Emperor of Japan

by Donald Keene

  This episode demonstrates that Meiji (although he seldom expressed political views openly) kept a close watch on the officers of his government and formed his own judgments of their capabilities. It also shows that even when he intervened concerning an appointment, he did not necessarily have his own way.

  The emperor’s opinions of the principal figures of the government are most clearly recorded in the diaries kept by his long-time adviser Sasaki Takayuki. For example, during their conversation on March 19 the emperor said, “Shinagawa is honest, but he is narrow-minded and has no patience. Even at cabinet meetings he sometimes flies into a rage, weeps and behaves in a completely unreasonable way. The other day Itō questioned him about irregularities in the election and criticized his interference, whereupon Shinagawa became greatly excited and said he had heard Itō intended to resign and organize a political party. Then he said, ‘Your political party is no concern of mine, but if you persist in your abusive language, I will deal with you by putting emergency measures into effect immediately.’ Itō became angry, and his face colored as he answered, ‘Do you think you can dispose of Itō as you please, even if you use your authority as Interior Minister?’” 14

  Meiji had obviously listened with the utmost attention as Shinagawa and Itō exchanged threats, and his comments on the characters of the two men, as well as on Soejima, Gotō Shōjirō, and Mutsu Minemitsu, were frank and illuminating. Sasaki was one of the few people to whom the emperor could express his views freely, and Sasaki in turn spoke his mind to the emperor, although he naturally was always deferential.

  As the emperor predicted, Soejima did not last long in office. He resigned in June and was appointed as an adviser to the Privy Council, the standard assignment for ministers who resigned or were dismissed. The political situation was marked by so many quarrels between individuals and parties that Inoue Kowashi concluded that the emperor was the only hope for a stable government. He appealed to the emperor to give a “great command” and take the lead in giving the country a course to follow. He specifically asked the emperor, who was known for his love of simplicity, to eliminate wasteful expenditure on ceremonies, suggesting that a reduction of 10 percent in court expenditures might be used for augmenting the navy.15

  The emperor no doubt agreed in principle to Inoue’s call for economy, but even though he preferred to have his uniform patched rather than buy a new one, he was surrounded by the luxury of others and had to respond appropriately. When he visited the house of a minister or other dignitary, he expected to be suitably entertained, regardless of the cost. On July 4, for example, the emperor visited the residence of Gotō Shōjirō in Takanawa. He was obliged by precedent to give Gotō the customary gifts—a set of silver cups with the imperial crest, a pair of cloisonné vases, and 1,000 yen, along with a bolt of silk for Mrs. Gotō and presents for their children. Gotō offered in return a valuable sword, a Korean tea jar, and a porcelain badger. That afternoon there were performances of nō by outstanding actors of the day—Kanze Tetsunojō, Hōshō Kurō, and Umewaka Minoru. After dinner the imperial party was entertained with recitations by Momokawa Joen and performances of Satsuma biwa by Nishi Kōkichi, both recognized masters of their art. Apart from these special entertainments, musicians of the Household Ministry played Japanese and Western music all day long. At night, thousands of lanterns were lit and bonfires burned under the trees. Tens of thousands of fireflies were released over the pond, making a sight more beautiful than any picture. The emperor did not leave until after midnight. The next day, similar entertainment was offered to the empress.16 Despite his predilection for simplicity, the emperor enjoyed the extravagant entertainment that Gotō had provided that evening.

  Less than a week later, on July 9, he visited the residence of Nabeshima Naohiro. The entertainment was not quite on the scale that Gotō had offered, but there was the usual exchange of gifts, followed by demonstrations of martial sports, a banquet, conjuring, recitations, and so on, but not any nō plays.17 Such visits by the emperor, though profoundly appreciated by his hosts, did nothing to foster his policy of thrift.

  Again, although the emperor informed the Interior Ministry that he desired economies to be practiced in the imperial household in order to raise money for building warships, he specified that in two areas there must be no skimping of funds—the expenses of observances for his ancestors and for maintenance of their tombs, and the household expenses of the empress dowager. When the empress dowager learned of the economies being practiced in the palace, she indicated that she too wished to cut the expenses of her household by one-tenth, but the emperor indignantly refused to allow any reduction, saying that she should not worry about such matters.18

  In any case, much of the money from the royal purse was used by the emperor and empress not on themselves but to relieve suffering or rebuild schools in towns and villages where there had been fires and other disasters. There was also a royal obligation to protect and encourage the arts. For example, on July 12 the empress presented the Japanese Women’s Association for the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago with 10,000 yen to improve the quality of the Japanese exhibition.19 Buddhist temples that had long been neglected were given funds to repair their buildings and works of art. There were also gifts to members of the imperial family, even relatively distant members, on the occasion of their marriages or when they built new residences. Even if the emperor and empress had desired nothing more than to live in perfect simplicity, they still needed funds to meet these public obligations.

  The most important political development of 1892 was Itō’s emergence from his retirement in Odawara, where he had worked behind the scenes as a manipulator of the government. Again and again, he had refused reappointment as prime minister. When approached after Matsukata’s resignation at the end of July, he at once left Tōkyō and returned to Odawara, alleging sudden illness. It seemed as if he was trying (as before) to escape appointment, but when the emperor sent the imperial household minister to ask Itō to return to Tōkyō, he apparently judged the time was ripe for assuming the post of prime minister. He insisted, however, that he must have assurances that all the genrō would join the cabinet and assist him. This wish was granted. Itō’s cabinet included Yamagata Aritomo (minister of justice), Kuroda Kiyotaka (minister of communications), Inoue Kaoru (minister of the interior), Ōyama Iwao (minister of the army), Gotō Shōjirō (minister of agriculture and commerce), Mutsu Munemitsu (foreign minister), Kōno Togama (minister of education), Nirei Kagenori (minister of the navy), and Watanabe Kunitake (finance minister). It would be hard to imagine a more impressive array of able men.20

  When Itō went before the emperor to accept his appointment as prime minister, he promised that he would leave all major decisions to the emperor but would take responsibility for everything else. The emperor responded by promising not to interfere in any decisions; all he asked was that when making reports, Itō would give him the benefit of his opinions.

  The cabinet was more effective than its predecessors and remained in office longer, but in November the jinrikisha in which Itō was riding was overturned by a passing horse carriage. Itō suffered head and face injuries that kept him from attending court until February 1893.21

  That year opened in what was now the standard fashion: the emperor did not perform the ritual worship of the four directions, and most of the other New Year observances were performed by the chief protocol officer, Nabeshima Naohiro. Lectures were offered to the emperor on British history, a section from the Confucian classic the Book of Rites, and poetry from the Man’yōshō. The emperor paid his customary New Year visit to the empress dowager at the Aoyama Palace. The subject of the poetry meeting this year was “Turtles on the Rocks.”

  Everything seemed quite normal, but the festive New Year mood was rudely broken on January 12 when the House of Representatives voted to cut appropriations for officials’ salaries and warship construction. Although the government had constantly called for economy, these were areas where it wo
uld not tolerate any cuts. The reductions amounted to about 11 percent of the budget submitted by the government. Members of the House of Representatives argued that the cuts in wages for officials were reasonable and would not result in any loss of efficiency. They also argued that it was premature to increase the size of the navy without having first established a policy of national defense. Watanabe Kunitake, the finance minister, replied that the proposed cuts in the appropriation for civil officials would impede the functions of administrative organs. Neither side would yield, and the House was adjourned for five days. This was the first head-on collision between the government and the Diet, and it brought up the fundamental question of whether the government was entitled to have its way in matters it deemed to be of vital importance, even if this violated the Diet’s constitutional privileges.22

  Deciding that their only recourse was the emperor, members of the House of Representatives submitted a petition with 146 signatures. The emperor’s response was to suspend sessions until February 6.23 On February 7 Hoshi Tōru (1850–1901), president of the House, submitted a petition to the emperor justifying the decision to cut the budget and appealing for his intercession in preserving the rights of the Diet as stipulated in the constitution. Also on February 7 the House voted to submit to the emperor a petition condemning the cabinet and begging for the emperor’s intercession.24 Itō responded with a plea to the House of Representatives to reconsider its decision and not trouble the emperor, but the House affirmed its decision by a vote of 281 to 103.

  The only person who could end this confrontation was the emperor himself. He is often portrayed by historians as a mere figurehead, but this was one of many occasions when the pleas, couched in ritual formulas, for the emperor to vouchsafe his wisdom were not empty formalities. His was the only decision that everyone would have respected.

  In a memorial submitted on February 9, Itō recommended that the emperor choose one of two courses: (1) to command the House of Representatives and the government to open negotiations with the purpose of securing a rapprochement (if the House of Representatives failed to obey this command or if negotiations failed to achieve the desired results, the House should be dissolved) or (2) to dissolve the House immediately. On the following day the emperor issued his decision. He reiterated his belief that it was necessary to increase Japanese military preparedness at a time when other nations were steadily growing more threatening. He had decided therefore to reduce palace expenditures and, for six years, to make an annual grant of 300,000 yen from palace funds for armaments. At the same time, the salaries of all civil and military officials would be reduced by 10 percent for the costs of building warships.25

  The House of Representatives responded deferentially, accepting the emperor’s command and promising to reach a compromise with the government. Members of the House of Peers also agreed on February 14 to donate one-tenth of their salaries to the costs of building warships. The emperor’s decision represented a compromise: civil and military officials would have their salaries reduced—as the House of Representatives had proposed—but the money saved would be used for warships—not what the House had voted. The imperial family as a whole voluntarily reduced its expenditures by 5 to 15 percent, but the empress insisted on reducing her palace expenditures by 20 percent during the coming six years.26

  The other major undertaking of the House of Representatives in 1893 was its action on treaty revision. The unequal treaties, most of them signed during the waning days of the shogunate, had been a source of discontent for the Japanese for many years. Everyone desired the end of extraterritoriality and the recovery of tariff autonomy, but the price for the Japanese to achieve these goals had again and again proved to be a stumbling block. Some people had asserted that it was easier to bear the humility of extraterritoriality than the danger of allowing foreigners to exploit the chance to control the lands and livelihoods of the Japanese.

  The House of Representatives prepared in May 1892 a bill for submission to the emperor calling for the end of extraterritoriality and foreign control of customs. The ultimate objective was to secure equality, and to achieve that objective, it would allow foreigners to live in the interior, although it would deny them permission to own land or to own or operate mines, railways, canals, and shipbuilding facilities. It also called for most-favored-nation treatment from all countries with which it concluded treaties.27 But the bill went nowhere because the Diet was dissolved. It was introduced again in December when the new Diet was convened and was discussed in secret sessions (by request of the government) in February 1893.

  Even though there was little progress, the issue was by no means forgotten. In July the House passed a bill calling for the end of extraterritoriality. The foreign minister, Mutsu Munemitsu, believed that the history of attempts to modify the treaties had been a history of failures and that the causes of failure were always internal, based on the Japanese inability to act together. He himself drew up a new treaty of commerce and navigation and presented it to the cabinet for its consideration. In preparing the treaty, he consulted the British-Italian treaty concluded in 1883 and the Japanese-Mexican treaty, both of which were based on equality. He proposed that the treaty take effect five years after being signed, giving adequate time for the transition between the old and new systems.28

  Mutsu believed that the best course was to open separate negotiations with the various nations, and he chose to begin negotiations with England, the longtime opponent of equal treaties. He selected as his negotiator Aoki Shūzō, the minister plenipotentiary to Germany. The emperor approved the plan. Aoki met Hugh Fraser, the British minister to Japan (then on leave in London), in September and started preliminary preparations for discussions with the British government.

  Treaty reform would be by no means easy. Foreigners living in Japan repeatedly protested the prohibition on their residing in the interior, contrasting this with the freedom that Japanese enjoyed to travel and live anywhere within the principal Western countries. Some Japanese, fearful of the disasters that would occur if foreigners were permitted to live among them, had committed acts of violence against the foreigners. They hoped that this show of violence would make foreigners understand that they were not welcome, but their actions made it difficult for the Japanese government to reassure foreigners who feared that if extraterritoriality was ended, the Japanese courts would not punish such acts of violence. But treaty reform was of immense psychological importance to most Japanese, as it would signify that Japan had been recognized as a modern nation.

  The opposition between those who favored treaty revision and those who preferred to extend the existing treaties (rather than allow foreigners to live in the interior), continued throughout 1893. At the heart of the matter was the xenophobia common to most Japanese. In December, when Mutsu examined the various proposals concerning treaty revision before the House of Representatives, he was dismayed by their content. He commented,

  These bills look on foreigners as if they belonged to a different species, rather the way the Russian government still treats the Jews. This runs counter to the imperial policy of opening the country to the world. The government must at this time make it absolutely clear that its policy ever since the Restoration has been one based on this policy; and it must adopt means of eradicating and suppressing contrary movements that oppose this policy. If it fails to do so and merely watches on in silence, these tendencies will spread increasingly throughout the country. There is a danger that eventually this will create great confusion in internal and external negotiations and will be a major obstacle to the negotiations now under way for treaty reform. The government must not hesitate another day.29

  Mutsu made a similar statement at a cabinet meeting on December 11. When the cabinet appeared reluctant to take positive action, he announced his intention of resigning. Itō reminded Mutsu, however, that a display of impatience was not the way to settle the important matter before them. He urged Mutsu not to be rash. Mutsu, mollified, withdrew his resigna
tion.

  Opposition to treaty revision continued in the House of Representatives. A resolution was put forward on December 19 calling on the government to clarify Japan’s rights and duties as prescribed in the treaties. To this resolution were appended descriptions of the rampant disorders of foreigners that would accompany any relaxation of national control over the interior.

  The debate became so heated that an edict suddenly arrived from the emperor adjourning the Diet for ten days. During the debate, the emperor had been greatly upset by the acrimonious arguments. He sent chamberlains to listen to the proceedings and keep him informed. When disputes arose over major matters, these men reported the situation to him moment by moment by telephone.30

  On December 29 debates were resumed in the House of Representatives. Mutsu delivered a speech against renewing the existing treaties, once again insisting that the government’s basic policy ever since the Restoration was one of an open country and progress. The renewal of existing treaties would be contrary to national policy. These treaties did not suit the modern society that had evolved since the time they were first signed. Now was the time to reject the shogunate’s policy of “close the country and expel the foreigners” and to recoup the rights that had been lost. In return, it was appropriate to reward the foreigners with privileges not provided in the existing treaties. Moreover, the Japanese should not forget that if foreigners were free to travel inland, the money they would spend would enrich the people living there. And if Japan wished to modify the treaties, the only way would be to make the foreigners aware how greatly Japan has progressed, which could be done only by following a policy of “open country.” In conclusion, Mutsu asked the House to withdraw the proposal to preserve the existing treaties. He failed to get support for this motion. An edict was issued ordering a suspension of the Diet for another fourteen days.31