Emperor of Japan

by Donald Keene

  Four months later, in July 1867, Gotō, with two other Tosa men, Sakamoto and Nakaoka Shintarō (1838–1867), in attendance, met in Kyōto with three leaders of the Satsuma domain—Saigō Takamori (1828–1877), Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878), and Komatsu Tatewaki (1835–1870)—and drew up a pact between the two domains. The language and political ideas embodied in this pact closely resemble those originally expressed by Sakamoto in his Senchū hassaku (Eight Proposals Composed Aboard Ship), written while on his way from Tosa to Kyōto several weeks earlier.15

  After promising to do everything in their power to restore rule to the emperor, the two domains agreed to eight articles. The first article declared that all powers for deciding the administration of the country resided with the court. Subsequent articles expressed their belief in the necessity to erect (with money provided by the various domains) a parliamentary building in Kyōto from which would emanate the laws governing the entire country. The parliament would consist of two chambers, and the members of the lower house of this parliament, selected for their righteousness and blamelessness, would include persons from all walks of life, ranging from high-ranking nobles to samurai and even commoners. Daimyos would take their places in the upper chamber. But before these changes could occur, the shogun would have to resign his office, resume his status as a daimyo, and return his political powers to the court. New treaties should be concluded with foreign countries that would provide for fair commercial practices.16

  In October of the same year, Satsuma and Chōshū concluded a pact that was specifically aimed at overthrowing the shogunate. Ōkubo Toshimichi and Ōyama Tsunayoshi (1825–1877), central figures in Satsuma, traveled to Yamaguchi, where they communicated to Mōri Takachika (1819–1871), the daimyo, the frustration of their own daimyo over his failure to persuade the shogunate to mend its ways. They declared that there was no way to solve the nation’s problems except by using military force to overthrow the shogunate. They asked that Chōshū send troops to support their own in Kyōto, where they were guarding the imperial palace.17

  Impressed by Ōkubo’s arguments and his straightforward answers to the questions put to him by members of the Chōshū domain, Mōri Takachika agreed without hesitation to support Satsuma and to send troops to Ōsaka. He added, however, that guarding the imperial palace was a heavy responsibility, and if by some mischance, the emperor were captured by the enemy, everything would be lost.

  There was contact also between the Kyōto aristocrats and the samurai who were planning the overthrow of the shogunate. Iwakura Tomomi, still living under house arrest at Iwakura Village, had maintained relations with the principal Satsuma leaders, and he was otherwise kept abreast of recent developments by visitors from the various domains. In July, Nakaoka and Sakamoto called on him and urged him to make up his differences with Sanjō Sanetomi, his personal enemy. Iwakura agreed, and Nakaoka was also able to persuade Sanjō to forget old grievances. In this way the loyalist nobles were united both in their opposition to the shogunate and in their support of the major domains.18

  In November 1867 Yamauchi Yōdō (1827–1872),19 the former Tosa daimyo, sent a letter to Tokugawa Yoshinobu urging him to return the government to the court. Yōdō was by no means a militant supporter of the restoration of imperial authority, but Gotō Shōjirō adroitly persuaded him that Yoshinobu himself would welcome such a proposal. In this way Yōdō would show his respect for the emperor and his compassion for the shogun. Gotō also stressed that Satsuma and Chōshū were planning military action against the shogunate and that the best way to avoid warfare was for the shogun to resign his office. Yōdō was so determined to avoid such a conflict that he declared he would not send one Tosa soldier to Kyōto. This was a disappointment to Gotō, who had promised Saigō and Ōkubo to return to Kyōto with Tosa troops, but he had obtained the desired letter from Yamauchi Yōdō.20

  The letter itself, apart from its reiterations of awe and dread over the propriety of addressing such a missive to the shogun, and an account of Yōdō’s recent illness, contains a vaguely worded expression of the belief that the time had come to change a system that had lasted for hundreds of years and to restore rule by the emperor. It concludes with Yōdō’s confession that worry over the predicament in which the country found itself had caused him to shed tears of blood.21

  An appended proposal, signed by Gotō Shōjirō and three others of the domain, was more specific. It listed seven points, some derived from Sakamoto’s recommendations and others from the Satsuma–Chōshū pact, opening with the proposal to establish a parliament in two chambers in which all classes of society would serve. The second article urges the establishment of schools in the cities where students would be instructed in the arts and sciences. The third article calls for new treaties and the establishment of fair trading practices.22 The next article stresses the importance of land and sea defenses. Military installations should be built between the capital and Settsu Province, and the court itself must be defended by well-equipped troops under the emperor’s personal command. The fifth article calls for basic reforms of old evils and not mere surface changes. Some court practices, sanctioned by centuries of observance, would have to be completely altered before Japan could stand independent among the nations of the globe. Finally, members of the parliament would have to be impartial and fair in their judgments and not get bogged down in arguments over trivialities.23

  The letters were received by Itakura Katsukiyo of the Council of Elders and delivered to Yoshinobu. Gotō had been instructed to obtain Satsuma’s approval for Yōdō’s proposal, but at first Saigō refused, saying that plans for attacking the shogunate had been completed and that it was too late to give advice to the shogun. He said that he could not prevent Tosa from carrying out its plans but that Satsuma would act as it thought best. Gotō, not discouraged by the refusal, approached other Satsuma men and found them willing to support the letter. In the end Saigō and Ōkubo agreed to postpone military action.24

  On November 9, 1867, a secret imperial command was issued to Satsuma and Chōshū ordering them to subjugate Tokugawa Yoshinobu:25

  Imperial Edict. Minamoto26 Yoshinobu, borrowing the authority of successive generations and depending on the strength of his pack of bandits, has wantonly impaired the loyal and the good and has frequently disobeyed imperial commands. In the end, not fearing to distort the edicts of the late emperor and not caring that he has plunged the populace into an abyss, his all-pervasive evil threatens to overturn the Land of the Gods. We are father and mother of the people. If We fail to strike down this traitor, what excuse shall We have to offer to the spirit of the late emperor? How shall We make Our profound amends to the people? This is the cause of Our grief and indignation. It is unavoidable that the period of mourning be disregarded.27 Implement the wishes of Our heart by slaughtering the traitorous subject Yoshinobu. When you have speedily accomplished this great deed to save the nation, you will enable the people to enjoy the lasting peace of the mountains. This is Our wish. See to it that you are prompt in carrying it out.28

  The edict is highly unusual in its strong, even violent, language. It is strange that although it is written in the first person (using the imperial pronoun chin), it is signed by three noblemen.29 For this reason the document has been labeled by some as a forgery, and by others as a pseudoedict inspired by Iwakura Tomomi but in fact composed by Tamamatsu Misao (1810–1872), a learned, former Shintō priest who served as Iwakura’s “brain.”30 According to Iwakura himself, the edict was shown to the emperor by Nakayama Tadayasu and approved by him before being sent to the two domains.31 But it is doubtful that Tadayasu would take to the emperor a document that was kept extremely secret (it was not shown even to the regent).32

  This edict was followed the next day by a much shorter one, ostensibly from the emperor himself, commanding Satsuma and Chōshū to kill Matsudaira Katamori and Matsudaira Sadanori.33 Although both domains sent replies promising complete obedience to the best of their abilities, neither edict led
to the prescribed murders.

  On November 8 Tokugawa Yoshinobu addressed a letter to the court requesting permission to return his authority to the court, and this prompted the emperor to call off the edicts issued to Satsuma and Chōshū.34 Historians have debated why Yoshinobu decided at this point to yield his authority.35 Within the shogunate itself, many men had recognized that a change was inevitable. On November 8 Yoshinobu assembled at Nijō Castle the senior officials of forty domains with incomes of more than 100,000 koku to discuss the return of rule to the emperor (taisei hōkan). Itakura Katsukiyo showed them the draft of Yoshinobu’s memorial to the throne requesting permission to surrender his office. He asked their opinions. Most of the officials withdrew without committing themselves, but after the meeting, Komatsu Tatewaki from Satsuma, Gotō Shōjirō and Fukuoka Takachika from Tosa, and Tsuji Igaku from Aki lingered behind to thank Yoshinobu for his sacrifice and urge him to take decisive action. They were joined by men from other domains. Yoshinobu at last made up his mind, and that day he gave the memorial to the two military liaison officers.36

  Yoshinobu’s memorial to the throne was couched in familiar language, tracing the long history of his family’s service to the throne and the favors it had received and blaming his scant virtue for the present difficult situation in which the country found itself. In yielding his authority, he looked up to the emperor’s wisdom for guidance. If all joined to ensure the security of the imperial land, he felt sure that Japan would be able to stand on equal terms with foreign countries. On the following day, November 10, Yoshinobu was summoned to the court and informed that the emperor had granted his request to return his powers to the court.

  The official proclamation of the resumption of imperial rule was not made until January 4, 1868, but the decision had been made: in principle, the emperor was now the sole ruler of Japan. His reactions to this event are unknown. Not even a poem survives that might give a clue to his feelings, something similar to what Queen Victoria wrote in her journal the day she became queen: “I am very young, and perhaps in many, though not in all things, inexperienced, but I am sure, that very few have more real good will and more real desire to do what is fit and right than I have.”37 All the same, the emperor was aware that the line of Tokugawa shoguns, begun with Ieyasu in 1603, had ended and that for the first time in more than 500 years, an emperor ruled without a shogun.38

  On the same day Iwakura Tomomi received a pardon from the emperor and permission to attend court once again. Earlier, someone learning of Iwakura’s intention of restoring power to the emperor had compared his plan with that of the Kemmu Restoration—when (in 1333) the emperor Godaigo was empowered to rule without a shogun. Tamamatsu Misao disagreed, holding that the scope of the present restoration was so huge that its only real precedent was the founding of Japan by Emperor Jimmu.39 It had been more than 670 years since Minamoto Yoritomo first founded his shogunate and more than 260 years since the Tokugawa shogunate was founded.

  About a month later foreign envoys in Japan received this communication:

  The emperor of Japan announces to the sovereigns of all foreign countries and to their subjects that permission has been granted to the Shōgun Tokugawa Yoshinobu to return the governing power in accordance with his own request. We shall henceforth exercise supreme authority in all the internal and external affairs of the country. Consequently the title of emperor must be substituted for that of Tycoon, in which the treaties have been made. Officers are being appointed by us to the conduct of foreign affairs. It is desirable that the representatives of the treaty powers recognize this announcement.40

  The message (as translated) was dated February 8 by the solar calendar and signed Mutsuhito.

  Chapter 14

  Restoration of imperial rule, the dream of many Japanese ever since cries of sonnō jōi were first raised around the country, had at last been achieved. Political power was (at least in principle) in the hands of the court, but the court still had no organs of administration or legislation. On November 27, 1867, senior members of the Court Council met at the house of the regent Nijō Nariyuki to determine basic policies but failed to reach a decision.1 Proponents of rule by the emperor had not given adequate consideration to the problems they were likely to encounter when they assumed responsibility for running the government.

  By imperial decree, major state decisions and policies with respect to foreign countries were to be determined by a council consisting of daimyos with incomes of more than 100,000 koku.2 However, it was clear that it would take time for these men to assemble in Kyōto, and in the meantime decisions were urgently needed in order to dispose of the mountain of accumulated major national and international problems. The court seemed powerless to act; indeed, this period has been characterized as one during which there was no government in Kyōto.3

  Despite the earnestness of the shogun’s words and actions when he returned power to the court, many daimyos, in both Edo and Kyōto, were indignant over Yoshinobu’s decision. They held meetings to discuss what the return of power to the emperor signified, and some personally visited Yoshinobu to express their discontent. He patiently explained the inadvisability of divided allegiances within a country and urged them to return to their domains. Above all, he warned them not to do anything rash. But daimyos living in Edo, regardless of whether they were allies or enemies of the Tokugawa family, ignored his plea for caution. They supported the shogunate against the court, some so strongly that they refused to obey commands issued by the court. Many samurai, angered by the change in the government, advocated increasing military preparations in order to seize control by main force. Some urged Prince Asahiko, perpetually lurking behind the scenes, to restore shogunate authority.4

  Restoration of the emperor had not brought peace and order to the capital. Tension was heightened by incessant rumors. On November 14 Iwakura Tomomi went incognito to the Satsuma residence in Kyōto to inform the samurai of an urgent matter. According to a former official with whom he was in close contact, a samurai of the Ōgaki domain had proposed that the Council of Elders order soldiers to set fire to the Satsuma residence; then, taking advantage of the confusion, they would abduct the emperor and spirit him off to Ōsaka Castle. This rumor, though probably groundless, seemed so serious to Iwakura that he felt obliged to warn the Satsuma retainers to take emergency precautions.5

  Assassinations—a conspicuous a feature of the period—also contributed to the tension. On December 10, 1867, Sakamoto Ryōma and Nakaoka Shintarō, who had played a major role in arranging the alliance between Satsuma and Chōshū, were assassinated in Kyōto.6

  Restoration of imperial rule had yet to be formally proclaimed, but the court in Kyōto was already faced with practical problems now that the shogunate was no longer administering the country. When the regent and other members of the court met with Tokugawa Yoshinobu and senior retainers of resident daimyos on December 16, the following were some of the problems brought up for consideration: What arrangements should be made for soldiers from different domains to take turns in guarding the city of Kyōto and the grounds of the imperial palace? How would money to be raised for building the Ōmiya Palace?7 What would the functions of the shoshidai and lesser officials be? How would the issuance of paper currency be regulated?8

  In principle, such matters were to be decided by an assembly of senior daimyos, but very few of them had yet appeared in the capital, as they were waiting to see the way the wind was blowing before leaving their domains. The court finally decided to leave everything as in the past, at least for the time being. We can all but see the smile of amusement on Yoshinobu’s face as he contemplated from a distance the spectacle of the nobles helplessly floundering in their new and unfamiliar tasks.9

  On December 17 the emperor issued an edict to three nobles who had taken a prominent part in the restoration movement—Nakayama Tadayasu, Ōgimachisanjō Sanenaru, and Nakamikado Tsuneyuki—instructing them to direct Satsuma and Chōshū to discontinue for the time being their at
tacks on the shogunate.10 On December 20 Yoshinobu again formally requested permission to resign his post, but the regent Nijō Nariyuki rejected his petition, commanding him to remain in office until the assembled daimyos could decide on his future. Obviously the court still had not made up its mind how to deal with this man, powerful even in defeat.

  Some historians have even suggested that Yoshinobu used the return of power to the emperor as a means of strengthening his position. Foreigners in Japan suspected that Yoshinobu had some ulterior motive for giving up his office. Sir Ernest Satow recalled that when the English were informed that Yoshinobu had long been intending “to surrender the government to the Mikado,” they were skeptical:

  This of course we did not believe, our view being that he was tired of being badgered by Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa and Hizen, and that in order to give unity to his own party, he had resolved to call a general council, which possibly might reinstate him by a majority of votes, and thus establish his authority more strongly than ever.11

  As far back as July 23, 1867, Itakura Katsukiyo and Nagai Naoyuki, two highranking officials of the shogunate, had hit on the plan of having the shogun serve as regent during the emperor’s minority, in this way preventing any division between the court and the shogunate.12 Nothing seems to have come of this proposal, but toward the end of that year, Nishi Amane (1829–1897), the “brain” of Yoshinobu, drew up the first bill to be presented to the Assembly of Daimyos dealing with the form of the future government.

  The bill called for a division of power into three branches—the government, the court, and the daimyos. By “government” was meant administrative authority. The head of the Tokugawa family, known as the taikun (tycoon), would be the chief of this branch. He would establish his government in Ōsaka and rule the whole country through officials appointed unilaterally by himself with the exception of the presiding officer, who would be selected by the tycoon from among three candidates proposed by the daimyos.