Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Arthur received command of the city, which he held for a year and a half, proving himself quite acceptable to the inhabitants.32 During this time he also commanded an expedition against a guerrilla force of as many as 50,000 under Dundia Wagh, operating in the northern area of Mysore, and in this case distinguished himself. After a long campaign destroying the guerrilla bases, the British finally surprised Dundia Wagh with 5,000 cavalry in the open. Wellesley commanded about 1,600 British and local cavalry. Without hesitation Wellesley deployed his men in line and led the attack from the front, saber in hand.33 The British conducted this operation with the assistance of a number of surrounding powers, including the Marathas, as Dundia Wagh was an outlaw who threatened everyone. Thus, Wellesley got the opportunity to see his future enemy in action.

  The next three years consisted primarily of administrative duties for Wellesley, but he was promoted to major general in April 1802. War with the Marathas was brewing. The members of the confederacy began to fight among themselves. As noted earlier, the position of the peshwa had diminished over the years, but it still held some cachet. Peshwa Baji Rao II, who was hardly a model of decorum or honesty, had managed to alienate the two major Maratha powers, Scindia and Holkar. In the fall of 1802 Holkar defeated the peshwa’s forces outside his capital at Poona. Holkar seized the city but failed to rouse any support. Needing a powerful ally, Baji Rao reluctantly signed the Treaty of Bassein on 31 December 1802, making himself a subject of the East India Company. This overt cooperation and cession of territory to the British was more than the other Marathas could stand. However, now that the treaty was in place, Governor-General Wellesley could put troops in the field to protect Rao. If the Marathas went to war, so much the better: with the political bonds of the confederacy weakened, Richard Wellesley thought the time was ripe to expand the company’s influence.

  The Battle of Assaye

  RICHARD PUT ARTHUR in command of company forces in the south central part of India known as the Deccan. General Arthur Lake commanded forces in the north that were to protect Oudh and capture Delhi in order to “protect” the Moghul emperor (and further the company’s influence at the same time). Richard gave Arthur wide-ranging authority, to determine if the Marathas were going to war and to act without consultation in response. This was a move both politically savvy and practically minded. Richard could trust his brother to be both; if he made a political mistake, however, Richard could exercise deniability. Should circumstances arise under which Arthur was attacked, he would not have to wait weeks to get a message to Calcutta asking permission to respond.34 The plan of action was to settle the situation peacefully if the other Maratha states would follow the lead of their peshwa into a subsidiary alliance, raising the question of whether the peshwa had signed the treaty for his own lands or as prime minister of the entire confederacy. If the other states would not follow along, then war was deemed inevitable. The other states did not follow.

  Arthur had occupied Poona and restored Baji Rao II to his position, and used the city as his base of operations. He had some 11,000 men; a further 4,000 were to the northwest in Gwaikar, and another 9,500 were based in Hyderabad to the east. Wellesley gathered what supplies he could from the Poona area, but Holkar had burned much of the region when he withdrew to his homeland.

  Given his campaign against Dundia Wagh, Wellesley felt himself sufficiently knowledgeable to handle the Maratha army. He launched his offensive in August 1803 against the hill fort of Ahmadnagar. This fell within two days, to the great amazement of a Maratha chieftain, who remarked: “These English are a strange people. They came here in the morning, surveyed the wall, walked over it, killed the garrison and returned for breakfast.”35 Ahmadnagar provided Wellesley with a forward base of supply. His plan was to carry his own supplies by bullock train, yet move quickly enough with pontoons to create bridges and maintain pressure on the Marathas so they could not stay in one place long enough to gather supplies. Surprisingly, Wellesley’s army could march twenty-three miles in a day. The first major obstacle was the Godavari River, but an advance force had constructed a large number of wicker and leather boats, and the army was completely across in three days (by 25 August). Wellesley’s eastern force under Colonel James Stevenson had advanced from Hyderabad and positioned itself at Jafarabad at the junction of the Kaitna and Purna Rivers.

  By 29 August 29 Wellesely’s force had reached Aurangabad, where he met with Lieutenant Colonel John Collins, who had just left the position of British representative to Daulat Rao Scindia’s court. Collins had often seen the Maratha infantry in action; Wellesley had not. Collins tried to warn the much younger Wellesley what to expect: “The Colonel tried to persuade Arthur that Sindia’s army was different and the conventional threat that it posed was very real. A single one of Sindia’s five brigades, when accompanied by its artillery park, packed enough firepower to maul Wellesley’s Army of the Deccan.… ‘I tell you. General, as to their cavalry [meaning the enemy’s], you may ride over them wherever you meet them; but their infantry and guns will astonish you.’”36 Wellington and his staff dismissed the old man as out of touch, but were later to be haunted by his wisdom. Collins reported that Scindia’s last response to peace negotiations was evasive, which did not change the situation—the offensive would go on. Instead, intelligence reached them that Scindia was planning a quick thrust between Wellesley and Stevenson toward Hyderabad, which could be a feint or could be an attempt to cut the British supply lines.

  For the next week the two British and one Maratha force crisscrossed the countryside, jockeying for position. Scindia was not able to break free of Wellesley’s pursuit and so decided on battle. He sent for 17 battalions of his elite infantry, expertly trained and equipped and commanded by European officers.37 Wellesley decided that he needed to gather his forces for what looked like a set-piece battle. Stevenson met him at Hasnapur on 8 September, having launched a number of cavalry raids of his own against Scindia’s camps and supply columns. Word soon arrived that Scindia was withdrawing north to meet his infantry in the hills around Borkarden; he also met with the Raghuji Bhonsle, raja of Berar, who brought a large army.

  On 21 September, Wellesley met with Stevenson again at Budnapoor and developed his plan to bring the Marathas to battle in the open. He sent Stevenson on a wide left hook to come down on Scindia from the northwest while Wellesley would take his force east, then north to Naulniah near the Purna River. This would put Scindia between them. Both forces began their marches early on 22 September. By midday on the 23rd Wellesley’s force reached Naulniah, about six miles from the river. At that point Wellesley received information that the Marathas had proceeded out of Bokarden and were encamped along the Kaitna River. He rode forward to inspect the ground and found the report to be true. The Kaitna had steep banks at that point and a direct assault was impossible. Wellesley immediately decided to see if he could quickly deploy across the Kaitna downriver and perhaps strike the Maratha flank before they could reposition themselves.

  Wellesley knew he was outnumbered and outgunned, but decided to press forward, although he deployed only part of his force. He had left his baggage under guard back at Nauliah in hopes to catch the Marathas on the move, as the initial reports said they were. When he found them not marching but ready for battle, and realized they knew his force was there, he decided retreat was not an option. Seeing their great superiority in cavalry, Wellesley believed that a withdrawal now would further distance him from Stevenson and give the Marathas the central position to try to defeat them in detail. He decided to seize the opportunity.38 He also knew that if he didn’t press forward, he would lose the element of surprise. Even though the Marathas were aware of his presence, he did not think they would be ready for a quick attack. Additionally, Wellesley recognized that any attempt to withdraw would have a negative morale factor.39

  Wellesley took his force downstream to a ford, crossing with his English battalions and his sepoys but leaving the allied cavalry of Mysore and Peshwa on th
e south bank to protect his forces from any potential Maratha cavalry attack on that side. As soon as the British began fording the three-foot-deep stream they came under long-range Maratha artillery fire. It was random since the gunners could not see the British force but effective nonetheless, with one of Wellesley’s aides being decapitated by a cannonball. Wellesley had seven infantry battalions numbering 3,170 men, four regiments of cavalry numbering 1,200, and a relative handful of artillery, 22 guns with none larger than a 6-pounder.

  This seemed ridiculously small compared to the Maratha army arrayed across the field. Daulat Rao Scindia had been joined by three campoos (brigades) of infantry, each numbering eight battalions. These were referred to as regular troops, trained by Europeans and usually officered by them as well. Berar brought another force of 6,000 infantry. The Maratha right flank was manned by the regular troops trained by a Belgian, Sumroo, here commanded by Jean Saleur. The center was under the command of the Hanoverian Anthony Pohlmann, who had taken over from the retired de Boigne, the creator of Scindia’s regular infantry. To the left, next to Assaye, was the least-talented campoo, commanded by the Dutchman John James duPont. At least 100 cannons deployed across the Maratha front. The regulars numbered about 15,000 soldiers under European officers. Apart from the regular battalions, Scindia and the state of Bhosle had other units numbering between 10,000 and 20,000 infantry and 30,000 armed horsemen, who may or may not have been trained soldiers.40 Although Wellesley hoped that the Marathas would not be able to maneuver in time, the Marathas surprised him with their quick and disciplined response. They established a front of about a mile with both flanks anchored by the Kaitna River on their right, the Jua River and the town of Assaye on their left. Behind the infantry and artillery the massed cavalry were formed.41 A second line of infantry deployed perpendicular to the first, from Assaye westward along the Juah River.

  There is some discussion as to the nature of the European leadership in the Maratha forces. At the outbreak of the war British officers serving in the Maratha armies were offered bounties by the British to desert, and many did so. Instead of making better offers to maintain the officers, the commander of the regulars, Pierre Perron, decided to fire all British and Anglo-Indian officers. This immediately cut the skill level of the regular Maratha infantry forces by a significant amount, and also provided the company army with a number of men intimately familiar with the Maratha army.42 Thus, the midlevel officer corps at Assaye may well have been less than top-notch. Recent Indian military historian Pradeep Barua describes this situation, asserting that early in the battle when one of the regular brigades deployed to meet the British, “it did so awkwardly by moving in a line formation, rather than marching in column and then deploying to fight in line. The inability to execute such a simple maneuver would seem to indicate that the veteran brigade, which had conducted far more complicated maneuvers under intense fire, was indeed devoid of most of its command element.”43

  Wellesley’s initial idea was to move against Assaye to strike the Maratha infantry’s flank and rear, but the enemy’s rapid repositioning made that idea virtually suicidal. Instead, he decided to strike the far right Maratha flank and drive it back, hoping to have the whole Maratha infantry line swing away to the northwest. Thus, the firepower located in Assaye could never come into play. He rode out to each battalion with orders. The 78th Highlanders on his far left would lead the attack along the Kaitna, with the other units following along in echelons to one flank in a manner reminiscent of Frederick’s oblique order.44 The 74th Highlanders held the right wing with units of the Madras Native Infantry in between. The cavalry, stationed to his right, would cover the flank against any Maratha counterattack. The light infantry companies of each battalion moved forward as skirmishers as the units deployed from column into line.

  As Wellesley’s men were deploying they came under intense artillery fire, which they could do little to counter as their smaller 6-pounders could not match the 9- and 12-pounders the Marathas employed. The Maratha artillery wrought immense havoc, destroying the British artillery at long range. As the infantry advanced, they too were badly hurt by round shot as well as chain shot.45

  The British advance thus started badly. Although Wellesley had given orders personally to each unit, the skirmishers did not turn toward the enemy but kept marching toward Assaye; the 74th followed them rather than abandon them to their fate. This took them away from the rest of the infantry. They quickly suffered horrendous casualties from artillery fire and began falling back. Maratha cavalry around Assaye followed them, along with Pohlmann’s closest infantry units. As the 74th withdrew some 150 yards, they stopped and formed squares, which successfully kept the enemy attacks at bay.46

  Meanwhile, Wellesley had stationed himself with the 78th on the far left and was leading the remainder of the infantry toward the battalion on the far left of the Maratha line. Pohlmann’s regular infantry was fronted by some 60 cannon only 700 yards away. The assault was textbook. At 60 yards the Scots of the 78th stopped, fired a volley, reloaded, and advanced with fixed bayonets. When they reached the guns they fired again, and the fighting became hand-to-hand. Some gunners defended their guns to the last, a few fled, some fell to the ground feigning death. The Scots moved on, fired a volley at the infantry, reloaded, and fired a second. At this point some of the European officers mounted their horses and fled, and British cavalry came on the scene and charged the breaking infantry lines. The massed fire and advancing cavalry caused the Maratha center to break, opening a 900-yard gap, and the Marathas abandoned some 40 guns.47 Some of the sepoys broke ranks to give chase but the 78th re-formed to face a cavalry counterattack. Twenty thousand Maratha light cavalry began riding toward the Scots, but a solid line and a solid volley convinced them not to press the attack.

  As the 78th and the Madras infantry battalions were breaking the Maratha right wing, Wellesley heard the sounds of the Assaye guns and quickly learned of the bad position in which the 74th found themselves. He ordered the 19th Light Dragoons and the 4th and 5th Native Cavalry to ride to the rescue. The cavalry were outstanding. They drove back the units milling about the British squares, then pushed the fleeing Marathas into units south of Assaye. They struck Pohlmann’s northern sector as Wellesley was breaking the southern part of the line.48 The cavalry almost overpursued their enemy, but the commander rallied them before they got too close to Assaye and launched all the remaining cavalry at the collapsing Maratha infantry.

  The Maratha infantry retreated in fairly good order to the second line established along the south bank of the Juah. Wellesley’s infantry and cavalry now had a full head of steam and were preparing to attack, but the Marathas had one last trick up their sleeve. Once the British and Madras infantry broke through, some of the “dead” Maratha gunners came back to life, turned their guns around, and fired into the backs of their enemies. Wellesley personally faced about with a cavalry and an infantry unit and rode down the revived gunners and captured the artillery. With most of the artillery now gone, the Maratha infantry fled. In spite of their large numbers, their cavalry did little in the battle.49 As the Maratha infantry were backed up against the Juah, the 19th Light Dragoons crossed the river just downstream from Assaye and attacked some of the retreating units. They inflicted severe damage until the British commander was killed, which caused the attack to stop.

  The three-hour battle tapered off as the sun set. The bulk of the Maratha force crossed the Juah and retreated in good order, leaving behind all their artillery, numbering between 90 and 102 guns. The gunners who played dead were made to quit playing the part. Given the fact that Wellesley’s force had been on the move since daybreak and had suffered more than one-fourth of their force as casualties, there was no immediate pursuit. (Wellesley did, however, lead a force the following morning at dawn that pursued the retreating Marathas and captured an encampment of them.) The casualty count was 198 British and 258 Indian officers and men killed, 442 British and 695 Indians wounded; this was 27 perce
nt of his force. The Maratha losses were some 1,200 killed and perhaps four times that number wounded.

  The battle at Assaye was a meeting engagement resulting from Wellesley’s quick march to the scene upon receiving intelligence of the Maratha whereabouts. His analysis of the ground and the best method of launching a hasty attack was as worthy a coup d’oeil as any Frederick could have accomplished. He was unable to surprise the Marathas in spite of his rapid deployment, but he controlled the tempo by keeping up constant pressure all along the Maratha lines. Only the opening Maratha cannonade kept him from making all the movement decisions. Assaulting an army many times the size of his own, with virtually no artillery support, was the virtual definition of audacity. After quickly locating the weakest point in the enemy line, Wellesley’s force was intended to be wholly concentrated on the enemy right flank; only the actions of the skirmishers and the 74th Regiment kept this concentration from being complete. The fatigue and heavy casualties among his army kept Wellesley from engaging in any rapid exploitation, but a delayed pursuit did succeed in catching and destroying a part of the retreating enemy. Philip Mason, in his book on the Indian army, comments, “Assaye has always been described as a general’s battle, and so it was; to fight at all was the General’s sole decision and the operation was designed entirely by himself. Few indeed have been the commanders who would have ventured on so daring a plan or carried it through with such courage, resolution and dash. But it was also, in another sense, a soldier’s battle, illustrating in the highest degree the confidence men feel in a general who knows what he is about.”50