Rosewater (Movie Tie-in Edition)

by Maziar Bahari

  1989: RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI DIES; ALI KHAMENEI BECOMES SUPREME LEADER

  On June 3, 1989, Khomeini dies after eleven days of hospitalization for internal bleeding. His funeral is the largest public gathering in Iran’s history.

  After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts, which chooses the supreme leader and supervises his actions, gathers to select a successor. In the assembly, Rafsanjani lobbies for Ali Khamenei to succeed Khomeini. Many suspect that Rafsanjani supports Khamenei because he sees him as a weak character, a supreme leader he’ll be able to control. Rafsanjani becomes president, the post of prime minister is abolished, and Mir Hossein Mousavi resigns from politics. Mousavi continues to work as an artist and architect and eventually becomes the head of Iran’s Academy of Arts.

  1989–97: AKBAR HASHEMI RAFSANJANI’S PRESIDENCY

  Rafsanjani calls his tenure the “era of reconstruction” and proceeds with repairing the damage of the Iran-Iraq War, allowing the private sector to be more involved in industries and the economy, and improving Iran’s relations with the West. Rafsanjani becomes known as “Akbar Shah” because his presidential style resembles that of the shah and the shah’s father; he has the same interest in the industrialization of Iran and a similar disdain for criticism and freedom of expression. He creates hundreds of new industries and builds thousands of miles of roads, but at the same time scores of student activists and opposition figures are jailed and dozens of intellectuals are mysteriously murdered.

  Through unofficial channels, Rafsanjani presents himself as someone the West can work with. His government starts a strategy of rapprochement with the West and Iran’s former enemies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani tries to reverse Khomeini’s xenophobic and socialist economic policies by opening Iran’s markets to the rest of the world and encouraging foreign investment. Yet the privatization and free market benefit only a limited number of people, those referred to as Iran’s economic mafia. One of the most important achievements of Rafsanjani was helping to establish, and later expand, the Free University in 1982. This semiprivate university has educated millions of young Iranians who want to continue their education but cannot pass the extremely difficult entrance exams of the national universities. This has helped to create a generation of politically aware, educated Iranians who will demand their rights as citizens in post-2009 elections.

  Rafsanjani’s reconstruction also means the return of consumerism to Iran after ten years of revolutionary idealism. While some technocrats and retired Revolutionary Guards who are hired by the government or have started their own businesses become enormously wealthy, many war veterans find themselves dispossessed. In order to gain more power, Khamenei taps into the nostalgic anguish of this war generation and builds a powerful base that will become increasingly strong in the next two decades.

  1997: MOHAMMAD KHATAMI, THE REFORMIST PRESIDENT

  Radical supporters of Khomeini’s, including many of the students who took over the American embassy, are removed from positions of power during Rafsanjani’s presidency. Ostracized from the government, they study and criticize their past actions and create the Iranian reformist movement. During the 1997 presidential elections, they support Mohammad Khatami in a contest against Khamenei’s preferred candidate, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri. Khatami wins by a landslide. The majority of Iranians hope that the more honest, anti-establishment Khatami will bring an end to eight years of Rafsanjani’s corrupt rule.

  Khatami promises to establish a civil society in which debates are tolerated and people with different viewpoints and from different backgrounds can express themselves. Almost three years later, Khatami’s supporters take over the Majlis. With the help of the Majlis, Khatami attempts to expand the responsibilities of the president and curb the power of the supreme leader. But by the time of Khatami’s election, Khamenei has already developed a broad base of support among ideological religious Iranians, who regard him not only as their leader but as Allah’s representative on earth. He also has the courts and the armed forces under his control. While Khatami’s government tries to make Iran a more open society, Khamenei’s judges and security forces work to suppress any voice of dissent. Dozens of newspapers are shut down, and many reformists are imprisoned on fabricated charges.

  When, in the summer of 1999, a group of students protest against the closure of a newspaper, they are brutally beaten by pro-Khamenei vigilantes. Many students are disappointed that President Khatami remains quiet while atrocities are committed against his supporters and that he prefers to use a back channel to reach an agreement with Khamenei.

  Khatami’s tenure coincides with the decreasing price of oil in the international markets, which hits the Iranian economy hard. Iranians become poorer, and hard-liners blame the government’s inefficiency for people’s suffering and the economic crisis.

  During Khatami’s presidency, the United States and its allies invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Khatami advocates a dialogue among civilizations, but his attempts to improve Iran’s relations with the United States are sabotaged by Khamenei’s supporters. Iranian hard-liners think that resuming relations with the States will undermine their positions; at the same time, American neoconservatives promote a regime change in Iran. They believe that after what they see as their successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran can be contained or even dominated militarily by the United States. In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, President George W. Bush calls Iran part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea and Iraq.

  A combination of diplomatic ineffectiveness, the poor economy, and the failure to realize a civil society leads to the demise of the reformist movement. Yet the eight years of Khatami’s relatively democratic and open-minded style of governance and cultural policies change Iran forever and make ordinary Iranians more aware of their rights as citizens.

  Khatami’s tenure also makes the hard-liners more determined to do their utmost to stop reformists from ever again coming to power.

  2005: AHMADINEJAD’S ELECTION

  In June 2005, former president Rafsanjani; former speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi; a former Revolutionary Guards commander, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; Tehran’s mayor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and three other candidates compete in a tight race for the presidency of the Islamic Republic.

  The continuation of the reformist movement in Iran means a more accountable government, which will limit Khamenei’s reign. In the sixteen years since he has become the supreme leader, Khamenei has not been able to establish an absolute rule because of Rafsanjani’s prominence for the first eight years and Khatami’s pro-reform policies for the next two terms. Khamenei needs a subservient president who will listen to him, and Khamenei’s followers need one of their own in office to guarantee their survival.

  Prior to the June 2005 election, the main question is: Who will Khamenei support during the campaign? Karroubi, a tribal leader from the western province of Lorestan, has been a maverick in the parliament and is too close to the reformists. The repeat of Rafsanjani’s presidency would mean that Khamenei has to work with a president whose revolutionary background and political prominence equal or even exceed his own. Khamenei’s first choice is Ghalibaf, who has been a Khamenei devotee for years and who, during the 1999 student demonstrations, signed a letter, along with twenty-three other Guards commanders, accusing Mohammad Khatami of throwing the Islamic Republic into anarchy. But during his campaign, Ghalibaf avoids using pro-Khamenei ideological rhetoric. He dons a fashionable white suit instead of a military uniform and portrays himself as a modern independent leader. He famously says that he wants to be “an Islamic Reza Khan.”

  In the meantime, the fringe candidate Ahmadinejad chastises others for forgetting the ideals of the revolution and being corrupted by money and power. A former Revolutionary Guard, Ahmadinejad promises to clean Iran of corruption and make Iranians more prosperous. Unlike other candidates who spend lavishly on their campaigns and make well-produced films, Ahmadinejad opts for face-to-face cam
paigning and produces a low-budget documentary about his simple life and achievements. A month before the election, it is obvious that Ahmadinejad has the support of the majority of poor and disenfranchised Khamenei supporters.

  A few weeks before the election, many members of the Basij (pro-government volunteers) and the Guards are told by their commanders that Ahmadinejad is the leader’s choice for president. No candidate wins the clear majority in the first round of votes. The top two candidates are Rafsanjani, with 21.13 percent of the votes, and Ahmadinejad, with 19.43 percent.

  In a letter to Khamenei, Mehdi Karroubi, who is third, with 17.24 percent, accuses Khamenei’s son, the Guards, and the Basij of manipulating the votes in Ahmadinejad’s favor. His objections are dismissed and newspapers are banned from publishing Karroubi’s letter. In the second round, Rafsanjani gets only 35 percent of the votes. Ahmadinejad, with 61 percent, becomes president.

  2005–09: AHMADINEJAD’S PRESIDENCY

  Blessed by the rising price of oil, Ahmadinejad runs the country as if it’s a charity. During his monthly trips around Iran, he distributes the oil money as he sees fit. The failures of the United States and its allies in the two ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq allow Ahmadinejad to adopt more combative international policies. Supported by Khamenei, Ahmadinejad rapidly develops Iran’s nuclear program and increases Iran’s help to such regional proxies as Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and Hamas, in Gaza.

  During Ahmadinejad’s tenure, the suppression of internal dissent continues, activists and students are jailed, newspapers are shut down, and hard-liners are put in charge of cultural organizations. Ahmadinejad assigns retired Revolutionary Guards to key positions, and many lucrative industrial contracts are given to the Guards’ engineering companies. The Khamenei-Guards-Ahmadinejad alliance tightens its grip on all aspects of life in Iran. Most reformist officials are either dismissed, retired, or demoted to junior positions. Khamenei’s power becomes near absolute. Even though many people close to him object to Ahmadinejad’s erratic policies, Khamenei repeatedly expresses his satisfaction with the government and privately forbids other hard-liners from running against Ahmadinejad.

  In order to return to power, prominent reformists decide to agree on a single candidate to defeat Ahmadinejad. In February 2009, Mohammad Khatami announces his intention to run for president again. Khamenei sends Khatami a private message to step down; Khatami is also threatened privately and publicly. A month later, on March 16, 2009, he steps down in favor of former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, who has been away from politics for two decades.

  Many young Iranians do not remember Mousavi, and it takes him two months to introduce his programs to the public. Karroubi announces his candidacy around the same time, but because of his impulsive behavior and lack of sophistication, many people do not take him seriously. Mousavi, the main reformist candidate, promises to repair the damage done to the country during the four years of Ahmadinejad’s rule. He declares that he wants Iran to be a friend to the rest of the world, and pledges more freedom of expression and respect for human rights. Millions of educated young Iranians campaign for Mousavi all around the country. A secret poll by the Ministry of Intelligence, conducted in major cities around the country three weeks before the election, shows that Mousavi is well ahead of Ahmadinejad.

  Glossary of Terms

  Ashura: The anniversary of the martyrdom of Hossein, the third imam of Shias and son of Ali, in a battle against the Sunni caliph in A.D. 680. Ashura means the tenth day of the month; Hossein’s battle against Yazid took place on the tenth day of the month of Moharram. Like Catholicism, Shiism is a religion of icons and rituals. Ceremonies held on Ashura and on the previous day, Tasu’a, including self-flagellation and passion plays, symbolize the oppressive conditions Shias have endured throughout history and the necessity to fight for justice. Many Ashuras throughout Iran’s history have provided Iranians with an opportunity to demonstrate against the atrocities of the regime.

  ayatollah: A high-ranking Shia cleric. “Grand ayatollah” refers to the highest-ranking Shia clerics, who can interpret religious teachings for their followers.

  Basij: Short for Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (the Resistance Mobilization Force). The Basij was established at the beginning of the revolution to allow pro-government volunteers to dedicate part of their time to protecting the revolution. Each government office, educational institution, and neighborhood mosque has its own Basij office. The members of the Basij, called Basijis, receive their directives from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Even though Basijis are volunteers and most of them do not receive a salary, being a Basiji has its perks. Basijis have priority for places at universities and can receive bank loans more easily than ordinary citizens. Many Basij members have permits to carry a gun and are put in charge of the security of their neighborhoods or of other areas when the IRGC feels a threat. Basij members were instrumental in crushing postelection protests around Iran and were financially rewarded by the government accordingly.

  chador: A traditional cloak worn by many Muslim women to conceal their bodies. Women from different social, economic, and cultural backgrounds choose different material for their chadors (for example, thick, thin, plain, floral, or with other patterns) and wear them in different styles (tight, loose, with a scarf underneath or without one).

  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC): The most powerful and influential branch of the Iranian army. The IRGC, commonly called the Revolutionary Guards, was set up after the 1979 Islamic Revolution when dozens of Royal Iranian Army officers were executed by the new government, which did not trust them. Throughout the years, the Revolutionary Guards has grown to become a mighty armed force, as well as an industrial conglomerate. There are no statistics about the number of Guards, but it is estimated to be about 200,000 military personnel, including navy, ground, and air forces. Guards commanders hold different political opinions, but all of them firmly believe in the Islamic Republic and are dedicated to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who personally appoints them. It is widely believed that the force is divided between the old guard, those who are less ideological and pragmatic, and the new guard, those more ideological and extremist. The current commander of the Guards, Mohammad Ali Jafari, is part of the new guard.

  Mahdi, Imam: The twelfth imam of Shias, he was born in A.D. 869 and at the age of five went into hiding when his father, Hassan al Askari, the eleventh imam, was martyred. Shias believe that Imam Mahdi is not dead and will reappear before Judgment Day for a period of time, and will bring justice, equality, and happiness to people around the world.

  manteau: A knee-length tunic that is preferred to the chador by many Iranian women, mostly in urban areas, and women working, studying, or from less traditional or less religious families. Manteaus vary widely in terms of color, pattern, and shape—they can be knee-length, waist-length, tight, baggy, straight, light, dark, and so on.

  marja: Shias believe that during the absence of Imam Mahdi, marjas (objects of emulation) can lead Muslim communities. The marjas have to be grand ayatollahs (but not all grand ayatollahs are marjas). Shias are free to choose their marjas, and marjas, depending on their religious and political viewpoints, can be relatively liberal or conservative.

  Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Iran’s equivalent of the FBI and CIA. It was established in 1984 to gather information on internal and external threats to the legacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic. Since the concept of threat has been open to interpretation, the Ministry of Intelligence has gone beyond its mandate since its inception. In the 1980s and 1990s (during the Khamenei and Rafsanjani presidencies) the ministry became involved in economic activities, and many of its high officials became rich by driving out the competition in the name of national security. During the same period, the ministry was also involved in assassinating Iranian opposition members in Europe. From 1994 to 1999, as many as eighty intellectuals, authors, and ordinary Iranians were
killed, allegedly by rogue members of the ministry. The uncovering of the perpetrators of the killings in 1999 (during Khatami’s presidency) by reformist members and retired employees of the ministry resulted in a massive overhaul of the ministry, which put a stop to its economic activities and drove out several corrupt officials. Around the same time, with Khamenei’s blessing, a parallel intelligence organization was formed. It was primarily made up of the cleansed former agents and members of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence unit. During the postelection protests, the supporters of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad accused the ministry of working with the opposition, and on Khamenei’s orders the parallel intelligence organization and the Guards’ intelligence unit took over the intelligence apparatus. Soon, dozens of high-ranking officials of the ministry were forced to retire and the ministry agents were effectively put under the Guards’ command.

  mullah: A cleric; someone who studies or has studied religion. The word is not negative, but it has been used in negative contexts—for example, the mullahs’ regime in Iran.

  Shia Islam (also Shiism): The second-largest denomination in Islam. Unlike the majority of Muslims (Sunnis), who believe that the first four leaders of Muslims (the caliphs) were selected by the people, Shias (also called Shiites) believe that Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad, was his immediate and divinely chosen successor. Shias regard Ali and eleven of his descendants as their imams. The imams are infallible leaders who lead Muslim communities in all mundane and spiritual aspects during their lifetimes, and after their death, their words and legacies guide Shias.