by Donald Keene
46. Kurobane, Nichibei, p. 23.
47. Hayashi, Ato wa mukashi, pp. 321, 327.
48. Ibid., pp. 330–31.
49. The agreement, signed on October 16, 1900, proclaimed the Open Door policy in China and the integrity of Chinese territory. The special relations between England and Germany at this time are discussed in Kurobane, Nichiei, pp. 24–34. The German minister to England, Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, proposed to Hayashi Tadasu, on March 18, 1901, a three-way alliance including Germany, but he acted without authorization from the German Foreign Ministry (pp. 29–30).
50. For details of the Japanese revisions, see Hayashi, Ato wa mukashi, pp. 349–50.
51. Ibid., p. 159.
52. Ibid., p. 160.
53. Ibid., p. 306.
54. Baelz described Japanese reactions to the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in these terms: “February 14, 1902. The Japanese can hardly contain their delight at the new alliance. It is unquestionably a triumph for them that the one power which on principle has abstained from alliances should now enter into an alliance, on terms of perfect equality, with the Japanese, who are of an utterly different race. The students of the Keiogijuku School had a torchlight procession and gave three cheers in front of the British legation” (Awakening Japan, p. 154).
Chapter 52
1. Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 176–77.
2. Ibid., 10, p. 181.
3. Ibid., 10, pp. 184–87.
4. Ibid., 10, p. 187. As of February 7 there were 17 survivors, 108 dead, and 85 unaccounted for. Some of the survivors died in the hospital (p. 198).
5. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 187.
6. See chapter 48.
7. Ian H. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 31. The provisions of the treaty were not fully divulged until 1922.
8. Nish, Origins, p. 39.
9. Ibid., p. 41. According to Andrew Malozemoff, at a meeting of the Russian czar and the German kaiser in August 1897, the czar had assented to a temporary visit by the German squadron to Kiaochow Bay in time of need (Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 96–101). The Germans, taking advantage of this agreement, entered the bay in November 1897. The Russians, who were not seriously concerned, decided in December to send a squadron to occupy Port Arthur temporarily, following the Chinese proposal. Malozemoff writes, “William II was delighted. On December 17 he conveyed his approval of the action through the Foreign Office. On the nineteenth he himself telegraphed to the Tsar: ‘Please accept my congratulations on the arrival of your squadron at Port Arthur.’ On the same day, he charged Baron Osten-Sacken [the Russian chargé in Berlin] to convey to Nicholas II the message: ‘Your enemies, whether they be called Japanese or English, now become my enemies; and every troublemaker, whoever he may be, who wishes to hinder your intentions by force, will meet the German squadron side by side with your warships.’”
10. For the Nishi-Rosen Convention, see Malozemoff, Russian, p. 110. Baron Roman R. Rosen, the Russian minister to Japan, later termed this agreement a “rather lame and pointless convention.”
11. Malozemoff, Russian, p. 146. See also Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 224–25.
12. Malozemoff, Russian, pp. 172–73. Count Sergei Witte recalled Itō’s visit in these terms: “Unfortunately, he was received coldly …. In the end we countered his proposal with our own, which did not accept the basic wishes of Japan. We sent our draft proposal to Ito, who was by this time in Berlin: he did not respond to it, nor could he have, for seeing how his friendly proposals had been received in Petersburg, he no longer opposed having an agreement with England, by which she would pledge herself to support Japan in a quarrel with Russia, an agreement that would lead to a war that was disastrous for us” (The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. Sidney Harcave, p. 303).
13. According to Nish, “It is broadly accepted that Open Door ideas developed in the brains of Alfred Hippisley, one of the senior officials of the Chinese Maritime Customs, and William H. Rockhill, a junior of John Hay at the State Department in Washington” (Origins, p. 55).
14. The literal translation of kokuryū as “Black Dragon” may account for this society’s sinister reputation.
15. Nish, Origins, p. 95.
16. Quoted in ibid., p. 17.
17. Witte, Memoirs, p. 307.
18. Nish, Origins, p. 142.
19. Erwin Baelz, Awakening Japan, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, p. 249.
20. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 243.
21. Ibid., 10, p. 261. The prince would later be known as Chichibunomiya.
22. Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 275, 346. Akasaka Detached Palace, as it came to be known, was completed in 1908, but during the Meiji period it was not used by the crown prince or anyone else. When the emperor examined an album of photographs of the completed palace, his only comment was “Such extravagance!” a blow to the architect Katayama Tōkuma, who had made several journeys to Europe and America to study buildings erected for royalty and the very rich. The palace is mainly in neobaroque but contains elements of many other styles. The materials used were equally varied. As Dallas Finn, the author of a study of surviving Meiji-period buildings, wrote, “Wherever he could, Katayama used Japanese materials: hinoki wood for rafters, native copper for roofing, Ibaraki granite for sheathing, Kyoto silk, and thirteen million local bricks. For the interior, however, he had to import, as he put it, the best from everywhere: marble from France, Morocco, Spain, and Italy; plate glass and carpets from England; heating, plumbing, and electrical equipment from the United States, and mantels, mirrors, mosaics, and chandeliers from France. France also provided furniture and a pervasive ambience” (Meiji Revisited, p. 236).
23. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 300.
24. Ibid., 10, p. 306.
25. Ibid., 10, p. 308.
26. Ibid., 10, pp. 318–19.
27. Ibid., 10, pp. 325–27.
28. Ibid., 10, p. 355.
29. Ibid., 10, pp. 366, 368.
30. Ibid., 10, p. 381.
31. Ibid., 10, p. 364.
32. Ibid., 10, p. 392.
33. Ibid., 10, p. 395.
34. Mori Senzō chosaku shū zokuhen, 5, p. 12.
35. Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 399–400.
36. For details, see ibid., 10, p. 406.
37. Ibid., 10, p. 405. For an English rendition of the seven demands, see Nish, Origins, p. 146.
38. They were Yamagata Aritomo, Itō Hirobumi, Katsura Tarō, and Komura Jutarō (Ōyama Azusa, Nichiro sensō no gunsei shiroku, p. 27).
39. Ōyama, Nichiro sensō, p. 28. See also Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 409–10.
40. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 416.
41. Ibid., 10, p. 417.
42. Ibid., 10, pp. 423–26.
Chapter 53
1. The text is in Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 444–49. Copies of the memorial were also sent to Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, Count Matsukata Masayoshi, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, and Army Minister Terauchi Masatake.
2. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 452.
3. Ibid., 10, p. 458.
4. The nine were Itō Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Ōyama Iwao, Matsukata Ma-sayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, Katsura Tarō, Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, Komura Jutarō, and Terauchi Masatake. These men have been referred to as the “oligarchs” who ran Japan at the time. For an extended treatment of this subject, see Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War.
5. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 460.
6. Ibid., 10, p. 464.
7. Ibid., 10, p. 469.
8. Ibid., 10, p. 475.
9. Ibid., 10, p. 479. For a translation of the six points, see Ian H. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 184–85.
10. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 224.
11. Witte’s memoirs gives August 13 according to the Julian calendar, then used in Russia. Other accounts give August 28, the date in the Gregorian calendar, used elsewhere in Europe and in Japan.
12. Count Sergei Iulevic
h Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. Sidney Harcave, pp. 315–16.
13. Ibid., p. 365.
14. Ibid., p. 366.
15. Malozemoff, Russian, p. 226.
16. Witte, Memoirs, p. 368.
17. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 477. See also Okamoto, Japanese Oligarchy, pp. 94–95. He quotes the diary of Dr. Erwin Baelz, who recalled, “On the train I met a fashionably dressed Japanese man. He told me, ‘the people’s indignation toward Russia is no longer under control. The government should declare war immediately. Otherwise, there will be, I fear, a civil rebellion. In fact, even the throne is threatened.’” Baelz commented, “Life is easy for such irresponsible men as this man” (diary entry, September 25, 1903). Okamoto quoted from the Japanese translation made by Baelz’s son, Toku Baelz. The English translation does not contain this entry.
18. Malozemoff, Russian, p. 238.
19. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 484. See also John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 102–3.
20. Text of the first exchange of Japanese and Russian proposals is in White, Diplomacy, pp. 351–52.
21. The text is in Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 516–17; the translation of the second exchange of proposals, in White, Diplomacy, pp. 352–54.
22. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 542. The new Russian proposals were probably the work of Alekseev and Rosen (Malozemoff, Russian, p. 243).
23. Malozemoff, Russian, p. 243.
24. Witte, Memoirs, p. 366.
25. Alexis Kuropatkin, diary entry, December 28, 1903, quoted in Malozemoff, Russian, pp. 243, 245.
26. Meiji tennō ki 10, pp. 545–46.
27. The text is in ibid., pp. 549–50; the translation of the Japanese proposal and the Russian counterproposal of January 6, in White, Diplomacy, pp. 354–55.
28. White, Diplomacy, pp. 112–13.
29. Okamoto, Japanese Oligarchy, pp. 99–100; Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 555–62.
30. Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 503–4.
31. Ibid., 10, p. 508.
32. Erwin Baelz, Awakening Japan, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, p. 240.
33. The text is in Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 568–69; the translation in White, Diplomacy, pp. 356–57.
34. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 569; White, Diplomacy, p. 355.
35. The reasons that the Japanese submitted the fourth set of proposals, although they were convinced it would do no good, differ. In addition to the need for more time to assemble the transport fleet in Sasebo (Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 575), White suggested three possible reasons: (1) the natural reluctance to become embroiled with a formidable adversary, (2) the natural reluctance to be considered an aggressor, and (3) the Japanese desire to prove itself a worthy and acceptable member of the society of nations (Diplomacy, p. 120).
36. The text of the fourth Japanese proposal is in Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 577–79; the translation, in White, Diplomacy, pp. 356–58.
37. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 582.
38. Ibid., 10, p. 583.
39. Sasaki Nobutsuna, Meiji tennō gyoshū kinkai, p. 202; Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 584.
40. Maurice Paléologue, Three Critical Years, pp. 4–5. White wrote that the hope of using France’s good offices to moderate the rigid demands of the two antagonists went back to Lamsdorf’s visit to Paris in October 1903 (Diplomacy, pp. 124–25). Delcassé accepted this responsibility at the request of both England and Japan, and Russia had also approved. But the Japanese were convinced that further delay would serve Russia’s interests, and Russia showed no signs of relenting in what for Japan were totally unacceptable demands.
41. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 6.
42. Witte, Memoirs, p. 382.
43. Ibid., p. 369.
44. Wilhelm was Queen Victoria’s grandson; Alexandra, the wife of the czar, was her granddaughter.
45. Isaac Don Levine, Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar, p. 10. The kaiser’s letters to Nicholas were written in English. Nicholas’s replies have not been published.
46. Levine, Letters, p. 13. When the kaiser spoke of “Mongols,” he meant all members of the yellow race, but especially the Japanese. Itō Hirobumi, in a conversation with Dr. Erwin Baelz, said, “There can be no shadow of doubt that the Mongols he had in mind were chiefly the Japanese; for, if any Mongol power should threaten Europe, it could not be impotent China, but only Japan, the rising power of the Far East” (quoted in Baelz, Awakening Japan, p. 222).
47. Levine, Letters, p. 17. See also chapter 50.
48. Levine, Letters, pp. 96, 100.
48. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 8.
49. Witte, Memoirs, pp. 365, 368.
50. Okamoto, Japanese Oligarchy, p. 100.
51. Ibid., p. 101.
52. White, Diplomacy, p. 129. He mentions a rumor that the message was purposely delayed by the Japanese telegraph.
53. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 593.
54. The text is in ibid., pp. 595–96.
55. Sasaki, Meiji, p. 158.
Chapter 54
1. The two cruisers did not reach Yokosuka until February 16, 1904 (Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 639).
2. Ishikawa Takuboku zenshū, 5, p. 37.
3. Ian H. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 255–56.
4. The Japanese government, replying to accusations by the Russian government, stated that it had informed the Russian government of its intention to act independently: “An independent action implies all, including, as a matter of course, the opening of hostile acts. Even if Russia were unable to understand it, Japan has no reason to hold herself responsible for the misunderstandings of Russia. The students of international law all agree that a declaration of war is not a necessary condition for beginning hostilities, and it has been customary in modern warfare for the declaration to follow the opening of the war. The action of Japan had, therefore, no ground for censure in international law” (quoted in K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 354). Asakawa, a Japanese scholar living in the United States, wrote that this was translated from a statement published in the Japanese press on March 3, 1904.
5. The Times (London) of February 24, 1904, carried this statement by the Russian government: “Although the breaking-off of diplomatic relations by no means implies the opening of hostilities, the Japanese Government, as early as the night of the 8th, and in the course of the 9th and the 10th, committed a whole series of revolting attacks on Russian warships and merchantmen, attended by a violation of international law. The decree of the emperor of Japan on the subject of the declaration of war against Russia was not issued until the 11th instant” (quoted in Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 351).
6. Maurice Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 16.
7. Baron Roman Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, 1, p. 107.
8. E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, p. 288.
9. Rosen, Forty Years, 1, pp. 231–32.
10. Ibid., 1, pp. 232–33. By the time Rosen got back to Russia, rumors had spread that his wife had “received from the Mikado a complete dinner service in gold of great value” (p. 246). The czar had heard the rumor, but he assured Rosen that his wife had done exactly right in accepting the empress’s gift. For a Japanese account of the same incident that discloses that Rosen had forgotten some of the gifts received from the empress, see Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 623–24.
11. Rosen, Forty Years, 1, p. 235.
12. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 613.
13. John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 146.
14. Ishikawa Takuboku zenshū, 5, p. 43.
15. For the texts of both declarations, see Meiji tennō ki, 10, pp. 618–22.
16. Ishikawa Takuboku zenshū, 5, p. 42.
17. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 616.
18. Jane H. Oakley, A Russo-Japanese War Poem, p. 9. Bel was the chief deity of Babylon, the lord of heaven and earth, who, King Hammurabi stated, had given him “the black-headed people” and enlarged his kingdom. The name was used in the poem to
suggest the great antiquity of the Japanese dynasty.
19. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 100.
20. Rosen, Forty Years, 1, p. 235. Arishima Takeo, who was studying in America at this time, recalled in later years how extremely displeased he was when his classmates praised Japan every time news came in of a Japanese victory. He detected behind the praise their secret pleasure in the victory of a little dog over a big dog (preface to Ribinguston den [1919], 4th ed., in Ishimaru Akiko, ed., Arishima Takeo, pp. 49–50).
21. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 119, 120.
22. Roosevelt read the book at the suggestion of Kaneko Kentarō and was so impressed that he ordered thirty copies for distribution among interested friends, including members of Congress. He felt that the book had given him a new insight into the Japanese character (Kaneko Kentarō, Nichiro sen’eki hiroku, pp. 119–21; see also White, Diplomacy, p. 158).
23. Sidney Lewis Gulick, The White Peril in the Far East, pp. 17–18.
24. Ibid., pp. 95–96. Gulick’s description of the treatment given to Russian prisoners of war was confirmed by Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, the wife of a Russian prisoner in Japan. She wrote that “the government furnishes here as much privacy and more foreign comforts than any tourist can command in a tea house; while the rank and file are in a heaven of plenty, cleanliness, comfort, and idleness they never dreamed of before” (As The Hague Ordains, p. 293).
25. Gulick, White Peril, pp. 118, 153, 173–74.
26. Meiji tennō ki, 10, p. 899.
27. According to Kaneko’s own account, he was extremely reluctant to go to America because he was convinced that the Americans were pro-Russian. He gave various reasons for this belief, including Russian support for the United States during the War of 1812 and the frequent marriages between American heiresses and impoverished members of the Russian aristocracy. He said it would be beyond his powers to induce the Americans to feel sympathy for the Japanese cause, but Itō Hirobumi persuaded him to accept the assignment (Nichiro, pp. 11–20).
28. Kaneko, Nichiro, pp. 57–59. Roosevelt had been informed in advance by Minister Griscom of Kaneko’s forthcoming visit.
29. Kaneko Kentarō, “Meiji tennō to Ruzuberuto daitōryō,” p. 123.