The Good Book
Page 59
22. And he should not try to administer all the affairs of the state by his own speeches, decrees and actions,
23. But should have good, trustworthy men and employ each of them for each particular service according to his fitness.
24. So Pericles made use of Menippus for the position of general,
25. Humbled the Council of the Areopagus by means of Ephialtes,
26. Passed the decree against the Megarians by means of Charinus,
27. And sent Lampon out as founder of Thurii.
28. For, when power seems to be distributed among many, not only does the weight of hatreds and enmities become less troublesome,
29. But there is also greater efficiency in the conduct of affairs.
30. For just as the division of the hand into fingers does not make it weak, but renders it a more skilful instrument for use,
31. So the statesman who gives to others a share in the government makes action more effective by co-operation.
32. But he who through insatiable greed of fame or power puts the whole burden of the state upon himself,
33. And sets himself even to tasks for which he is not fitted by nature or by training,
34. As Cleon set himself to leading armies, Philopoemen to commanding ships and Hannibal to haranguing the people – such a man has no excuse when he makes mistakes.
35. So, being no persuasive speaker, you went on an embassy,
36. Or being easy-going, you undertook administration,
37. Being ignorant of accounting, you were treasurer,
38. Or when old and feeble, you took command of an army.
39. But Pericles divided the power with Cimon so that he should himself be ruler in the city and Cimon should man the ships and wage war against the barbarians;
40. For one of them was more gifted for civic government, the other for war.
41. And Eubulus the Anaphlystian also is commended because, although few men enjoyed so much confidence and power as he,
42. Yet he administered none of the Hellenic affairs and did not take the post of general,
43. But applied himself to the finances, increased the revenues, and did the state much good thereby.
Chapter 25
1. Since there is in every democracy an inclination to malice and fault-finding directed against men in public life,
2. And they suspect that many desirable measures, if there is no party opposition and no expression of dissent, are done by conspiracy,
3. And this subjects a man’s associations and friends to calumny,
4. Statesmen ought not to let any real enmity or disagreement against themselves subsist.
5. When the populace are suspicious about some important and salutary measure,
6. The statesmen when they come to the assembly ought not all to express the same opinion, as if by previous agreement,
7. But two or three of the friends should dissent and quietly speak on the other side, then change in their position as if they had been convinced;
8. For in this way they draw the people along with them, since they appear to be influenced only by the public advantage.
9. In small matters, however, which do not amount to much, it is not a bad thing to let one’s friends really disagree,
10. Each following his own reasoning that in matters of the highest importance their agreement upon the best policy may not seem to be prearranged.
11. Now the statesman is always by nature ruler of the state, like the queen bee in the hive,
12. And bearing this in mind he ought to keep public matters in his own hands;
13. But offices which are called ‘authoritative’ and are elective he ought not to seek too eagerly or often, for love of office is neither dignified nor popular;
14. Nor should he refuse them, if the people offer them and call him to them in accordance with the law,
15. But even if they be too small for a man of his reputation, he should accept them and exercise them with zeal.
16. For it is right that men who are adorned with the highest offices should in turn adorn the lesser,
17. And that statesmen should show moderation, giving up and yielding some part of the weightier offices, and adding dignity and grandeur to the minor offices,
18. That we may not be despised in connection with the latter, nor envied on account of the former.
19. And when entering upon any office whatsoever, one must not only call to mind those considerations of which Pericles reminded himself when he assumed the cloak of a general:
20. ‘Take care, Pericles; you are ruling free men, you are ruling Greeks, Athenian citizens,’
21. But one must also say to oneself: ‘You who rule are a subject, ruling a state controlled by proconsuls, the agents of peace;
22. ‘These are not the spearmen of the plain, nor is this ancient Sardis, nor the famed Lydian power.’
23. One should imitate the actors, who, while putting into the performance their own passion, character and reputation,
24. Yet listen to the prompter and do not go beyond the degree of liberty in rhythms and metres permitted by those in authority over them.
25. For to fail in one’s part in public life brings not mere hissing or catcalls or stamping of feet.
26. Furthermore when we see little children trying playfully to bind their fathers’ shoes on their feet or fit their crowns upon their heads, we only laugh,
27. But the officials in the cities, when they foolishly urge the people to imitate the deeds, ideals and actions of their ancestors, however unsuitable they may be to the present times and conditions, stir up the common folk,
28. And though what they do is laughable, what is done to them is no laughing matter, unless they are merely treated with utter contempt.
Chapter 26
1. The statesman, while making his native state readily obedient to its laws, must not further humble it;
2. Nor, when the leg has been fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke,
3. As some do who, by referring everything, great or small, to the sovereign power,
4. Bring the reproach of slavery upon their country, or rather wholly destroy its constitutional government, making it timid and powerless in everything.
5. For just as those who have become accustomed neither to dine nor to bathe except by the physician’s orders do not even enjoy that degree of health which nature grants them,
6. So those who invite the government’s decision on every decree, meeting of a council, granting of a privilege or administrative measure,
7. Force their government to be their master more than it desires.
8. And the cause of this is chiefly the greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens;
9. For either, in cases in which they are injuring their inferiors, they force them into exile from the state,
10. Or, in matters concerning which they differ among themselves, since they are unwilling to occupy an inferior position among their fellow-citizens, they call in those who are mightier;
11. And as a result senate, popular assembly, courts and the entire local government lose their authority.
12. But the statesman should soothe the ordinary citizens by granting them equality, and the powerful by concessions in return,
13. Thus keeping them within the bounds of the local government and solving their difficulties as if they were diseases, making for them, as it were, a sort of political medicine;
14. He will prefer to be himself defeated among his fellow-citizens rather than to be successful by outraging and destroying the principles of justice in his own city,
15. And he will beg everyone else to do likewise, and will teach them how great an evil is contentiousness.
16. But as it is, not only do they not make honourable and gracious compromises with their fellow-citizens and tribesmen at home and with their neighbours and colleagues in office,
17. But they carry their dissensions outside and put them in the hands of
lawyers, to their own great injury and disgrace.
18. For when physicians cannot entirely eradicate diseases, they turn them outwards to the surface of the body;
19. But the statesman, if he cannot keep the state entirely free from troubles, will at any rate try to cure and control whatever disturbs it,
20. Keeping it meanwhile within the state, so that it may have as little need as possible of physicians and medicine drawn from outside.
21. For the policy of the statesman should be that which holds fast to security and avoids the tumultuous and mad impulse of empty opinion.
22. For he must not create storms himself, and yet he must not desert the state when storms fall upon it;
23. He must not stir up the state and make it reel perilously, but when it is reeling and in danger, he must come to its assistance and employ his frankness of speech as an anchor.
24. You would not see the man who is really a statesman cowering in fear,
25. Nor would you see him throwing blame upon others and putting himself out of danger,
26. But you will see him serving on embassies, sailing the seas,
27. And even though he had no part in the wrongdoing of the people, taking dangers upon himself on their behalf.
28. For this is noble; and besides being noble, one man’s excellence and wisdom, by earning admiration,
29. Has often mitigated anger which has been aroused against the whole people and has dissipated the threatened terror and bitterness.
30. Something of that sort seems to have happened in the case of Pompey regarding Sthenno,
31. When, as he was going to punish the Mamertines for revolting, Sthenno told him that he would be doing wrong if he should destroy many innocent men for the fault of one man;
32. For, he said, it was he himself who had caused the city to revolt by persuading his friends and compelling his enemies.
33. This so affected Pompey that he let the city go unpunished and also treated Sthenno kindly.
34. But Sulla’s guest-friend, practising virtue of the same sort but not having to do with the same sort of man, met with a noble end.
35. For when Sulla, after the capture of Praeneste, was going to slaughter all the rest of the citizens but was letting that one man go on account of his guest-friendship,
36. The latter declared that he would not be indebted for his life to the slayer of his fatherland,
37. And then mingled with his fellow-citizens and was cut down with them.
Chapter 27
1. Deeming every public office to be something great and important, we should respect one who holds an office, and understand the difficulty of its performance;
2. But the honour of an office resides in honesty and diligence, and in concord with colleagues, much more than in titles and uniforms or a purple-bordered robe.
3. But those who consider that serving together in a campaign or in school is the beginning of friendship,
4. But regard joint service in the generalship or other office as the cause of enmity, have failed to avoid one of the three evils;
5. For either they regard their colleagues as their equals and are themselves factious, or they envy them as their superiors, or despise them as their inferiors.
6. But a man ought to conciliate his superior, add prestige to his inferior, honour his equal,
7. And be affable and friendly to all, considering that they have been made all alike by vote of the people,
8. And that they bear goodwill towards one another as a heritage, from their country.
9. Scipio was criticised in Rome because, when he entertained his friends on a feast day, he did not include his colleague Mummius;
10. For even if in general the two men did not consider themselves friends,
11. On such occasions they usually thought it proper to show honour and friendliness to each other on account of their office.
12. Inasmuch, therefore, as the omission of so slight an act of courtesy brought a reputation for haughtiness to Scipio, a man in other respects admirable,
13. How can anyone be considered honourable and fair-minded who detracts from the dignity of a colleague in office,
14. Or maliciously flouts him by actions which reveal ambitious rivalry,
15. Or is so self-willed that he arrogates and annexes to himself everything, in short, at the expense of his colleague?
16. I recollect that when I was still a young man I was sent with another as envoy to the proconsul;
17. The other man was somehow left behind. I alone met the proconsul and accomplished the business.
18. Now when I came back and was to make the report of our mission, my father left his seat and told me in private not to say ‘I went’, but ‘we went’,
19. Not ‘I said’, but ‘we said’, and in all other ways to associate my colleague in a joint report.
20. For that sort of thing is not only honourable and kind, but it also takes the sting out of any envy of our reputation.
21. Most people say and believe that it is the business of political teaching to cause men to be good subjects;
22. For, they say, the subject class is in every state larger than the ruling class;
23. And each official rules but a short time, whereas he is ruled all the time, if he is a citizen of a democracy;
24. So that it is a most excellent and useful thing to learn to obey those in authority, even if they happen to be deficient in power and reputation.
25. For it is absurd that in a tragedy the chief actor often makes his entrance after a hireling who takes third-class parts,
26. And addresses him in humble fashion just because the latter wears the diadem and sceptre,
27. But that in real affairs and in government the rich and famous man belittles and despises the official who is plebeian and poor,
28. Thereby using his own high standing to insult and destroy that of the state, instead of enhancing it rather and adding to the office the esteem and power derived from himself.
29. So at Sparta the kings gave precedence to the ephors,
30. And if any other Spartans were summoned, they did not walk slowly in obeying the summons,
31. But by running eagerly at full speed through the marketplace they exhibited to their fellow-citizens their rejoicing in paying honour to the state.
32. They did not behave like some uncultured and unmannerly persons who, as if swaggering in the excess of their own power,
33. Abuse the umpires at the games, revile the chorus at festivals and jeer at generals and gymnasiarchs,
34. Not knowing and not understanding that it is often more glorious to pay honour than to receive it.
35. For to a man who has great power in the state greater distinction accrues through serving in the bodyguard and the escort of an official than through being so served and escorted by him,
36. Or rather the latter brings him dislike and envy, but the former brings true reputation, that which comes from goodwill;
37. And by being seen sometimes at the official’s door, by greeting him first, and by putting him in the best place in walking alongside him,
38. A man adds lustre to the state without taking anything from himself.
39. It is also a service to the people sometimes to endure the evil speech and anger of a man in office,
40. Putting off requital to the right time; for then either we shall respond to him after his term of office is ended,
41. Or in the delay our gain will be the cessation of anger.
Chapter 28
1. One should, however, deal always and with every official in zeal, forethought for the common good, and wisdom;
2. If they are worthy men, voluntarily suggesting and pointing out to them things to be done, and allowing them to make use of well-considered ideas so that they will be held in high esteem as benefactors of the community.
3. But if there is in them any reluctance, delay or ill-will in putting such suggestions into effect,
5. And not neglecting or slighting the public interests on the ground that because someone else is in office it is not proper for him to meddle in the administration of affairs.
6. For the law always gives the first rank in the government to him who does what is right and recognises what is advantageous.
7. For example: there was in the army a man named Xenophon, neither a general nor a captain,
8. But perceiving what was needed and daring to do it, he put himself in command and saved the Greeks.
9. Certainly it is good to make innovations, not for the sake of small or casual matters, but in cases of necessity, or for glorious causes,
10. As Epameinondas did when contrary to the law he added four months to his tenure of office, in which time he invaded Laconia and carried out his measures at Messene;
11. So that if any accusation or blame be brought against us on this account we may have necessity as our defence,
12. Or the greatness and glory of the action as compensation for the risk.
13. A saying is recorded of Jason, monarch of Thessaly, which he always repeated when taking punitive measures against individuals:
14. ‘It is inevitable that those should act unjustly in small matters who wish to act justly in great matters.’
15. This is recognisable at once as the saying of a despot; a far more statesmanlike precept is this:
16. ‘Win the favour of the people by giving way in small things in order that in greater matters you may oppose them stubbornly and thus prevent them from committing errors.’
17. For a statesman who is always very exact and strenuous about everything,
18. Never yielding at all, but always inexorable,
19. Gets the people into the habit of opposing him and being out of temper with him.
20. It is better that he sometimes joins them graciously, as at public games and spectacles in the theatre, and sometimes pretends not to see or hear their errors,
21. Just as we treat the errors of the young people in a family, in order that the force of rebukes – like that of a medicine – may not become exhausted or stale, but may in matters of greater importance retain its full strength and credit.