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In Danger's Path

Page 67

by W. E. B Griffin


  “There’s a Major Williamson, from Pensacola, I don’t know who he is.…”

  “General, I don’t know how I know this,” Hart said. “But I think he’s a pal of Captain Galloway,” Hart offered. “He’s probably all right.”

  That figures, both that he’s a pal of Charley Galloway and “all right.”

  “And a fellow named Stevenson, who’s in Galloway’s squadron,” Pickering went on.

  Which means by definition…“One of Galloway’s misfits?” Hart asked, surprised.

  …one of Galloway’s misfits.

  “I don’t think Galloway would volunteer this fellow for this to get rid of him,” Pickering thought aloud. “Or that Colonel Dawkins, for that matter, would permit him to do that. So he’s probably all right.”

  “Yes, sir,” Hart agreed. “They both know how important this is.”

  “The other two officers, George, are Captain James B. Weston—”

  “Our Captain Weston?” Hart asked incredulously.

  “Our Captain Weston,” Pickering confirmed. “And the fourth one is Pick.”

  “My God!” Hart said. “He didn’t say anything to me when we were in Memphis.”

  “Or to me,” Pickering said.

  “You didn’t say anything about Operation Gobi to him in Memphis, did you, George?”

  “No, sir.”

  “Then I guess he just saw General McInerney’s request for volunteers,” Hart said. “And volunteered.”

  “What I can’t understand is why they took him,” Pickering thought aloud again. “I don’t think he knows how to fly a Catalina.”

  He doesn’t. That explains that business in Jake Dillon’s Special Channel…Pickering picked up the Special Channel and read the last paragraph again.

  …They know Pick does not have the “extensive experience” flying the Catalina that the other three have. What Jake is doing is telling me that Dawkins is doing all he can to give Pick the training he needs.

  “They know what a hell of a pilot he is, General,” Hart said. “That’s why they took him. It won’t take him long to learn how to fly a Catalina.”

  “And the same is presumably true of Jim Weston,” Pickering said. “He was selected because he was the best man available for the job.”

  “Yes, sir.”

  And the selector was Mac McInerney. Who would base his decision on that alone. With no consideration of fairness, of sending someone who hadn’t spent a year as a guerrilla in the Philippines instead of someone who did. Or sending someone who has never been in combat at all—or hasn’t already flown an incredibly hazardous mission like Pick did with Galloway to Buka—in place of someone who has.

  A general officer cannot permit himself to let his personal feelings interfere with his decisions, even when his decisions may send men to their deaths. Mac really likes Weston, and he showed at Memphis—again—how much he likes Pick. But he’s a Marine General, and he can’t let anything get in the way of his responsibilities.

  So what does that make me?

  The Easterbunny is getting next to me in the backseat of this staff car because I arranged it so that he wouldn’t get himself killed storming some beach in the Solomons.

  It makes me—because I would trade my life for a senior officer somewhere who would make the emotion-based decision to send someone else in place of Pick and Weston—a lousy general officer.

  “Pick will be all right, General,” Hart said, reading Pickering’s mind. “And so will Weston. They walk between raindrops.”

  “Well, we’ll soon find out, won’t we, George?” Pickering said.

  [FOUR]

  The White House

  Washington, D.C.

  2315 16 April 1943

  The President was sitting in his wheelchair in his dressing gown, lighting a fresh cigarette from the butt of another, when Admiral William D. Leahy, General George C. Marshall, and Colonel William J. Donovan were shown in.

  He looks tired, Donovan thought.

  “Good evening, Mr. President,” Admiral Leahy said.

  “What do we have here?” Roosevelt said, as he stuffed his fresh cigarette into an ivory holder and flashed his famous smile. “The Army, the Navy, and he who hears all evil, sees all evil, and speaks all evil?”

  “Is that how you think of me, Mr. President?” Donovan asked.

  “A poor attempt at humor, Bill,” the President said. “I tend to tell terrible jokes when I am forced to make decisions I would rather not make.”

  There was no reply.

  “Would anyone like coffee?” he asked. “Or something stronger?”

  There was a chorus of “No, thank you, Mr. President.”

  “Let me see it, please,” the President said.

  Donovan reached into his interior pocket and handed the President a white, blank, unsealed, letter-size envelope.

  Roosevelt took two sheets of typewriter paper from it. He glanced quickly at both of them. “Oh, we’ve heard from Halsey, too?” he asked.

  “I thought we should wait for Admiral Halsey’s recommendation before coming to see you, sir,” Admiral Leahy said.

  Roosevelt carefully read the messages.

  * * *

  TOPSECRET-MAGIC

  OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

  1005 GREENWICH 16 APRIL 1943

  DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN

  FROM SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST

  PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

  BRISBANE

  TO CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY

  WASHINGTON

  EYES ONLY GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

  INFO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PACIFIC

  PEARL HARBOR

  EYES ONLY ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ

  SUBJECT: OPERATION FLYSWATTER, REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO EXECUTE

  1. SUPREME HEADQUARTERS SWAPO HAS INTERCEPTED AND DECRYPTED THREE (3) MESSAGES FROM JAPANESE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF DEALING WITH VISIT TO BOUGAINVILLE BY ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO COMMANDER OF JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET BY AIR ON 18 APRIL 1943, INCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF HIS ROUTE, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND ESCORT.

  2. SUBJECT MESSAGES WERE CLASSIFIED IN HIGHEST SECURITY CATEGORY. ANALYSTS ATTACHED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BELIEVE THEM TO BE GENUINE, BUT SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MAY BE A RUSE ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE WITH THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER THE CODE USED HAS BEEN COMPROMISED BY US. IF IT IS A RUSE, ANY ACTION OF MINE TO INTERCEPT ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO WOULD CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE BROKEN THEIR CODE.

  3. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT MY ANALYSTS DO NOT REPEAT DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE MESSAGES ARE A RUSE, SOLELY THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY REPEAT POSSIBILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

  4. AT MY DIRECTION, A MISSION CODENAME FLYSWATTER INVOLVING FOUR (4) ARMY AIR CORPS LOCKHEED P-38 AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS HAS BEEN PLACED IN READINESS TO INTERCEPT AND DESTROY THE YAMAMOTO AIRCRAFT OVER BOUGAINVILLE. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED THE MISSION WOULD HAVE A SEVENTY-FIVE (75) PERCENT CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

  5. IN VIEW OF THE RECENT POTENTIAL BREACH OF MAGIC SECURITY AT US MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE A TENDENCY TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION IN THIS CASE, BY DENYING ME PERMISSION TO EXECUTE OPERATION FLYSWATTER IN THE BELIEF THAT SO DOING WOULD PROTECT MAGIC.

  6. BRIG GEN PICKERING’S REPRESENTATIVE WHO WAS IN CHUNGKING WITH GENERAL PICKERING HAS INFORMED ME THAT BOTH HE AND GENERAL PICKERING BELIEVE MAGIC WAS NOT REPEAT NOT COMPROMISED BY THE RECENT EVENTS AT US MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA. I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL PICKERING’S JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF THIS NATURE.

  7. NEVER BEFORE IN THE HISTORY OF NAVAL WARFARE HAS THERE BEEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE A BRILLIANT AND FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY SUCH AS ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO FROM THE SCENE OF BATTLE, AND WE SHOULD NOT FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BY TAKING COUNSEL OF OUR FEARS.

  8. PERMISSION TO EXECUTE OPERATION FLYSWATTER IS REQUESTED IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

  DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

  GENERAL, US ARMY

  SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

  TO
PSECRET-MAGIC

  * * *

  “Douglas does have a way with words, doesn’t he?” the President said, and turned to the second message, which was considerably shorter than MacArthur’s.

  * * *

  TOPSECRET-MAGIC

  OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

  1635 GREENWICH 16 APRIL 1943

  DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN

  FROM COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

  PEARL HARBOR

  TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

  WASHINGTON

  EYES ONLY ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY

  INFO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST

  PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

  BRISBANE

  EYES ONLY GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

  1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO TOP SECRET-MAGIC MESSAGE FROM SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS TO EYES ONLY CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY SUBJECT OPERATION FLYSWATTER, REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO EXECUTE DATED 16 APRIL 1943.

  2. THE REFERENCED MESSAGES CONCERNING ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO WERE INDEPENDENTLY INTERCEPTED, DECRYPTED AND ANALYZED HERE. ANALYSTS HERE CONCUR THAT MESSAGES ARE GENUINE, AND SHARE CONCERN THAT THEY MAY BE A RUSE.

  3. THE UNDERSIGNED SHARES GENERAL MACARTHURS CONFIDENCE IN BRIG GENERAL PICKERING’S DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REGARDING POTENTIAL BREECH OF MAGIC AT USMMCHI.

  4. THE REMOVAL OF ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO FROM COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC TO JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND HIS LOSS PER SE TO UNITED STATES ACTION WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE JAPANESE NAVAL PRESTIGE AMONG THE JAPANESE PEOPLE.

  5. THE UNDERSIGNED STRONGLY URGES THAT THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS RECOMMEND TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE OPERATION FLYSWATTER.

  CHESTER W. NIMITZ

  ADMIRAL, US NAVY

  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC

  TOPSECRET-MAGIC

  * * *

  “Halsey thinks MacArthur is right,” the President said. “Is that a unanimous feeling here, too?”

  He looked at Donovan, who was the junior man present, for an answer.

  “Mr. President, I don’t think I should second-guess either Douglas MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz,” Donovan said.

  “Go ahead, Bill, second-guess them.”

  “It boils down to a choice between a chance to eliminate Admiral Yamamoto or possibly, I emphasize possibly, compromise MAGIC.”

  “No, it doesn’t,” the President said. “The choice is between sharing Fleming Pickering’s belief that MAGIC has not been compromised by those people in Chungking, or not believing him. I don’t think we’re in a position to cavalierly dismiss the possibility that the Japanese at least suspect we’re reading their mail. A deception like this would be entirely appropriate if they did.”

  “We have no reason to believe we have given them any reason to be suspicious, except for the Chungking business,” Donovan said.

  “Do you think Pickering’s right, or don’t you?” Roosevelt asked, a tone of impatience in his voice.

  “I’ll go with Pickering’s judgment, Mr. President,” Donovan said after a perceptible pause.

  Roosevelt nodded and looked at General Marshall.

  “If we didn’t take advantage of the opportunity, Mr. President—” General Marshall began.

  “Even at the risk of confirming to the Japanese that we’ve broken their codes?” Roosevelt interrupted.

  “Yes, Mr. President,” General Marshall said.

  “Admiral?” Roosevelt asked, turning to Leahy.

  “This seems to be one of those very rare instances, Mr. President, where Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur seem to be in complete agreement. I don’t want to challenge their judgment.”

  “But, truth to tell, out of school, everybody’s more than a little nervous with this, right?” Roosevelt said.

  There were nods, and Donovan said, “Yes, sir, I am.”

  “And so am I,” Roosevelt said. His cigarette had burned down close to his ivory holder. He snatched it out, dropped it into an ashtray, and stuffed a fresh cigarette into the holder.

  “Okay,” he said, as Donovan walked up to him with a cigarette lighter. “We’ll do it. Admiral Leahy, send Douglas MacArthur the following: Direction of the President. Execute Operation Flyswatter.”

  “Aye, aye, sir,” Admiral Leahy said.

  “If that offer of a drink is still open, Mr. President?” Donovan said.

  “Of course it is, Bill,” the President said. “Now that we each can tell ourselves that when we made this decision we were stone sober.”

  XXIII

  [ONE]

  Somewhere in the Gobi Desert

  Mongolia

  1115 20 April 1943

  The 32nd Military District supply column, sent to supply the patrols it was operating in the Gobi Desert, consisted of two jeeps (one at the head of the line of vehicles, the other bringing up the rear); two GMC six-by-six two-and-a-half-ton trucks, both towing five-hundred-gallon trailers; three Studebaker open-bodied trucks carrying, four to a truck, a dozen Mongolian ponies; and two Dodge three-quarter-ton weapons carriers.

  All of the vehicles were grossly overloaded, and there had been frequent breakdowns during the six-day trip from Yümen, almost all of them due to blown tires. The repair technique was simple. The wheel with the blown tire was removed and replaced with a spare wheel from the half-dozen or so spares lashed to each vehicle. The wheel with the blown tire was then moved to one of the weapons carriers, now converted to a mobile tire-repair station. And the march was resumed. The blown tire was repaired, if possible, while on the march. But tires beyond repair were not without value in wartime China, and bad tires were lashed wherever space could be found.

  The convoy stopped at nightfall. The Mongolian ponies were then encouraged—by the point of a bayonet—to jump from the Studebakers, and Chinese soldiers mounted four of them bareback and began a roving perimeter patrol. Other soldiers lit fires, and still others rigged pieces of canvas tarpaulin wherever they could, to provide shelter from the icy winds.

  Breakfast in the morning was the same as dinner, rice with sweet peppers and onions and chunks of lamb and pork. After breakfast, bayonet jabs at their ribs—in the case of reluctant animals, at their genitals—encouraged the ponies to climb back on the Studebakers, and the march resumed.

  The first day they met a Yümen-bound camel caravan. But after that, the convoy encountered no other travelers. After the second day, McCoy and the others in his party began to notice evidence of what they could expect to find farther into the Gobi. The desert all around them was windswept flat rock, huge sheets of it, with no landmarks at all. In some places large rocks were strewn about. But in most places the flat, indifferent landscape was broken by nothing at all but patches of snow where the wind had blown it.

  There was, however—good news—very little ice. Probably, McCoy decided, because the snow would have to melt during the day and then freeze at night. But it was too cold during the day—and the wind was blowing so hard, keeping the snow moving—that the sun could not melt it.

  The bad news was that the snow often covered the path they were following—it could not be called a road—making it frequently necessary for the convoy commander, a taciturn captain, riding in the lead jeep, to halt the convoy because he couldn’t see the “road.” When that happened, the trailing jeep scouted ahead of the convoy, making wider and wider sweeps through the shallow snow, until he found the faint signs marking the “road.” Then the march resumed.

  As they moved deeper into the desert—and this was also good news—McCoy and Zimmerman had both reached the conclusion that there was absolutely nothing suspicious about their ambulance and weapons carrier, which McCoy had put in the line of vehicles immediately behind the GMC trucks. They looked as if they were a perfectly ordinary part of the convoy.

  When the convoy came to a halt on the morning of 20 April, McCoy expected that somebody had once again blown a tire or else that the “road” was again obscured by snow. But then Chinese so
ldiers started jumping down from the six-by-sixes and moving off to the side. When McCoy looked closer, he saw that they had stopped by fire-blackened rocks and were about to light fires.

  That meant they had reached the point where they would rendezvous with the patrols out in the Gobi.

  He got out from behind the wheel of the weapons carrier and went back to the ambulance. “I think we’re here,” he said to Zimmerman. “You go see Captain Whatsisname, and remind him that our deal was full tanks of gas and good tires all around. I’ll go see that sergeant who seems to know where we’re going and take another look at the so-called map.”

  “We’re moving on now?” Captain Sampson asked.

  “We can make five, six hours before dark,” McCoy said.

  “I can have the radio on the air in forty-five minutes, if I can get help to string the antenna,” Sampson said.

  “We’re not going to do that,” McCoy said simply.

  “But they’ll be expecting to hear from us,” Sampson protested.

  “Tonight, when we stop, you can set up the receiver,” McCoy said. “I gave you the SOI. You can listen when they’re scheduled to contact us and see if they have anything for us.”

  “They’ll expect us to respond,” Sampson said.

 

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