Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Marlborough chose the direct route for the attack, up a steep hillside. He sent 6,000 men in three lines in the first wave, supported by eight battalions directly behind and another eight echeloned to the right. He also had 35 squadrons of cavalry, which he formed close behind and to the right of his main force.42 At about 6:15 p.m. the lead force of 6,000 grenadiers and volunteers charged at the strongest point of the defense, just uphill from the unrepaired Fort Augustine. English cannon fire was very accurate, and the English were soon fighting hand-to-hand on the parapets. A French defender wrote an account of the battle: “The English infantry led this attack with greatest intrepidity, right up to our parapet, but there they were opposed with courage at least equal to their own. Rage, fury, and desperation were manifested by both sides, with the more obstinacy as the assailants and assailed were perhaps the bravest soldiers in the world.”43 After two failed assaults in an hour’s fighting, the English fell back to a dip in the ground where they were protected from enemy fire.

  All of this, however, was diversion, designed to draw as many reserves as possible to the right flank of the defense. As the assault ended, a new one began on the defenders’ left, where the fortifications were not in good repair. Here, Baden somewhat surprisingly led a mixed Anglo-imperial force into the now lightly held section of the defense. They quickly broke through and swarmed onto the defenders’ flank and rear, while Marlborough rallied his men for a third assault. Pressed from both sides, the defenders broke and ran for the river, where a pontoon bridge broke under their weight. The pursuing cavalry showed no mercy.

  The assault cost the allied army 1,500 killed and 4,500 wounded, most of them British. So many casualties in so short a space of time was rare, and the news was not well received in London. The defenders, however, suffered much more heavily. D’Arco commanded some 14,000 men, roughly 11,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. A British witness recorded, “The loss of the enemy was computed to be about 7,000 killed, 2,000 drowned, and 3,000 taken, with everything they had.”44 The Bavarian elector had been marching to the town’s relief but arrived too late; he instead moved south to the stronghold of Augsburg. He ordered Donauwörth to be destroyed and the garrison to join him, but the French commander fled without carrying out his orders and the allies captured the town intact. They now held a secure crossing over the Danube, had captured a large amount of supplies, and seized the initiative. With Donauwörth in allied hands, the road to Vienna was blocked and the Bavarian towns and rich countryside were wide open.45

  In spite of this costly success, the overall situation remained bleak for Marlborough and his allies. Max and Marsin refused to come out of Augsburg, mainly because they had received word that Tallard was marching to their aid. Eugene, however, was between the two French forces and delayed Tallard’s advance, as did the 8,000 supply wagons he had to navigate through the Black Forest. Perhaps one-third of the French force became stragglers.46 By late July both forces joined their respective sides. As Tallard marched, Marlborough grew desperate to draw the enemy out of Augsburg. Military historian Russell Weigley comments that he therefore “embarked on one of the less admirable ventures of his career. He turned his army loose to plunder and devastate Bavaria, with the idea that the cries of his subjects might cause the Elector to either make peace or, at least, to disperse his army for the protection of the countryside.”47 This action partially achieved the desired effect. Maximilian did spread out some of his troops, and even considered negotiating, but Tallard’s arrival on 5 August ended that hope. On the other hand, the juncture of the armies brought about the real potential for a pitched battle, which had been Marlborough’s ultimate goal.

  Once the Franco-Bavarian army was collected, Tallard marched it along the north bank of the Danube, hoping to cut Marlborough’s lines of communication. Marlborough sent Baden with 15,000 men to besiege Ingolstadt. Many sources claim this move was designed to remove the cautious general from the planning for a decisive battle. In reality, the idea to capture Ingolstadt was Baden’s own. Nonetheless, Marlborough and Eugene do not seem to have been sad to see him off. Although these two had only known each other for less than two months, they were as closely attuned as Chinggis and Subedai. Marlborough sent for his forces to rally at Rain (site of Gustavus’s victory over Tilly), while Eugene held his force on the north bank at Hochstadt for forward observation.

  With the arrival of Tallard’s forces, Tallard superseded Marsin, but he could not give orders to Elector Maximilian. That proved to be a key factor in the upcoming events. When Marlborough had sent his men to loot the Bavarian countryside, Max had sent out forces to garrison key towns for protection. They were still deployed across the area, leaving the three generals in command of a force that was primarily French though technically commanded by the Bavarian. The question before them was: what would the allies do? The three were fairly sure that their vast numbers were sufficient to oblige the allies to abandon the Danube region, probably retreating into Franconia. Thus, all that was necessary was to keep together and allow that to happen. In order to avenge the recent pillaging, Max was eager to set out in search of the allied force. “However, Tallard was less hasty, preferring to await the arrival of the recalled Bavarian detachments,” writes Charles Spencer. “When the Elector persisted, Tallard replied icily: ‘If I were not so convinced of Your Highness’s integrity, I should imagine that you wished to gamble with the King’s forces without having any of your own, to see that no risk would happen.’”48 They decided to move forward to the town of Hochstadt, from where they could deploy in a strong defensive position.

  That movement obliged Eugene to withdraw slightly and call for Marlborough to bring up his forces, now numbering 38,000 after detaching 15,000 with Margrave Louis to besiege Ingolstadt. Marlborough brought his men across the Danube at Donauwörth and marched four miles along the north bank to join Eugene at Münster. On 11 August their forces were combined, and the enemy was deploying just to the west between the villages of Hochstadt and Blindheim, along a stream called the Nebel. A personal reconnaissance gave Marlborough and Eugene a good view of the ground and the layout of the enemy forces. Tallard had chosen his bivouac site more for defense than for a battle. After all, he was used to siege warfare and not rapid action. This was all Marlborough needed to implement a great surprise.49 This complacency was compounded by intelligence gathered by the French from allied prisoners that Louis was leaving Ingolstadt to join Marlborough and Eugene, at which point they would all retreat northward. Marlborough, however, had sent those prisoners to be captured and give this disinformation.

  The allied army was on the march by 3:00 p.m. on 13 August. The plain around the Nebel is a large semicircle of wooded hills overlooking the Danube. However, the approach from the east is through narrow passages, and the allied army could not arrive all at once. Luckily for the allies, a morning mist covered their arrival, and by the time it began to lift Marlborough’s forces were already lined up along the Nebel. The French, meanwhile, were not in their normal deployment of infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings. The force that had arrived with Tallard was arrayed northwest-southeast between the villages of Oberglau and Blindheim. The elector and Marsin were to the left in an almost east-west line from Oberglau to Lutzingen. The Nebel flowed across their front, but was only about ten feet wide, not very deep, with marshy ground along both sides. Almost their entire front was cavalry, with infantry units arrayed in a second line. Blindheim and Oberglau were both occupied by infantry and were the right and center anchors of the line. The force numbered between 56,000 and 60,000 with 90–100 guns.

  The allied Anglo-Imperial force had between 52,000 and 56,000 men and only 60 guns. The numerical difference between the forces meant little to Marlborough, who had great faith in his men and their training.50 He fronted his line with infantry, cavalry in a second line, and infantry in a third, massing around the village of Unterglau. He put his strongest effort on his left against the village of Blindheim. When Eugene’s force
s arrived they passed behind Marlborough’s to deploy opposite the elector and Marsin. Eugene deployed infantry along the Nebel near Oberglau and put most of his cavalry on the far right flank. The plan was for Eugene’s troops to hold the French left wing in place while Marlborough took care of Tallard’s army on the right wing. A front line of cavalry was unusual, but apparently Tallard depended on the mud along the Nebel to significantly hamper any allied advance. With the allies deployed, Tallard decided not to alter his forces. He apparently was going to wait for Marlborough to bring his men across the river, then force them back into it.51 While the British were trying to recover their lines after the crossing, Tallard expected his artillery and enfilading fire from Blindheim and Oberglau to pin them down.

  Marlborough saw that Blindheim and Oberglau were the keys. Both were strongly defended, and those became the focal points for his attacks. One of Marlborough’s major biographers, David Chandler, writes, “Marlborough did not disappoint Tallard in selecting this apparent death-trap for his main assault, but the Duke’s eagle eye had not failed to notice several weaknesses in the French position. If the garrisons of Blenheim and Oberglau could be effectively contained within their positions, Tallard’s center would be dangerously exposed. … It would be difficult for the French commander to ensure full co-operation between his two flanks.”52 Thus, Blindheim became the target of the initial assault. The village of some 300 houses was defended by the best French infantry available, in sixteen battalions with another eleven arrayed behind the village. Twelve squadrons of dismounted dragoons held the ground between Blindheim and the Danube.

  The battle started, as was customary, with an exchange of artillery fire. Marlborough’s men had to withstand some four hours of this while Eugene’s men moved into position. Also, the engineers were trying to position pontoons to aid in crossing the Nebel, for the stone bridges across the stream were easily within musket range of Blindheim and Oberglau. Marlborough had his men lie down most of the time in order to try to avoid some of the artillery fire. Just past noon he received word from Eugene that the right flank units were in position and he was ready for battle. At about 12:30 the attack began with Lord Cutts leading twenty battalions of infantry and fifteen squadrons of cavalry against Blindheim. These were the cream of the British forces, and they took a terrible beating. They retreated and attacked again. Their bravery frightened Lieutenant General Philippe, the Marquis de Clérambault, commanding the defense, so he called up the reserves and had the dragoons leave their flanking position and come into the village as well. He also brought in infantry reserves from the center of Tallard’s line, weakening that sector. Tallard was at the time on the far side of the battlefield conferring with Marsin and Maximilian. Blindheim now held twenty-seven battalions; troops were packed so tightly into the village they could barely move, but they made easy targets for English muskets. A mere nine battalions, primarily recruits, remained to support the French cavalry in Tallard’s lines.

  With the struggle going back and forth, French cavalry tried to assist in throwing back the assaults. This is where Marlborough’s philosophy of aggressive cavalry tactics paid off. Tallard had just returned from the left wing when he saw eight squadrons of his elite cavalry being driven back by five squadrons of British cavalry. Even though a relatively minor action, it still shook Tallard’s morale.53

  With Blindheim sucking in French resources, Marlborough ordered units on his right to attack Oberglau while units in the center began to cross the Nebel and form up on the far side. Tallard was once again out of the picture, now looking into the situation at Blindheim as the advances took place. At Oberglau, however, the French were doing just fine without him. Ten battalions under the prince of Holstein-Beck assaulted the well-defended position and were not only repulsed but pursued by the defenders, primarily the Irish “Wild Geese,” who served with the French after William drove them from Ireland. As they came out of their defenses cavalry units joined in, and it looked as though Marlborough’s right flank might collapse. The infantry held the French cavalry at bay long enough for the retreating British cavalry to reform and recover the field. For assistance, Marlborough sent an urgent request to Eugene for more cavalry support. Hard-pressed himself, Eugene sent some squadrons anyway while he kept up his attack with infantry. Meanwhile, Marlborough brought up some artillery to aid in the assault, gathered together cavalry and the re-formed infantry under Holstein-Beck, and personally led the charge against the village.54

  On the allied right wing Eugene had his hands full. Marsin and Maximilian had decided to defend the Nebel rather than let the enemy across, and they were doing a good job of it. Imperial cavalry had tried to sweep the far right flank and had captured some guns near Lutzingen, but a Bavarian counterattack regained the lost ground and guns. A second cavalry charge fared no better, nor did a third. After Eugene dispatched cavalry aid to Oberglau, he was immediately back into the thick of the fight. The three failed charges had begun to dishearten some of the troops and there was a feeling of panic, but after he shot two men for running, the others took heart. Declaring, “I wish to fight among brave men and not cowards,” Eugene joined units of Prussian and Danish mercenaries.55

  The allied regrouping after the initial repulse at Oberglau kept up pressure on the village and brought in a few more French reserves, further weakening the French center. Now was the time for Marlborough to strike. Weigley describes the scene: “Choosing with superb military instinct—the hallmark of the warrior, reaching beyond the intellectual qualities of the educated professional soldier—the moment when the fight was most fluid and ready to be resolved by a fresh effort by either side, Marlborough ordered a general assault and threw in his massed cavalry.”56 His reserves had crossed the Nebel and deployed on the French side, two lines of cavalry in front with two lines of infantry in support. Artillery was also hauled across the pontoons and brought to bear. Marlborough now deployed 80 fresh squadrons against the 50–60 tired French squadrons, plus 23 battalions of British and German infantry against the remaining 9 French battalions. The lessons taught by Gustavus came to life again, as infantry and cavalry worked together. The British cavalry charged, then withdrew between gaps in the infantry battalions, which blasted the pursuing French cavalry, which were then chased by the re-formed British horsemen. That, in addition to the newly placed artillery, broke the French center and the rout was on. The massed advance was more than the French cavalry could take, with even the elite Maison du Roi in headlong flight.57

  Once Tallard began to fall back, allied infantry split to surround both Blindheim and Oberglau, as well as strike Marsin’s rear. Pressed by Eugene in front (who was by now making good progress on the far flank near Lutzingen) and the victorious allies on their right, Marsin and Maximilian had no choice but to join in the retreat. They withdrew in better order, trying to make for Hochstadt. The 27 battalions in Blindheim surrendered about 9:00 that evening, their commander having fled on horse and drowned in the Danube. With the surrender of some 10,000 troops, the psychological effect was tremendous across western Europe, for the concept of French invincibility had been proven false.58

  In a time when casualties were usually numbered in the hundreds or a few thousand, the Battle of Blenheim (as the German village came to be known in its anglicized form) was horrific: more than 4,500 allied soldiers killed and almost 8,000 wounded. Of the British soldiers engaged, one in four was killed or wounded, and some 40 percent of the British officers were casualties. The number, of course, was much higher on the losing side. Spencer recounts, “Marlborough intercepted reports sent from Duttlingen to the French court by survivors. These conceded that 40,000 of Louis’s and the Elector’s men had been killed, wounded, or captured at Blenheim. … Perhaps most revealing is the statistic calculated by Marlborough’s biographer, Archdeacon Coxe: of the 4,500 Franco-Bavarian officers who fought at Blenheim, only 250 were not killed, wounded or captured.”59

  The allied approach march began at roughly 3:00 a.m. but,
owing to rougher terrain on the northern flank of the march, Eugene’s deployment delayed what could have been a surprise attack. Having surveyed the battlefield site the day before, Marlborough already had in mind the deployment of all three arms for best coordination in a deliberate attack. His primary tactic was feint and demonstration, successfully tying down large numbers of enemy troops while at the same time creating a weak spot for his main assault. The breakthrough allowed for only temporary pursuit as it was late in the day; therefore, there was no real attempt at immediate exploitation, although operations over the next few months took advantage of the victory. The most important military effect was the virtual destruction of the Franco-Bavarian force. Strategically, it allowed for capture and securing of all major strong points along the Danube and Rhine as well as potentially laying France open to invasion. Politically, it saved Vienna and the empire from collapse and took Bavaria out of the war. J. F. C. Fuller remarks on the importance of the battle: “Had Marlborough been defeated, the Elector of Bavaria would have replaced the House of Habsburg on the Imperial throne; Munich would have ousted Vienna; and the Empire itself would have become a satrapy of France. … For England, Blenheim was the greatest battle won on foreign soil since Agincourt. It broke the prestige of the French armies and plunged them into disgrace and ridicule.”60