Eisenhower

by Louis Galambos

  The assault from the west now, for the first time, was running into the same sort of manpower shortages that the British and Germans had been facing for many months. Replacement troops were not always available. Eisenhower began to look nervously to his own soldiers in noncombatant positions: he proposed an “immediate and drastic comb-out here of able bodied men.” He scrounged off an Italian campaign that appeared to be going nowhere, and he looked to France, Poland, and Belgium. He also sought volunteers among the more than 100,000 African Americans doing “back-breaking manual work” for the armed forces on the “docks, in depots and on roads.” He said that “in existing circumstances I cannot deny the Negro volunteer a chance to serve in battle.”49 Many did.

  The End Game

  Nervous about his sluggish campaign and the intensity of German resistance, Ike gazed to the east with an aroused interest. Panzer units could move rather quickly between the Eastern and Western Fronts, and he longed for a new Soviet offensive that would, he reasoned, cut down the flow of German soldiers away from the Oder River and westward toward the Rhine. He now thought it was “essential” to know if a Soviet offensive was in the works and, if so, when it would start. He sought coordination with an associated power he tended to consider a virtual ally.50 After consulting with Marshall and the CCS, Eisenhower established a liaison with the Soviets and wrote his first message to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, a leader who would have a dramatic impact on Ike’s career.51

  That impact suddenly took a new form on January 12, 1945. Following plans that had been set since November 1944, the Soviet offensive that Hitler had discounted as a bluff began with massive force, concentrated now across a shortened front. Along the Warsaw-Berlin axis, Stalin and the Stavka had concentrated 163 infantry divisions and more than 6,000 tanks. With a five-fold advantage in manpower and armor, the Soviets drove relentlessly toward the Oder River and the German frontier.52 The entire Eastern Front, from the Baltic through Hungary, was under assault by the Red Army, and the Wehrmacht no longer had sufficient forces to resist the attack. The campaign was so massive that coordination proved as serious a problem for the Soviets as it was for Eisenhower and Bradley in the Ardennes.

  At first there appeared to be no problems with the Soviet advance, which exceeded Stalin’s expectations. The Soviet tank and infantry forces, preceded by awesome artillery barrages, pressed forward rapidly across the Vistula River. Driving hard toward the German border, Marshal Zhukov’s assaults quickly penetrated the German defenses, pressing twenty miles forward in a day. As Eisenhower had anticipated, he benefited from the advance when Hitler began to move units back from the west to the east. Stalin also benefited when the Führer inexplicably moved the most powerful panzer army to the defense of Hungary, leaving the center of the front weakened. By late January, the Soviets were attacking on the German frontier.

  Outgunned and outmanned, a German army that seemed close to collapse nevertheless continued the type of fierce counterattacks that all of the generals of the Allies and associated powers, Eisenhower included, had learned to respect. Now, however, the counterattacks no longer achieved their objectives. By the end of January, Soviet forces were slightly less than fifty miles from Berlin. Ahead of schedule, they had outrun their supplies of both fuel and ammunition. Their forces were worn down by the rapid advance and losses in battle. Soviet manpower for replacements was at last becoming a problem. Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Ivan Konev had to stop, consolidate their positions, and rearm their forces. Stalin grew cautious, concerned that Germany might launch an attack like the one dealt to the Allies in the Ardennes.

  The first major counterattack came in Hungary in mid-February, as did a fierce stroke on Zhukov’s exposed northern flank. Fighting desperately for the defense of their homeland and people, the German panzers cut deeply into the Soviet forces. But, lacking the element of surprise and weakened by the long grinding Soviet offensive, the counterattacks were soon slowed and then stopped with frightful losses on both sides. It was now evident that Germany could no longer effectively resist on the Eastern Front.

  To the west as well, the German army was frayed and weakened. Threatened by encirclement, the German forces in the Ardennes had withdrawn after delaying the Allied offensive by about six weeks.53 Ike was pleased to see the Eastern and Western Fronts now developing in unison. If the Russian offensive was “strong and sustained” and the weather was good, he told Marshall, he thought his armies could defeat the enemy without additional troops. He “would be justified in expecting quick success only after we have closed the Rhine throughout its length, concentrated heavily in the north and staged a definite supporting secondary attack somewhere to the south of the Ruhr.” He needed “the ability to maneuver. For example, the ability to advance also on Frankfurt and Kassel, rather than to rely on one thrust in the north.”54

  News of Soviet success encouraged Ike to speed up his campaign to breach the Rhine in the north. At first Montgomery’s attack moved ahead quickly.55 But Bradley’s First Army moved even faster after capturing a railway bridge intact at Remagen and pushing a substantial force across the river.56 As Patton pressed forward with infantry and armor, he was able to breach the West Wall and continue his characteristic rapid advance.57 He crossed the Rhine in a surprise attack on March 22.58 Eisenhower reported to the CCS that although he was “continuing to plan for and to be ready to meet stern resistance, it is my personal belief that the enemy strength on the Western Front is becoming so stretched that penetrations and advances will soon be limited only by our own maintenance.”59 Eisenhower was justified in pausing at this point to reflect with satisfaction on the accomplishments of the broad front strategy he had promoted, defended, and was now bringing to a successful conclusion.60

  Following his breakthrough in the center, Ike pushed forward with what he knew was the final campaign for his Allied armies.61 He informed Montgomery—who had advanced across the Rhine in the north—that he was returning the American Ninth Army to the control of Bradley, who would make the major thrust into Germany.62 Eisenhower’s decision—his own Machiavellian moment, reminiscent of his encounter with MacArthur in the Philippines—brought down a new hailstorm of British protests But to no avail. Neither Montgomery, nor Brooke, nor even Churchill could persuade Eisenhower to change his strategy.63 Already the leading American hero of World War II, he was now truly supreme.64

  Even in that lofty position, he continued to have problems that could not be solved. One of them involved the Eastern Front. He had opened communications with the Soviets and had informed Stalin that the Allied drive into Germany would point toward Leipzig, not Berlin.65 Stalin had replied that his armies were also driving toward the center and not the German capital. But he was lying. He was lying both about the timing and about the objectives of the next Soviet campaign. He approved the plans for an early Soviet push to Berlin on the same day he sent his message to Eisenhower.66 This was the first serious lesson Ike had in dealing with Stalin and his Soviet government, and there is no evidence that he ever forgot what he learned.67 One could date Eisenhower’s experience with the Cold War from this exchange and the Allied rush to seize the German rocket bases before they fell to the Soviets.

  For Ike, these long-term strategic considerations were still less important than the final victory over Germany. The zones of occupation had already been staked out, and he was fully prepared for a peaceful meeting between his Allied armies moving east and the Soviets moving west. Patton had advanced rapidly after crossing the Rhine, splitting the German defenses.68 There was no possibility that Ike would abandon his strategic plan for a race with the Soviets to reach Berlin. He had made his position clear: “That place has become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a geographical location, and I have never been interested in these. My purpose is to destroy the enemy’s forces and his powers to resist.” To the CCS he explained, “Berlin as a strategic area is discounted as it is now largely destroyed and we have information that the ministries are moving to t
he Erfurt-Leipzig region. Moreover, it is so near to the Russian front that once they start moving again they will reach it in a matter of days.”69

  Ike was now concerned about evidence of “Soviet suspicion on this question of zones of occupation.” He wanted to avoid any misunderstandings as their forces met in Germany. He wanted “firm prior” agreements on these issues.70 In the meantime, he continued to give the Soviets accurate reports on his operations through the military mission to Moscow.71 The anticipated meetings took place, without incident, on April 25; indeed, the Soviets came prepared to bestow decorations on their American counterparts.72 By May 4, the Supreme Commander had the firm agreement he sought from the Soviets, who had followed Stalin’s plan and already entered Berlin.73

  German resistance ended on May 7, 1945, when Eisenhower received the surrender of all German forces on behalf of the Allies and their associated powers. Ike was formal but brisk and unyielding. His respect for German military prowess had morphed into bitter hatred for the Nazi regime and all those who supported it. He could never forgive the officers who had ordered the slaughter of American prisoners of war in the Ardennes. Nor could he forget the horrors he had encountered in his visit to a German concentration camp.74 Earlier, in Italy, he had questioned the policy of unconditional surrender, but in Germany he implemented it with relentless vigor.

  At last his authority was unchallenged, but his responsibilities had actually multiplied as the Allies swept toward victory. There were more and more populations to feed, more trouble over occupation zones, more undisciplined soldiers and officers to create problems.75 Supplies were short and shipping continued to be a bottleneck. There was still a war to be won in the Pacific, but now he could, ever so briefly, enjoy the great victory in Europe.

  Invited to speak in London at the Guildhall on June 12, 1945, Eisenhower gave an address that said a great deal about the quality of his leadership and the quality of the man. He had just received the Freedom of the City of London from Lord Mayor Sir Frank Alexander. Speaking before Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his cabinet, Eisenhower praised the accomplishments and lamented the sacrifices of those who had served under his command:

  Humility must always be the portion of any man who receives acclaim earned in blood of his followers and sacrifices of his friends.

  Conceivably a commander may have been professionally superior. He may have given everything of his heart and mind to meet the spiritual and physical needs of his comrades. He may have written a chapter that will glow forever in the pages of military history.

  Still, even such a man—if he existed—would sadly face the facts that his honors cannot hide in his memories the crosses marking the resting places of the dead. They cannot soothe the anguish of the widow or the orphan whose husband or father will not return.

  The only attitude in which a commander may with satisfaction receive the tributes of his friends is in the humble acknowledgment that no matter how unworthy he may be, his position is the symbol of great human forces that have labored arduously and successfully for a righteous cause. Unless he feels this symbolism and this rightness in what he has tried to do, then he is disregardful of [the] courage, fortitude, and devotion of the vast multitudes he has been honored to command. If all Allied men and women that have served with me in this war can only know that it is they whom this august body is really honoring today, then indeed I will be content.…

  No petty differences in the world of trade, traditions, or national pride should ever blind us to our identities in priceless values.

  If we keep our eyes on this guidepost, then no difficulties along our path of mutual co-operation can ever be insurmountable. Moreover, when this truth has permeated to the remotest hamlet and heart of all peoples, then indeed may we beat our swords into plowshares and all nations can enjoy the fruitfulness of the earth.76

  For a moment in history, Europe and Ike could contemplate truth, peace, and fruitfulness. But in the years to follow, that moment would fade, and swords as well as plowshares would continue to be Dwight David Eisenhower’s central concerns.

  Part III

  Becoming the Leader of the Free World

  Nine

  A Republican poster from the 1952 presidential election. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

  Duty, Honor, Party

  In 1943, in the midst of the brutal, slow-moving Italian campaign, Ike began to hear stories about his great potential for political office. He could be president of the United States. Or maybe vice president, serving with FDR. By D-Day he was an American hero, and after the German surrender he was the leading American military hero of World War II. As his reputation soared, Eisenhower heard over and over and over again that he should seek high office in America. His efforts to dissuade his admirers were unsuccessful. He had a war to win, and he was consistent and determined in denying political ambitions. But the thought had been planted and would not go away. His admirers made certain of that.

  By the summer of 1945, of course, he had more to worry about than political entanglements at home. As the military governor of the US Occupied Zone of Germany, he had all the political entanglements he could stand in western Europe. He had millions to feed and too few ships to supply the food and fuel that were needed immediately. There were survivors of the Holocaust to be taken care of and survivors of Nazi occupations to be helped. He had to find a means of dealing with the black markets that quickly developed in areas where commodities and currency were scarce. He had suddenly been transformed from a military officer into a political leader, and he quickly discovered that the unity inspired by the war against Germany would not carry into the postwar settlements.

  He had to move the Allies into their zones of occupation and be certain the three zones were transformed, quickly, into working units of government. He had to establish a new team because many of his experienced officers were sent to the Pacific to finish the conquest of Japan. Others were sent home in honor of their service in the war. His enlisted men were also eager to leave Europe and get home to their loved ones. Families quickly began to turn up the heat on the nation’s political leaders to bring the soldiers home and integrate them into civilian life as soon as possible. Initially, however, Ike did not even have all the ships he needed to transport troops being discharged from the army.

  While he continued to enjoy a good working relationship with the British, the French promptly began to create problems for Eisenhower. They were initially upset with the zone of occupation carved out for them. Their pride hurt by France’s minor role in the great victory, they sought retribution from Germany in matters large and small. Eisenhower had to juggle their requests while doing his best to see that he was not starving any civilians, even those whom the Allies and the Soviets had just conquered.

  At first Ike approached the Russians as comrades in arms. He got along well with Marshal Zhukov, who had emerged as the Soviet’s leading general by the end of the war. Eisenhower admired what Zhukov and his armies had achieved, and he wanted American soldiers to get along better with the Soviet troops: “I hope that we can do something toward indoctrinating our own people so that they may understand something of what the Russians have been through. They have not had our great advantages in sanitation, education and, of course, there is always the great language bar to real social contact. But the Russians have contributed mightily to the winning of this war. They have produced good soldiers and brilliant generals and, moreover, they are naturally a friendly race.”1

  Eisenhower hoped—as had President Roosevelt and to some extent Prime Minister Churchill—that good personal relationships between leaders and followers would be translated into good working relationships on the ground. Ike visited and was honored in Moscow in August 1945. But when he attempted for a second time to cooperate with the Soviets in an even-handed way, he soon began to learn the limits of personal relations where national interests and deep-set ideologies were concerned. The Soviets were determined to exact revenge on the Nazis, to we
aken German industry, to rebuild the Soviet economy, and to position the Soviet empire for the ultimate victory over capitalism that Marx and Lenin had foretold.

  Like most Americans, Eisenhower was slow to acknowledge the full measure of Stalin’s intentions in Europe. He continued to refer to the people as Russians, not Soviets. His optimism was understandable. The surrender had gone relatively smoothly. The Soviets were, quite reasonably, concerned when entire German units rushed away from the Red Army in order to surrender on the Western Front. The Soviets had also been worried about Germany signing a separate truce with Eisenhower’s forces. But Ike adhered strictly to his political guidelines, and the two armies met without further problems.

  Soon, however, there were difficulties in Yugoslavia, more questions about the Soviet unwillingness to exchange information, and ripples over the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Ike’s visits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and France left him pondering why “all of these countries are very much afraid of Russian intentions.”2 In these regards, he still had a touch of Abilene in his outlook on the world, but that would soon give way to a new brand of realism about US-Soviet relations. He was willing to send a supportive message to the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship, but Eisenhower’s “friendship” was clearly under pressure in Europe.3