Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Both in Jinxing and at the Wei River, Han Xin also played on the mind of his opposing commander. Aware that neither Chen Yu nor Long Ju took him seriously, Han Xin opened his battles with what seemed to be a foolish move in order to confirm his enemies’ opinions of him in their own minds. This made his deceptions all the more effective, for both opponents overcommitted their forces. When disaster struck, the soldiers of both the Zhao and Chu armies panicked, allowing the smaller Han force to turn their defeat into a rout.

  AFTER GAIXIA, LIU BANG became the recognized ruler of China and established the Han Dynasty. He was later given the title Gaotzu, or “Supreme Ancestor.” Liu Bang ruled from the end of February 202 BC through the beginning of June 195 BC. In that time span he did have some trouble with the frontier barbarians, but Han Xin did not fight them. Liu Bang’s opinion of Han Xin’s trustworthiness waxed and waned, alternately leading Liu Bang to deprive him of his army and name him to a high-ranking position, Marquis of Huai-yin. Liu Bang’s primary wife, Empress Lu, did not trust Han Xin and gathered evidence that he plotted rebellion. Invited to the imperial court, he was taken prisoner and executed. In Chinese history, only Cao Cao of the later Han Dynasty is considered near Han Xin’s equal.

  4

  Hannibal (247–182 BC)

  General of Carthage

  He was fearless in undertaking dangerous enterprises, he was prudent in discharging them. Toil could not weary his body or subdue his spirit. Heat and cold he endured alike.

  — Livy, History of Rome

  HANNIBAL WAS BORN THE SON of one of Carthage’s outstanding generals, Hamilcar Barca (whose surname was an epithet meaning “thunderbolt,” or possibly the “flash” of a sword stroke). Hamilcar was head of the clan known in Carthage as the Barcids and rose to prominence in the waning years of the First Punic War. As the Romans were gaining the upper hand in Sicily, the main battleground of the war, Hamilcar led an expedition of mercenaries whom he had personally chosen and paid to the northeastern corner of the island, where he established a stronghold at Hercte. From there he harassed the Romans for three years, avoiding a major battle against them. He then stole away from the position to seize a Roman position on the western coast at Eryx, just north of the town of Drepana. Hamilcar continued the same harassment for a few more years, until eventually a peace treaty ended the war.

  Some sources suggest that Hannibal, who would have been five, was with his father at Eyrx. If so, he was virtually born and raised at war with Rome. By the time Hannibal was nine, the war was over and Hamilcar was sent to establish a Carthaginian presence in Spain. He again led a force of mercenaries on the expedition and assembled them for a religious ceremony prior to departure. According to the first-century Roman history by Polybius, they met at the temple to Zeus. Having “poured a libation to the gods and performed the customary ceremonies,” Hamilcar summoned his young son and asked if he wanted to follow his father to Spain. “Hannibal was overjoyed to accept and, like a boy, begged to be allowed to go. His father then took him by the hand, led him up to the altar and commanded him to lay his hand upon the victim and swear that he would never become a friend to the Romans.”1 This has been taken by many sources as the root of Hannibal’s hatred for Rome, the so-called Barcid Rage. Polybius portrays this oath as creating a man “with a burning desire for power and seeing only one way to it, that is, by living surrounded by weapons and legions, and following one war with another.”2

  Hamilcar then left for Spain, where he succeeded in establishing Carthaginian hegemony. He died as the result of an ambush by a hostile Spanish tribe in 228 BC and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal. Whereas Hamilcar had been known for his military prowess as well as his diplomatic ability, Hasdrubal was more the diplomat. He solidified the hold that Hamilcar had established, ruling in Spain for eight years and establishing the city of New Carthage, modern Cartagena. During his reign, Hasdrubal made Spain extremely profitable for his homeland, but by establishing a major port and ship-building facilities he also drew the attention of Rome, whose nearest outpost was at Marseilles.

  It has been debated whether Hannibal was in Spain throughout Hasdrubal’s reign or had returned to Carthage for a time (as Livy relates).3 Either way, he seems to have gained quite a bit of military experience. Although very little is known of Hannibal’s upbringing, it can reasonably be assumed that his constant exposure to military men, through his father and the mercenaries that fought for him, had educated him in the ways of combat as well in the physical arts. He probably learned generalship from his father and diplomacy from Hasdrubal. He would therefore have known the importance of bravery in battle as a spur to the men under one’s command, as well as the psychological importance of dealing with populations that one needs to ally with—or fight. Although some contemporary Roman accounts portray him as bloodthirsty, a more balanced look at the sources shows a man who knew the value of clemency. Still, we can only draw conclusions from his actions. As Adrian Gold-worthy writes, “The true character of Hannibal eludes us.… We can say a good deal about what Hannibal did during his career, and often understand how he did it, but we can say virtually nothing with any certainty about what sort of man he was.”4

  Carthage came into existence as a colony of Phoenicia, the major sea power of the ancient world; the city was established in what is today Tunisia, while other Phoenician ports of call were established in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, and Italy. Carthage grew into a trading power in its own right, dominating the western Mediterranean as the eastern became a battleground for Greek and Persian navies.

  As Carthage spread its influence across northern Africa, wealth and status based on land came to rival that based on trade. As Carthage gained a more stable food supply, the population grew and colonies (not just trade centers) were needed to siphon off excess population. More land was therefore required, and Sicily became one of Carthage’s primary settlement grounds.

  Without its own military tradition to build upon, Carthage depended for the most part on mercenary troops. By the third century BC, however, the citizenry began to become more involved. They had always provided the oarsmen for the naval battles, but now they began to organize and train in hoplite-style warfare. They used chariots until the mid-third century BC; when they encountered war elephants while fighting the Greek general Pyrrhus in Sicily, the Carthaginians chose that new weapon for their shock forces.

  As Carthage was establishing its sphere of influence, the citizens of Rome were doing the same. By the middle of the third century BC, they had come to dominate most of the Italian Peninsula, whether directly or indirectly. Although they showed little interest outside the peninsula, Romans came to see Carthaginian interest in Sicily as a potential threat to the southernmost regions of Rome’s control. Overlapping spheres of influence thus led to military conflict when Sicily became the battleground between Carthage and Rome in the First Punic War (264–241 BC). One of the most important results of the war was that nascent Roman naval power grew into a force, one powerful enough to destroy Carthage’s fleets. This obliged Carthage to spend even more time building up an army, which still depended on mercenaries to a great extent. The end of the war brought Hamilcar Barca and his family to the pinnacle of Carthaginian society and government, and it was thus Hamilcar who led an army to Spain to reestablish an economic base that had been lost with the Roman takeover of Sicily.

  Warfare of the Time

  WHEN HE ROSE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF CARTHAGINIAN SPAIN, Hannibal commanded a polyglot army with a variety of weapons, backgrounds, talents, and languages. Like his brother-in-law and father, he had not forced these people into service: they fought for pay and for their leader. They had followed Hamilcar and Hasdrubal and they followed Hannibal, not just because he was his father’s son but because he had earned their respect in combat. He seems to have been schooled in the military arts from a young age and had the environment from which to learn a variety of the tricks of the trade from the multiethnic mercena
ry forces and the Iberian tribes. The government in Carthage readily named him to succeed Hasdrubal.

  The mercenary infantry troops from Africa were either Carthaginian or Libyan, and they began the Second Punic War closely resembling the traditional Greek hoplites. After campaigning in Italy, however, they soon began wearing captured Roman mail and using Roman weapons, primarily the short stabbing sword known as the gladius. They did not, however, use the Roman shield, probably to maintain quick identification in the midst of battle. The African cavalry forces were primarily from the Kingdom of Numidia, modern Algeria. They were excellent horsemen and reputedly rode without saddle or bridle, armed with shields and long javelins. The Spanish cavalry was heavier, used more for shock than scouting or harassment. Thus Hannibal’s Spanish cavalry accepted and delivered head-on charges; the Numidian light cavalry were used for harassment.5

  Hannibal’s Spanish and Gallic-Celtic infantry was made up of both heavy and light varieties, with slingers from the Balearic Islands acting as skirmishers. The light infantry (caetrati) carried a buckler and short sword; the heavies (scutarii) carried a large, flat, oval shield and were armed with short sword, stabbing spear, and javelins. The ancient Roman historian Polybius notes, “The shields used by the Spaniards and Celts [northern Iberian tribes were of Celtic/Gaulish ethnicity] were very similar to one another, but their swords were quite different. The point of the Spanish sword was no less effective for wounding than the edge.… [T]he troops were drawn up in alternate companies, the Celts naked [probably to the waist], the Spanish with their short linen tunics bordered with purple—their national dress—so their line presented a strange and terrifying appearance.”6 Like Alexander’s army, the Carthaginians employed combined arms, but Hannibal depended on cavalry as the primary arm of decision. Even so, cavalry under Hannibal did not hold the special status it had had with Alexander’s Companions.

  The Romans also had cavalry, but the strength of their army was their infantry. Like the Greeks, the Roman Republic employed citizen-soldiers who fought for short enlistments and spent most of their lives tending their farms. Thus, whenever the Roman army took the field there was a mixture of veterans and new recruits. It was that mixture that led the Roman military to move away from the traditional phalanx formation of the ancient world. Instead of one long, continuous line, the troops were formed into “maniples”—smaller units made up of two sixty-man units called centuries, lining up twelve men wide and ten deep. The maniples deployed with gaps between them. In the second rank, another set of maniples deployed behind the gaps created in the first line. This allowed the front units space to retreat, if necessary, into the second line or the second line to advance into the first. A third line of maniples, made up of single rather than double centuries, lined up behind the second rank’s gaps.

  In front of the army came the velites, the youngest and poorest recruits who formed the skirmish line. They were armed with javelins, gladius, and a hide-covered wicker shield. In the leading line of the phalanx were the hastati, young men who could provide some armor for themselves. They carried two throwing spears, called pila, made of a long metal shaft extending from a wooden haft. This metal was tempered only about halfway back from the point, making the entire pilum bend on impact and rendering it temporarily useless, so that it could not be used by the enemy. The hastati also carried a short sword based on a Spanish design, the gladius hispaniensis, as well as a large oval shield, the scutum. The second line of maniples were made up of principes, veterans in their twenties and thirties, armed like the hastati. The third line were the triarii, older veterans who acted as reserves and who were armed mainly with the Greek-style spear in order to form a last line of defense. John Warry describes the Roman army going into combat:

  At about 150 yards both sides charge. The front ranks of hastati throw their light pila at about 35 yards from the enemy, quickly followed by their heavy pila. They draw swords and close up on the run and hit the enemy with as much impact as possible. Succeeding ranks throw pila over the front ranks. The battle is a succession of furious combats with both sides drawing apart to recover. This might go on for several hours.7

  Just how the separated maniples worked in battle is a question of some debate. Did they remain separated in battle? “An area of significant dispute is the lateral spacing between these dueling front rankers,” Philip Sabin notes. “Polybius claims that there was only one legionary in the front rank for every six feet of unit frontage, whereas Vegetius states that legionaries fought on a frontage of just three feet.”8 Some scholars also argue that the gaps were only there during the approach. Once the velites had accomplished their skirmishing, they would withdraw through the gaps. Once they did so, the rear century would slide over the forward to fill the gap.9 Thus, a solid line made the assault. Another possibility is that the maniples were deployed for battle (while the velites were skirmishing) in separated units, with each man having Vegetius’s three-foot frontage. Then, as the velites retreated through the gaps and the maniples started forward, the men began to spread apart to Polybius’s six-foot frontage. Well before physical contact with the enemy, the gaps between units would disappear and each man would have the individual fighting room he needed. As the lines drew back, the men would then close back up into a more defensive posture of a three-foot frontage. This seems a much simpler process and explanation than shifting units.

  How did a battle play out? Most sources believe the hastati, once in a full line, broke into a run, with each man throwing his pilum at about thirty yards’ distance from the enemy, before they hit full force with their shields and swords. If that did not cause the enemy’s line to break, it became a matter of positioning legionaries in a line, thrusting at whatever enemy soldier came within reach. After a time, exhaustion would begin to set in and the opposing lines would draw apart. The dead and wounded would be replaced by soldiers advancing from the rear of the maniple. More pila would be thrown, and the assault would begin again when the soldiers had caught their breath. Periodically, if the clashes of front lines did not cause a full retreat, the hastati may have been relieved by the second line of principes. This would not only bring in fresh troops but more experienced ones to renew the fighting. At some point, one side or the other would sense defeat and begin to fall apart. Most believe that the rigorous discipline of the Roman troops was their primary advantage in the overall decision, allowing them to pound away with infantry until the other side was too tired or too broken in spirit to fight any longer.10

  The Opponents

  THE INITIAL CAUSE OF HANNIBAL’S INVASION of Italy was a treaty negotiated by his brother-in-law Hasdrubal, wherein he agreed to limit Carthaginian occupation of Spain to the south bank of the River Ebro. North of that line, Roman allies held sway. The problem arose when Hannibal, who took power after Hasdrubal’s death, laid siege to the town of Saguntum, an ally of Rome that lay about a hundred miles south of the Ebro. The Roman government sent a delegation to Carthage, demanding that Hannibal be surrendered to them for punishment. The Carthaginian government argued that the Ebro agreement was made by Hasdrubal and not ratified by the government; hence, it was not bound by it. When Carthaginian leaders would not give the Roman emissaries satisfaction, war became the only option. Hannibal indeed set out for Rome, but at the head of an army rather than as a prisoner.

  The Roman system of government and military command rotated annually with the election of two consuls, who had civil duties but also commanded legions in the field. Thus, Hannibal never faced the same general twice. The presumption of the system was that sooner or later an elected consul would have the talent to win battles. The primary drawback was that with no consistent leadership, little or no esprit de corps developed. Coupled with the annual draft of manpower that mixed together citizens from all across the peninsula rather than retaining local or regional units (where some knowledge of one’s comrades already existed), and the fact that there was a war on and training time was therefore limited, the unit cohesion
in the Roman army was negligible.

  The Romans assumed they could pin Hannibal down in Spain with one force while landing another in North Africa and threatening Carthage itself. Hannibal was too fast for them, however. In March 218 BC he started out on one of the great marches in all of military history, leading some 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants. He had just over seven months to cross the Pyrenees, get through southern Transalpine Gaul (modern France), cross the Rhone River, and get through the Alps into Italy before the snow fell. By the time the Romans had their first army embarked for Spain and stopped for supplies as Massilia (Marseilles), Hannibal was already past them, headed east. One of the consuls, Publius Cornelius Scipio, sent his army on to Spain under command of his brother, then left Massilia and quickly returned to the Po River valley to recruit new forces and meet Hannibal’s army as it emerged from the Alps. Scipio had to pick up what manpower he could as he headed up the Italian Peninsula, and incorporated garrison forces recently beaten back by Gallic forces and therefore not the cream of the crop. Scipio therefore had an army of raw recruits and defeated veterans—a poor mix militarily and psychologically.11