Rogue Tory

by Denis Smith

  Harkness told colleagues once more that he would have to resign. Fleming urged him to await the prime minister’s speech in the foreign affairs debate, while McCutcheon and Hees said they agreed entirely with him. “They urged me,” Harkness wrote, “to stand firm against the Prime Minister and said that we should act on the offers to resign, which he had made many times during the crisis and throughout the period from the 1962 election on, unless he accepted the position set out in the memo.”155

  On Friday afternoon, January 25, Diefenbaker rose before a crowded House to respond to Pearson’s indictment of his government’s indecision. In familiar manner he ridiculed the inconsistencies in Pearson’s own record while claiming logic in his own. His ministers listened as intently as others in search of that logic – and discovered only calculated obscurity. Canada had repudiated no undertakings, but it would not be pushed around by “anyone visiting our country.” For Donald Fleming “this was without exception the most equivocal speech I had ever heard in the House of Commons. It surpassed Mackenzie King at his best. It confused even his own cabinet colleagues.” The speech was the usual mélange of notes prepared by Robert Bryce and Diefenbaker himself. To his astonishment, Fleming saw in Diefenbaker’s bundle of papers the special committee’s memo, which Diefenbaker proceeded to weave, in disconnected bits, into his own text. Canada’s NATO role would be determined in May; negotiations with the United States for North American weapons had been “going on quite forcibly for two months or more.” “Every word of the memo now had full government authority back of it,” Fleming concluded. “This was an enormous step forward, or so we thought.”156

  Harkness too was briefly encouraged. He decided the prime minister had come off the fence. When Diefenbaker left the House, Harkness followed him to the lobby, shook his hand, and offered thanks. Diefenbaker did not reply. Charles Lynch found Harkness in the lobby to tell him that the members of the press gallery were “completely confused.” What did the speech mean? Harkness told him that the pro-nuclear message was contained in “four points near the end of the speech.” Lynch was sceptical.157

  The Saturday press took Lynch’s line. Defence policy was “left hanging in mid-air,” reported the Globe and Mail, “this is no policy at all,” complained the Ottawa Citizen; others echoed their uncertainty.158 Harkness was dismayed, and concluded that Diefenbaker had intended after all to maintain his ambiguity. He decided to issue a press release “to bring things to a head and thus decide the matter, and at the same time to make my own position clear to the country.” Early on Monday morning he released a statement declaring that Diefenbaker had asserted “a definite policy for the acquisition of nuclear arms.” Diefenbaker summoned Harkness to his office and exclaimed: “This is terrible – you’ve ruined everything – why did you do it?…You had no right to make such a statement – you have put me in an impossible situation.” Harkness replied angrily that he was ready to resign at any time, and left when Diefenbaker refused any further argument. For two days Diefenbaker played a game of evasion in response to questions in the House; cabinet argued in circles; Harkness drafted his resignation; and delegations of ministers, led by Hees, Fulton, and McCutcheon, urged him to stay. On January 30, at a farewell party for the Fultons (who had now decided to leave Ottawa for British Columbia provincial politics), Hees, McCutcheon, Balcer, and other ministers pledged their word to Harkness that “we must get rid of Dief the next day.” The atmosphere was “very peculiar.”159

  A shaky conspiracy was taking form. Diefenbaker was in a condition of “numb torpor.” While Harkness and Fleming were still hoping to rouse him to a decision, perhaps half a dozen ministers had agreed he would have to go. Simultaneously, Oakley Dalgleish had reached the same conclusion, and was planning a Globe and Mail editorial making that demand. He was also in touch with Wallace McCutcheon, expecting to coordinate his public appeal with a cabinet revolt. McCutcheon, Nowlan, Fulton, Hees, and Fleming persuaded Dalgleish to hold his editorial for the following week, while cabinet made a final effort to resolve the crisis from within. McCutcheon, Nowlan, and Hees talked among themselves of Nowlan as interim prime minister while the party chose a new leader. Fleming thought of himself as the natural successor.160

  The next blow came from Washington, where there had been outrage at Diefenbaker’s January 25 House of Commons speech. Late in the afternoon of January 30 Basil Robinson was summoned to the State Department to receive a press release. It was “a frontal attack on the Canadian government for its nuclear policy.”

  The Department has received a number of inquiries concerning the disclosure during a recent debate in the Canadian House of Commons regarding negotiations over the past two or three months between the United States and Canadian Governments relating to nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces.

  In 1958 the Canadian Government decided to adopt the BOMARC-B weapons system. Accordingly two BOMARC-B squadrons were deployed to Canada where they would serve the double purpose of protecting Montreal and Toronto as well as the U.S. deterrent force. The BOMARC-B was not designed to carry any conventional warhead. The matter of making available a nuclear warhead for it and for other nuclear-capable weapons systems acquired by Canada has been the subject of inconclusive discussions between the two governments. The installation of the two BOMARC-B batteries in Canada without nuclear warheads was completed in 1962.

  In addition to the BOMARC-B, a similar problem exists with respect to the modern supersonic jet interceptor with which the RCAF has been provided. Without nuclear air defense warheads, they operate at far less than their full potential effectiveness.

  Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October 1962, the Canadian Government proposed confidential discussions concerning circumstances under which there might be provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Canada and Europe. These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.

  The discussions between the two governments have also involved possible arrangements for the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian NATO forces in Europe, similar to arrangements which the United States has made with many of our other NATO allies.

  During the debate in the House of Commons various references were made to recent discussions at Nassau. The agreements made at Nassau have been fully published. They raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD obligations.

  Reference was also made in the debate to the need of NATO for increased conventional forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires increased conventional forces, but conventional forces are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is designed to defend the North American continent against air attack. The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout this decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force. An effective continental defense against this common threat is necessary.

  The provision of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the “nuclear club.” As in the case of other allies custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would remain with the U.S. Joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty can be worked out to cover the use of such weapons by Canadian forces.161

  Blast Off

  At the State Department, Robinson was told that four years of discussions with Canada had “proved abortive and not for technical reasons.” The recent Canadian proposals to store component parts in the United States amounted to “a contrived solution which might … create added confusion at a time of emergency and might mislead people as to the state of continental defence.” The prime minister’s disclosure of secret negotiations – which was made without notifying Washington – had caused “much concern,” although this was not mentioned in the press release.162

  Telephone lines between Otta
wa and Washington crackled, and within hours the Canadian ambassador, Charles Ritchie, had been “recalled for consultation.” Diefenbaker learned of the press release on a short trip to Toronto. As he returned to Ottawa late in the evening with Donald Fleming, he clutched the document in his hands, his eyes glowing fire: “We’ve got our issue now … We can call our general election now.” Fleming replied: “No, John. You can’t do that.” Three times the brief dialogue was repeated.163

  Cabinet met at 9:30 the next morning to face this latest and most serious storm. Ministers agreed unanimously on a strong protest, and under the leadership of Fleming, Hees, and Harkness, “beat off Diefenbaker’s proposal to dissolve the House that afternoon and enter an election campaign against the US administration. Instead, they bought a few hours’ time: they would discuss dissolution after the day’s debate in the House.164

  When the House met, the prime minister condemned the American statement as an “unprecedented and … unwarranted intrusion in Canadian affairs.” Canada, he said, would honour its obligations, but “it will not be pushed around or accept external domination or interference in the making of its decisions. Canada is determined to remain a firm ally, but that does not mean she should be a satellite.” He added the stinging comment that Pearson’s views bore “a striking resemblance” to those of the State Department. The three opposition leaders joined in rejection of the American statement, but insisted as well on clarification of the government’s policy. Pearson pursued the line by moving adjournment of the House for an emergency debate, and after two appeals against the Speaker’s rulings, the debate proceeded.165

  Mike Pearson, Robert Thompson, and Tommy Douglas complained of the government’s petty politics, tightrope walking, changes of direction, postponement and procrastination. Thompson’s shift of tone was particularly threatening, since Social Credit votes had previously sustained the government’s tenuous majority in the House. Only Harkness spoke for the cabinet, after Diefenbaker had agreed during the dinner recess that the minister could use his press release as a basis for his remarks. Harkness – ever hopeful – took this to mean that Diefenbaker “was prepared to accept my position on nuclear warheads.”166

  On Friday the pace of collapse quickened. In Washington Dean Rusk – responding to sharp criticism from the Washington Post and the New York Times – offered a limited apology for giving offence to Canada, but insisted that the administration was justified in “fairly setting out” the facts of the case. He would not say whether the State Department’s press release had been approved by the president. Arthur Krock of the Times reported that the statement had been cleared by Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy.167

  In Ottawa, cabinet met twice. Diefenbaker was not ready to declare himself in favour of nuclear arms, and repeated his call for a dissolution on the issue of American interference in Canadian affairs. Several ministers protested that the consequences for the economy and for Canada’s defences would be dangerous. Diefenbaker insisted that he could win an anti-American campaign; “this, to him,” Harkness judged, “was all that mattered.” Debate churned on inconclusively, until Diefenbaker proposed another meeting for Saturday morning. Afterwards, discussion continued in ministers’ offices. Now at least nine ministers talked of resignation if Diefenbaker launched an anti-American campaign. George Hees thought that a united front of critical ministers could persuade Diefenbaker to abandon the intention – or could force him out the next day if necessary.168

  Diefenbaker frustrated that plan by dealing with a long list of appointments at the Saturday meeting. “It was,” Harkness believed, “quite evidently a trick to prevent the discussion we had all come for … Finally he tried to get a snap decision on … dissolution on the American interference basis, without any discussion, by simply asking each member in turn to say whether he favoured dissolution or not – a straight yes or no without remark.” Fleming, Hees, and Harkness protested and called for another meeting, but since the press gallery dinner was scheduled for that evening, members agreed to a Sunday morning, off-the-record meeting at 24 Sussex Drive. As they departed, ministers learned of the death that day of Chief Justice Patrick Kerwin of the Supreme Court of Canada.169

  In the inevitable conversations after cabinet, this time at George Hees’s room in the Chateau Laurier, Hees took on the task of opening the next cabinet meeting with the declaration that he would resign unless Diefenbaker did so.170 By early evening, as the drinks began to flow in ministers’ offices before the gallery dinner, Fulton, Starr, Bell, and Churchill were “kicking around” the notion that Diefenbaker “might accept the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court.”171

  The prime minister attended the gallery dinner in decidedly sombre spirit. The skits and songs were certain to be directed at his own dilemmas, and he was in no mood for them. With his imperfect hearing, he was especially offended by a parodic performance of “Jesus Loves Me”: “The people love me/This I know/Allister Grosart tells me so.” It included the lines: “Why they even say/I have Harkness’s disease.” This, Diefenbaker wrote, was slander: “That I was the victim of an advanced case of Parkinson’s disease … They sang and acted out my physical and mental sufferings.” Harkness, too, was an informal target during the evening, and early the next morning Diefenbaker received a telephone message that Charles Lynch had challenged Harkness to resign. If Harkness went, the Chief was told, three or four other ministers would follow, including Wallace McCutcheon. The informant would not say who the others were.172

  As he prepared for the Sunday meeting of ministers, Diefenbaker also reflected that “my leadership had just endured a week-long editorial barrage from the pages of John Bassett’s Toronto Telegram, and that this thundering might prelude some action by Hees or McCutcheon. At any rate, I was ready, or as ready as I could be in these circumstances.”173 The old warrior drew a certain stimulation from the prospect of battle – even against his own team.

  At mid-morning all the ministers except Ellen Fairclough gathered in the blue dining room at 24 Sussex Drive. Diefenbaker sat at the centre on the window side of the long table, his back to the dramatic sweep of the Ottawa River and the Gatineau hills beyond. Howard Green sat to his right and Donald Fleming to his left. Diefenbaker began by calling for the dissolution of parliament that afternoon, in order to pre-empt an early defeat in the House. The election was bound to have “strong overtones of an anti-U.S. platform” because of the intolerable American intervention. He asked quietly for other views.

  Hees was the first minister to speak. An election, he said, required a genuine national issue, one that divided the parties. Yet the issue of the American press release had united all parties – and Dean Rusk had already apologized. What the people wanted was a government that made its own decisions, but on defence policy they did not know what decisions the government had made. The public believed there were commitments to be carried out, that the planes and the Bomarcs should be armed with nuclear warheads. An election fought against the United States would mean a Conservative rout: Grosart, he said, had told him that the party would win only thirty-seven seats if it went to the country. Suddenly there were interruptions, some in support, some opposed. Hees did not reach the point of asking for the prime minister’s resignation. The heat rose. Hees tried to continue and a voice cried: “Traitor!” The interjections grew louder.

  Diefenbaker insisted: “I did not ask for this job; I don’t want it, and if I’m not wanted, I’ll go.”

  Harkness turned coldly on the prime minister. “You might as well know,” he told him, “that the people of Canada have lost confidence in you, the party has lost confidence in you, and the Cabinet has lost confidence in you. It is time you went.” Personally, Harkness said, he had no option but resignation.

  Now there was pandemonium. Diefenbaker banged the table and rose to his feet. “Those who are with me stand up, those against me remain seated.” Fleming and Bell asked what they were being asked to stand for, dissolution or confidence
in Diefenbaker? The prime minister repeated his challenge. Some ministers stood, but moving left around the table, Fleming, Hees, Fulton, Harkness, Balcer, Flemming, Halpenny, Sévigny, Martineau, McCutcheon, and Bell remained seated. Eleven to nine against the prime minister – on an uncertain question. Diefenbaker sat, turned to Fleming, and whispered: “I’m going to tell them to make you prime minister.” “You can’t do that!” cried Fleming. Without a pause, Diefenbaker called out: “I propose that Donald Fleming be named prime minister. I will leave you to discuss the proposal. I will be in the library.”

  Some ministers thought Diefenbaker had said he was going to Government House to resign.174 Two ministers told Patrick Nicholson later that the prime minister seemed at that moment like a “raging lunatic.” Green and Churchill followed Diefenbaker to the door as Green cried: “Nest of traitors!” at those who remained. “I wouldn’t follow Fleming anywhere,” Churchill added. Mike Starr rose to follow them out. Alvin Hamilton joined him, yelling: “You treacherous bastards! No prime minister has ever had to deal with so many sons of bitches.” More ministers straggled out as others sat stunned.

  McCutcheon eventually suggested that all this was foolishness: “If everyone resigns, there won’t even be a Cabinet left to fight an election.” A delegation left the room to persuade the others to return. “Amid shouting of insults and disorder,” everyone eventually came back except the prime minister.

  Fleming now intervened in an effort “to restore the dignity of cabinet,” urging them not to “make bad history.” He acknowledged the prime minister’s whispered words about the succession, insisted that he had no warning of the proposal, and said that he put party unity first. A sense of calm returned, and ministers began to talk of the conditions they would need to maintain their support for Diefenbaker. Bell tried out a draft resolution, which was generally agreed after a paragraph calling for immediate talks between Diefenbaker and Kennedy on the nuclear issue had been eliminated. The rest of it read: