Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces sic-3

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Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces sic-3 Page 40

by Tom Clancy


  The party returned to Fort Bragg on October 11 to complete the plan.

  During the next week, they worked day and night. For security purposes, planning for General Luck's special missions operations continued at his headquarters, but liaison officers were exchanged between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Joint Special Operations Task Force to ensure continuity and integration.

  The morning after their return, Stiner spoke to the planners at Fort Bragg:

  "As I analyze this mission," he explained, "these are the specified and implied tasks that we must be concerned with:

  • The priority is to protect U.S. lives and the key sites and facilities in Panama.

  • We must capture Noriega and deliver him to competent authority.

  • We must neutralize the PDF, and at the same time neutralize the command-and-control mechanism (that is, the Comandancia), as well as the national police.

  • We must support the establishment of a U.S.-recognired government.

  • We must be prepared to begin stability operations as soon as the fighting is over — because there will be no law and order.

  • We must be prepared to engage in necessary nation-building activities to assist the new government get on its feet and begin to meet the expectations of the people.

  • We must be prepared to restructure the Panamanian Defense Forces and the national police as the new government decides.

  "This is a very difficult and complex mission," he continued. "We must plan to defeat the PDF and the national police in one night, and the next day raise those whom we have fought in a new image — no longer the oppressors of the people, but respected by them. We will be extending our hand to the PDF and then reraising him in a new image as a citizen or national policemen — whatever the new government decides.

  "Practically all the fighting must be done in urban terrain — cities and built-up areas. We must limit the collateral damage — which translates to minimum loss of life on both sides — and limit all damage outside of what is strictly necessary to accomplish the mission.

  "Accordingly, we will be forced to establish for ourselves specific rules of engagement that will limit our total combat capability. That is, we must limit ourselves to using only direct-fire weapons — individual rifles; machine guns; 66mm LAWs and AT-4 antitank weapons; Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles, with their large-caliber main guns; Apache helicopters with their hellfire missiles; AC-130 gunships; and artillery — the last three only in a direct-fire role for building-busting purposes. There'll be no "area fire" weapons, such as mortars and bombing.

  "These rules of engagement must be very clear, so that every person involved in this operation has a clear understanding of what he can and cannot do.

  "As for planning, the staff is to concentrate on the conventional aspects of this operation, leaving the special operations part to General Luck's headquarters — specifically, the capture of Noriega and his henchmen. The Noriega gang must be neutralized in order to provide an environment where the civilian government can function without threat. All other special mission requirements will also be the responsibility of Luck's command, but when it comes time for execution, the two plans will be integrated. Luck will control the special operations side, reporting to me, the same as the other task force commanders.

  "The success of this mission depends in large measure on the effectiveness of small units accomplishing their assigned missions. Therefore, I want to give them maximum flexibility and latitude in making the decisions necessary to accomplish their mission."

  He continued: "1 will personally begin work on structuring the command and control arrangements for this operation. These will be simple and direct — no unnecessary layering. As it stands right now, I plan to absorb the U.S. Army South headquarters into my headquarters (Joint Task Force South), making General Marc Cisneros my deputy.

  "Because different forces from different services will be involved, we must have a joint CEOI [Command Communications and Electronic Operating Instructions], so we can talk to each other. I want this to be short and to the point, not a Sears, Roebuck catalog. Once it is developed, I plan to have an exercise where we can tweak all our radios and other means of communication, to ensure that we can talk to each other — and once we start this operation, we are not changing frequencies and call signs until it's over. We will conduct this operation with such momentum that it will not matter if the PDF gets hold of one of our CEOIs, because they won't be able to do anything with it anyhow."

  "Finally, within four days I want to see a draft plan that I can have in the hands of my major subordinate commanders within five days, to allow them time to study it before our next meeting in Panama, when I plan to have them present."

  COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

  Within four days, a draft operations plan was completed. This included command-and-control relationships:

  Beginning at the top was General Thurman, CINC South.

  Immediately under him was Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander Joint Task Force South. When Stiner's headquarters absorbed the Headquarters of U.S. Army South, Major General Marc Cisneros became Stiner's deputy commander, and Cisneros's staff principals became deputies to the staff principals of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

  Directly underneath Stiner were six task forces, as follows:1. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was headed by Major General Gary Luck. All special mission forces in Panama were to be under his command and control.2. The Air Component was commanded by Lieutenant General Pete Kemph, the 12th Air Force Commander. All the planning for tactical air support would initially be handled by Brigadier General Bruce Fister, Gary Luck's deputy. After the initial assault, control of all aviation assets would revert to Pete Kemph.3. Task Force Bayonet, headed by Colonel Mike Snell, was to be made up of the 193rd Brigade already stationed in Panama.4. Task Force Pacific was to be headed by Major General Jim Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and his Division Ready Brigade (DRB) — approximately 4,000 paratroopers, with all weapons and equipment, including twelve more Sheridans.5. Task Force Atlantic would initially be commanded by Colonel Keith Kellogg, the 7th Infantry Division's 3d Brigade Commander, already in Panama.6. Task Force Semper Fi was headed by Colonel Charles Richardson, commander of the Marine Expeditionary Battalion already brought in during the May 1989 buildup.

  These officers were responsible for completing their portion of the plan, and then for rehearsing it.

  The units already in Panama (12,000 troops), together with those coming from the United States at H-hour and throughout the first day, would bring the troop total to more than 26,000. By comparison, the earlier version of BLUE SPOON provided only 10,000 additional troops (total: 22,000) over twenty-two days. At H-hour there would be enough forces available to secure twenty-four of the twenty-seven planned targets. The three remaining — Panama Viejo (on the eastern side of Panama City), Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron — would be secured by battalion air assaults conducted by the 82nd Airborne Division DRB, who would jump into Tocumcn International Airport at H+45 minutes. The airport itself would be taken by Rangers, who were to jump in at H-hour. After landing, the 82nd was to assume operational control of the Rangers and take responsibility for security of the airport.

  If all went as planned, the heavy fighting should be over by daylight, with all targets either neutralized or protected, as the case may be.

  Later that day, the remaining two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Carmen Cavezza, would arrive from Fort Ord, California, while the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade would fly in from Fort Bragg. These units would round out the forces necessary to bring stability and security to Panama City and Colon, and in time to the rest of the country.

  On Friday, October 13, Carl Stiner drove from Fort Bragg to Knoxville, Tennessee, for his daughter Carla's wedding the next day at the Ball Camp Baptist Church. Just in case he couldn't make it, he had arranged for his brother Tom to stand in; but in
fact, everything worked out fine — with one hang-up. When he linked up with his wife, Sue, at the Holiday Inn, he found her sitting there with a shoe off and pain on her face.

  "What's wrong?"

  "I broke a bone in my foot yesterday," she answered, "and it hurts bad."

  "Arc you going to be able to go through with the wedding?"

  "One way or another. This is my first daughter's wedding, and I'm certainly going to do my part. What I want you to do is go out and get me an ace bandage, and wrap my foot real tight. We've got to get on over to the rehearsal."

  That I did, Stiner remembers. Sue could always withstand a lot of pain, but what she did that night during the rehearsal and the next evening during the wedding was just out of sight. It was beyond me how she made it through the entire ceremony, walking without a limp, and with a heatific smile on her face.

  Talk about courage.

  During the reception, at about ten in the evening, I received a call: The Chairman wanted to see me and Gary Luck the following day for a briefing on the revisions to OPLAN BLUE SPOON.

  We were stuck with two cars in Knoxville. That meant Sue had to drive one back to Bragg; my other daughter, Laurie, drove the second.

  At six the next morning, Sue dropped me off at Cherokee Aviation at Knoxville Airport, where a plane was waiting to fly me to Washington. Then she headed back to North Carolina — in pain. The next day, her foot was placed in a cast, but that didn't do the job; and a month later she had to have screws put in.

  Meanwhile, I linked up with Gary Luck in the Pentagon, and we proceeded to the Chairman's office, where I brought General Powell up to speed on the conventional side (pointing out our efforts to make the operation more responsible and decisive), while Gary Luck covered the special mission part. After we had both explained the revised command arrangements and our plans to integrate efforts, General Powell praised the work everyone had put into the plan, then released me to return to Fort Bragg. Gary Luck stayed overnight, and accompanied Powell to the Oval Office to brief the President on his special task forces' mission in Panama.

  FINALIZING THE PLAN

  On October 19, Stiner, his key staffers, and the commanders of his major units made another civilian clothes visit to Panama, this time in two special mission aircraft. For two days, the warfighting commanders met to discuss the plan and put the final details in place. Joining them were General Thurman and the SOUTHCOM staff; Lieutenant General Pete Kemph; Brigadier General Robin Turnow, the commander of Howard Air Force Base; and Rear Admiral Jerry C. Gnechnow, CINCLANT's representative to the operation.

  The meeting started with an intelligence estimate:

  The Panamanian Defense Forces numbered almost 13,000 troops, including the national guard, the police, and other separate units, but only 4,000 to 5,000 of these could be counted real combat troops. The ground forces were deployed throughout thirteen military zones, and consisted of two infantry battalions, ten independent companies, one cavalry squadron, a riot control company, and a special forces command, which numbered about four hundred specially trained and equipped troops. PDF army equipment included twenty-eight V-150 and V-300 armored cars. The navy numbered about four hundred sailors and was equipped with twelve high-speed patrol boats, all armed with cannons. The Air Force numbered about five hundred troops and was equipped with thirty-eight fixed-wing aircraft, seventeen helicopters, and numerous air defense weapons systems. There were, finally, up to eighteen paramilitary units—"Dignity Battalions" — but intelligence about these units and their missions was spotty.

  Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies had begun to develop a most wanted list — people who would have to be removed or neutralized if there was to be a democratic environment in Panama. In addition to Noriega, up to a hundred others were expected to be on the list: Noriega's disciples and henchmen, those in key government positions, and others wanted for crimes against the people, or simply for racketeering — the whole gang was up to their eyeballs in crime.

  Stiner then presented his concept of operations: After an analysis of the mission statement, his "Commander's Intent, the operational command structure, the targets assigned to each major subordinate command, and the allocation of forces, he gave his thoughts on the phasing of the operation:

  PHASE I

  • Clandestinely deploy JSOTF Headquarters, Army Special Missions Unit, and Special Aviation assets to in-country forward staging base (FSB).

  • Infiltrate other needed conventional weapons systems for H-hour activities to in-country FSB.

  • Marshall other CONUS [Continental United States] forces for deployment.

  PHASE II

  • Begin reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).

  • Deploy rangers to CONUS intermediate staging bases (ISBs).

  • Deploy selected CONUS forces to in-country FSB.

  PHASE III

  • Conduct pre H-hour activities — i.e., secure critical facilities.

  • II-hour activities.

  PHASE IV

  • Conduct follow-on/stability operations.

  • Handover and redeployment.

  • Transition to nation building (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY).

  Stincr concluded by summarizing H-hour activities:

  Fire Support: Just before H-hour, the AC-130 gunships will he in orbit with a full load of ammunition and prepared to respond to the fire-support needs of all task forces. Apache helicopters will also be ready to deliver precision fire support against all major targets.

  Beginning at H-hour, the following will occur simultaneously:

  In conjunction with the opening of comhat activities, JTF South will use EF-111 aircraft to jam all PDF tactical communications, and use EC-13 °Compass Call and Volant Solo aircraft to override all Panamanian media and broadcast this message to the people: "We are the Americans, your friends. We are here to give your freedom back. We will be attacking only those targets that are necessary for that purpose. Stay in your homes and no one will be harmed."

  Task Force Red: The 75th Ranger Regiment will conduct concurrent parachute assaults to secure Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport and neutralize the 2nd Infantry Company, and at Rio Hato to neutralize the 4th and 6th PDF Companies, the Sergeant Majors Academy, and the Cadet Academy.

  The Joint Special Operations Task Force will conduct operations to rescue Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison; render unusable the airfield at Paitilla (in Panama City), along with Noriega's executive jet located there; disable Noriega's presidential yacht; secure the waters of the Canal south of the Miraflores locks (that is, between the locks and Panama City and the Pacific — about five or six miles); conduct activities as necessary to capture Noriega and other priority targets on the most wanted list; and conduct hostage-rescue operations and other special mission activities as directed.

  Task Force Bayonet (the 193rd Brigade): Will conduct operations to neutralize the Comandancia; secure Fort Amador; and neutralize the 5th Independent Company, Ancon DENI stations (PDF intelligence), PDF engineer compound, Balboa Harbor (the harbor at Panama City), and the PDF dog compound.

  Task Force Semper Fi: Will conduct operations to secure and protect the Bridge of the Americas; Howard Air Force Base; seize the port of Voca Monte; and neutralize all PDF and Dignity Battalion units in its area of operations (AOR).

  [Task Force Semper Fi had initially deployed to Panama as a battalion-size unit, but was now brigade-size after augmentation by U.S. Army attachments.]

  Task Force Atlantic [elements of the 7th Infantry Division]: Will be responsible for securing most of the former Canal Zone north of those operations areas in the neighborhood of Panama City. It will conduct operations to secure Fort Sherman and the Caribbean entrance to the Panama Canal; the Gatun Locks; Coco Solo; Fort Espinar; the Madden Dam; rescue political prisoners from the Renacer Prison; and secure Cerro Tigre (a PDF supply complex).

  Task Force Pacific: The 82d Airborne Division conducts parachute assault at H+45 at Tocumen Airport; assumes
OPCON of 1st Ranger Battalion and security of the airport; beginning within thirty minutes, conducts air assault operations to secure in priority Panama Viejo (a primarily ceremonial cavalry squadron and a 170-man detachment from Noriegas elite and fiercely loyal special operations antiterrorist unit known as the USEAT), Tinajitas (5th Rifle Company), and Fort Cimarron (Battalion 2000).

  Following my presentation, each major subordinate commander presented. his portion of the plan and described how he expected to accomplish his mission.

  Toward the end of the first day, each commander made a clandestine reconnaissance of his targets. That night, they made adjustments to their plans, and these were briefed and finalized the next day in open session, with everyone present. That way, the process was coordinated, and each commander was familiar with the overall plan and its details.

  Toward the end of the second day, three fire support concerns came up:

  First: The fire support systems available at H-hour were not powerful enough for the 193d Brigade's building-busting mission in and around the Comandancia. Although the 82d Airborne would be dropping twelve Sheridans at H+45, these would not be available for support of the 193d brigade as they entered the built-up area near the Comandancia.

  Second: It was feared that low cloud cover could limit the effectiveness of the AC-130 gunships. Given the kind of "surgical" fighting planned for built-up areas, an additional highly accurate fire support system was needed.

  Third: Colonel Buck Kernan, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, pointed out that the airfield at Rio Hato, the only available drop zone for the parachute assault, was close to the 6th and 7th PDF Companies, two of Noriega's best. If surprise was not achieved, his Rangers could take heavy casualties during the jump. For that reason, Kernan asked for air strikes against these two companies' barracks.

 

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