by Tom Clancy
"This was a serious problem," Carl Stiner observes, "because air strikes against the PDF had been ruled out by the Secretary of Defense, on the grounds that most of them were our friends — just misguided — and if at all possible, we had to give them a chance to surrender.
"We had to find another way to deal with this threat. In fact, over the coming days, we had to come up with solutions to each of these three problems — and we did."
At the end of the conference, the commanders discussed the various employment options — the time necessary to round up all the planes and crews and get them to the right bases for loading the assault troops. BLUE SPOON would most likely be launched following a Noriega-inspired provocation. He had already stepped up the frequency of these events, a flash point was always possible.
The urgency of the provocation would determine the launch time available. The deliberate employment option was based on a forty-eight-to-sixty-hour notification — plenty of time.
However, there always remained a strong possibility that Noriega would create an incident requiring a quicker response than BLUE SPOON allowed. To cover that possibility, two corollary plans had to be worked out: a no-notice response (in case of a hostage situation or a threat to a key facility — such as the canal locks), and a short-notice response (less urgent, but still requiring action within fourteen to sixteen hours).
In either case, the initial response would have to come from forces already in place — seven U.S. combat battalions, including a Special Forces battalion, and aviation support; General Luck's forces would follow on from CONUS within twelve hours. Responsibility for both the no-notice and short-notice option was laid on General Cisneros, the U.S. Army South commander, who was tasked to develop these plans.
On the way back to Fort Bragg, Stiner worked on fire support issues: The 193rd Brigade H-hour problem at the Comandancia was relatively easy to solve. They would clandestinely pre-position four Sheridans, with their large-caliber main guns; six Apache helicopters, with their hellfire missiles; and three OH-58 scout helicopters. A few days later, he put this into a formal request, and on November 7th, Secretary Cheney signed the deployment order.
Buck Kernan's problem with the drop at Rio Hato was tougher. They had to keep the PDF from killing Rangers when they were most vulnerable — descending in parachutes — but they also had to do all they could to avoid killing PDF, if that was prudently possible.
The answer, when it hit Stiner, was logical: "We don't have to kill PDF in their barracks. We just have to put them in no condition to fight." A way had to be found to stun them long enough — five minutes would do it — for the C-130s to get safely across the drop zone. Once the Rangers were on the ground, they could do the rest.
Offset bombing[28]— for shock and awe — was the solution. The question, then, was by what?
He first considered using F-111s, with their standard 750-pound bombs; then called his air component commander, Pete Kcmph, to get his views. What he wanted, he explained, was to create five minutes of shock and confusion by dropping bombs maybe 150 to 200 meters from the 4th and 6th PDF Companies barracks.
"I'm thinking of using F-111s," Stiner told Kemph.
"There is a much more accurate system," Kemph replied. "The F-117. And it can carry bigger bombs — two thousand pounds."
"But F-117s are black," Stiner said — secret.
"For something as critical as this, it could probably be brought out," Kcmph pointed out. "I'll tell you what. The next time you are down in Panama, I'll send the F-117 wing commander down with bomb data, and you can decide for yourself."
Not long after that, Stiner reviewed the data with the wing commander, and there was simply no comparison. The F-117s could put 2,000-pound bombs exactly where he wanted them. With the F-111s, there was a significant risk of error. In due course, the Secretary of Defense approved an F-117 drop of two bombs at Rio Hato in support of the Rangers.
Toward the end of October, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, asked Stiner and Luck to come to Washington to bring him up to date — primarily to make sure they were getting the support they needed.
"This is the most sophisticated thing I've ever seen," he announced when he'd heard the details. "Over three hundred planes and helicopters in one small area, attacking twenty-seven targets at night. You'd better rehearse this thing all you can."
"It's not going to be as messy as it looks," Stiner explained. "A lot of detailed flight planning has already gone into it. All the pilots are proficient with night-vision goggles, and the AC-130s can illuminate the key targets with their infrared searchlights; the night will look like daytime. We'll own the night.
"Our units can do this. We've trained them that way. "
Vuono liked what he'd heard and pledged his support.
Planning continued until October 30, 1989, when General Thurman signed USCINSCO OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON), making BLUE SPOON official — though planning did not stop there. Stiner's planners completed the Corps plan a few days later, and he signed it as ready to execute on November 4. Gary Luck's planners completed their plan the same day.
On November 3, Thurman, Stiner, and Luck gave the BLUE SPOON briefing to the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon in a room called the Tank. Though the Chiefs were generally supportive, like Vuono, they questioned the plan's complexity. Assurances of the capabilities and readiness of the forces convinced them, and they approved it.
Meanwhile, the Sheridans and Apaches were set to deploy on the nights of November 15 and 16. The Sheridans would go the first night on a C-5 aircraft, and the Apaches the following night on another C-5.
Stiner took advantage of the transportation to set up another commanders' conference in Panama. Accompanying him on the C-5 hauling the Sheridans were Colonels Needham, G-3 (operations), and Walters, G-2 (intelligence); Colonel Bill Mason, Corps Signal Officer; and Major Huntoon, one of the chief planners. Three days later, he was joined at Fort Clayton by his major subordinate commanders and staff officers.
The four Sheridans and their crews arrived at Howard AFB at about midnight. For the sake of operational security, the crews had removed their 82nd Airborne division patches and sewed on 5th Mech Division patches.
With their swim shrouds raised to break up their outline, the tanks were loaded on tractor trailers and taken to the mechanized battalion's nearby motor pool and placed inside large tents, where they'd remain until needed — though the crews drove them two nights a week in the motor pool to keep the seals lubricated to prevent leaking.
In order to familiarize themselves with the environment, the Sheridan crews accompanied the mechanized battalion on their daily Sand Flea exercises, which let them eyeball the targets they'd hit — though they had no idea that was what they were doing.
The C-5 carrying the six Apaches landed at Howard the next night at midnight. They were off-loaded and rolled into hangar number one for reassembly. They remained there during the day, but the crews flew them at night — to familiarize themselves with flying in Panama and to condition the locals to the sound of Apaches.
At the commanders' conference, each commander briefed Stiner on the details of his plan. All of this was generally satisfactory, but Stiner was still uncomfortable with the level of the crew proficiency for executing battalion-size air assaults at night. A program of intensified training was initiated to correct this.
BOMB THREAT
On November 18, word came to General Thurman that the Medellin drug cartel was planning attacks against Americans in Panama in retaliation for U.S. counterdrug assistance in Colombia. The source stated that three car bombs had already been positioned in a Panama City warehouse, ready to be moved to American targets and activated, and that a three-person terrorist team, expert at fabricating false identities and gaining access to U.S. installations, was already operating within Panama. The source providing this information had been given a lie-detector test, and had passed.
"We have no choice," Thurman said to Stiner. "We have to ta
ke that kind of threat seriously. That means you are stood up, my friend" — meaning he was activating Joint Task Force South immediately for its wartime mission. "I will increase the alert status to the maximum for all installations and troops. You're in charge. So start operating now."
"Yes, sir, >> Stiner replied.
When Thurman told Powell what he had done, Powell was a little bent out of shape; only the SECDEF has authority to activate a Joint Task Force. But Secretary Cheney, recalling the Beirut bombing of U.S. Marines, did not contest Thurman's action.
Stiner sent his commanders back to their units in the United States to begin rehearsals, but he and his staff remained behind in Panama to oversee the increased security.
Carl Stiner continues:
All U.S. installations were "closed," checkpoints were manned by armed guards, nothing was admitted without a thorough inspection and proper identification, and SOUTHCOM flew in explosive detection dogs — not enough of them, it turned out, to suit the MPs. They started hollering for more.
"Shit," I told them, "you don't need a trained dog, what you need is 'deterrent' dogs to spread out among the ones you've already got. So get out and catch you some."
They did, and it was a sight to behold. As the trained dogs were crawling underneath the cars, the deterrent dogs were as often as not hosing down the hubcaps.
All our security measures quickly resulted in virtual gridlock. Traffic lined up to get on installations was sometimes over a mile long.
Meanwhile, our people had located the warehouse where the car bombs had supposedly been placed, and I'd gone to General Thurman to see if he couldn't get Panama-based FBI or DEA personnel in there to check it out; but it turned out they had no legal authority. Neither was it technically legal to use U.S. military personnel, since a deployment order for a military operation in Panama had not been published by the Secretary of Defense.
We still needed somehow to get into that warehouse, which was guarded twenty-four hours a day by an armed guard. I told Thurman that it would be unconscionable to let one of those bombs explode, and that I would take care of it. The guard agreed to cooperate and willingly unlocked the door. There were no car bombs, and no evidence there ever had been.
The whole thing was a hoax.
On November 27, with approval from Washington, the Joint Task Force was dissolved and I returned home.
The bomb hoax was not a total loss, however. The security measures had turned out to be a good exercise in readiness.
PROVOCATIONS
As units rehearsed their plans in the United States and Panama, the situation in Panama was swiftly deteriorating. Dignity Battalions were increasing their provocations, and Noriega was busy firing up the PDF with machete-waving personal appearances.
Back in the States, Stiner was involved in rehearsals or on the road, making certain that all the major commands from all the services were aware of all the details of the plan and prepared to support their part in the operation.
He made three trips to the Pentagon to brief General Powell, and he also briefed Admiral Frank Kelso, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command (who was responsible for providing cover for the airlift armada as it passed Cuba); General Hansford T. Johnson, the Commander of the Military Airlift Command, who would be providing the airlift; General Edwin H. Burba, U.S. Army Forces Command Commander; and General Jim Lindsay, Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
In late November and early December, conventional and special operations forces conducted detailed rehearsals at Fort Bragg and Eglin Air Force Base, and in Panama. Since operational security was a major concern, rehearsals were masked as routine training exercises. Only senior commanders and staff knew about the link with the actual contingency plan.
As the situation in Panama continued to deteriorate, Stiner grew more and more convinced that it was just a matter of time before the plan would have to be implemented. Every unit was rehearsed and ready, but training continued, to maintain unit readiness. Now came the waiting.
The National Command Authority had never wanted a preemptive strike, since the universal perception would be that it was an "invasion of a small and unprepared foe by the world's strongest nation" — taking a sledgehammer to a flea. Instead, they wanted a trigger incident that would justify the operation in the eyes of the world.
On December 15, the Noriega-appointed National Assembly voted to make him head of government and "maximum leader of the struggle for national liberation." Another resolution stated, "The Republic of Panama is declared to be in a state of war with the United States, as long as U.S. aggression in the form of economic sanctions imposed in 1988 continues."
TRIGGER
At about 9:30 P.M. on Saturday, December 16, four young officers, just off duty at SOUTHCOM headquarters, were driving downtown for a pizza, when they were stopped at a PDF roadblock near the Comandancia. The PDF soldiers began beating on the car, trying to drag the Americans out. The driver sped away. The PDF opened fire. Barely a minute later, when it was all over, one officer had been shot in the ankle and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz had been mortally wounded.
Shortly afterward, the PDF stopped Navy Lieutenant Adam Curtis and his wife, Bonnie, who had witnessed the shooting incident, at the same roadblock. They were taken to the Comandancia and interrogated in the presence of a PDF officer. There, Curtis was kicked in the head and groin, and his wife was threatened sexually, then made to lean against a wall. She eventually collapsed on the floor. When the lieutenant protested, the PDF interrogators shoved wads of paper into his mouth, put a gun to his head, and again kicked him several times in the groin. "Your husband will never perform in bed again," one of the interrogators told Bonnie.
After four hours of this, the PDF abruptly released them.
General Thurman learned of these incidents at 11:00 P.M., in Washington, where he'd gone for meetings. He immediately flew back to Panama.
About the same time, the liaison team in Panama got word to Stiner at Fort Bragg.
Meanwhile, Noriega had issued a communique that blamed the shooting incident on the four U.S. officers, alleging they had broken through a PDF checkpoint, shot at the Comandancia, and wounded three Panamanians — a soldier, a civilian, and a one-year-old girl.
The next morning, Sunday, December 17, Stiner got a secure phone call from Lieutenant General Kelley: "General Thurman is recommending the implementation of the OPLAN," Kelley told him. "The Chairman, the SECDEF, and I are about to brief the President. Is there anything you want to pass on?"
"Yes, there is," Stiner answered. "What happened is unfortunate; there is nothing we can do to bring back Lieutenant Paz or relieve the pain and suffering of the Navy lieutenant and his wife. But what we can do is clean up this mess once and for all by implementing the full OPLAN, and that is my recommendation. We are prepared to do it right."
Stiner continued:
"We need a decision on H-hour, and I'd like to have it established at 0100 hours. I have three reasons:
"First, that's when the tide is highest in Panama (it fluctuates some forty-three feet there). The SEALs have to swim to some of their targets in order to place their explosive charges. If we pick the wrong time, they'd have to walk across mudflats, thus compromising their operations, and greatly increasing the risk of not being able to accomplish these critical missions at H-hour.
"Second, we want to minimize possibilities for hostage situations. For that, we need a time when there is little chance that a wide-body civilian jet, and several hundred passengers, will be landing at Torrijos Tocumen International Airport. We have been watching the airport for a couple of months, and seldom does a large jet land after midnight.
"Third, we have three major targets that we cannot secure at H-hour. After it jumps at H+45, the 82nd Airborne Division needs four hours to make three battalion-size combat air assaults before daylight. With H-hour at 0100, we believe that most of the fighting will be over come daylight."
Kelley promised to pa
ss this on to the President and get back to Stiner after the meeting. He called back at 5:15 that afternoon: "The President has made the decision to go," he said. "And you've got what you wanted. H-hour will be at 0100.
"The President also wants you to pass on to the commanders and troops his total trust and confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission, and that he'll be praying for them."
Stiner immediately called his stateside commanders to give them the word. A couple of hours later, he assembled his staff at the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters to review the sequencing of operations that would follow on the President's decision.
Shortly, the official "Execute Order" was published by Secretary Cheney. It established H-hour as 0100 hours, 20 December 1989.
That night, Brigadier General Ed Scholes, XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff, left for Fort Clayton with a contingent of headquarters staff officers to establish a small command post to handle pre-H-hour details from that end.
At 0900, Monday, the eighteenth, the XVIII Airborne Corps called an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) to serve as a cover and no-notice order for executing Corps Plan 90-2. This initiated the 82nd Airborne's eighteen-hour planning-and-alert procedure, a normal routine which would cover deployment, though only key personnel knew this.
Later in the afternoon, Stiner, key members of his Corps staff, and an advance command element from the 82nd Airborne Division, led by Brigadier General Joe Kinzer, took off for HowardAir Force Base in two unmarked C- 20s. The entire contingent traveled once again in civilian clothes; they did not change into battle dress until Tuesday night.