Emperor of Japan

by Donald Keene

  24. Yasuda, Nikorai, pp. 16–17. The last such entry in his diary was written in 1916, the year before his death.

  25. Yasuda, Nikorai, p. 12.

  26. Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 51–53.

  27. Witte, Memoirs, pp. 126–27.

  28. Fraser, Diplomat’s Wife, pp. 281, 284.

  29. Ibid., p. 283.

  30. Meiji tennō ki, 7, pp. 812, 813–14.

  31. Ibid., 7, pp. 817–18. One of the doctors sent by the emperor was actually not a Japanese. Dr. Scriba was a foreign professor at the medical university. Erwin Baelz wrote, “Scriba and the leading Japanese surgeons, whom the emperor sent to Kyoto, were not admitted to the tsarevich’s presence. They say that the Russians’ attitude was most unfriendly” (Awakening Japan, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, p. 96).

  32. Meiji tennō ki, 7, pp. 819–20.

  33. Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 100–101. See also Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 821. There is some confusion in the latter account; it says on the same page that Nicholas, fearing for his own safety, begged the emperor to accompany him, but this does not accord with other statements made by Nicholas at this time.

  34. The letter is given (in Japanese translation) in Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 825.

  35. The emperor normally did not carry cigarettes, but he was specially prepared on this occasion, no doubt informed by someone of the custom.

  36. Meiji tennō ki, 7, pp. 829–31.

  37. Fraser, Diplomat’s Wife, pp. 286–87.

  38. Lafcadio Hearn, Out of the East, p. 254.

  39. Ibid., p. 256.

  40. Ibid., p. 260. A more sober account of Hatakeyama Yūko is given in Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 257–63. It does not contain Hearn’s quotation.

  41. Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 826.

  42. Fraser, Diplomat’s Wife, p. 289. A drawing reproduced by Yasuda shows the deck crowded with screens, chests, and other bulky items (Nikorai, p. 55). Mary Fraser wrote that even very poor people brought presents—rice, shōyu, or eggs. It was estimated that the gifts would have filled sixteen chests (nagamochi) (Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 823).

  43. A list of organizations that sent messages to the wounded prince is in Andō, Ōtsu jiken ni tsuite, 1, pp. 489–93.

  44. Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 79–80.

  45. Mary Fraser described him as “an old sergeant-major in the army,” but he was only thirty-six at the time of the Ōtsu incident.

  46. Details of Tsuda’s service during the war are in Andō, Ōtsu jiken ni tsuite, 1, p. 251. See also Kojima Koretada, Ōtsu jiken nisshi, pp. 193–94.

  47. Kojima, Ōtsu jiken, p. 193. For fuller biographical information, see Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 248–52.

  48. The reference is to the man who burned the temple of Diana of the Ephesians in order to achieve a place in history.

  49. Baelz, Awakening Japan, p. 95.

  50. His anger over these three points is found in the testimony he gave at his trial (Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 133–34; Meiji tennō ki, 7, pp. 834–35).

  51. Andō, Ōtsu jiken ni tsuite, 1, pp. 248–54. His brother-in-law testified that Tsuda had said he believed the rumor and worried about the consequences of Saigō’s return.

  52. Kojima, Ōtsu jiken, p. 192; Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, p. 135.

  53. Osatake, Ōtsu jiken, pp. 135–36.

  54. Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 840.

  55. See the admirably clear presentation of the situation in Barbara Teters, “The Otsu Affair,” p. 55.

  56. Meiji tennō ki, 7, pp. 848–49.

  57. Teters, “Otsu Affair,” p. 59.

  58. Kojima, Ōtsu jiken, p. 194. There is no indication that the pneumonia was induced by conspicuously bad treatment.

  59. The diary and related materials are now easily available, edited by Ienaga Saburō, in the Tōyō bunko series. In June 1892 rumors circulated to the effect that Kojima was addicted to gambling, especially hana-awase, with his colleagues (Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 86). The case against Kojima was dropped for want of evidence the following month (p. 97). However, on August 23 Kojima resigned his post, alleging illness. Apparently the gossip about his gambling, even if untrue, had made him feel disqualified to serve as a judge (p. 120).

  60. Baelz, Awakening Japan, p. 95.

  61. The letter is in the library of the University of Virginia.

  Chapter 43

  1. Meiji tennō ki, 7, p. 804.

  2. Donald Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Japanese Culture,” pp. 261–62.

  3. It is not clear which photograph was sent; possibly it was not a photograph but a reproduction of Chiossone’s etching. On November 25 of the same year, tacit permission was given to sell portraits of the emperor, empress, and dowager empress (Meiji tennō ki 7, p. 934).

  4. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 5. Shinagawa’s first fame was as a composer.

  5. There were 25 deaths and nearly 400 injuries.

  6. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 19. In Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, Roger Hackett gives the figure of 183 for the popular parties.

  7. Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 25–26.

  8. Ibid., 8, p. 67. The Shūgi-in passed a similar resolution, affirming that officials had interfered with the election and demanding that the cabinet ministers accept responsibility (p. 68).

  9. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 22.

  10. Ibid., 8, p. 32.

  11. Shinagawa was unrepentant about the methods he employed during the election. He explained, “If the obstructionists were re-elected it would endanger the nation’s safety; therefore, various means were used to influence the election so that they would be defeated and loyal representatives would be elected. If similar conditions should prevail in the future, I would do the same again and exterminate the obstructionists” (Okutani Matsuji, Shinagawa Yajirō den, pp. 286–87, as quoted in Hackett, Yamagata, p. 152).

  12. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 32.

  13. Ibid., 8, p. 33.

  14. Ibid., 8, p. 39. Other evaluations by the emperor of the men around him are quoted from Sasaki’s diary, pp. 107, 126–27.

  15. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 94.

  16. Ibid., 8, pp. 100–101.

  17. Ibid., 8, pp. 103–4.

  18. Ibid., 8, p. 227.

  19. Ibid., 8, p. 104. The empress subsequently (on November 25, 1892) made a supplemental gift of 5,000 yen to the Sekai hakurankai Nihon fujinkai.

  20. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 117.

  21. Ibid., 8, p. 161.

  22. Ibid., 8, pp. 187–88. As we have seen (in chapter 41), Meiji anticipated this possibility. Itō had told him that in such cases the government would have to try to persuade the Diet to change its mind.

  23. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 189.

  24. The text is in ibid., 8, pp. 195–97.

  25. Ibid., 8, p. 206.

  26. Ibid., 8, pp. 209, 239.

  27. Ibid., 8, pp. 211–12.

  28. Ibid., 8, pp. 273–74.

  29. Ibid., 8, p. 340. He made a similar statement at a cabinet meeting on December 11.

  30. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 348.

  31. Ibid., 8, p. 359.

  32. Ibid., 8, p. 372.

  Chapter 44

  1. The prince (the future Emperor Taishō) became an excellent calligrapher, and the kanshi he composed are surprisingly skillful. It has been stated that he spoke English, French, and German fluently (see, for example, Julia Meech-Pekarik, The World of the Meiji Print, p. 128), but this seems improbable.

  2. Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 584, 586, 595.

  3. The print by Hashimoto Chikanobu entitled Fusō kōki kagami, published on August 8, 1887, shows the crown prince standing between the emperor, seated to the right, and the empress, seated to the left. His face is turned in the direction of the empress, but he is gesturing toward the emperor. Three books lie on the table behind the prince, perhaps intended to suggest that he was a diligent student (reproduced in color in Meech-Pekarik, World of the Meiji Print, plate 23). A somewhat later (August 23, 1887) print by Chikanobu entitled Kanjo Yōfuko saih
ō no zu shows the crown prince, the empress, and a little girl in a room where one court lady operates a sewing machine and another measures fabric (reproduced in color, plate 24).

  4. The gold medals were intended for members of the imperial family (kōzoku) (Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 382–83).

  5. However, the best known of the nishikie depicting the celebration, showing various Japanese and foreign dignitaries presenting their messages of congratulations to the emperor, is Nansai Toshitada’s Dai Nihon teikoku ginkon goshiki, evidence that the term “silver wedding” (ginkon) was used at least informally. The scene depicted in this print was imagined, as it was published before the actual ceremony. For a reproduction, see Konishi Shirō, Nisshin sensō, pp. 16–17. Other prints published at the same time by Toyoharu Kuniteru and Shunsai Toshimasa included the word ginkonshiki in their titles (pp. 18–19).

  6. Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 384–90. For the menu of the dinner served in the palace, see Tennōke no kyōen, p. 41.

  7. For a discussion of Fukuzawa’s relations with Kim Ok-kyun and other Korean intellectuals, see Kan Je-on, Chosen no jōi to kaika, pp. 193–203. Kinebuchi Nobuo’s Fukuzawa Yukichi to Chōsen is a full-length study of Fukuzawa’s opinions on Korea.

  8. Kim took the name Iwata Shūsaku shortly after arriving in Japan in 1884, but when he went to China in 1894 he changed his name to Iwata Sanwa, sanwa (three peace) being a reference to his plan for the three nations of East Asia to cooperate in keeping out foreigner aggressors (Kan, Chōsen, pp. 174, 184).

  9. On May 17, 1894, thirty-five members of the Jiyū-tō presented a question to the government concerning the assassination of Kim Ok-kyun and the attempted assassination of Pak Yong-hyo. They claimed that Korean assassins had crossed into Japan three times with this mission, each time claiming it was by order of the king (Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 412).

  10. Kan, Chōsen, p. 185. See also Meiji tennō ki, 6, pp. 624–25.

  11. Kan, Chōsen, p. 183.

  12. Ibid., p. 185; Kinebuchi Nobuo, Nikkan kōshō shi, p. 107.

  13. Tsunoda Fusako, Minbi ansatsu, p. 186.

  14. For example, Hayashi Tadasu, at the time the deputy foreign minister, recalled in his memoirs that he had advised Kim to give up his plan of going to Shanghai, asking, “Isn’t that, as far as you are concerned, enemy territory?” Kim answered that Shanghai was neutral ground (referring presumably to the international concessions) and therefore not dangerous, but he promised to consult Fukuzawa Yukichi on the advisability of travel to Shanghai as soon as Fukuzawa returned from a tour of Kyūshū (Hayashi Tadasu, Ato wa mukashi no ki, pp. 73, 253).

  15. He made this statement to Miyazaki Tōten (Kan, Chōsen, pp. 174–75).

  16. Kan says that the bill of exchange (kawase tegata) was fake (Chōsen, p. 176). Hong was the first Korean to study in France. After leaving Paris in 1893 he did not return to Seoul but went instead to Tokyo. He contacted Koreans in Japan, hoping for their assistance in getting a job in the Korean government. Yi Il-sik apparently promised his assistance if Hong killed Kim (Tsunoda, Minbi, p. 188). Hayashi Tadasu (who knew Hong personally) thought he had killed Kim in order to win favor with the queen of Korea (Ato wa mukashi, p. 73).

  17. For Kim’s personality and achievements, see Kan, Chōsen, pp. 187–93. See also the brief account in Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 396

  18. This account is derived from Wada’s recollections, as given in Kan, Chōsen, pp. 179–80. The chief authority in the International Settlement was the British consul general. He turned Kim’s body over to the Chinese without following the proper procedures, laying the British open to the charge of having condoned the crime (Kinebuchi, Fukuzawa, p. 160). A different account was given in the Shūgi-in on May 18: Moriya Koresuke of the Rikken kaishintō asked the government why, after having been loaded aboard the ship and all formalities completed, Kim’s coffin should have been seized by the Chinese and loaded aboard a Chinese ship. He considered the Chinese action to be an insult to Japan. On May 31 the government replied with its own version of what had happened. It said that Wada had received the coffin but, instead of loading it aboard ship, left it lying by the road and went away. The chief of police of the International Settlement, following regulations, moved the coffin to the police station. Wada returned to Japan without making any arrangement for receiving the coffin. The Chinese government had indeed disposed of the body, but there was no “snatching away” of the coffin as alleged, and there was no occasion for the Japanese government to intervene. Regardless of whether or not this official account is correct, it shows how reluctant the Japanese government was to become involved (Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 413).

  19. For a drawing of this grisly sight, as depicted in the Jiji shimpō of April 24, 1894, see Kinebuchi, Nikkan, p. 118. Kinebuchi gives extracts from the Japanese press reporting the crime. There is also a blurred photograph of the exposed head and the inscription in Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensō, p. 48.

  20. Fujimura, Nisshin, p. 49.

  21. Hayashi wrote, “There is no doubt that the dispatch of troops to Asan was the fuse leading to the Sino-Japanese War, but I believe that it was in fact precipitated by the assassination of Kim and the actions of the China at this time” (Ato wa mu-kashi, p. 74). According to Fujimura, Hayashi “testified” that Foreign Minister Mutsu decided on a war with China because of the assassination of Kim and the Chinese actions (Nisshin, p. 49).

  22. Kinebuchi, Fukuzawa, pp. 156–60.

  23. Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku, trans. Gordon Mark Berger, p. 5.

  24. See the brief account in Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner, pp. 258–59; see also Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 428.

  25. Katano Tsugio, Richō metsubō, p. 103.

  26. Ibid., p. 104.

  27. Ibid.

  28. Gordon Mark Berger, who translated the work, preferred to leave the title in romaji, but he gave as a literal translation “A Record of Arduous and Selfless Service to the Throne” (Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 257).

  29. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 5.

  30. See, for example, Ōe Shinobu, Higashi Ajia shi toshite no nisshin sensō, p. 282. He compared the Tonghak rebellion (a term he avoided) with the Wat Tyler revolt in England, the peasant war in Bohemia associated with Jan Hus, and the T’ai P’ing revolt in China.

  31. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 428.

  32. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 8.

  33. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 427.

  34. Hayashi, Ato wa mukashi, p. 69.

  35. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 15. See also Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 433–34.

  36. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 20.

  37. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 437.

  38. Ibid., 8, p. 437.

  39. Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 24. See also Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 441–42.

  40. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 446.

  41. Ibid., 8, p. 452.

  42. Ibid., 8, p. 456.

  43. Ibid., 8, p. 449.

  44. For an account of the final negotiations to end extraterritoriality and the text of the draft treaty prepared by Mutsu Munemitsu, see Louis G. Perez, Japan Comes of Age.

  45. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 464.

  46. Ibid., 8, p. 466.

  47. Ibid., 8, p. 467. For the opinion of Dr. T. E. Holland, a leading English authority on international law, who concluded that the Japanese had behaved properly and that “no apology is due to our government” see Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 89–90.

  48. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 473.

  49. Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū, 14, p. 500. See also Donald Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Japanese Culture,” p. 263.

  50. Uchimura Kanzō zenshū, 16, p. 27.

  51. Ibid., p. 35. See also Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War,” pp. 263–64.

  52. It was later discovered that this identification had been mistaken and that the bugler was not Shirakami but Kiguchi Kohei. Kiguchi’s name soon replaced Shirakami’s and acquired a legendary character; he became the symbol of the virtue of loyalty. “Kiguchi Kohei died with the bug
le pressed to his lips” was featured in elementary-school textbooks as the perfect example of loyalty (Keene, “Sino-Japanese War,” pp. 278–79).

  53. Chuzan sonkō, 2, p. 309. See also Keene, “Sino-Japanese War,” p. 278.

  54. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 481.

  55. Keene, “Sino-Japanese War,” p. 266.

  Chapter 45

  1. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 486. Mutsu Munemitsu dismissed these different proposals as being “nothing more than private thoughts whispered among a few individuals” (Kenkenroku, trans. Gordon Mark Berger, p. 29). He added, “In my view, the reforms in Korea should focus primarily on Japan’s national interests; and there should thus be no cause for hardship or sacrifice for the sake of reform.” See also Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensō, p. 106.

  2. Meiji tennō ki, 8, pp. 487, 488.

  3. Shirai Hisaya, Meiji kokka to Nisshin sensō, pp. 81–82.

  4. Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 497. Itō participated in military as well as political decisions. He stressed particularly the need to win a quick victory before the great powers could intervene, and the emperor frequently consulted with him on wartime policy (Shirai, Meiji kokka, p. 82).

  5. On August 25 Mutsu reported to the emperor that the negotiations in London by Aoki Shūzō, initiated in December of the previous year, had been successful despite many obstacles. He felt confident that similar treaties would gradually be concluded with other allied countries. He now had the “joyful duty” of informing the emperor that the revised treaty had been signed by Queen Victoria. The new treaty of commerce and navigation was publicly announced on August 27 (Meiji tennō ki, 8, p. 493).

  6. Fujimura Michio suggested that Itō’s real reason for advocating the move of Dai-hon’ei was to demonstrate to the people that the war was being fought under the leadership of the emperor and to unite them in support of the war (Nisshin sensō, p. 112).