven back, while still others are funnelled into the lanes through the Roman formations where they are more easily dealt with. Roman losses are heavy but the ranks hold fast. Some of the wounded elephants stampede towards the Carthaginian horse on Hannibal’s right, disrupting those formations (4).

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase VI. Laelius and Dacamas charge (1), putting the Carthaginian cavalry to rout. The fight is now between the infantry of each side and Hannibal orders his first two ranks forward (2) against the Romans, who dress ranks and advance to meet their foes (3).

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase VII. As the opposing foot soldiers close with each other (1) the Punic forces initially exercise an advantage, as they employ a variety of weapons types and fighting techniques the Roman short swords and pila cannot counter.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase VIII. As the Romans close with the Punic mercenaries, their short swords and discipline quickly gain the upper hand. Many of the mercenaries in the front rank attempt to flee, but their path is blocked by the levies in the second rank (1). Fighting ensues as the panicking troops try and cut their way through their erstwhile comrades. Trapped between the legionaries and the Punic second rank, the mercenaries are destroyed (2).

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase IX. The Punic second line counterattacks (1), pressing the hastati back in some confusion (2). The Roman principes stand firm, however, and the hastati rally, driving the Carthaginian levies back until they break (3). Hannibal’s line of veterans (4) rebuffs their attempt to force through the line, and those survivors that can flee towards the open plains on the flanks.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase X. The routing of the Carthaginian second line (1) still leaves the third line to deal with. Scipio redresses his formations, ordering his principes and triarii (2) to deploy to the flanks of the surviving hastati (3), forming one continuous line facing Hannibal’s veteran infantry across the corpse-strewn plain.

  The Battle of Zama, 202 BCE, Phase XI. The action hangs in the balance as both sides trade blows in fierce hand-to-hand fighting (1). The sudden reappearance of Masinissa’s Numidian horse (2) and Laelius and Dacamas with their cavalry (3) tips the scales in Scipio’s favour. The horsemen swiftly deploy and charge into the rear of the struggling Carthaginian formations, killing most of Hannibal’s veterans where they stand. The survivors are quickly ridden down, though Hannibal manages to flee the field.

  Polybius states Roman casualties at 1,500 killed, while the Carthaginians lost more than 20,000, with nearly as many taken prisoner.357 Appian reports Roman casualties at 2,500 and Punic killed at 25,000, though he estimates the amount of prisoners taken at only 8,500.358 Livy adds that the Romans captured 132 Punic military standards and eleven war elephants.359 Whatever the final numbers, it is somewhat ironic that Hannibal’s army was finally destroyed by being held in place by infantry and attacked and struck down by cavalry, the same tactic the Carthaginian general used to spectacular effect against the pride of Rome at Cannae fourteen years before.

  Scipio Africanus: ‘Greater than Hannibal’?

  Scipio’s victory at the Battle of Zama was decisive and it broke the Carthaginian government’s will to continue the Second Punic War. But the outcome of the battle was not inevitable, even taking into consideration the Roman general’s clear advantage in cavalry. In
fact, in many ways this engagement was a near-run thing. Hannibal’s basic strategy was brilliant in its simplicity – strike the Roman centre and hope to win the day. He understood well his quantitative advantage in numbers did not necessarily translate to a qualitative advantage in combat power. He was weak in cavalry, a tactical system he used to great effect throughout his military career, and he respected his enemy’s advantage in horsemen on the morning of Zama.

  Hannibal also understood that although he possessed more infantry than his Roman counterpart, perhaps two-thirds of his footmen (the first two lines) were not as well-trained or as disciplined as the veterans in Scipio’s ranks. Hannibal’s only real chance of victory was to break the Roman centre with wave after wave of attack, beginning with a war elephant charge to break up the Roman first line, followed by three waves of infantry to punch through the Roman ranks. In reality, this strategy worked exceptionally well, for the commentators make note of how exhausted the hastati were after fighting the first line of mercenaries and the second line Carthaginian levies, whose advances also pushed into the second line Roman principes. It is here that we see the fruits of the Roman military system’s superior training and tactical articulation, for after the rout of the Punic second line, Scipio was able to redress his lines, pulling back his battle-tested hastati and pushing forward his principes and triarii to form a single line, before advancing against Hannibal’s veteran third line. Still, according to Polybius, Hannibal’s strategy nearly worked, for the battle ‘hung in the balance’ until the return of the Numidian and Roman cavalry.360

  History will never know for certain if the Carthaginian phalanx would have prevailed had Masinissa and Laelius not returned when they did, but we can surmise that if the Roman lines had broken, it probably would have meant an end to Rome’s African expedition and a very different conclusion to the war. Scipio needed a decisive victory at Zama to secure his precarious political position in Rome and his proconsulship in Africa, whereas Hannibal needed to break the enemy and escape with enough of his army to fight again if necessary. Scipio and his veterans did not give Hannibal that opportunity.

  So, how do Hannibal and Scipio compare as tacticians and strategists? Polybius concludes that Hannibal did all that a good general could do, but that he was simply bested by a better man.361 There is something to this appraisal. Hannibal was a master tactician, who understood both the combat capabilities and motivations of his multinational troops. Like Alexander before him, who he no doubt imitated, Hannibal used cavalry as his decisive arm, the hammer to his infantry’s anvil. Infantry, in Hannibal’s art of war, was used defensively and in support of his more mobile and more highly-skilled cavalry arm. This can be seen in his defeat of the Romans at Trebia in 218 and Cannae in 216. Hannibal understood the limitations of his forces and created a winning strategy to fit these limitations. Weak in cavalry at Zama, the Punic general was forced to reconsider his usual tactics, opting to use his war elephants and infantry as his offensive striking force. And even with inferior foot soldiers, Hannibal nearly carried the day. Additionally, the heterogeneous character of his fighting force always hampered Hannibal. His army was made up of people from many nations, a fact which presented numerous problems in battlefield command, control and communication.

  Scipio also possessed superior skills as a tactician, and unlike his adversary who was always cobbling forces together in a hostile environment, the Roman general always had as the core of his fighting force the well-trained and disciplined legionary, a soldier produced from the seemingly inexhaustible manpower resources of the Roman confederation. Unlike Hannibal, Scipio used his infantry often as an offensive striking force, as his victories at Baecula in 208, Ilipa in 206 and Great Plains in 203 illustrate. True to the Roman art of war, infantry held a central place in Scipio’s tactics, and the centrepiece of the Roman heavy infantry organization was the maniple.

  But Scipio had the luxury of adding an impressive cavalry force to his army with the recruitment of Masinissa to his cause, creating a very impressive combined-arms army featuring cavalry, unusual in the annals of Roman warfare. With a large Numidian contingent attached to his army, Scipio could afford to alter his own tactics at Zama. There, he used his numerically superior cavalry to best the enemy, and then used his better-trained and equipped infantry in a defensive capacity, standing firm against the repeated Punic onslaughts until the Roman horse returned.

  When we compare the two men as strategists, both Hannibal and Scipio rate as bold and prudent, though it should be noted that the Punic commander faced a very different strategic reality than his Roman adversary. Hannibal inherited his father Hamilcar Barca’s plan to bring the war to Italy and assembled a massive army of 90,000 men to carry out the plan. After reducing the Roman allied city of Saguntum in the summer of 218, Hannibal’s task was to evade an enemy army sent to intercept him in southern Gaul, cross the Alps in bad weather, and then, with his army depleted, quickly defeat two Roman armies at Ticinus and Trebia in late 218 to bolster his men’s morale and help recruit a new army from foreigners in a hostile environment. With his numbers replenished with Celtic allies, Hannibal pushed south into Italy, evading one Roman army and ambushing and annihilating another at Lake Trasimene in 217. Maintaining the initiative, he skirted the Eternal City, realizing its walls were too strong and fearing a prolonged siege would trap his army in place. Here, Hannibal showed great restraint and situational awareness, crossing the Apennines again into the fertile plains of Campania, looting and burning the countryside before returning to Apulia to winter.

  With three victories over the Romans in just two years, Hannibal recognized that the Romans were preparing for a massive set-piece battle, so in the spring of 216 he moved to the old Roman citadel at Cannae and handpicked the next killing field, seized the high ground and waited. Outnumbered nearly two-to-one, Hannibal met the largest Roman army ever assembled, over 80,000 men, and annihilated three-quarters of the enemy host in a brilliant double-envelopment. Historically, Cannae became the military debacle against which all other Roman losses would be judged. After Cannae, the Romans would not risk another large set-piece battle against the eldest Barca son, preferring instead to pursue a ‘Fabian’ strategy of delaying and harassment.

  For the next thirteen years Hannibal fought the Romans in southern Italy while simultaneously cultivating alliances with the Greeks and other captive peoples of the region. Hannibal’s formidable diplomatic skills kept him in good standing with some of the indigenous peoples, but the Roman confederation did not unravel as his father Hamilcar had predicted, and despite overwhelming battlefield victories in the first three years of the war, the Punic general was never able to sow the seeds of rebellion necessary for the destruction of Rome as a regional power. Nor was Hannibal able to muster a large enough fighting force after Cannae to compel his enemy to fight on his terms. Attempts to reinforce his army by his younger brothers were crushed, first when Hasdrubal Barca was killed at Metaurus River in 207 and again when Mago Barca was held in place in northern Italy from 205 until his recall to Africa in 203. In the end, Hannibal’s strategic miscalculation doomed the Punic expedition, while Rome’s ‘Fabian’ strategy kept him effectively confined to southern Italy and away from the new theatre of operations, Iberia.

  After Cannae, the Roman Senate understood the necessity of a mirror strategy in defeating the Carthaginians, though the question remained where to push back against Punic aggression. Despite Polybius’ claim that the original strategy was to invade North Africa as early as 218, the Senate adopted a more prudent strategy of taking the war to the Iberian Peninsula and sent the elder Scipio brothers and then the younger Scipio to Spain to attack the house that Hamilcar Barca built.362 Like his father and uncle before him, Scipio made his military reputation in Spain, honing his skills as a strategist there when he took over the command of Roman forces after the loss of both elder Scipios and their armies in 211.

  When the younger Scipio arrived in Spain in late 210 he inherit
ed a theatre of operations in complete disarray. The destruction of two armies set the Romans back on their heels and Roman influence waned quickly in Iberia. With his army of 11,000 Scipio secured a winter quarters at Tarraco and immediately began to court the assistance of local Spanish tribes and reconnoitre his enemy’s location. When he learned that the Carthaginians had split their forces into three armies to pacify the peninsula in 209, the young Roman general decided to strike the political, military and psychological heart of Punic Spain – the city of New Carthage. Undaunted by the city’s strong defensive position, Scipio took New Carthage by storm quickly, which was essential with three enemy armies in the region. This bold plan paid huge dividends, for, once New Carthage was in Roman hands, the Punic forces lost their major port in Spain and would never regain their strategic balance.

  In the spring of 208 Scipio struck out with a substantial Roman army aided by Spanish mercenaries with the goal of destroying the Punic forces on the field of battle. But with Hasdrubal Barca, Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca and their three armies in the vicinity, this was a dangerous strategy. If engaged individually, Scipio had the advantage over the three Punic armies, but if the enemy converged on him, the Roman army would be in a dangerous position. Scipio surprised Hasdrubal Barca’s troops in the vicinity of Baecula, killing or capturing perhaps as many as two-thirds of the Punic army. After Baecula, Scipio resisted the temptation to pursue his enemy into the coastal southern mountains in what would have certainly been a guerrilla war against the Romans, instead deciding to regroup and wait for a better opportunity to bring his enemy to battle. Two years later in 206, Scipio would have this opportunity, following up on his win at Baecula with a stunning victory over Gisgo and Mago at Ilipa, scattering the remaining Punic forces to the wind. Scipio was now master of Spain, and used the political capital these successful campaigns won him to secure a consulship in Rome and a new army for the invasion of North Africa.