Teutonic Knights

by William Urban

  For Sweden and Poland this was not a happy development. The war had drawn them into a distant region, drained them of men and treasure, and given them grounds for future quarrels.

  For Russia it meant another century of weakness and isolation; the country was deprived of those European contacts that could balance the Asiatic influences on its culture and politics. The frustrated tsar died soon thereafter, leaving his country in a shambles. For Livonia it was the beginning of centuries of conflict, centuries when the country went from being an important if isolated part of Western Europe to a minor province of Eastern Europe. Soon Livonia would be practically forgotten, a footnote in the careers of great men.

  The Turkish Wars

  Coin collectors are aware that the Teutonic Knights survived into the seventeenth century, because the beautiful Talers produced in this period properly bring high prices. But historians lose interest once the military role of the grand masters is reduced to providing a handful of troops to Habsburg operations on the distant Balkan front.

  This is understandable, but unfortunate. The Turks first attacked Vienna in 1529 and raided almost annually along the frontier until the final siege of Vienna in 1689. The principal reason that the Turks could not advance farther north was weather: by the time that grass was high enough to feed the horses of an army marching out of Istanbul, the Turkish commanders were already counting the days necessary to cross the Balkans and proceed up the Danube; once at the Austrian or Polish frontiers, the Turks had only a few weeks left for campaigning before they had to start their return journey. If the Christians could delay an operation at all, it would frustrate the Turkish efforts to round up cattle, horses and slaves. Thus, the seemingly obscure struggles to capture border castles were of vital importance.

  Troops raised by the German, Bohemian and Austrian convents were involved in many of these campaigns. Only the commanders were members of the military order – the fighting units were mercenaries. This part of the Teutonic Order’s history is little known, but it deserves closer study because these campaigns illuminate the military problems of the Habsburg dynasty and also the confrontation of Serbs (Orthodox Christians who were Turkish subjects) and the Croatians (Roman Catholics who were Habsburg loyalists).

  This era came to an end when Napoleon secularized the German possessions of many religious orders, among them the estates of the Teutonic Knights.

  13

  Summary

  There had still been a future for the Teutonic Order once the crusading era had fully run its course. Several futures, in fact, since the organisation had disintegrated into three distinct parts in 1525. But that fate was not preordained; it merely came about.

  The secularised members of the Teutonic Order in Prussia gave up all efforts to continue their former crusading and religious functions. Albrecht von Hohenzollern-Ansbach adopted the Lutheran teaching and secularised the state. Those who wished to remain friar-knights withdrew to Germany to discuss impossible plans to conquer Prussia and reinstall Roman Catholicism. Perhaps the best hope for the military order to continue its crusading tradition had been Polish proposals to resettle them on the Turkish frontier, using the order’s German resources to support a small but efficient army. Those proposals had all been rejected as a result of pride and stubbornness, combined with hatred of the Polish king, a justified suspicion of his motives, and a fear of defeat in the Balkans. In any case, the Polish offers had not been altogether fair and honest: Prussia was to be surrendered for new, unsettled, danger-filled territories. The knights saw this as trickery, a none-too-subtle means of killing them off and seizing their lands. They gave the crusade against the Turks but feeble support. Perhaps nothing demonstrates better the moral bankruptcy of the traditions of the Teutonic Knights in their last days in Prussia, and the amorality of their enemies too, than the mock negotiations to move the order to the Balkans.

  Grand Master Johann von Tiefen did command a Prussian force on one last crusade, a miserably botched invasion of Moldava led by the Polish king in 1497. The aged grand master died of illness and exhaustion during the harrowing retreat.

  The Livonian Knights survived longer and better than their Prussian brethren. There were those who should have known better who accused the knights of being lazy, drunken, womanising cowards. A more accurate assessment is that a Roman Catholic military-religious order found it impossible to recruit knights and men-at-arms from its traditional North German homeland, which was now Protestant, and Livonia did not produce enough noble sons to fill the ranks.40 Nor did the order have the money to maintain a large mercenary army in peacetime, the power to persuade the independent-minded estates of the Livonian Confederation to tax themselves, or the ability to force on the estates common plans in wartime. Lastly, it could no longer count on reinforcements from Prussia in moments of emergency. Unable to stand up to the numerous well-armed, well-trained, experienced troops sent by Ivan the Terrible, the Livonian Order went down fighting, defending Lutheran and Roman Catholic subjects alike from an insane Russian Orthodox tsar.

  Into the vacuum came Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and Russia. None was particularly interested in acquiring the Baltic coastline, but all were determined that the others would not get it either. Therefore, though each new mega-state had more important problems – Sweden with Denmark, Poland-Lithuania with the Turks, Russia with the Tatars – all would be drawn into war over the pitiful remains of the mini-empire of the Livonian Order.

  The German Order (Deutscher Orden, a more accurate name than Teutonic Knights) continued its military and religious role in the Holy Roman Empire for almost another three centuries, serving in imperial armies against Turkish sultans, French kings, and Protestant princes. Most members were Roman Catholics, but in accordance with the Augsburg Treaty of 1555 they had to share the faith of the rulers in the Protestant and Reformed parts of Germany; hence some members of the order were Protestants. It had a distinguished and varied career. The Teutonic Knights of this era were a baroque organisation that contrasted strongly with the Gothic order of medieval Prussia. Hardly a region of south Germany does not boast of a palatial residence that was formerly the seat of a local castellan. Their time eventually expired, too, and Napoleon abolished the German Order along with many other relics of bygone times.

  The German Order was revived twice after Napoleon’s fall, first as a private order for the Habsburg family, then as a religious order after 1929. Small churches and hospitals continue to operate under its auspices today. These are missions which go back to the order’s foundation at Acre in 1189 – caring for the sick, the aged, and the troubled. That aspect of the order had been important throughout the Middle Ages too. Hardly a middle-sized town in Germany was without a hospital, church, or convent which street names commemorate today. By serving local needs, the order kept alive the memories and traditions of the past.

  Today the German Order provides priests for German-speaking communities in non-German-speaking countries, particularly in Italy and Slovenia. In this it has returned to another major aspect of its original mission, the spiritual care of Germans who were being neglected by other orders.

  This later history suggests that it had not been necessary for the Teutonic Knights in Prussia to see themselves solely as a territorial state. It is understandable that they did so – looking back to their expulsion from Transylvania, the loss of the Holy Land, the destruction of the Templars, and the jealousy of Ladislas the Short – but it is less understandable that they forgot their primary duty to serve as crusaders. The crusade had once been a matter separate from the state, so that they could discuss the conversion of Mindaugas’ Lithuanians without first conquering his lands; it was sufficient to be present at his coronation. Unfortunately, the acquisition of West Prussia and Danzig had changed the Poles from traditional allies to mortal enemies, so that the Teutonic Knights came to see further territorial conquests as the best means of protecting themselves. Once they had convinced themselves that they would be safe only if they
held onto all of Prussia – and Samogitia as well, to secure the land route to Livonia – they were doomed. Changing times found them petrified in old ideas.

  Samogitia was lost at Tannenberg in 1410, a fact that the order acknowledged, more or less, in the Treaty of Melno in 1422; but the knights deluded themselves for many years that the crusading tradition could still be revived. Worse, they came to believe that little else could be done until the order had taken revenge for the defeats at Tannenberg and after; the ancient belief that one could not be both a vassal and honourable came to be the ghost at the banquet that spoiled every occasion for celebration. That collection of self-deceptions became the evil spirits of the order. They made a radical break with the past impossible.

  In sum, what happened after the battle of Tannenberg was a lengthy and often unplanned reorientation of the Teutonic Order from its commitment to an outdated crusade to other endeavours. That was painful and cost the order heavily. The future was partly determined by the men ruling at the time, partly by events beyond their control. History makes its own rules; men play their games within those bounds. The Teutonic Knights had mastered the possibilities during the fourteenth century and had prospered. When history introduced new challenges and the order failed to meet them satisfactorily, the Teutonic Knights shattered into three parts. Two of those, Prussia and Livonia, vanished in the sixteenth century. The third evolved, ultimately finding a small but useful niche in the vast edifice of modern Roman Catholic orders and activities.

  What remained of the order’s political heritage was that of a powerful symbolism. Lithuanians and Poles remembered the evil deeds attributed to the crusaders vividly, and Germans tended to remember only the crusaders’ glorious victories.

  There should be no misunderstanding of this circumstance, for it relates to modern history rather than to medieval. Poland and Lithuania disappeared as states in the eighteenth century, while Germany became a more eastward-looking power which could associate its traditions and aspirations with medieval Prussia. That circumstance has caused subsequent generations to view the medieval crusades in Eastern Europe (and the other eastward migrations by Germans, Jews, and Poles known as the Drang nach Osten) as first a stage of German imperialism, then as a forerunner of Nazism. Historians must share more than a small burden of the guilt for that overly simplified misreading of history, more than even that borne by the history-makers themselves, because they should know better the consequences of their actions. Medieval history is filled with atrocities and cruelties, yet it is not right to perpetuate mutual hatreds. Just as the English and French have largely forgiven one another for the many misdeeds of the Hundred Years’ War, so, too, must the descendants of the aggressors and victims do the same, if for no other reason than because it is impossible to say that either side was purely aggressor or purely victim.

  A first step is to see that historians do not describe the crusading movement only as a selfish seizure of land belonging to innocent peoples, but as an aspect of both larger and local events. The larger scene must include the interplay of differing religious beliefs, the expansion of peoples, dynasties, and trade, and great personalities; the local should include geography, past interactions of peoples, their desires for glory, revenge and booty, and the accidents of life and death to major and seemingly minor political figures. Misunderstandings, too, should be included – though these can be exaggerated: Christians may not have known much about the Golden Horde, but not understanding what the Tatars wanted was not the problem. History is more than victimisation, more than heroic posturing. More, alas, than any historian can write. But one must do what one can. Above all, we should remember that historians who simplify the complexity of the past too much do a disservice to future generations who must live with the impressions their work makes on readers.41

  Appendices

  Appendix A

  Major Figures in the History of the Teutonic Order

  Hermann Balk The first master in Prussia, 1230 – 9, and Livonian master 1237 – 9. Probably a former canon of the Hildesheim church, he may have joined the Teutonic Knights in Acre in 1189. He died in 1239/40.

  Louis von Erlichshausen Grand Master 1450 – 67. His efforts to suppress the Prussian estates representing burghers, vassals, and gentry led to the Thirteen Years’ War. The Peace of Thorn, 1466, ended the order’s last hopes at recovering its lost importance.

  Siegfried von Feuchtwangen Grand Master 1303 – 11. He moved his residence from Venice to Marienburg, thus establishing the Prussian crusade as the order’s primary duty.

  Albrecht von Hohenzollern-Ansbach The last grand master in Prussia, 1511 – 25. He introduced Lutheran reforms, secularised the order’s domains, married, and became the duke of Prussia, 1525 – 68.

  Conrad von Jungingen Grand Master 1393 – 1407. His military and diplomatic skill led to the victorious conclusion of the Samogitian Wars. The Treaty of Sallinwerder, 1398, brought peace with Poland and Lithuania and guaranteed his order possession of Samogitia, thus securing the overland route to Livonia.

  Ulrich von Jungingen Grand Master 1408 – 10. His defeat and death at the battle of Tannenberg marked the end of the order’s era of greatness.

  Winrich von Kniprode Grand Master 1352 – 82. His genial personality and instinctive sense of etiquette won the order firm friends among the highest nobility of Germany, France, and England. Under his supervision the Teutonic Order became famous for its chivalry and courtesy.

  Michael Küchmeister Advocate of Samogitia, Grand Master 1414 – 22. Fearing that Heinrich von Plauen’s policies would lead to another military disaster, he led the high officers in a coup-d’état, after which everything went wrong. The First Peace of Thorn, 1422, was the true beginning of the order’s downhill course.

  Poppo von Osterna Prussian master 1237 and 1241 – 4, Grand Master 1253 – 7. From a prominent family in the Nuremberg region, it must have come as a surprise that he separated from his wife to join a military order (she entered a nunnery). Poppo guided the order through its most difficult crisis, the war against Sventopełk of Pomerellia and the Prussian pagans.

  Heinrich von Plauen Grand Master 1410 – 13. His heroic efforts in saving Prussia from the armies of Poland and Lithuania almost resulted in restoring the order’s power and prestige.

  Hermann von Salza Grand Master 1210 – 39. Friend and confidant of popes and emperors, he presided over the order’s rise to prominence in the Holy Land and sent knights to Transylvania, Prussia, and Livonia.

  Anno von Sangershausen Livonian master 1254 – 6, Grand Master 1257 – 74. He governed through the critical years following the 1259 – 60 defeats by the Samogitians and the subsequent revolts in Prussia and Livonia.

  Conrad von Thüringen (Thuringia). Although grand master for only a year, 1239 – 40, he was the first important noble to join the order. Henceforth it became easier to recruit knights and ask for pious donations of money and lands.

  Appendix B

  The Grand Masters to 1525

  Heinrich Walpot 1198 – 1200

  Otto von Kerpen 1200 – 1208

  Heinrich Bart 1209 – 1210?

  Hermann von Salza 1210 – 1239

  Conrad von Thüringen 1239 – 1240

  Gerhard von Malberg 1241 – 1244

  Heinrich von Hohenlohe 1244 – 1249

  Gunther von Wullersleben 1249 – 1253

  Poppo von Osterna 1253 – 1257

  Anno von Sangershausen 1257 – 1274

  Hartmann von Heldrungen 1274 – 1283

  Burchard von Schwanden 1283 – 1290

  Conrad von Feuchtwangen 1291 – 1297

  Gottfried von Hohenlohe 1297 – 1303

  Siegfried von Feuchtwangen 1303 – 1311

  Karl von Trier 1311 – 1324

  Werner von Orslen 1324 – 1331

  Luther von Braunschweig 1331 – 1335

  Dietrich von Altenburg 1335 – 1341

  Ludolf König 1341 – 1345

  Heinrich Dusemer 1345 – 1351

>   Winrich von Kniprode 1352 – 1382

  Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein 1382 – 1390

  Conrad von Wallenrode 1390 – 1393

  Conrad von Jungingen 1393 – 1407

  Ulrich von Jungingen 1408 – 1410

  Heinrich von Plauen 1410 – 1413

  Michael Küchmeister 1414 – 1422

  Paul von Russdorf 1422 – 1441

  Conrad von Erlichshausen 1441 – 1449

  Louis (Ludwig) von Erlichshausen 1450 – 1467

  Heinrich Reuß von Plauen 1469 – 1470

  Heinrich von Richtenberg 1470 – 1477