by Donald Keene
30. Ishimaru, ed., Arishima Takeo, p. 49.
31. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 112.
32. Ibid., pp. 126, 133. For an excellent account of Russian opposition to the war, see Adrian Jones, “East and West Befuddled.”
33. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 153.
34. Ibid., pp. 163, 90.
35. Ibid., p. 175.
36. Ibid., p. 181.
37. Ibid., p. 200.
38. Ibid., p. 207.
39. Ibid., pp. 221, 255. The Moroccan crisis of 1905 was caused by German apprehension about the increasing French influence in Morocco.
40. Paléologue, Three Critical Years, p. 258.
41. Count Sergei Iulevich Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. Sidney Harcave, pp. 420, 422.
42. Hinonishi Sukehiro, Meiji tennō no go-nichijō p. 49.
43. Sir Claude MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, October 24, 1905, quoted in Nish, Origins, p. 9.
44. Rosen, Forty Years, 1, p. 29.
Chapter 55
1. Report by the British ambassador to Russia, quoted in Raymond A. Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun, p. 38.
2. Gaimushō, Gaikō bunsho: Nichiro sensō, no. 5, pp. 231–32, quoted in Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 119.
3. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 173. Roosevelt was referring to the Three Power Intervention after the Sino-Japanese War that deprived Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula.
4. Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 23–27.
5. Ibid., p. 180. This message was in a telegram sent by Komura to Takahira on April 25.
6. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 25.
7. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 33.
8. Ibid., 11, pp. 3–4.
9. Sasaki Nobutsuna, ed., Meiji tennō gyoshū kinkai, p. 244. A different version of the last line—tsutae kinikeri—is in Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 4–5.
10. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 30.
11. Sasaki, Meiji, p. 254. Himugashi no miyako was a poetic way of referring to Tōkyō.
12. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 83–84. A similar (but shorter) message was sent to the Yalu River Army.
13. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 93.
14. Ibid., 11, p. 101.
15. Ibid., 11, p. 156.
16. Kaneko Kentarō, Nichiro sen’eki, p. 217.
17. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 39. The original document is in Nihon gaikō bunsho: Nichiro sensō, 5, pp. 233–34, 252–54.
18. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 40.
19. Isaac Don Levine, Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar, p. 172.
20. Ibid., p. 175.
21. Dennett, Roosevelt, p. 219. The American ambassador to Germany, Charlemagne Tower, reported this to the president in a letter dated June 9.
22. Dennett, Roosevelt, p. 220. In a letter dated June 4, the kaiser wrote Ambassador Tower, “Considering the grave dangers to all of us, which might arise in case something serious happened to His Imperial Majesty, I have written him a letter counselling him to open negotiations for Peace.” He told Tower, “Unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar.” See also Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 41.
23. Esthus, Double Eagle, pp. 43, 45.
24. Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 224–25, 225–26. The Japanese text is in Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 173.
25. Dennett, Roosevelt, p. 226.
26. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 48.
27. Quoted in ibid., p. 47.
28. Roosevelt was aware of the danger of causing the czar and the Russian government to suspect he was pro-Japanese (Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 103).
29. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 176, 177.
30. Quoted in Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 51.
31. When the American ambassador George von Lengerke Meyer went to see the czar to persuade him to consent to direct negotiations, the czar finally yielded and then suddenly confessed, “You have come at a psychological moment; as yet no foot has been placed on Russian soil; but I realize that at almost any moment they can make an attack on Sakhalin. Therefore it is important that the meeting should take place before that occurs” (quoted in Dennett, Roosevelt, p. 194). On March 31 an order was issued for the Japanese Thirteenth Infantry Division to assemble, for the purpose of occupying Sakhalin (Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 106).
32. Kaneko, Nichiro sen’eki, p. 225. Kaneko wrote that on June 8 Roosevelt urged him to send a message to the Japanese government, advising it to seize Sakhalin before negotiations began and even specifying the number of troops and gunboats that would be needed. Roosevelt believed that unless the Japanese occupied Russian territory, they would be in a weak position at the conference table. Exactly a month after Roosevelt gave this advice, Japan sent two gunboats and a mixed brigade to Sakhalin. Kaneko said he was not sure if this action was inspired by Roosevelt’s advice. See also Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 46.
33. The emperor’s reliance on Itō during the war began earlier. When Itō decided to send Kaneko to America, he admitted that it would be better if he himself went, but the emperor had made it clear he needed his counsel and would not let him go abroad (Kaneko, Nichiro sen’eki, p. 16).
34. Matsumura Masayoshi, Nichiro sensō to Kaneko Kentarō, pp. 234–41; Akabane Shigeru, Nichiro sensō shiron, pp. 287–311. Colonel Akashi Motojirō, who was based at the Japanese legation in Stockholm, operated a network of spies that provided him with information on conditions in Russia. He was enabled by Konni Zilliacus, a Finnish patriot, to meet various Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin, and generously backed them. Zilliacus said of Akashi’s activities, “Half the people to whom Japanese money is distributed don’t know where it comes from—and the other half don’t care” (quoted in Noel F. Busch, The Emperor’s Sword, p. 122).
Soon after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, a booklet called Rakka ryūsui describing Akashi’s secret activities was published by the Russian state police. His cooperation with Russian revolutionary elements may have helped the success of antigovernmental movements in 1905 and 1917. An English translation of parts of Rakka ryūsui was published in Helsinki in 1988. Japanese intelligence activities during the war are described in John Albert White, Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 138–42. E. J. Dillon wrote, “The strikes, the demonstrations, the subterranean agitation, the spread of revolutionary leaflets, and the brisk, illegal traffic between Finland and Russia, were in varying degrees evidences of Japanese propaganda” (The Eclipse of Russia, p. 184).
Kaneko Kentarō recalled in later years that the celebrated historian and author Henry Adams, whom he described as the “brain” (chiebukuro) of John Hay, the secretary of state, had advised him that Japan should send secret agents to Finland and Sweden to stir up the people there and create unrest. Kaneko and Adams met in Washington on January 15, 1905 (Kaneko, Nichiro sen’eki, pp. 70–76; Busch, Emperor’s Sword, p. 122; Elizabeth Stevenson, Henry Adams, pp. 315–16).
35. Esthus, Double Eagle, pp. 82–83. The original instructions given to the Japanese emissaries on June 4 are listed in Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 198. They differ somewhat from the demands made at Portsmouth. For example, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the demand that Vladivostok be demilitarized was removed from the list.
36. Esthus, Double Eagle, pp. 84, 61.
37. Okamoto, Japanese Oligarchy. p. 117.
38. Esthus writes, “From the records that are available, it is impossible to determine conclusively whether Komura was deliberately misleading his government on the Sakhalin question” (Double Eagle, p. 151). Komura did not inform the Japanese government of the Russian proposal to divide Sakhalin until the czar’s decision had already been reported in the press. President Roosevelt wrote the kaiser proposing binding arbitration on the money question, but Komura could not be reached for confirmation. Esthus thought that Komura’s failure to respond may have been deliberate (p. 153).
39. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 281–84.
40. Ibid., 11, pp. 286–87.
41. The full English text sent by Katsura to K
omura is in Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, 2, pp. 349–50.
42. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 158.
43. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 2, p. 351.
44. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 159.
45. Ibid., p. 164.
46. Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, As The Hague Ordains, p. 346. The reference to Kronstadt may simply equate this Russian naval port with the similar Portsmouth. Il Strenuoso is an ironic reference to Theodore Roosevelt’s love of the strenuous life.
47. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 165.
48. Ibid., pp. 171, 173.
49. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 314–15.
50. Esthus, Double Eagle, p. 188. He quotes a letter written by Roosevelt on September 6.
51. Theodore Roosevelt to Takahira Kogōro, September 8, 1905, quoted in ibid.
Chapter 56
1. Iguchi Kazuki, Nichiro sensō no jidai, pp. 127–28. Iguchi declared that without Britain’s support, Japan lacked the fighting strength to pursue the war with Russia. The Japanese, as yet incapable of casting the main and secondary guns for their battleships and armored cruisers, depended on the British not only for the guns but also for charging the missiles fired. The British also supplied the Japanese navy with 20,000 tons of coal each month.
2. Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 289. Britain decided that it could not “permit any ship now in the Black Sea to take part in warlike operations,” and at Britain’s request, Turkey refused to allow vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet through the Straits.
3. Nish wrote that “Britain may have given the impression of being more a neutral and less an ally” (Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 292).
4. Sir Claude MacDonald to Charles Hardinge, British ambassador to Russia, December 23, 1904, quoted in Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 299.
5. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 303.
6. Telegram, Hayashi Tadasu, Japanese minister to England, to his government, quoted in ibid., p. 309.
7. The English text of the agreement is in Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 331–33.
8. Ibid., p. 346. Prince Arthur’s father, also called Prince Arthur of Connaught, had made an unofficial visit to Japan in 1890, spent mainly in sightseeing and acquiring “curios.” It is surprising that the son, rather than the father, should have been assigned so important a task as the conferment of the Garter, but the father was occupied in India.
9. Lord Redesdale, The Garter Mission to Japan, pp. 1–2.
10. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
11. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. It is described in detail in ibid., pp. 16–20.
14. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 492.
15. Hinonishi Sukehiro, Meiji tennō no go-nichijō, p. 184.
16. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 493.
17. Redesdale, Garter Mission, pp. 22, 23.
18. Ibid., p. 25.
19. Ibid., p. 29.
20. The name by which William Adams (1564–1620) became known after he decided to live permanently in Japan.
21. Redesdale, Garter Mission, pp. 76–81. Yoi, yoi, yoiya, sa, the burden of the song, has a vaguely felicitous meaning.
22. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 350–51.
23. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 374–75.
24. Ibid., 11, pp. 376–79.
25. Ibid., 11, pp. 380–81. See also Kim Un Yon, Nikkan heigō, pp. 187–88.
26. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 381–84. Kim gives a shortened but very similar account (Nikkan heigō, pp. 183–91). According to Woonsang Choi, the last utterance of Emperor Kojong was “Assent to your proposal would mean the ruin of my country, and I will therefore sooner die than agree to it” (The Fall of the Hermit Kingdom, p. 46).
27. For an account of the opinions expressed, see Katano Tsugio, Richō metsubō, pp. 217–18. The Koreans called attention to the paradox that Japan, the ostensible defender of Korean independence, proposed to rob the country of its independence.
28. Choi, Fall of the Hermit Kingdom, p. 47.
29. Ibid., p. 47.
30. Ibid., p. 48.
31. Katano gives a vivid description of Itō’s asking each cabinet member by turn whether he was for or against the treaty (Richō metsubō, pp. 221–22). Vague responses were tallied as “not opposed” and marked O, and only the determinedly opposed were marked X. Katano does not give his source. See also Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 190–92.
32. Kim, Nikkan heigō, p. 195. Choi gives an account of how Japanese officers dragged the defiant acting prime minister into a side room where, the other cabinet ministers feared, he was likely to be killed (Fall of the Hermit Kingdom, pp. 48–49). This action by the Japanese induced several of the cabinet ministers to consent to the treaty. Choi says of the different accounts of the conference, “All authors vary little in describing the substance of the conference scene, namely its coercive nature” (p. 54). However, Duus states that the acting prime minister left the room in so highly agitated state that he accidentally wandered into the women’s quarters (Abacus, p. 191, citing Japanese authorities). Petrified by his mistake (and the shrieking of the women), he had fainted dead away. The discussion continued without him. The marked discrepancy between the two accounts suggests that neither may be completely reliable.
33. Kim, Nikkan heigō, p. 195.
34. Ibid., p. 196.
35. Historians do not agree on whether or not the emperor signed the treaty. For the controversy, see Duus, Abacus, pp. 193–94.
36. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 408.
37. Katano, Richō metsubō, pp. 225–26. The five ministers who had voted in favor of the treaty were branded by the public as ulsa ojok, the five bandits of 1905
38. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 435. He was succeeded as president of the Privy Council by Yamagata Aritomo. He took leave of Emperor Meiji on February 2 and, after arriving in Korea, was formally installed as the first resident general on March 3.
39. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 596–98. Itō was particularly concerned about rebellions that seemed to be backed by influential persons in the palace. Most rebellions were directed against the treaty, but there were also some without ideological content.
40. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 228. The letter was sent by secret messenger to Chefoo in China, and from there by cable to Washington where Homer Hulbert, an American missionary who enjoyed the confidence of the Korean emperor, delivered it to Elihu Root, the secretary of state, who in turn passed it on to Roosevelt. It had no effect, perhaps because the American minister to Korea had warned the secretary of state that Hulbert’s judgments were often “colored by prejudice” in favor of the Koreans (Duus, Abacus, p. 206).
41. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 536–37. The review took place on April 30 at the Aoyama parade grounds. It was notable otherwise because Meiji wore for the first time the khaki uniform that had become standard in the Japanese army.
42. According to Katano, the emperor did not utter a word when Itō presented his credentials on March 9 (Richō metsubō, p. 238).
43. See, for example, Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 642–44.
44. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 661, 724.
45. Choi, Fall of the Hermit Kingdom, pp. 61–63. See also Katano, Richō metsubō, pp. 242–45, and Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 765–66.
46. Sunjong, earlier known as I Chok, was Kojong’s son by Queen Min. He was poisoned in 1898, and although doctors saved his life, the poison affected his mind (Kitano, Richō metsubō, pp. 254–55).
Chapter 57
1. When I visited Madagascar in 1963, I learned that Japan enjoyed the reputation of being “the land of liberty.” At the time, although the country was officially independent, the French still controlled the radio. They seemed eager to broadcast my lecture until they learned it was to be on Japan, a dangerous subject!
2. Arishima Takeo zenshū, 10, p. 475.
3. Ishikawa Takuboku zenshū, 5, p. 118.
4. The poem was shown to the president in the translation by Arthur Lloyd, a p
rofessor at Waseda University (Chiba Taneaki, Meiji tennō gyosei kinwa, p. 203).
5. Shinshū Meiji tennō gyoshū, 1, p. 638.
6. Ibid., 1, p. 613. The poem is discussed in Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 456–57.
7. Shinshū Meiji tennō gyoshū, 2, p. 732.
8. Asukai Masamichi, Meiji taitei, p. 278.
9. Matsushita Yoshio, Nogi Maresuke, p. 188.
10. Oka Yoshitake, “Generational Conflict After the Russo-Japanese War,” trans. J. Victor Koschmann, p. 199.
11. Ibid., p. 207.
12. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 468.
13. According to Chamberlain Bōjō Toshinaga, the emperor offered chairs to only three Japanese: Prince Taruhito, Itō Hirobumi, and Yamagata Aritomo(Kyūchū gojūnen, p. 17).
14. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 469. Tsai Tse received the Order of the Paulownia Leaf, First Class; the other Chinese received lesser decorations.
15. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 472–74.
16. Ibid., 11, pp. 501–2. The emperor appointed Makino Nobuaki as minister of education on March 27, replacing Saionji. Hayashi Tadasu succeeded Saionji as foreign minister on May 19.
17. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 535.
18. Ibid., 11, p. 586.
19. Ibid., 11, p. 643.
20. George Trumbull Ladd, Rare Days in Japan, pp. 18–22.
21. Ibid., pp. 339–40. For an estimation of Ladd’s contribution to Japanese education, see Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 796.
22. Meiji tennō ki, 11, p. 661.
23. Ibid., 11, p. 754.
24. Ibid., 11, p. 726.
25. Ibid., 11, pp. 671–78.
26. See chapter 48.
27. Meiji tennō ki, 11, pp. 749, 778.
28. Ibid., 11, pp. 773–76.
29. Ibid., 11, pp. 777–78, 790. Kōshaku was the highest rank of the peerage, sometimes translated as “duke.”
30. Katano Tsugio, Richō metsubō, pp. 255–56.
31. On November 19 the emperor of Korea issued an edict to his people explaining why the crown prince was going to study in Japan. He cited the European practice of sending crown princes from an early age to study abroad and mentioned that sometimes they even had these princes join the armed forces of another country. He said that he was entrusting the education of Yi Eun to Emperor Meiji (Ei shinnō rigin den, p. 70; Katano, Richō, pp. 256–57).