Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Napoleon’s training and specialty was with artillery, an arm that was also undergoing a major transformation in the prerevolutionary era. By the time of the Seven Years’ War, other countries had begun manufacturing smaller cannon for more mobility on the battlefield, while the French were still focused on artillery as siege weapons. Bitter experience in battles against Prussian and English armies brought them to the realization they needed to adapt their theories. In 1763, Jean Baptiste Vacquette de Gribeauval was assigned to oversee the modernization of French artillery. He had worked with the head of the Austrian artillery forces during the Seven Years’ War, during which the Austrians had developed the finest artillery arm in Europe. Using the Austrian guns as models, Gribeauval redesigned the French pieces to be more maneuverable than before. Instead of fifteen horses, his 12-pounder cannon could be moved by six horses or fifteen men. Also like Frederick’s guns, the new French artillery could be transported across obstacles easily and moved as quickly as infantry.17 Gribeauval was also responsible for two technical innovations: the elevating screw to more accurately adjust for range, and a graduated rear sight. These, as well as the adoption of Dutch casting methods, made the French guns highly accurate.

  Napoleon inherited from the du Teil brothers the opinion that artillery fire on the battlefield should be just like that in a siege: massed fire at a single point to break down the defense. The increased use of smaller guns on the battlefield, however, brought about the view that placement on high ground was not the best position for maximum damage. Artillery usually fired cast iron balls, which were most effective when fired at a level trajectory about chest high. Whether flying through the air or bouncing along the ground, they caused serious wounds and death. Higher trajectories meant less bouncing, hence less damage. Therefore, gunners preferred flat, open, hard ground.18 As that was just the type of ground that facilitated linear warfare and cavalry charges, the use of artillery naturally became more widespread and deadly. Napoleon increased the number of guns to four per one thousand men, each gun having at hand 300–350 rounds.

  Along with these developments came a debate over how best to actually engage the enemy. Since the time of Gustavus Adolphus armies had been deploying in linear formations in order to maximize the firepower of inaccurate arquebuses and muskets. To be effective, this demanded disciplined troops who would stand and take casualties while delivering their fire. The question that Napoleon and contemporary generals faced was whether a citizen army could be sufficiently trained to handle that pressure, as had the professional armies that had dominated the battlefield for more than a hundred years. If not, how could these citizen soldiers best be employed? One answer was the use of infantry as if it were pre-gunpowder cavalry, for shock attacks. The soldiers were deployed not in line but in column and sent forward in a rapid bayonet charge. Harking back to the concept of othismos in ancient Greece, the depth of the column and the momentum generated by the pressure of the rear ranks upon men in front could create sufficient shock effect sufficient to puncture and break the enemy’s line.19 This recalls the Athenians at Marathon; speed could diminish the effect of firepower given the slow reloading time necessary for the musket. Other advantages of this column formation were the ability to better cross rough terrain, the concentration of officers and noncommissioned officers giving an example of leadership, the smaller target that would be presented to the enemy line formation, and the fact that the unit could more easily form into a defensive square should cavalry attack. The battalion column was one or two companies wide, making it a front of 50–80 men, and a depth of 9–12 men. This would make it 30–60 yards wide and 12–15 yards deep. It was therefore still wider than it was deep, but significantly narrower on its front than the shallow line it would be attacking.20

  On the other hand, the column could not produce much firepower, and if the soldiers in the defending line were well trained they could maintain a fairly steady rate of fire by ranks, somewhat negating the slow reloading. The compromise, and the formation favored by Napoleon, was a combination of line and column, known as l’ordre mixte. This would usually be a battalion in line flanked by two battalion columns. Chandler observes that l’ordre mixte was “ideally adapted for the exploitation of success, the assumption of the defensive or an abrupt change of front; in other words it could perform almost any role with a minimum of delay.”21 The size of the formation could vary up to a divisional line with brigade flanking columns. If columns alone advanced onto the field, they would do so in order to gain position as quickly as possible before deploying into line to begin the actual exchange of fire. It was during that shift that the French troops were most vulnerable; Chandler notes that the French columns “habitually attempted to carry out these instructions, but often delayed the final evolution until it was too late.”22

  Another addition to the military repertoire was the large-scale introduction of light infantry as skirmishers. Skirmishers had been used during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, introduced by the Austrians, who learned the practice in their wars against the Ottomans. The French began using them during the War of the First Coalition (1792–95) in order to soften up the enemy line before the main attack. Military historian Trevor Dupuy in his Evolution of Weapons and Warfare notes that “by 1793 all battalions were acting as light infantry, dissolving into skirmisher swarms as soon as action was joined. These fighting methods, sometimes called ‘horde tactics,’ were in turn superseded after 1795 by a tendency to return to properly controlled assault columns, preceded by skirmishers whose functions were reconnaissance and disruption of the enemy by individual aimed fire.”23 Significantly, this French skirmishing system was not performed by special light troops but by regular soldiers. Thus, during the Wars of Revolution the swarm, or horde, could disrupt the normal linear tactics. They later became more specialized, often marksmen; in the Prussian forces they were called Jägers, hunters. As such, they were used to counter the enemy’s skirmishers and to pick off officers, thus diminishing command and control functions.24 These soldiers in the French army were called tirailleurs; later Napoleon introduced the voltigeurs, who were to go into battle with the cavalry. Usually one company per battalion was designated as skirmishers, though at times entire battalions might be deployed as such. French skirmishers gained a solid reputation for the effectiveness of their harassing fire.

  In spite of the adoption of the 1791 manual, during the Wars of Revolution the mode of warfare depended on the man in command, though the government attempted to dictate a constant offense, usually with the bayonet. This sounded good to politicians in Paris but was of little practical use on the battlefield. Once the national conscription, or levée en masse, was introduced in late summer 1793, manpower became a French advantage. The French column attack became stereotypical, but wasn’t quite as bayonet-oriented as believed. Early in the Wars of the Revolution the French system became more flexible, shifting between line and column, using skirmishers and artillery as the situation called for.25 This system brought two battalions of recruits together with one of veteran regulars. The regulars deployed and fought in line flanked by the new men. The battalion in the center used the veterans’ discipline to maintain sufficient fire while the recruits were thrown at the weak points created in the enemy lines. Napoleon developed this ordre mixte all the way to divisional level.26 Coupled with the increased production of arms, the French ordre mixte produced both firepower and shock.

  All that was missing was cavalry. The French fielded the arm, of course, but the troopers were few in number and lacking in effectiveness, as many of the former cavalry officers were nobles who had not fared well in the Revolution. Napoleon expanded the role of light cavalry, depending on them for both reconnaissance and as a screen for his widely separated divisions. The screen effectively provided early warning of enemy movements and also denied the enemy the ability to know just where the French army was located. Light cavalry also proved extremely effective in the pursuit. On the
other hand, Napoleon also revived the true heavy cavalry. Dupuy writes that Napoleon’s cavalry, “provided with horse artillery and used in great but articulate masses and in surprise operations against hostile cavalry and infantry,” was very effective, particularly as it was often used against enemy troops who were already shaken by massive artillery fire or by infantry attack. “During the early Napoleonic Wars, under outstanding leaders, and by its impetuous charges, French cavalry was generally superior to the best cavalry in other European nations.”27

  Other than the more mobile horse artillery, virtually none of the weaponry of the Napoleonic era differed to any great extent from that of Frederick’s day. The standard French infantry weapon was a .69 caliber smoothbore musket introduced in 1777. Though Napoleon had enhanced light infantry, the regular blend of fusilier and grenadier remained fairly standard. The main advancement was the development, thanks to Guibert and Bourcet, of the independently acting division made up of all arms, which made for speed and ease of supply. In his classic work on strategy, Peter Paret observes that living off the land was facilitated by Napoleon’s warfare style of combined arms in the corps organization. He notes that “the extended army covered much ground … but also, and primarily, enabled its component parts to move more rapidly, gave them greater flexibility, and multiplied the commander in chief’s operational choices.”28 The separated corps could move and converge into a variety of formations: echelon, wedge, or en potence with one flank reinforced. Napoleon also introduced what became known as the batallion carré: He moved his army in four corps in a rough diamond shape along separate lines of march, roughly a day’s march apart. “Each self-contained, all-arm corps was capable of engaging or holding off several times its own number for several hours, during which time the neighboring formations could move up to its support or to outflank the enemy,” Chandler explains. “This dispersal was carefully controlled, and the appearance of disunity was stronger than the reality.”29

  The batallion carré worked both for intentional and surprise contact with the enemy. All the corps marched toward a predetermined site where the enemy army would be located; Napoleon cared little for other targets, such as cities or fortresses. The enemy army was the center of gravity, the key to breaking an enemy’s will and forcing his surrender. If, however, along the line of march the advanced cavalry screen stumbled into an unexpected force, the corps nearest at hand would engage. The two closest corps would come up on either side, looking for which enemy flank was weakest. The farthest corps would come up and act as a reserve. Either way, the goal on the battlefield was the manoeuvre sur les derrières, the flanking move that would either result in positioning the corps for an attack on the enemy rear or oblige the enemy to redeploy to protect his flank or line of communications, which would create an exploitable weakness somewhere else along the line. Once the weak spot was discovered, the reserve would be thrown in to break the line and begin the pursuit. In Chandler’s view, “In this way Napoleon fused battle with maneuver, and thus made possibly his greatest contribution to the art of war.”30

  The Opponents

  THE AUSTRIANS, WHO FOUGHT AGAINST NAPOLEON more than any other power, went into the Napoleonic Wars with the traditional linear tactics of the century, apparently unaware of (or unconcerned with) developments in France. The Austrian generals favored defense over offense, firepower to break the enemy charge rather than to break the enemy line. They had increased the professionalism of their forces in the wake of their experiences against Frederick, improving their performance as the Seven Years’ War progressed after their defeat at Leuthen in late 1757.31

  The Austrians began to change their tune, however, when the French revolutionaries won victories against them and other European armies with their attacks in column. Although they attempted to adopt the French tactics for themselves, the Austrians were far less successful with these maneuvers. The revolutionaries won their early battles as much by numbers and the willingness to accept high casualties, both of which came from the spirit of the times in France. Such nationalism could not be matched in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, composed as it was of Germans, Czechs, Flemings, Walloons, Croats, Serbs, Poles, and a number of smaller ethnic populations. Without nationalistic fervor to draw on, the Austrian army had to rely on traditional tactics until a sufficiently peaceful period should occur when reforms might be considered. As it happened, that was not until 1804–5. When the Austrians met Napoleon in northern Italy, they were facing an army whose revolutionary elan had cooled somewhat, but which had a commander for whom they were unprepared.

  The French first ventured into the Italian Peninsula in 1792 in an effort to secure their southeastern frontier from a hostile but weak House of Savoy. They were quickly victorious but made no further immediate forays into the neighboring states, most of which were owned or dominated by Austria. When the Wars of the Revolution began in earnest, the French government was more worried about its eastern frontier. After initial French successes against coalition invaders into France in 1793–94, the southeast became the object of the French army’s first offensive moves.

  Napoleon, who had been in and out of prison in direct relation to changes in the revolutionary leadership, had finally proved himself worthy to the new Directory under Paul Barras by suppressing a Paris revolt against Barras’s government in July 1794. This later earned him appointment to command of the French Army in Italy. The Austrians allied with Piedmont had kept French armies at bay until 1796, when the Directory decided to make war against Austria with a main effort through the Rhineland and a diversionary offensive into Italy. The plan was to have the Army of the Alps under Count F. E. Kellerman pin down the Piedmontese army while Napoleon marched along the coast road in a flanking move. Napoleon took command of a starving army led by veterans who despised him for his political appointment. The two commanders in the region, Andre Massena and P.F.C. Augereau, each thought he should be in command rather than this boy general. Napoleon’s charm and acumen, however, won them over on their first meeting.32 He convinced his new subordinates that the divided Austrians could be beaten separately; he convinced his troops that victory would lead to full bellies and full pockets. Indeed, it has been supposed one of the reasons for the 1796 offensives was to enhance the French treasury by living off enemy territory and pillaging the enemy’s wealth.

  Although the French were outnumbered by the Austrians (47,000 to 37,000), the enemy were in two separated columns. Napoleon here first introduced one of his signature strategies, that of the central position. Using the divisional concept from Guibert, he posted a minimal force to the east to hold back one Austrian army while he took the bulk of his forces against the western enemy in mid-April. This resulted in the defeat of Austrian general Michael Colli’s army of 25,000 on the 22nd, after which Piedmont agreed to sign an armistice. Napoleon then force marched his men to his eastern detachment and obliged the other Austrian army to retreat. Now with the numerical advantage (and a victory under his belt), he pressed the Austrians hard. In early May he introduced his manoeuvre sur les derrières for the first time.33 He left a holding force in front of Austrian general J. P. Beaulieu while he led the bulk of his army up the Po River to Piacenza, where he crossed in order to cut the Austrian lines of communication back to their base in Mantua. Again the Austrians retreated without fighting, although they lost their rear guard to Napoleon’s advancing troops at Lodi on 10 May; the French were in Milan five days later. The Austrians by the end of the month were back in Trent and Mantua.

  Napoleon soon laid siege to Mantua, a task that would occupy him off and on for almost a year. For the remainder of 1796 Napoleon marched his men across northern Italy in constant attempts to either beat back Austrian thrusts toward Mantua or trying himself to force his way through the Alps. He won victories over a variety of Austrian generals. At Castiglione in early August and Bassano in early September he defeated General Dagobert Wurmser, who did manage to reinforce Mantua though he was captured in its fall in Fe
bruary 1797. From November 1796 through the spring of 1797 Napoleon’s main opponent was Field Marshal Josef Alvintzi (or Alvinczy), a decorated veteran of the Seven Years’ War, War of the Bavarian Succession, and the invasion attempts to restore the French monarchy.

  The Battle of Rivoli

  IN JANUARY 1797 THE AUSTRIANS sent Alvintzi to try once again to lift the Mantua siege. The Austrian plan was to approach along three lines of advance to face Napoleon’s forces spread in a broad line to cover all possible attacks. The first army of 9,000 marched from Padua toward Augereau’s forces near Legnano; the second of 6,000 marched from Vicenza toward Messena’s forces at Verona; the third, 28,000 men under Alvintzi, left Trent down the valley of the Adige River toward B.C. Joubert’s force at La Corona. Napoleon also had a force to the west under Brigadier General Louis Rey (4,500 men), to the south Brigadier General Jean Lannes (6,800 men) maintained a watch on the Papal States, and Major General Philibert Sourier with 8,500 men maintained the siege at Mantua. The first two Austrian attacks began on 12 January, pressing hard on both Augereau and Massena. When Napoleon learned, however, that Alvintzi had pushed Joubert back to the plain at Rivoli, he decided that he would concentrate the main effort there. He ordered Augereau to cover the eastern flank while he sent Massena north to reinforce Joubert, followed by the cavalry reserve. Rey was also ordered to join. Napoleon rode with his chief of staff, Louis Berthier, to join his army, confident he could win no matter the odds.34