Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  So why would Alexander risk his life so often? Certainly his ego played a part in refusing to allow anyone else to outdo him in bravery. One Alexander biographer, J. R. Hamilton, argues, “Perhaps it was an inevitable consequence of leading from the front, but we may suspect that for a general he liked the thrill of battle too much.”36 Lendon argues that it was his obsession with Homer’s tales of the Trojan War: “Alexander fought in rivalry with this ancestor Achilles, seeking out the heroes of the enemy to slay in single combat.”37 There was also the weighty legacy he had carried since childhood, the belief that his forebears included Achilles and Herakles, and that his own mother thought him the son of Zeus. That belief seems to have been reinforced when he visited the temple to Amon at the oasis of Siwa in Egypt, although no one knows what was said during Alexander’s meeting with the priests there. While Alexander never claimed divinity for himself, after that experience he never stopped anyone else from claiming it for him. It has long been debated whether this was a true belief on his part or a clever bit of public relations to appeal to the populations of the East that viewed their rulers as divine. Given his apparent conviction that he would not be killed in battle, it would not be hard to extrapolate that he assumed a divine protection. As Curtius put it, however, he simply lacked normal human proportions. Alexander had a “continuous disregard for death, which frightens others out of their minds; a lust for glory and fame reaching a degree which exceeded due proportion but was yet pardonable in view of his youth and great achievements.”38

  In all his battles, Alexander’s primary talent was, as we have seen, his ability to see what needed to be done to win, whether that involved maneuver or brute force. He never lacked for imagination to adapt to whatever problem faced him. The sieges at Tyre and Multan exemplified his ability to overcome physical obstacles by direct action. At the Hydaspes River in India, he showed his ability to outmaneuver his opponent by constantly feinting river crossings to keep his enemy’s attention, while the real crossing was taking place more than a mile upstream. At that battle he also faced, as noted earlier, elephants for the first time, but offset their effect by doing what he did best: bypassing the animals fronting the enemy line and crashing a flank, forcing the enemy commander to surrender.

  Alexander was most fortunate in possessing the army that he led, built for him by his father. No more disciplined force existed in the world at that time, and both the common soldiers and the noble officers were proud of their martial abilities and demanded the same in their commander. Alexander provided sufficient brains and brawn to satisfy them. Historian Eugene Borza offers a nice summation:

  Alexander was above all else a military genius, soldier, general, psychologist. Each battle was different. Each was fought as he wished. Each was decisive. Alexander never faltered or made mistakes. He won by manoeuvre, by the application of overwhelming force at the decisive point, by deception. Not only his own troops but the enemy too seem to have done precisely as he wished.39

  The battlefield manipulation of both his own army and that of his enemy brought him victory in every battle he fought. Following Alexander’s death, a void in leadership and skill on the battlefield emerged. As John Drogo Montagu has noted in Greek and Roman Warfare, “In the Hellenistic period (after Alexander) warfare failed to retain his subtlety and gloss.”40 The innate ability to lead with courage and tactical genius was not something Alexander could pass on, and his successors failed to keep the empire he gained.

  3

  Han Xin (?–196 BC)

  General under Liu Bang, Emperor

  of the Western Han Dynasty

  Generals are easy to get, but when it comes to a man like Han Xin, there is not his equal among the officers in the country. If you really want to contend for the empire, except for Han Xin there is no one who can plan it for you.

  —Xiao He, chief advisor to Emperor Liu Bang

  VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN of Han Xin’s early years other than that he was of common birth and lived in poverty in his late adolescence and early adulthood. The primary source for Han Xin’s life and career is the Shihchi of Sima Qian, known in the West as Records of the Grand Historian. Sima Qian tells stories of Han Xin begging for food just to survive. In another, Han Xin apparently was acting tough and was challenged by a “butcher” (probably another term for bully). “You are tall and big and like to carry a sword.… If you can face death, try to stab me. If you cannot face death, crawl between my legs,” the bully is supposed to have said. “Then Han Hsin, after looking him over carefully, bent down and crawled between his legs on his hands and knees.”1

  This humbling experience had a great effect on him and later in life, after he had achieved success, he rewarded the bully as well as those who had fed him.

  Han Xin joined the army of Xiang Liang, founder of the Western Chu Kingdom, in March 208 BC, early in the dynastic rebellions against the Qin Dynasty. After Xiang Liang was defeated and killed, Han Xin shifted his allegiance to Liang’s nephew and successor, Xiang Yu. Here he took his first very small step toward greatness when he was named a “palace gentleman,” which was probably just a palace door guard. He must have had regular access to Xiang Yu, however, for he suggested several strategies to his master, all of which were rejected. In March or April 206 BC, the war against Qin was over and as Xiang Yu was the dominant general, he began assigning kingdoms to his generals. Liu Bang, one of his most successful generals, was given the province of Han, roughly corresponding to modern southern Henan and northern Hubei. At this point Han Xin left Xiang Yu’s army for Liu Bang’s, hoping a new commander might be more appreciative of his talents. One can only ponder on how these talents were acquired; it is known that Han Xin had studied the writings of Sun Tzu, but that was hardly unusual for military men of that day.

  Soon thereafter, Han Xin violated some law and, with a number of others, was sentenced to death. When his turn came before the executioner, he noticed Liu Bang’s chief advisor, Xiao He, and called out to him, “Does not the emperor [Liu Bang] want to go after the empire? Why should he have a valiant fighter beheaded?”2 Intrigued, Xiao He freed Han Xin and talked with him at length. During these discussions it became clear to him that Han Xin indeed had a brilliant military mind. Xiao He mentioned his discovery to Liu Bang, who in turn appointed Han Xin head of the commissariat, something along the lines of quartermaster general. Further discussions convinced Xiao He of Han Xin’s talents, but Liu Bang was uninterested.

  That changed a couple of months later when a number of Liu Bang’s generals deserted him. Han Xin, thinking that commissary general was as high as he would rise and not believing it to be a position in which he could employ his talents, deserted as well. Hearing of this, Xiao He pursued him. It was reported to Liu Bang that Xiao He had deserted as well. Liu was greatly pained at the loss of his chief lieutenant and was even more greatly surprised when Xiao He returned to court a few days later. Xiao He explained that he had chased down Han Xin and convinced him to return to the emperor’s service. This finally convinced Liu Bang that Han Xin was a man to be trusted and taken seriously, and on Xiao He’s advice he promoted him to general-in-chief.3 It was now June 206 BC.

  Warfare of the Time

  THE TERRA COTTA WARRIORS OF XIAN, protecting the grave of Emperor Qin Shihuangdi, are perfect examples of how a warrior would have been accoutered in the time of the Chu-Han Conflict. The primary military arm was the infantry, which by the end of the third century BC would have been wearing scale armor made of iron, bronze, or leather strips sewn together with leather thongs. The terra cotta soldiers almost certainly represent an elite imperial guard force, but even the regular soldiers probably had at least leather armor.

  The standard weapons were the halberd and the bow. The ge, a dagger-axe in use for almost a thousand years, vaguely resembles the European halberd or poleax. It had a point extending at right angles to the shaft, which would be used by swinging the weapon. It was originally made of bronze or jade, but by the end of the third cent
ury iron weapons were becoming somewhat more common. Some have suggested that the dagger blade could be used against charioteers, which may be one reason why chariots had become used mainly for officer transport or ceremonial purposes by the end of the third century. The head of the dagger grew wider and heavier by the same time period. The ji, another common weapon, was much like the ge but with a spear point extending from the shaft. Both were about ten feet long. Spears ranging from five to twelve feet were used as thrusting weapons.

  The infantry was also well manned with archers. A standard five-man squad would usually be made up of three spearmen and two archers, who used both the longbow, made of bamboo, and the crossbow, which had been invented in the sixth century BC and first been used in a pitched battle (as opposed to a siege) in 341 BC. Crossbows reportedly had a range of six hundred paces—roughly the same as six hundred yards. By the time of the Chu-Han conflict, they might have become light enough (and easily enough drawn) to be used by cavalry, but those most likely came a few decades later.

  Cavalry was also an important military component by this time. In previous eras the Chinese had shunned the use of horses as too barbarian. Experience fighting against the Hu on the northwestern frontier began to change some attitudes by the late fourth century, however. Wu Ling of Chao created a cavalry force and obliged his men not only to learn to fight like the barbarians but to dress like them as well. At first only peasants and Hu mercenaries were cavalrymen, but by the time of the Qin dynasty all social classes were involved. Cavalry was used mainly for harassment and pursuit rather than shock. The primary weapon for the cavalry was the bow, but horsemen also carried swords, which most infantrymen carried as well—the jian, a straight, double-edged blade roughly three feet long.4

  The Opponents

  DURING THE CLOSING STAGES OF THE REBELLION against the Qin, Xiang Liang invited Liu Bang to aid him in selecting a new king of Chu. The only descendent they could find, a grandson of King Huaiwang, was a shepherd, but he was named the new king of Chu and given the same name as his grandfather. After Xiang Liang was killed in battle, the shepherd king announced that whoever conquered the Qin capital of Chang’an would be the new king of that principality. Liu Bang and Xiang Yu both asked for the honor. According to contemporary historiographer Sima Qian, the goal was the “region within the passes.”5 This describes the Guanzhong Plain area around Chang’an, which is bordered by the Wei River to the north and mountain passes to the west, south, and east. Although both generals yearned for the glory the conquest would bring, Xiang Yu instead marched northward to the Zhou principality to relieve the prince there from an attack by Qin general Zhang Han, who had killed Xiang Liang.

  Liu Bang’s army therefore marched against Qin. He captured Luoyang and Nanyang, then marched westward through the Wuguan Pass (modern Danfeng) and up the Dan River to Chang’an. The Qin prime minister tried to bargain with Liu, offering to divide the kingdom with him equally; the offer was rejected. The grandson of the emperor Qin Shihuangdi killed the prime minister and took the throne. He voluntarily surrendered his kingdom to Liu in January 206 BC after serving as emperor a mere forty-six days.

  In his campaign in Zhou, Xiang Yu negotiated the surrender of his rival Zhang Han and captured 200,000 soldiers in the process. Although this would have brought his army up to a reported 600,000, Xiang instead decided to kill his prisoners—by burying them alive. (He spared Zhang Han, later naming him king of Yong.) He then marched his army to Chang’an to claim it as his own. Liu Bang met Xiang Yu at the Wuguan Pass and found himself outnumbered four to one. Deciding discretion was the better part of valor, he informed Xiang Yu that he had been holding the capital in trust, awaiting his arrival: “I did not presume to take possession of the tiniest thing I came upon. I registered the officials and people, I sealed up the treasuries, and I waited for the general.… Day and night I was expecting the general to arrive, so how would I go against him!”6 Xiang Yu further illustrated his brutality as he proceeded to occupy Chang’an, kill the Qin emperor and all his family, and burn the palace. He afterward invited Liu Bang to a celebratory dinner during which he planned to assassinate him, but Liu Bang escaped.

  With the rebellion now officially over, Xiang named Chu king Huai-hang to be the new emperor, Yidi. He made himself king of Western Chu and named eighteen other generals and advisors to principalities across China. Instead of receiving the valuable and prestigious land of Qin, therefore, Liu Bang received the state of Han, on the southwest rim of “civilized” China. This “reward” seemed to him and most others to be a slap in the face. It was at this time that Liu Bang finally promoted Han Xin, who immediately proposed a strategy for Liu Bang to unseat Xiang Yu and claim the title of emperor for himself. Han Xin argued that Xiang was an able general but a poor leader. His execution of 200,000 Qin soldiers—while sparing their generals—had unnerved Qin’s population, especially since those same generals were now the kings of the three parts of Qin: Yong, Sai, and Di. Further, when Liu had occupied the Guanzhong area he had treated the people leniently and cancelled the Qin emperor’s harsh law code, replacing it with one of only three rules. Thus, Liu had the Qin people’s support and they would welcome him as their king and even as their emperor. All Liu Bang needed was an opportunity. “The conflict between them was more than a question of personalities; it was a battle between old and new, between the aristocrat and the peasant, the former kingdoms and the unified state,” writes Ann Paludan, in her major book on the Chinese emperors.7

  Upon withdrawing to his mountain capital in Han, Liu Bang had destroyed the zhan dao, wooden-plank roads (alternately described merely as wooden bridges) along cliffs on the way to Chang’an. This was designed both to protect himself from attack and to assure Xiang Yu that he would not be attacking the capital city. Luckily for Liu Bang, he was not the only unhappy king—the king of Qi was assassinated by one of his generals, and Xiang Yu gathered his forces from their capital in his home territory at Pencheng (modern Xuzhou) to suppress that rebellion.

  This was Liu Bang’s chance; with Xiang Yu occupied far to the east, he could now follow up on Han Xin’s plan to unseat Xian Yu and claim for himself the title of emperor. First, Liu placed soldiers to work repairing the zhan dao. This alerted King Zhang Han of Yong, who placed troops in a blocking position for Liu Bang’s outbreak.

  Liu Bang and Han Xin, meanwhile, led an army westward through Hanzhong (modern Nancheng), then marched northward to Chencang (modern Baoji) on the Wei River, just upstream from Chang’an. The three kings of Qin were taken by surprise and surrendered to the Han army, and Liu Bang ruled the region—within a “few months,” according to Chinese military historian Sun Haichen.8 Whether that “few months” in the autumn and winter of 206 BC included the preliminary actions before Chencang, a battle against all three kings at once, or defeating the kings in turn is not clear. To this day in China, “advancing by way of Chencang” is an idiom for a secret move or an illicit rendezvous.

  Xiang Yu could do nothing about Liu Bang’s conquest, because the conflict in Qi dragged on. Liu thus seized the opportunity to expand territory under his control. He sent a column north to take control of two commanderies, Shang and Beiji, west of the Yellow River. He also sent a column toward Xiang Yu’s capital at Pengcheng, where his wife and his father were being kept hostage. Xiang Yu’s army turned them away. Seeing a potential threat toward his capital, Xiang Yu ordered that Emperor Yi leave the city; continuing his ruthless ways, he quickly thereafter ordered the king of Jiujiang to assassinate the expendable monarch. Liu Bang and Han Xin, in the meantime, captured Luoyang and forced the surrender of the king of Henan in February 205 BC, then took over the principality of Wei, just across the Yellow River, seven months later. This success brought defections from Xiang’s camp into Liu Bang’s, including the king of Hann. The king of Yin, Sima Mao, resisted but was defeated; he fled to Chaoge, which Han Xin soon besieged. A feigned withdrawal drew Sima Mao out of the city and he was ambushed and captured. His submis
sion to Liu Bang followed.

  Now in possession of the city of Luoyang, Liu Bang was succeeding in Han Xin’s measured strategy to strangle Xiang Yu’s home province of Chu. Two things changed his mind against this course of action, however. A deserter from Xiang Yu, Chen Ping, advised Liu to march on Pengcheng, Xiang’s capital city, now relatively undefended since Xiang was fighting in Chi. Liu also met Dong-gong, a longtime member of the ruling clique in Luoyang, who suggested that Liu Bang rally the kings around Emperor Yi’s assassination. This brought in pledges of loyalty from the kings of Wei and Dai. Now with an army reportedly of a half-million9 soldiers from his own kingdom as well as Sai, Di, Hann, Wei, Yin, Dai, and Henan, Liu Bang marched for and captured Pengcheng in the spring of 205 BC. Unfortunately, he did nothing to secure his victory: “Drunk with victory and puffed with pride, Liu Bang seized the treasures and women in Xiang Yu’s palace for himself and indulged in drinking parties and various other dissipations every day.”10 He was thus surprised when Xiang Yu returned with a mere 30,000 men, catching the Han army unaware and defeating them so badly that “more than 100,000 of the Han troops all went into the Sui River, which ceased to flow because of this.”11 Liu Bang managed to withdraw to Xingyang on the Yellow River.