Rogue Tory

by Denis Smith

  This was a reaction of solidarity tinged with scepticism and fear. It was not the declaration of unqualified support John Kennedy expected in so grave a crisis, but it was honestly ambiguous in the Canadian tradition, and it reflected the anguish in Canadian minds that evening. As two academic critics comment:

  To turn to the United Nations for assurance was not only consistent with Diefenbaker’s own position before the crisis but also a typical Canadian response. Canada had consistently supported the UN, Canadian statesmen had played a major role in strengthening it, and the UN was the one area of world politics where the Canadians believed they could exert some influence. Canadian doubts, latent or implied, about the wisdom of American actions were a reflection of perceptions of the Cuban-American issue. Some Canadians, their suspicions raised by the original American denials of involvement in the Bay of Pigs operation, may have had doubts about US claims as to the existence of an offensive base. Many, including some Canadian officials, feared that the United States might once more be overreacting.112

  A president with more understanding of Canada, less arrogance, and more respect for the Canadian prime minister might have ignored Diefenbaker’s reserve. But Kennedy was already disenchanted with his neighbour and in no mood for indulgence as he turned to face down Nikita Khrushchev. Livingston Merchant’s “surprise and disappointment” at Diefenbaker’s response were echoed in the White House. At the Canadian Embassy in Washington – where reading and interpreting the US administration’s perceptions of Canada was the reason for existence – the prime minister’s remarks in the House “had pained and dismayed everyone.”113

  Almost at once the Canadian position grew more ambiguous. When Harkness returned to his office after Kennedy’s address, the chief of the defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, informed him that American forces had gone on “DEF CON 3” alert. He requested permission to put Canadian forces – especially Canadian NORAD units – in the same state of readiness.114 NORAD headquarters had mixed Canadian-American staffs, and the entire system was designed to operate in integration. Harkness agreed that he should do so, but after consulting the war book guidelines (which were being altered), he decided he should first consult the prime minister. Diefenbaker arranged to see him at once, and Harkness left his office confident that the decision would be no more than a formality.

  Instead, Diefenbaker hesitated. He would not authorize an alert without a cabinet decision the next morning. Harkness returned to his office to discuss with Miller “what action we could take, without declaring a formal alert, which would put us in a position of maximum preparedness short of this.” They agreed to order immediate “full manning of the three H.Q.’s… Intelligence and communication centres, warning orders to the Commands and manning of their communications.” This amounted to virtually full, though informal, compliance with DEF CON 3. Diefenbaker was not informed.115

  Next morning Harkness and his chiefs of staff reviewed the latest intelligence reports, “which were ominous.” Russian freighters carrying missiles were still on course, apparently preparing to test the American blockade on the following day. Harkness directed the military to prepare all necessary orders for each stage of readiness to coincide with American actions, to take effect “as soon as I telephoned from cabinet that the alert had been authorized.” At cabinet, he reviewed the intelligence reports and recommended an alert “if the situation deteriorated.” All ministers, he judged, would have agreed, but “the Prime Minister argued against it on the ground that an alert would unduly alarm the people, that we should wait and see what happened, etc. He and I finally came to fairly hot words, but he refused to agree to the alert chiefly, I think, because of a pathological hatred of taking a hard decision.” No conclusion was reached.116

  The frustrated minister returned to his chiefs of staff and ordered all the actions they had discussed earlier that morning to be applied “in as quiet and unobtrusive a way as possible … These measures accomplished the majority of the purposes of an alert … but did not reassure the United States and our other allies, as the declaration of an alert would have done, that we were prepared to fight.”117 During the day Harkness continued to argue in favour of an alert, without informing Diefenbaker of his latest action. Diefenbaker would agree only to another special meeting of cabinet the next morning. That afternoon the prime minister had a heated telephone conversation with the president in which Kennedy objected to Diefenbaker’s public call for UN inspection and urged him to order the appropriate military alert. Diefenbaker later recalled his complaint to the president: “When were we consulted?” and Kennedy’s response: “You weren’t.” The conversation did not incline Diefenbaker to approve the alert.118

  Cabinet on October 24, Harkness wrote, “proved to be a long and unpleasant meeting at which members … were asked for their individual opinions. Most favoured the alert. The meeting was about to end inconclusively when I made a final effort with a rather angry outburst that we were failing in our responsibilities to the nation and must act, which produced an outburst from the Prime Minister to the effect that he would not be forced into any such action.” When Harkness returned to his office, Miller told him that the American Strategic Air Command and some naval forces had moved to DEF CON 2 (“immediate enemy attack expected”). Harkness went back to Diefenbaker, showed him the message, and insisted that Canada could delay no longer. The prime minister responded in agitation: “All right, go ahead” – and at last the formal alert was issued. In the end, Diefenbaker had acted with a wave of the hand, and without a cabinet decision.119

  Meanwhile, the prime minister had made clear to the House, after discussions with Pearson, that his call for UN involvement had been intended to support, rather than undermine, President Kennedy’s position.120 But Canada’s public stance remained confused after a CBC interview with Howard Green on October 24 in which he refused to offer endorsement of the American blockade and insisted that NORAD was not yet involved. The most he would say was that “the Americans have considered that the action has been necessary and they’ve taken it and I think that we must accept that fact.”121

  By Thursday morning Diefenbaker realized – as Bryce, External Affairs, and members of cabinet had advised him – that there was a need to clarify the government’s stance for the sake of understanding in his caucus, among the Canadian public, and in Washington. Bryce and the department produced drafts for a new statement to the House, and that afternoon Diefenbaker reviewed Canada’s actions in support of the United States and insisted that the crisis had been caused by the Soviet Union. Canada stood with its allies and was prepared for all contingencies. Canadian NORAD forces, he said, were at “the same level of readiness as the American forces under NORAD operational control.”122 Diefenbaker was now firmly on side. Two days later, as the confrontation played out, the Washington Post commented editorially that any differences between Canada and the United States over Cuba had been “swept aside by the Soviets’ provocation … Whatever the outcome, it is deeply reassuring that no cool air is blowing from Canada.”123

  The crisis was not over. On Wednesday, Soviet ships had begun to turn back from the confrontation line, but there were provocative submarine movements in the western Atlantic, and construction work continued at the Cuban missile sites. President Kennedy’s crisis team maintained its round-the-clock consultations as it made preparations for air strikes on the bases, while urgent communications were exchanged between the White House and the Kremlin. On Saturday, October 26, an American U–2 photographic spy plane was shot down over Cuba as Kennedy and Khrushchev engaged in negotiations on a secret deal to avoid nuclear war; and elsewhere the risks of unplanned military engagement mounted as American forces reached hair-trigger readiness. Cabinet ministers and senior officials in Washington, Ottawa, and other Western capitals prepared to move to their emergency headquarters and evacuate their families to the countryside. Diefenbaker told a staff member “we would all be obliterated in a few days.”124


  Diefenbaker was near distraction. He was receiving overnight briefings on the latest intelligence reports each morning at 6:30 am as he ate breakfast. Orme Dier, his new External Affairs liaison officer, recalled an incident in a letter to Basil Robinson.

  One episode that I will never forget occurred just before the crisis reached its climax. Bill Olivier and I were at the breakfast table at the appointed hour but the P.M. was not waiting for us. He surfaced about 20 minutes later, in his bathrobe as usual, complaining that worry had kept him awake most of the night. Indeed, he did look pretty beat. Just as I was placing our material before him, the butler appeared with the breakfast. I immediately retrieved the papers and stood aside while the repast was laid. As soon as the butler closed the door, the Chief stood up at his choleric best and almost literally laying his finger aside of my nose, gave me the best of his House of Commons dressing-down. Pacing up and down, he made it excruciatingly clear that I was a guest in his house, that he would not stand being humiliated before his staff, and that he did not need a civil servant to point out what was right or wrong. When I managed to make reference to security classifications, I was immediately shot down for impugning his awareness of such matters as well as for my rudeness and lack of respect. The tirade ended abruptly, breakfast and the documents were quickly ingested and the meeting ended in silence.

  Later that day Diefenbaker explained that his outburst had been the result of lack of sleep. Dier took this as “an oblique apology,” and “concluded that my boss was an extremely difficult but nevertheless human old curmudgeon.”125

  On Sunday morning, October 28, at 9 am Washington time, Radio Moscow broadcast Khrushchev’s concession: Work at the sites would stop and the weapons would be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union, in return for Kennedy’s promise not to attack or invade Cuba. Kennedy responded at once to welcome “this statesmanlike decision,” and both sides agreed on United Nations supervision of the dismantling operation. There was no announcement of the other American concession, which was carried out without fanfare in the following months: US Jupiter missiles located in Italy and Turkey, and targeted on the USSR, would also be removed.126 The world relaxed.

  Diefenbaker issued an unusual Sunday statement that morning.

  Mankind will breathe more hopefully now that there is an early prospect that the threat to the Western Hemisphere from long-range Soviet missiles in Cuba will be removed.

  This prospect has resulted from the high degree of unity, understanding and cooperation among the Western allies. In this the Canadian Government has played its full part. Indeed Canada was the first nation to stop overflights of Soviet aircraft so as to prevent war material being carried to Cuba and as well to that end instituted a full search of all Cuban and Czech planes which are entitled under international agreement to use Canadian airport facilities.

  The introduction of missiles into the Western Hemisphere has brought the world too close to disaster for anyone to indulge in either self congratulations or complacency at this time. I know there will be universal relief that in the last two days the outlook for the peaceful solution of the Cuban problem has greatly improved but there is a continuing need for negotiation on this and other potential sources of threats to world peace.

  The United Nations deserves special mention for the worthy and constructive role it has played in this crisis.127

  Diefenbaker rushed to the front of the parade – but only after his defence minister and his armed forces had acted surreptitiously to sustain the country’s military commitments. The whole cabinet knew that the experience would have its costs. The prime minister’s loyal lieutenant Gordon Churchill told Douglas Harkness after the October 24 cabinet meeting that “the country just could not afford to have the Prime Minister in that position at a time of crisis – he refused to act when action was absolutely necessary.”128

  FOR DOUGLAS HARKNESS AND OTHER MINISTERS, THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF THE Cuban affair was to reopen the subject of nuclear warheads for Canadian NORAD and NATO forces. The shock of the crisis, the sense that there was no time for consultation in an emergency, and new forebodings about the inability of the prime minister to make decisions under pressure pointed to the urgency of an agreement with the United States to supply the warheads. At the next cabinet meeting on October 30 Harkness raised the issue, and gained unanimous agreement that negotiations with the United States should recommence. Ministers agreed that Canada should accept warheads in Europe on the same terms as other NATO countries. In Canada, Harkness accepted a compromise: “We were to try to get an agreement under which the nuclear warheads, or essential parts of them, would be held in the United States, but could be put on the weapons in Canada in a matter of minutes or hours. This arrangement I did not think was likely to prove satisfactory, but it was a great relief to have the question settled as far as the European weapons were concerned and to have a basis to work from for the Canadian weapons.” Negotiations were to be undertaken by Howard Green, Douglas Harkness, and a few officials, along with Gordon Churchill. Diefenbaker himself had added Churchill to the team, Harkness wrote, “evidently with the idea that he would hold the balance between Howard and myself and would prevent deadlocks occurring.”129

  In late November negotiations commenced in Ottawa. Agreement was quickly achieved over warheads for Canadian weapons in Europe, where the United States proposed its standard, two-key arrangement. Agreement on Canadian warheads was more difficult because of Green’s insistence that Canada should be able to say that no nuclear weapons were stored on Canadian soil. The negotiators allowed for a maximum of two hours to arm the weapons in an emergency. But if warheads were to be stored across the border, large numbers of men and aircraft would be needed on standby to perform the task. The Americans produced several further proposals, none of which seemed practical, and by early December the meetings ceased. When Harkness sought Diefenbaker’s approval for the European weapons agreement, the prime minister argued that he would accept only a complete package. In January US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Harkness that the latest standby scheme was unworkable. The final American counterproposal, to store some parts of the warheads separately in Canada, was unacceptable to Green and Diefenbaker.130

  Meanwhile, the Cuban crisis had precipitated open revolt in the Conservative Party. On November 8 George Hogan, who had served Diefenbaker through three election campaigns and was then the national vice president of the party, addressed a party group in Toronto and issued his text to the press, where it made headlines the next day.131 Hogan sent a copy to the prime minister, noting that “it expresses a rather complete disagreement with our policy on Cuba and nuclear weapons.” The policy, he said, “has done and is still doing more damage than any other single thing that has happened since we came into power. I gather from the press that the Cabinet is not solidly behind this policy. I profoundly hope so, because I believe we are in real trouble unless it is changed.”132

  In his speech, Hogan spoke of the party’s long and instinctive commitment to Canadian independence from the United States, but rejected the view that “the Conservative Party, or any party, can build a constructive policy for Canada on a basis of anti-Americanism … There is a time to stand up to the Americans, and there is a time to stand by them; and I suggest that when the security of the North American Continent is menaced by the threat of nuclear attack, that is a time to stand by the Americans clearly, swiftly, and unequivocally.” Canada was bound by geography, common tradition, and direct military alliance to joint defence of the continent. NORAD, he recalled, had been signed by the Conservative government.

  In return for Canada’s reasonable expectation to be consulted in advance about NORAD’s activities, Hogan suggested four changes of policy to indicate solidarity with the United States. Canada should break diplomatic relations with Cuba, suspend trade, give the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD the authority to place Canadian air units on alert when necessary, and set a time limit on reaching agreement with the
United States to accept nuclear weapons. On NORAD, he explained:

  The NORAD Agreement was founded on the assumption that the defence of one country was inseparable from the defence of the other. If enemy bombers or missiles ever start heading for our cities, questions of sovereignty and national control will swiftly become very academic. I believe we must either honour the NORAD Agreement or withdraw from it. To withdraw from it is unthinkable. But if we honour it we must do so in a way that will leave no doubt of our intention to be ready to respond swiftly and immediately to any hostile attack. Any other approach renders the whole concept useless.

  On nuclear arms, Hogan endorsed the government’s dedication to general nuclear disarmament. But Canada, he judged, was trying to influence attitudes from a position of weakness, “what in plain language amounts to a policy of unilateral disarmament.” Tactical, defensive weapons were useful as part of the Western deterrent and were thus a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing influence. He suggested a last, “massive attempt” to achieve an agreement on nuclear disarmament. If that failed, Canadians should “consider ourselves free thereafter to acquire defensive nuclear weapons.” This was a modest proposal, calling for less than the cabinet had already accepted. But it involved public disagreement with established policy, which remained obscure. Hogan believed that he spoke for the interests of the Conservative Party as well as the country: “Let us take a clear stand on behalf of our security, our principles, and our friends, and stick by it come what may.”133