Emperor of Japan

by Donald Keene

  In preparation for the general election of the House of Representatives on March 15, the home minister invited prefectural governors to the Interior Ministry to explain to them the importance of the elections. He cited abuses in election procedures and the need to control them in order to enable voters to elect the candidates of their choice. It was all too apparent that previous elections had not been conducted fairly. Votes had been purchased with money, gifts in kind, promissory notes, or property. Voters had been subjected to violence or threats, and there had been disturbances at polling places and at election meetings. All these activities were strictly prohibited, but the abuses had grown increasingly flagrant. Elections were coming up in a month, and the government must see to it that they were properly conducted. Candidates should not have to spend money in order to be elected, nor should voters be subjected to violence or threats.6 Emergency orders were issued on February 8 prohibiting persons engaged in election activities from carrying guns, spears, or clubs.

  The elections resulted in the Jiyū-tō winning 98 seats; the Shimpo-tō, 91 seats; and the Yamashita Club, 48 seats.7 Sixty-three seats were won by minor parties and independents. The cooperation between the government and the Jiyū-tō, initiated by the appointment of Itagaki as interior minister in the second Itō cabinet, had not yet ended, even though Itō refused to include Itagaki in his new cabinet. After the election the Jiyū-tō demanded Itagaki’s inclusion in the cabinet, threatening otherwise to create difficulties in the Diet. But the cabinet threatened to resign if any of its members were dismissed in order to make room for Itagaki. On April 15 Itō sent a letter to the Jiyū-tō refusing to appoint Itagaki and indicating that there would be no further cooperation with his party.8

  The Diet was convened on May 19. On the twenty-sixth, the government offered a bill to increase taxes on land, income, and saké. Faced with a serious shortage in the balance of payments with foreign countries, the Matsukata cabinet had earlier introduced a bill increasing the taxes on land and saké, but the Diet had been dissolved without the bill’s being put to a vote. When the bill was again submitted, this time by the Itō cabinet, it was rejected on June 20 by a crushing margin of 247 to 27, followed by Itō’s dissolution of the Diet.9

  The stalemate between the cabinet and the Diet led to an unexpected development. A new political party, the Kensei-tō (Constitutional Government Party), was formed by a union of the erstwhile enemies, the Jiyū-tō and the Shimpo-tō. At a gathering on June 16 Ōkuma and Itagaki delivered speeches on the urgent reasons for joining the two parties, and on the twenty-first, both parties were dissolved in preparation for the formation of the new party on the following day. The official announcement stated,

  It will soon be ten years since the promulgation of the constitution and the opening of the Diet. During this period the Diet has been dissolved no fewer than five times, and constitutional government has yet to bear fruit. The political parties likewise have made no progress, and as a consequence, the lingering evils of the domain cliques are still frozen solidly. This has shattered the harmony between the government and the people and delayed matters of state, something that all men who love their country deeply deplore. We, in consideration of the situation at home and abroad, have dissolved the Jiyū and Shimpo parties in order to organize one large political party, rallying men of like mind. We hope that renewal and renovation will create a fully constitutional government.10

  Of the nine points of the new party’s program, the most important was the second: in the future, cabinets would be formed by a prime minister chosen from the strongest political party, in place of the prevailing practice of the emperor’s choosing as prime minister someone who was from either Satsuma or Chōshū, normally a man who had rendered service at the time of the Restoration.

  Itō’s first reaction to this program was to initiate plans for a political party of his own, which would consist of businessmen and public-spirited patriots. He quickly received the support of members of his cabinet. They pointed out, however, that in order to appeal to voters in the coming election, Itō would have to deliver speeches all over the country and explain the government’s policies. He was also reminded how little time was left for campaigning before the election. Kuroda Kiyotaka promised that if Itō founded a political party, he would accompany him wherever he gave speeches, although he was now so old he would have to hobble around, leaning on a cane.

  When Inoue Kaoru visited Yamagata to ask his support, he answered, “It is not improper for people of the same mind to form a political party, but to allow a political party to form a cabinet would be to destroy the history of the Meiji government and to violate the imperial constitution. If this is done, we shall undoubtedly share the fate of countries like Spain and Greece.”11 Yamagata rejected Itō’s plan in such strong terms that Kuroda changed his mind about supporting a new party, and Itō himself finally abandoned the project.

  After the Kensei-tō had been formed, the army minister, Katsura Tarō, who was resolved to maintain the existing political system, met with Yamagata, Inoue, and Saigō. After expressing regret that Itō intended to resign if his desire to form a political party was rejected, he suggested that if Itō could not deal with the political situation, the genrō must step into the breach. If the Diet continued to oppose the government, it could be dissolved, and if necessary, the constitution could also be suspended.12

  The emperor, deeply disturbed by the situation, summoned a meeting on June 24 with Itō, Kuroda, Yamagata, Saigō, Inoue, and Ōyama Iwao. At the meeting Itō said that the new political party of Ōkuma and Itagaki had a majority in the Diet and that there was no way to avoid asking the two men to form a cabinet. Yamagata and Kuroda strongly opposed Itō, sure that if forming a cabinet were left to Ōyama and Itagaki and their cabinet was based on the program of a political party, this would be a contradiction of the national polity and a gross violation of the spirit of the imperial constitution.

  The debate in the emperor’s presence continued without reaching a resolution. The emperor grew increasingly apprehensive and summoned Itō after the meeting had ended in order to reveal his own opinions. He thought that while remaining as prime minister, Itō should ask the Jiyū-tō to cooperate with him, as it had in the past. Itō replied that this was no longer possible because of the two parties’ merger. He suggested that the best plan was to let Ōkuma and Itagaki take responsibility for dealing with the difficult situation. Itō asked not only to resign but also to return his rank and title.13

  On June 25 the emperor summoned Yamagata, Kuroda, Ōyama, Saigō, and Inoue. He announced that Itō could not be dissuaded from resigning. According to Itō, the consensus of opinion was that there was no choice but to recommend Ōkuma and Itagaki as his successors. Seven cabinet ministers immediately asked to resign. That night, Itō met Ōkuma and Itagaki privately, briefing them on the extremely critical situation, both internal and external. He said that he had recommended them to the emperor because they controlled a majority in the House of Representatives, which would enable them to pass necessary legislation for dealing with the crisis. He urged them to accept if the emperor asked them to serve. On the following day they informed him that they would not decline the responsibility, heavy though it was. On June 27 the emperor commanded Ōkuma and Itagaki to form a cabinet. The two men vowed to exert themselves to the utmost to repay their debt to the emperor.14

  On June 28 Ōkuma and Itagaki, at an audience with the emperor, reported that they had completed their selection of cabinet ministers. Looking over the list, the emperor asked questions about the personalities of the men they had chosen. Most were Diet members, and there was no need to ask about their official career, court rank, or decorations, but the emperor wished to know what they were like as human beings. Ōkuma and Itagaki by turns described the different men. When the emperor reached the name of Ozaki Yukio, he expressed surprise, asking how it happened they had recommended as a cabinet member a man who some years earlier had been condemned to disciplin
ary punishment and who had not yet been pardoned.15 The next day when Ōkuma and Itagaki visited the palace, the emperor reiterated that the office of cabinet member was of such importance that anyone appointed to this position must perform his duties with the utmost devotion and make no mistakes in dealing with matters of state, perhaps an indirect criticism of Ozaki.

  Itō had become convinced that there was no way to prevent the majority party in the Diet from appointing the cabinet. He knew that this would mean the end of the domination of Satsuma and Chōshū and of rule by old friends with whom he had been closely associated since the days of the Restoration. The emperor also was distressed by the new state of affairs. Matsukata later told friends that he had never seen the emperor look so sad.16

  No sooner did it become apparent that a cabinet controlled by a political party would become a reality than it was predicted that it would not last. This proved to be true of this particular party cabinet: the cabinet was destined to fall apart, not because the members belonged to political parties, but because the beliefs of Ōkuma and Itagaki were irreconcilable. On June 30 the new cabinet was invested by the emperor. Among those sworn in, Ōkuma became both prime minister and foreign minister; Itagaki, home minister; and Ozaki Yukio, education minister.

  Shortly after taking office, Ōkuma called a meeting of prefectural governors at which he explained the special features of a party cabinet and promised fair elections and a reform of prefectural administration. He particularly stressed the elections as the bone marrow of constitutional government and said that in order to ensure fair elections, strict controls would be maintained over elections in order to forestall the violence, bribery, intimidation, and the rest that had marred previous elections.17

  On July 14 Sasaki Takayuki visited the palace with the two princesses who had been left in his care. After the audience granted by the emperor, Sasaki, one of the few people with whom the emperor spoke freely, said that he could imagine how upset the emperor had been by the change in the cabinet. The emperor replied, “The present major change in the cabinet, like a tidal wave that sweeps in a moment over the shore, was of irresistible force. It had been brought about by the times, and that was why I listened to Itō’s recommendation and commanded Ōkuma and Itagaki to form a cabinet. I believed at first that because Ōkuma was the head of the Shimpo-tō and Itagaki the president of the Jiyū-tō, the two of them would lead and guide the Kensei-tō and select cabinet appointees. This was definitely not the case. Their strength within their party is nil, and their wishes are paid not the slightest attention. The selection of members of the cabinet was made at party headquarters. Moreover, the Jiyū and the Shimpo factions have yet to resolve their differences. If the Jiyū faction recommends something, the Shimpo faction disapproves, and if the Shimpo faction advocates something, the Jiyū faction is against it. Ōkuma and Itagaki can do nothing about it. They are constantly being manipulated by party members and harassed by their demands. As long as the two of them are at cabinet sessions, everything is peaceful, but once they return to their residences, dozens of party members, relying on their numbers, are there to ask for various favors, and their demands never stop. At first I thought that if I entrusted the situation to Ōkuma and Itagaki, they would suitably reorganize general affairs and would be able to carry out the administration, but I was completely mistaken.”18

  Sasaki asked if, considering the present lamentable state of affairs, the coalition would in the future be able to manage state business. The emperor replied that it was difficult to predict the future, but there were likely to be problems. The worst of all would probably be the Ministry of Education: “People say that Toyama Masakazu, who served as minister and earlier as assistant minister, is a scholar and that Kikuchi Dairoku is a skillful administrator. Hamao Arata apparently had no special ability. They say that the new minister, Ozaki Yukio, is a good match for Hamao, although he may have some ability. The general opinion is that there is not much chance that his coping with problems at the ministry will lead to any advancement in education.”19 The emperor’s sarcasm directed at Ozaki Yukio seems to reflect a deep personal dislike.

  On July 8 the grand duke Kiril Vladimirovitch, a cousin of Nicholas II, paid a state visit. He was suitably received by the emperor and empress, although such visits had become so common that they no longer aroused much interest at the court. On August 5 Itagaki asked Ōkuma to relinquish his post as foreign minister, claiming that he had been allowed to occupy the post in order to facilitate receiving and entertaining the Russian grand duke. Now that the grand duke’s visit had ended, it was time for Ōkuma to give up this second post and reestablish parity between the two parties. Itagaki favored Hoshi Tōru or Ebara Soroku as the new foreign minister. Ōkuma’s reluctance to step down caused the first clash within the coalition. The emperor was consulted as the final court of appeal. He thought that Ōkuma should remain as foreign minister. The emperor’s decision was, of course, obeyed but deepened the rift between the two factions.

  The next clash between the two factions of the Kensei-tō came when the Shimpo faction proposed that the Metropolitan Police Office be abolished. Itagaki composed a statement for the emperor stating the reasons why it should not be abolished. No action was taken. In this and later clashes of opinions, the Jiyū faction, despite its traditions of liberalism, showed itself to be fundamentally more conservative than the Shimpo faction.

  On August 11 the Ministry of Education abolished all the various ministerial ordinances, official notices, unofficial notices, directives, private instructions, and so forth that it had issued since 1881 to control freedom of assembly, speech, association, and the like. Explaining this sweeping action, Ozaki Yukio said that many of these ministerial orders had been rendered unnecessary by the enactment of related laws. Other orders, intended to remedy some specific abuse of their day, had become obsolete because of the changes brought about with the passage of time. A few, it is true, still were relevant, but he considered that educational problems were best resolved by school principals, teachers, and other persons engaged in education. Ozaki believed that the ordinances were a burdensome legacy of the past and, by abolishing them, hoped to reform education.20

  On August 22 Ozaki delivered an address at the concluding ceremonies of the Imperial Educational Society Summer Institute. One remark gained undue prominence: he said that although it was unlikely Japan would ever became a republic, if it did, the candidates for president would likely be from Mitsui and Mitsubishi. This probably was his way of implying that the worship of money had become so prevalent that one day wealth (symbolized by the two giant companies) might rule the nation. These lightly delivered words gave Ozaki’s political enemies a golden opportunity for questioning his patriotism. They demanded how the minister of education dared mention the possibility of a republican government in Japan. If this was not intended to destroy the national polity, what was it? The Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun harshly attacked Ozaki in the language of righteous indignation. Ozaki, upset that the newspaper account had falsified his words, published the stenographic record of his address in order to correct the newspaper article, but his opponents claimed that he had tampered with the record. The accusations grew ever more hysterical, and Ozaki’s speech became a major question both inside and outside the government.21

  On August 25 Tokudaiji Sanetsune sent word to Ozaki asking for the manuscript of his address. Not having a copy of his extemporaneous remarks, Ozaki submitted instead a clean copy of the stenographic report.22 The chief chamberlain’s request suggests that the emperor, having heard rumors about Ozaki’s offensive remarks, wished to examine the words. The emperor also sent Iwakura Tomosada to Ōkuma privately with the message: “Ozaki has delivered a speech about a republic and suchlike matters, arousing public opinion. There is no telling what kind of trouble he may stir up in the future. One cannot trust such a minister. You should get him to resign at once.”

  Overcome with awe and trepidation, Ōkuma wished to go to the palace a
nd personally explain the situation to the emperor, but Iwakura said, “His Majesty has already made up his mind. There is no point in your speaking to him. If you have anything to say to His Majesty, tell me. I will transmit it for you.” Ōkuma asked Iwakura, “Is there no confidence in me either?” Iwakura answered, “It’s not for me to say.” Iwakura returned to the palace where he reported to the emperor his conversation with Ōkuma. The emperor said, “The matter I mentioned concerns only the minister of education. It has nothing to do with any other minister. Report this, and inform them all of the situation. And see to it that they get Ozaki to submit his resignation afterward.”23

  The emperor’s reactions to one unfortunate phrase in Ozaki’s speech is likely to strike modern readers as excessive. Granted that a mention of even the possibility that some day a republic might exist in Japan was repugnant to Meiji as a threat to the unbroken line of emperors, surely it should have been apparent that Ozaki’s ironic comment was directed not against the monarchy but against business interests whose sole consideration was money. Meiji seems to have disliked Ozaki ever since his participation in the 1887 incident. We know of the emperor’s reactions on this occasion because they are preserved in Sasaki Takayuki’s diary. Years earlier, this diary had recorded the emperor’s criticism of various men around him, but he had never before expressed his dislike so openly.

  The emperor’s command created problems for a parliamentary government. If he had been the ruler of an absolute monarchy, he could have ordered Ozaki’s head chopped off or banished him without trial to some distant island; but Japan had a constitution and a cabinet that consisted not of sycophants but of members of a political party with a program. Iwakura feared that Ōkuma might cite this as a reason for not obeying the emperor’s command to get rid of Ozaki but discovered to his relief that Ōkuma was quite ready to obey the emperor.