Hannibal’s Last Battle

by Brian Todd Carey; Joshua B. Allfree; John Cairns

  Appian claims the Roman army which assembled at Scipio Africanus’ old fortress, Castra Cornelia, was the largest Roman army fielded since the battle of Cannae in 216, consisting of 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and supported by fifty quinqueremes and one hundred smaller galleys.385 Our source tells us that there was no shortage of recruits for the African campaign, with volunteers streaming in from all over the republic to fill the troop rosters. The possibility of an easy victory over Rome’s greatest adversary no doubt attracted these men, as did the prospect of sacking the only city in the western Mediterranean which rivalled Rome’s opulence.

  A large army would be needed to breach the impressive walls of Carthage.386 The city was protected by twenty-two miles of circuit walls and difficult to besiege and blockade because of its unique defensive position and large, well-defended harbours. A triple line of defence protected the northern approach to the city on its landward side, beginning with a sixty-foot-wide ditch and timber palisade, backed by a wall over fifty feet in height and thirty feet wide, with towers placed at two hundred feet intervals. This wall was built across the 3,000-yard wide isthmus and was divided into two stories. Appian tells us that in the lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, while above there were stables for 4,000 horses. This wall also contained barracks for 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalrymen.387 Despite fifty-years of manpower restrictions, the Carthaginians were able to muster enough defenders to man the walls, although the relinquishing of critical armour and siege equipment must have weakened the defenders’ position.

  The Romans attacked Carthage from two directions. The consul Manius Manilius led his legionaries against the northern wall protecting the isthmus, while the other consul, Lucius Marcius Censorinus, used the Roman fleet to attack a weak stretch of wall near a narrow spit of land edging Lake Tunis to the south of the city. Here, legionaries using scaling ladders mounted on the prows of warships tried to climb the wall. Both attacks were met with a hail of missile fire from Carthage’s walls, forcing the attacking Romans to retreat. Manilius and Censorinus attempted a second assault with the same results. Unable to quickly storm their objective, the Romans settled in for a longer siege and constructed camps near the city’s long walls.388

  The Roman siege was complicated by the existence of a strong Carthaginian presence outside of the walls, an army of 30,000 led by a man named Hasdrubal. This Punic force harassed the Roman lines, while another under the command of one Himilco Phameas massacred a Roman foraging party gathering wood, killing five hundred soldiers. Manilius was able to secure enough wood to construct ladders and a third assault against Carthage’s northern walls was attempted, but failed to breach the span.389

  Meanwhile, Censorinus continued his assault against the southern wall, filling in a portion of the lake in order to utilize two large battering rams. Appian tell us that these massive machines were supposedly manned by 6,000 men apiece, the first with a crew made up of legionaries and commanded by tribunes, and the second made up of sailors and officers from the fleet. Appian believed the consul used the service rivalry to spur a competition to breach the walls.390 It worked, as two breaches were made, but the Carthaginians managed to drive the Romans back late in the day, executing repairs on the wall that evening. The Punic defenders even managed to sortie out under cover of darkness and burn both battering rams, making both engines inoperable. Unfortunately, the Carthaginians were unable to complete their repairs, providing the Romans with another opportunity to enter the city. To defend this gap, the Punic defenders formed a makeshift and poorly-armed mob behind the breach and stationed throngs of missile throwers on the walls and on the roofs of nearby homes. Taunted by the Punic defenders, the Romans hastily mounted an assault, but the attack was poorly organized and bogged down after the initial push through the walls. It was at this moment that one of the military tribunes, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus and the same man whose report back to the Senate in 151 helped escalate tensions between Rome and Carthage) enhanced his military reputation, holding back his men from the initial assault and covering the Roman retreat when the attack began to disintegrate and the legionaries were expelled from the city.391

  Scipio Aemilianus’ actions are significant in that he was the only senior military officer to win distinction during the early phases of the Third Punic War, raising his stock in the eyes of the Roman Senate back home. No doubt, Scipio’s impressive lineage helped keep the Senate’s focus on his career. The youngest of four sons of the victor at Pydna, Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Aemilianus was adopted by Publius Scipio, the son of Africanus. Roman custom allowed for the adoption of young men between prominent families, and Scipio Aemilianus’ connection to two of the most prominent families in Rome placed enormous pressure on the young tribune to succeed. Groomed since birth to be a military leader, Scipio saw his first combat as a teenager at Pydna, where his enthusiastic pursuit of the enemy nearly had him declared missing in action. Later, in 151, he would take the position of tribune in the Spanish campaign, even personally killing an enemy champion in single combat.392 One distinguished historian of the Punic Wars explains that ‘it was perhaps his service in Spain that taught Scipio the importance of maintaining a reserve and cautious pursuit, for the tribes of the [Iberian] Peninsula were quick to punish careless attackers’.393

  The Roman strategic position eroded further when disease began to spread throughout Censorinus’ camp near the shore of Lake Tunis, forcing the tribune to relocate his camp closer to the sea. The Carthaginians also sent fire ships against the Roman fleet, coming, according to Appian, ‘a little short of destroying the whole fleet’.394 Emboldened, the defenders launched a nocturnal attack against Manilius’ camp on the isthmus, crossing the Roman defensive ditches with planks and tearing down the wooden palisades. As the Romans within the camp panicked at the suddenness of the attack, Scipio Aemilianus led a cavalry detachment out of the rear gate and swung around the camp, striking the attacking Carthaginians in the flank, scattering the Punic troops.395 After this near disaster, Manilius strengthened the defences of the camp and constructed another fort near the shore to cover Roman supply ships as they unloaded their cargo. Unable to quickly take Carthage over the campaigning season, the Roman expedition was settling in for the winter.

  Censorinus returned to Rome to oversee the election of new consuls, leaving his colleague to carry on the siege. Manilius organized a strong contingent of 10,000 Roman infantry and 2,000 cavalry to punish the loyal regions around Carthage and to forage for food and wood for the winter. The Roman’s inexperience precipitated disaster as groups of foragers were attacked by Himilco Phameas and his Numidian and Moorish allies, leading to terrible loss of life. Once again, Scipio showed his military acumen by keeping his foragers close to his troops and supporting the infantry guards with cavalry. When Manilius brought his column back to the main Roman camp, the Carthaginians mounted another night attack, this time against the small fortress protecting the Roman fleet. As the Punic forces threatened the smaller fort, Scipio took 300 Roman cavalry armed with torches into the night to create an impression of a larger force. The ruse worked and the Punic forces withdrew.396

  Unable to bring a decisive conclusion to the siege, Manilius decided to seek out Hasdrubal’s main army and destroy it. Hasdrubal was camped around the city of Nepheris, about twenty miles southeast of Tunis. The Carthaginian general made his camp on higher ground beyond a small river at the end of a valley, a very defensible position and one that forced the Romans to attack in column and not in line. Although Scipio Africanus was able to use this very difficult manoeuvre at Ilipa during the Second Punic War, the tactical articulation of the Roman army during the Third Punic War was not nearly as refined as a half century before. Ignoring this fact, and against the protests of Scipio Aemilianus, Manilius ordered a direct assault against the Punic position straight out of the march, not bothering to fortify his own camp and rest. Perhaps the Roman consul believed surprise w
ould serve him well and his men did initially make some headway, fording the river and pushing the Carthaginians back up the slope. Hasdrubal waited patiently as the Roman troops tired and began to pull back, then ordered a ferocious counterattack. Bottle-necked at the ford, the legionaries were cut down by the Punic troops. Once again, Scipio saved the day, taking his contingent of 300 cavalry, and any other Roman horsemen he could gather along the way, and galloping towards the ford. Once there, Scipio divided his horsemen into two groups and led a series of controlled charges against the pursuing enemy, keeping his lines close and rotating his cavalry attacks in order to keep constant pressure on the enemy lines. His decisive intervention allowed the majority of the legionaries to cross the river to safety, with his own horsemen barely making it across the ford.397 Scipio went on to lead another daring rescue mission, freeing four Roman units (probably maniples) who had taken refuge on a hill at the beginning of the melee. Scipio even managed to secure the bodies of several fallen tribunes from Hasdrubal, illustrating his penchant for negotiating with the enemy.398

  The fact that it was Scipio, and not the consul and commander Manilius, who negotiated for the return of these fallen officers illustrates the young tribune’s understanding of North African culture and the personal relationships forged with Punic and Numidian leaders in the years before the start of the war. At times, these relationships spurred rumours of collaboration (often spread by the tribune’s jealous rivals in the Roman army), but Scipio’s knowledge of his enemy made him a better commander in the field, while also placing him in a stronger position to take on greater responsibility as the war continued. Perhaps more interestingly, Scipio’s lineage as the adopted grandson of Africanus presented an unusual opportunity for the Roman cause in North Africa. When ninety-year-old King Masinissa died in the early months of 148, his will called for Scipio to oversee the division of his assets among the old king’s three legitimate sons. Scipio completed this task and persuaded one of these sons, the Numidian prince Gulussa, to join the Roman effort against Carthage.

  Overall, the Roman expedition against Hasdrubal’s camp near Nepheris was a disaster, and the Roman column was even attacked again by Himilco while trying to return to the main Roman camps near Carthage. The consul would mount a second, better organized, attack against Nepheris in the early spring of 148, but this campaign also failed to destroy Hasdrubal’s army. The only bright spot in this second campaign was the defection of Himilco Phameas and 2,200 of his cavalry to the Roman cause, an act secretly negotiated by Scipio.399 When Scipio was called back to Rome in 148, Himilco accompanied him to the Senate, where he received, according to Appian, ‘a purple robe with gold clasps, a horse with gold trappings’, as well as a fully-furnished tent and great sums of silver.400 Scipio Aemilianus had in Himilco what his grandfather secured in his alliance with Masinissa – a faithful North African ally in his war with Carthage.

  The Siege Perfected and the Fall of Carthage, 147–146 BCE

  While in the Eternal City, Scipio planned to stand for the office of curule aedile, a logical next step for a young, well-connected aristocrat. But his name was submitted by the comitia centuriata as a candidate for the consulship of Rome for 147–146. As a man of thirty-six or thirty-seven, he was still a few years short of the minimum age of forty required to stand for consul. This technicality was overcome with a Senatorial annulment of the old law, allowing Scipio to stand for election, just as his underage grandfather had done in 205. Granted Africa as his command region, Scipio raised a new army from volunteers and returned to the war, sailing first to Sicily, then on to Utica.401

  Roman actions during the previous campaigning year (148) made little headway in North Africa. The consul in charge, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, maintained a loose blockade around Carthage, but placed more emphasis on subduing cities in the region. Unfortunately, no strategically-important cities were taken and the campaigning season ended without any significant gains. Hasdrubal, the leader at Nepheris, assumed command in Carthage and, after disposing of his rivals, continued the defence of the city.

  As the Roman blockade of Carthage continued into early 147, the Roman commander of the fleet, Lucius Mancinus, decided to exploit an apparent weak spot in the city’s defence, a section where the natural defences were so strong that a strong wall seemed unnecessary. Mancinus sent men with ladders to scale the cliffs, but their assault was noticed by the Punic defenders, who sallied out of a nearby gate to attack the Romans. The Romans soon put the Carthaginians to flight, and then pursued the enemy through the portal and into the city. Mancinus poured all of his available resources into the city. Unfortunately, of these 3,500 men, only about 500 were fully-equipped legionaries, while the rest were poorly-armed and -armoured sailors. After nearly two years, a small corner of Carthage was now in Roman hands. Well aware that his men did not have adequate supplies to hold the city, Mancinus sent messengers to the consul Piso (who commanded the field army) and the Roman base at Utica asking for reinforcements. As luck would have it, Scipio had arrived in Utica that evening and immediately prepared an expedition to relieve Mancinus. After releasing some Punic prisoners with the hope that his arrival would strike fear into the Carthaginians, Scipio set sail in the early morning for Carthage. First light brought a renewed attack against Mancinus and his men, an attack which only stalled when Scipio’s fleet came into view, with legionaries crowding the decks to suggest the arrival of a new army from Italy. There was enough of a pause in the fighting to allow Mancinus and his men to escape the city on the decks of Roman ships.402

  Assuming command of the African campaign, Scipio concentrated his army outside of Carthage, reinvigorating a strategy with the capture of the Punic capital as its centrepiece. The new consul inspected his troops, dismissing those men who he felt were there to loot and not to fight.403 A year of battlefield reverses weighed heavily on the remaining Roman veterans, and the task of integrating raw recruits brought from Italy compounded the problem. Scipio understood that he did not have sufficient time to fully train his new army, but he also understood the importance of military success in healing the psychological wounds inflicted by the long siege. Mancinus’ successful capture of a corner of Carthage inspired the young consul, and he ordered two simultaneous Roman assaults against the Megara, one of the largest suburbs surrounding the Byrsa or old citadel. These attacks were launched at night and against two widely-separated sections of the wall. Punic defenders hurling missiles repulsed these two assaults, but the Romans were able to seize an abandoned tower adjacent to the wall. Using planks as a gangway, the Romans bridged the gap and fought their way onto the rampart, finally seizing a nearby gate and admitting Scipio and 4,000 of his legionaries.404 The Punic defenders panicked, fleeing back to the protection of the Byrsa. Scipio and his men slowly moved through the dark streets and city orchards and gardens, but were wary of the numerous areas suitable for ambush and disturbed by the lack of defensible positions in this area of the city. Wisely, Scipio ordered a withdrawal from the city back to his main camp.405

  The success of the Roman assault greatly upset Hasdrubal, who reacted to the incursion by ordering Roman prisoners taken to the walls and tortured to death in full view of their comrades, an act incensing the Italian besiegers. This was the action of a desperate commander. Hasdrubal understood his city was now very vulnerable to storm and he wanted to send a message to his own population that the Romans, should they enter the city again, would not show any quarter. This act angered some members of the Carthaginian Council of Elders, but when they protested, Hasdrubal had them arrested and executed.406

  Scipio recognized that he now possessed the initiative in the siege, and he pressed his advantage by instituting a tighter blockade of the city. The consul ordered the abandoned camp by Lake Tunis to be burned, then moved his own main camp closer to Carthage’s walls on the isthmus. Scipio fortified this new position in the traditional rectangular manner, taking twenty days and nights to dig ditches (filled with sharp stakes)
and erect a rampart twelve-feet high with towers at regular intervals and a tall tower in the middle of the wall facing Carthage to act as an observation post. Appian states that this tower was tall enough for Scipio to observe what was going on in the streets of Carthage.407 Roman commanders had long used engineering projects to impose drill and discipline among their soldiers, and the construction of such a large camp no doubt helped build an esprit de corps among the troops, helping to integrate the new recruits with the veterans. This new Roman fort dominated access to the city on the landward side.

  With the isthmus under Roman control, Scipio next tackled the porous nature of the naval blockade. Throughout the Roman siege of Carthage, Punic ships regularly ran the blockade and brought much-needed supplies into the city via the seventy-foot-wide harbour entrance. These supplies were essential in maintaining the fighting spirit of Hasdrubal’s 30,000 active defenders, though this was done at the expense of the rest of the population, creating a famine in the city.408 Scipio decided to cut off the harbour with the construction of a mole, hoping to seal the fate of the city. The mole was designed to cut across the harbour entrance from the isthmus to an earthen tongue or natural quay which projected outward on the seaward side of the harbour entrance.