Swiss and the Nazis

by Stephen Halbrook

  The Nazi regime quickly moved toward a totalitarian reorganization of German society. With compulsive efficiency, it declared whole classes of people enemies of the state, and started the process of rooting them out of the German Volk. Political opponents, Jews, Masons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, gypsies, the disabled, the mentally ill, many Catholic priests, homosexuals and other “undesirables” were encouraged to leave Germany minus their property and possessions, deprived of their livelihoods and subjected to increasing intimidation and physical violence. Those who resisted or could be labeled as criminals or traitors began to be placed in concentration camps. Wolfgang Langhoff’s Die Moorsoldaten (The Swamp Soldiers), published in Zurich as early as 1935, was the first major exposé of Nazi concentration camps.9

  Prompted by the authorities in Nazi Germany, the flight began. But where could refugees go? Virtually every European country plus the United States had restrictive quotas. Because Switzerland, like Holland and Belgium, had a direct border with Germany, the Swiss feared they would be overrun with refugees, who would complicate their already tense relations with the Nazi state and swell the ranks of the unemployed. The Nazis dubbed Switzerland—an open, tolerant society with a free press—a “liberal Jew-state” and a “Freemasons’ democracy.”10 The Swiss were also characterized as “Bergsemiten,” mountain Semites.

  There was also the rising military threat. Swiss policymakers knew how dependent their own economy was on Germany for foodstuffs, coal and raw materials. Without German imports, the Swiss economic situation, already battered by the worldwide Depression, would be grim. The Germans knew they had a stranglehold, and were quick to use it against the Swiss. Any decisions the Swiss made regarding borders also risked German tit-for-tat reprisals against Swiss living in or traveling to Germany. The fairly large contingent of Germans resident in Switzerland posed the danger of a German fifth column.11 The employment situation was tense, and newcomers had to be supported. They could not be immediately put to work. Throughout this period there was a fear of skilled foreign workers displacing Swiss in the labor market. Unemployment and displacement continued to be boiling hot political issues. Therefore refugees—at least in large numbers—created mounting political pressure.

  So-called illegals, people without permission to enter (visas were not required of Germans or Austrians) or without travel documents, were a special problem. However, lack of documentation did not disqualify a refugee’s entry into Switzerland, and refugees were to be returned to Germany only in exceptional cases. Flexibility was urged in dealing with illegal entrants.12 Swiss policymakers gradually began to resist the flood. In early 1938, Rothmund explained that “because of our geographical location, the foreign overpopulation, and the many foreigners living on our land, as well as because of the state of our job market, Switzerland can only be a country of transit for new refugees.”13

  Germany began an ominous—and under international law, illegal—one-way visa policy. For “undesirables,” visas would be granted only for departure, not for return. Then, in January 1938, a Swiss citizen living in Leipzig noticed, on renewing his traveler’s identity card required by the Germans, that a red stamp “Jew” had been added. German authorities informed him that “this stamp was being used for all ‘non-Aryans’ regardless of whether native or foreign, and that exceptions could not be made for Swiss citizens.”14 This was a harbinger of what would become the notorious “J” stamp which identified Jews.

  Events were overtaking policy. Germany’s Anschluss of Austria on March 12, 1938, precipitated an immediate refugee crisis as thousands of Austrian Jews, under Nazi pressure, were forced to flee. European countries would not, with few exceptions, admit these refugees.15 The Swiss Federal Council ordered the reinstitution of visa requirements for holders of Austrian passports. However, Switzerland at first readily granted visas and accepted refugees. Roughly 4,000 Austrians thus legally entered Switzerland by April 1.16

  This small flood occasioned by the issuance of visas for citizens of—and refugees from—the new Grossdeutschland rapidly became problematic. Was there to be a “visa barrier” and, if so, what kind? Initially, Swiss authorities considered mandatory visas for all German passport holders residing in Austria.17 Germany immediately threatened retaliation. On May 16, Privy Councilor Roediger of the German Foreign Ministry told Paul Dinichert, Swiss minister to Germany, that if Switzerland started requiring visas for German-Austrians and extended that requirement to all Germans, Germany would demand that all Swiss have German visas to enter Germany. This would have severely curtailed all cross border traffic and effectively cut Switzerland’s “lifeline” by vastly complicating the import of foodstuffs and fuel. Using visas across the board to restrict immigration thus became dangerous. However, Dinichert did report to the Federal Council: “The simplest solution, of course, would be to restrict the visa requirement to non-Aryan German citizens. This is admittedly repugnant to our principles, but it could easily be justified in that it is also in the interest of Swiss Jews to be protected against any further influx of foreign Jews.”18 This “simple solution” was not taken by the Swiss.

  Entry permits were a painful problem throughout the world. Right after the Anschluss, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt proposed an international conference to establish a permanent agency to assist the primarily Jewish refugees emigrating from Germany and Austria. Thirty-two governments participated in the resulting Evian conference, which was held in July 1938. It soon emerged that the conferees were more interested in getting rid of, rather than accepting, refugees.19

  Switzerland shared a border with Austria and offered at least a relatively easy, if not necessarily secure, escape. Soon the Swiss government saw that the number of refugees was already overwhelming support services. Switzerland needed and demanded help. Swiss representative Rothmund told the Evian conferees that the German and Austrian refugees admitted since March already posed a large burden, exacerbated by the Depression, on the country’s public and private relief agencies. Switzerland could not be expected to be the only lifeboat, and henceforward its acceptance of refugees would depend on the ability of those refugees to gain and demonstrate legal admission to other countries.20 Switzerland would provide transit, not permanent residence. Other countries must open their doors.

  Rothmund’s pleas fell on deaf ears. American delegate Myron C. Taylor indicated that the United States would not increase its own small immigration quota. Lord Winterton, head of the British delegation, insisted: “The U.K. Is not an immigration country. It is fully peopled and suffers from unemployment.”21 The London Times had opined on July 6 that “the presence of a large number of Jews within the state creates grave problems in certain countries, especially when they attain an importance there that is out of proportion to their number.”22 France and other European countries announced that they had no room for emigrants, nor did Canada, Australia, or Latin America. Only the tiny Dominican republic agreed to accept refugees.

  Despite the front-door rules, refugees were admitted through a variety of side doors. By early summer of 1938, according to the Council of German Jewry, the 150,000 Jews who had fled Germany were dispersed as follows: Britain 52,000, France 30,000, Poland 25,000, Belgium 12,000, Switzerland 10,000, and the Scandinavian countries 5,000.23 Those entering the United States were so statistically insignificant that they were not mentioned by the Council. In August, Lord Duncannon of the High Commission for refugees from Germany stated that Switzerland had done everything possible for refugees and that other members of the League of nations should give the Swiss some relief by agreeing to accept some refugees.24

  Meanwhile, the Federal Council was on the point of ordering that only persons with Swiss visas could enter Switzerland and that issuance of such visas required proof of entitlement to return to one’s own or some other country. That draconian proposal led to protests by the Swiss population.25 on August 22, Rothmund broached the possible solution to Franz Kappeler, Swiss Legation counselor in Berlin, that in order
to avoid adoption of a general visa requirement, “Aryan individuals whose return to Germany is prohibited, as well as all non-Aryans, should receive German travel passports only after a duly qualified German passport official has stamped the first page with the following restriction: ‘Valid for travel into Switzerland; visa of Swiss Consulate required.’”26 In other words, Swiss authorities would decide who could enter her borders, particularly Germans who could not return to Germany.

  The Swiss Jewish community itself was concerned about the influx. During this period, Rothmund met on refugee policies with Saly Mayer, president of the Federation of Swiss Jewish Communities (Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund, or SIG). In accord with the policy worked out at Evian, refugees were cared for in part by the religious or ethnic communities of the host countries. The number of unauthorized refugees was overwhelming the resources of the SIG and its Association of Jewish Support for the poor (Verband Schweizerischer Israelitischer Armenpfleger, or VSIA). Thus, on August 19, the VSIA asked the Jewish community in Vienna “to suppress and prevent all attempts of illegal entries into Switzerland.”27

  During this period, negotiations via the Swiss Legation in Berlin were taking place under the growing war clouds over Europe. German-Swiss relations were strained. Refugees were only one of the thorny issues. Hitler was outraged at the killing of German Nazi leader Wilhelm Gustloff in Davos, Switzerland, by David Frankfurter, a Jewish medical student, and by the Federal Council’s subsequent prohibition of Nazi party activities in Switzerland. Nazi officials thundered against open attacks on Nazism by the Swiss press, harassed Swiss citizens within Germany, and connived in illegal border violations.28

  On August 30, 1938, the Federal Council moved ahead by deciding to abrogate the 1926 accord with Germany that eliminated visa requirements.29 Rothmund wrote that “Germany persists in a ruthless deportation policy.”30

  On September 2, Dr. Otto Köcher, German minister in Bern, asked Rothmund if a general Swiss visa requirement could be waived if German passport holders who were Jews were identified as such. Rothmund replied that it was “technically” possible, but made clear “that we could not follow the course provided by Mr. Köcher.”31 In other words, the Swiss would never agree to identify “their” Jews.

  Despite this apparent rejection of a “J” stamp by the Swiss, Privy Councilor Roediger of the German Foreign office informed Swiss Legation counselor Kappeler that Germany was preparing “to mark German passports issued to Jews,” and would require a similar mark on Swiss passports issued to Swiss Jews. Kappeler responded that “special identification of the passports of Swiss Jews was impossible on both practical and constitutional grounds.”32

  At the time, Swiss Jews in Germany were subject to the same restrictions as German Jews—including limitations on professional activity and the requirement to register property. On September 8, Rothmund telephoned Kappeler that any such [passport] discrimination “against Swiss Jews is out of the question.” “What is to be avoided if at all possible is express consent to special treatment of our Jews,” Kappeler insisted. However, he warned, Germany might require Swiss Jews to obtain visas if the Swiss required visas for German Jews.33

  Rothmund rejected any such concession in a report to the Federal Department of Justice and police on September 15. “An arrangement with another nation under which Swiss Jews would be dealt with differently from Swiss non-Jews seems unacceptable to me.” He added: “It is more than enough that we must submit to the special treatment of Swiss Jews who live in Germany. In my opinion, the German proposal must be rejected at once insofar as it calls for reciprocity.” Even without reciprocity, the proposal was considered a Nazi ruse, since the Swiss believed that, whatever the official agreement, Germany would continue to expel selected groups without regard to legalities.34

  Rothmund foresaw new waves of unauthorized refugees as Nazi Germany sought to expel other unpopular groups. He wrote:

  The National Socialist party’s campaign against its enemies will steadily intensify. As soon as the emigration of Jews is resolved, the struggle against the Church will be revived; the repression of German Nationals may well take many other forms. We will find ourselves defenseless against other categories of emigrants if we accept the German proposal; in short, we would be left with no control over the entry of refugees. The number of refugees with the stamp “political” would likely far outnumber the Jewish refugees.35

  In Rothmund’s view, a general visa for all Germans, not just Jews, was necessary. Otherwise, the German press would assert that “such measures proved the virulent anti-Semitism of the democracies, and they would display it as evidence of our adherence to the racial axis.” The German proposal is an “effort to draw us into anti-Semitism, or at least to make it appear to other countries that such is the case.” He continued:

  The Jews figure with all the other foreigners as a factor in the excessive influx of foreigners. Now we have assumed our share of the general obligation toward emigrants, and we intend to fulfill it humanely but with the utmost discipline through the Alien police. The Swiss Jews are helping us and also see our policy as being in their own interests. If now we come up with special measures that discriminate against them, we are simply alienating them. If they begin to protest internationally, instead of exerting their influence in their international circles on behalf of the measures that we have adopted, as they are doing today, then we risk having the whole civilized world turn against us.36

  A general visa policy would have been complicated. Requiring a visa for all Germans meant examining each applicant to determine whether he or she would be allowed to return to Germany. Certification as an Aryan meant that one would be readmitted, while status as a Jew meant that one would not.37

  While Switzerland was powerless to require Germany to rescind its racist policies, it is remarkable that Switzerland stood up for equal treatment of every one of its citizens, including every Swiss Jew. Switzerland did in fact attempt to limit the deluge of refugees. But its border controls had less to do with the fact that most of the refugees were Jewish than with the fear that the country would soon be overwhelmed by a large flood of refugees from Nazi repression. Switzerland should not be condemned for failing to admit unlimited refugees when the great democracies—England, France, and the United States—served notice that they would not accept any significant number of refugees. From the Swiss perspective, the argument continued to revolve around the overall number of refugees, not their religious or ethnic identity.

  The Germans opposed Rothmund’s insistence on a general visa requirement. On September 17, 1938, in Bern, he had a stormy meeting with Köcher and Hans Globke, the German legation counselor, who withdrew the German demand for reciprocity with respect to Swiss Jews but announced that Germany would unilaterally place a mark on the German passports of non-Aryans. Rothmund shot back the query of “how other categories of emigrants would be singled out if the struggle against the churches should be revived,” and stated that Germany’s past activities and her campaign to get rid of her Jews gave no confidence that she would abide by her agreements to restrict illegal emigration.38

  The peace of all Europe seemed to hang in the balance in that fall of 1938. Europe was in the midst of the Sudeten crisis. It was just days before the infamous Munich conference. No one knew what might trigger an explosion. Swiss Minister Hans Frölicher in Berlin warned Rothmund that “in today’s tense situation, our country must avoid anything that could be interpreted as one-sided,” and it would “be seen as both unfriendly and non-neutral if… the visa is introduced only for Germany and not for other neighboring states, which, like Italy, also have a problem with Jews.”39 Rothmund disagreed on this issue, adding: “I believe this would be interpreted as us bowing before Germany again and participating in the racial axis between Berlin and Rome. I fear that this would result in enormous damage for us.”40

  Rothmund then reluctantly journeyed to Berlin to negotiate what would become the German-Swiss protocol
of September 29, 1938. The German representatives began with the announcement: “For the execution of its laws and regulations against those Germans defined by the Nürnberg laws as non-Aryan, for domestic and foreign purposes, the German government needs an identity document designating them expressly as such. Domestically an identity card will be introduced which is compulsory for non-Aryans, and German consulates abroad will identify non-Aryans on passports.” regarding the latter, “All passports issued in Germany for traveling abroad will have on the left top of the first page a special mark for Jews in the form of a circle with a diameter of two centimeters and an inserted ‘J’.”41

  Rothmund later stated that this disclosure by Germany’s chief delegate—characteristically, Dr. Werner best of the Gestapo—about this “special marking of the passports delivered to Jews” was “the greatest surprise for him.”42 He should have expected it, in view of the previous German statements. At any rate, the “J” stamp on German Jewish passports was instigated as part of a broader enforcement by the Nazi government of the Nürnberg laws, which purported to define Jews and enact discriminatory policies against them. Identification of Jews on passports paralleled their identification on domestic identity cards.

  Faced with the fait accompli of the “J” stamp on German passports, the Swiss delegation insisted that Swiss Jews must suffer no discrimination. Rothmund “emphasized vigorously that an agreement would be unacceptable if it made a distinction between Swiss Aryans and Swiss non-Aryans. He said Switzerland did not make such a distinction and would not allow it. Rather, it treated Swiss Jews as full citizens. He said that we did not practice anti-Semitism and would prevent it from arising.”43 The 1999 Bergier report, which appears to imply that Swiss policy was anti-Semitic, does not discuss this statement or its implications.